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Abstract 
Jeffrey Ian Wale - Regulating Medical Decision-Making: A 
Qualitative Study of Fetal Reduction in Multiple Pregnancy 
This thesis examines and critically evaluates the regulation and practice of medical 
decision-making where the context is that of a multiple pregnancy and where the 
question is whether or not to carry out a fetal reduction procedure. Three principal lines 
of inquiry are pursued: first, to understand more about the nature of fetal reduction, its 
frequency, and the legal ground(s) for termination on which doctors typically rely; 
secondly, to assess the extent to which legal, ethical and professional norms guide and 
constrain this particular kind of decision-making; and, thirdly, to evaluate the adequacy 
of these norms.  We use a critical realist lens to pursue our inquiries and to develop our 
analysis. 
With regard to the first line of inquiry, the evidence suggests that fetal reduction 
(however defined) is a relatively rare event (fewer than 150 such reductions being 
undertaken each year) and that, by way of contrast with everyday terminations where 
the justifying ground is usually descriptively medical, it is fetal abnormality that is often 
given as the justifying ground. 
In relation to the second line of inquiry, analysis shows that the legal, ethical, and 
professional norms offer little explicit guidance in relation to fetal reduction.  In relation 
to the general question of termination, ethical norms suffer from a high level of 
contestation and a plurality of views, the key norms in the abortion legislation are both 
unclear and no longer properly connected to the practice of terminations, and 
professional norms are only marginally more adequate. Given the indeterminacy of 
these norms, it is no surprise that the empirical evidence indicates that doctors are only 
weakly guided by them in making their decisions about fetal reduction.  In practice, 
doctors are guided by the views of their peers and by the sense that, in the final 
analysis, they will be held accountable and will need to be able to justify their actions. 
Responding to the third line of inquiry, a number of recommendations are made. In 
particular, it is recommended that the fetal abnormality ground is so problematic that it 
should be removed from the abortion legislation; and that professional and ethical 
norms, while recognising that there is a legitimate place for professional medical 
discretion, should emphasise the importance of shared decision-making and patient-
centred care. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Contents: 
1.1 Aims and objectives 
1.2 The dilemma of multiple pregnancy 
1.3 Definitions and terminology 
1.4 Research context – some introductory considerations 
1.5 Contribution to research knowledge 
1.6 Structure and content of the thesis. 
 
 
 
1.1 Aims and objectives  
 
This research engages with medical decision-making at the beginning of possible 
'human' life in the context of fetal reduction in multiple pregnancy.  It explores the 
issues generated by these procedures, and examines a wide range of frameworks 
(moral, ethical, legal, professional, and cultural) potentially influencing decision-making, 
clinical developments and research in this context.  This work is exploratory and 
correlational because it explores the relationship between the ethical, legal and 
professional norms and the practice of medical decision-making.  There are three 
central research questions:   
1. To establish how and why healthcare professionals (specifically Maternal and 
Fetal Medicine specialists) make decisions (fetal reduction) in response to 
specific dilemmas (multiple pregnancy). 
2. To establish how existing norms and frameworks influence and direct the 
decision-making and behaviours of these individuals (to establish a 
connection/relationship between them). 
3. To consider how future legal, ethical and professional rules/guidance might be 
framed, and how future clinical developments/research might be advanced. 
At the outset, a research plan was devised which identified the following staged 
activities: 
1. Identify and define the practice of fetal reduction in multiple pregnancy (‘fetal 
reduction’) (chapter 1).  
2. Identify the legal, regulatory, professional and ethical frameworks around and 
impacting on fetal reduction (chapters 3-7).  
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3. Identify existing research, associated regulatory material, gaps in knowledge 
(chapter 8 and appendices E/F) and contemporary clinical issues relating to 
fetal reduction (appendix E). 
4. Formulate and conceptualise a research design in response to these findings 
(chapter 2).  
5. Construct data collection instruments (appendix A).  
6. Identify a sample population for data collection. 
7. Undertake a pilot interview. Reframe the data collection instruments as 
appropriate.  
8. Contact potential research participants, complete access formalities and obtain 
informed consent from active participants.  
9. Collect data from the participants using semi structured interviews.  
10. Transcribe interviews and code data using thematic analysis and NVivo 
software (NVIVO 11). Continually adjust stage 9 as appropriate.  
11. Write up the data and address research question number 3 in response to the 
findings for questions 1 and 2 (chapters 9 -10). 
Although these matters will be addressed more fully in chapter 2, this research uses 
qualitative research methodology/ data collection methods to obtain new interview data 
from Maternal and Fetal Medicine specialists and their representative bodies. 
 
1.2 The dilemma of multiple pregnancy 
 
Clinical studies highlight that multiple pregnancy significantly increases the risk of fetal 
mortality, development issues, prematurity and associated complications.1  In high 
order multiples there is a significant risk of whole pregnancy loss; and there are general 
elevated health risks for pregnant women associated with carrying a multiple 
pregnancy.2  There were no reasonably safe methods to reduce many of these risks 
until the late 1970’s/ early 1980’s.  During this period, clinicians evolved surgical 
procedures that made it possible to reduce some of the inherent risk by ending the life 
of one or more embryo/fetus, thereby preserving the pregnancy for the survivors, or at 
least increasing their chance of survival and a healthy life.3   
Multiple pregnancy can present a real dilemma for the parents and healthcare 
professionals involved, and decisions to reduce may be very difficult when set against 
 
1 See Table 2A/ appendix E.  Multiples currently represent about 3% of all births in England and Wales (TAMBA Press 
Statement 10 January 2019, < https://www.tamba.org.uk/document.doc?id=1018 >accessed 12 February 2019). 
2 Jane Denton and Elizabeth Bryan, Multiple Birth Children & their families following ART, Current practices and 
conspiracies in assisted reproduction (WHO Denton & Bryan 2002); Royal College of Obstetricians & Gynaecologists, 
Multiple pregnancy: the management of twin and triplet pregnancies in the antenatal period (NICE Clinical Guidance) 
(RCOG 2011a). 
3 See the pioneering work of Richard L. Berkowitz and others, ‘Selective reduction of multifetal pregnancies in the first 
trimester’, (1988) 318(16) The New England Journal of Medicine 1043.  Also, Jennifer Kelland and Rosemary Ricciardelli, 
‘Mothers of Multiple Perspectives on Fetal Reduction and Medical Abortion’, (2014) 5(2) J Motherhood Initiative for 
Research and Community 123, 124; R. Katie Morris and Mark D. Kilby, ‘Fetal Reduction’, (2010) 20(11) Obs, Gynae & 
Reprod Med 341. 
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a background of fertility treatment and longstanding desire for children.  These 
‘reduction’ procedures are far from routine and can involve technical/practical 
considerations around the ‘selection’ of the embryo to be ‘reduced’.4  Healthcare 
professionals need to consider their professional beliefs, training, ethical codes, 
relevant institutional policies and associated regulatory frameworks before, during and 
after undertaking these procedures. 
 
1.3 Definitions and terminology5  
 
Our working definition for fetal reduction is “the interruption of the development of one 
or more probably normal fetuses in multiple pregnancy”.6   Although there is some 
degree of clinical consensus, inconsistency and confusion still pervades the literature 
around the terminology and scope of these procedures.7  Some healthcare 
professionals conceptualise fetal reduction narrowly as a distinct medical procedure,8  
whilst others take a broader approach conflating fetal reduction with selective 
termination of pregnancy (‘selective termination’).9   Selective termination has been 
defined as a procedure: 
“used to interrupt the development of one of the fetuses affected by a serious 
and incurable pathology … [or in the] case of less severe pathologies which 
could be affecting the fetus, pathologies which could be prejudicial to the 
development of the healthy fetus or foetuses”.10   
  
The obvious distinction is that fetal reduction involves the termination of ostensibly 
healthy life, whilst selective termination entails the termination of some form of 
anomalous life.  However, in practical terms, both procedures can involve a choice 
against a background of overlapping risk to the fetal life or lives to be saved or 
preserved - a very real consideration in terminations of monochorionic pregnancies 
involving vascular connection between the fetuses.11  Both procedures may require 
 
4 Alan Cameron, Fetal medicine for the MRCOG and beyond (2nd ed, RCOG Press 2011). 
5 This section is developed from a working paper by Jeffrey Wale, ‘Selective termination of pregnancy and fetal reduction 
in multiple pregnancy: terminology, blurred lines and ethical discourse’,  
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303882409_Selective_termination_of_pregnancy_and_fetal_reduction_in_m
ultiple_pregnancy_terminology_blurred_lines_and_ethical_discourse >accessed 20 July 2018. 
6 Claire-Marie Legendre and others, ‘Differences between selective termination of pregnancy and fetal reduction in 
multiple pregnancy: a narrative review’ (2013) (26(6) Reproductive Bio-Medicine Online (Elsevier Science) 542, 543. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.; Royal College of Nursing (RCN), Termination of Pregnancy: An RCN nursing framework (RCN 2017). See also 
<https://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Multifetal-Pregnancy-
Reduction >accessed 1 June 2018. 
9 See for eg, Caroline M. Ogilvie, ‘Multiple pregnancy, fetal reduction and selective termination’, (2013) 26(6) Reproductive 
BioMedicine Online (Elsevier Science) 52; Morris & Kilby (n3); and Wale (n5).   
10 Legendre (n6), 543 (words in brackets added).   
11 A monochorionic multiple pregnancy has 2 or more embryos sharing a single placenta.  See Cameron (n4); Aris 
Antsaklis and Eleftherios Anastasakis, ‘Selective reduction in twins and multiple pregnancies’ (2011) 39(1) Journal of 
Perinatal Medicine 15; B R Toneto, Complications in Monochorionic Pregnancies (Intechopen 2018), < 
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consideration of the associated maternal risks, and intervention in high order multiple 
pregnancies12 often engages overlapping goals and motivation.  Finally, these 
procedures require active and deliberate steps by a healthcare professional to bring 
about the end of at least one embryo or fetal life, although it has been claimed that 
from the woman’s perspective these procedures involve an omission because they 
enable her to: 
 “decline the medical technology that would otherwise be required to sustain a 
pregnancy associated with severe fetal morbidity”.13  
 
This narrative framing presumes a need for technology that is foreseen by the 
intervening agent as necessary to sustain the ongoing pregnancy, and side steps the 
active steps necessary to remove the need for technological support.  The claim is also 
predicated on the risk of severe fetal morbidity – a point that is doubtful in most low 
order multiple pregnancies. 
We shall now examine the terminological distinction in a little more detail.  First, with 
selective termination, we have an elected procedure usually requiring informed 
agreement by the pregnant woman.  The prospective parents will probably have no 
responsibility for the existence of the anomaly, although a conscious decision will need 
to be made by the treating doctor and the pregnant woman14 to terminate a specific 
entity.  If the primary goal of the parties is to target the ‘affected’ fetus, then it 
necessarily requires a conscious assessment and decision concerning the nature/ 
severity of the anomaly.  In Great Britain, the relevant legal ground for termination 
requires two registered medical practitioners (doctors) to certify in good faith: 
“that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from 
such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped”.15   
 
Accordingly, when the doctors use this ground, they are primarily responsible for 
deciding whether the risk/anomaly meets the permissible criteria and they cannot be 
realistically challenged unless there is evidence of bad faith.   
Secondly, there is no doubt that selective termination involves termination of life, 
although we can debate the nature and value of that life.  However, it is plainly 
arguable that it is specific life, and not the pregnancy that is being terminated.  If that 
 
https://www.intechopen.com/books/multiple-pregnancy-new-challenges/complications-in-monochorionic-pregnancies 
>accessed 7 February 2019. 
12 3+ embryos or fetuses. 
13  Mary B. Mahowald, ‘The fewer the better?  Ethical issues in multiple gestation’. In: Donna Dickenson (ed), Ethical 
issues in Maternal-Fetal Medicine, (Cambridge University Press 2002), 258. 
14 On the assumption of free and informed patient consent. 
15 As per Abortion Act 1967, s1(1)(d).  There may be concurrent grounds under s1(1)(a) up to the 24th week of the 
pregnancy. 
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view is accepted, ‘selective fetal or embryo termination’ may be a better description of 
the procedure.   
Thirdly, the phrase “interrupt the development” obscures or avoids the practical reality 
of what is being undertaken, namely the active termination of embryo or fetal life.16   
Fourthly, the working definition of selective termination frames the procedure either as 
the means to prevent the birth of an entity with abnormality/disease or to protect other 
embryo/fetal life in the multiple pregnancy.  Whilst these are distinct ends, they may 
also be collective aims of the healthcare professionals and pregnant women involved.  
Our working definition of selective termination does not explicitly identify the prevention 
of maternal morbidity or mortality as a core aim, but the welfare of the pregnant woman 
is likely to be a central concern even if serious complications are uncommon and the 
risk of maternal death is very low 17 
By comparison, Legendre et al. have described fetal reduction as the means to three 
possible ends: reducing maternal morbidity, lessening fetal mortality and socio-
economic indications or ends.18  First, the fetal reduction label expressly includes the 
context (multiple pregnancy), whereas that specificity is missing from the selective 
termination label.   
Secondly, it is notable that the terminology for fetal reduction drops the word ‘selective’.  
In no sense does the healthy fetus choose to be terminated, and the term ‘select’ might 
be something of a misnomer because it probably overstates the actual choice available 
to pregnant women in this context.19  However, Judith Daar would retain the term 
‘selective’ because it accurately reflects “what is transpiring when a woman elects to 
undergo the procedure” in the sense that she chooses to have it.20   The pregnant 
woman’s involvement in the selection of the targeted life may depend on clinical 
practice, but if a choice is available, respect for her bodily autonomy dictates that she 
should be given this option.21  In any event, the pregnant woman will probably want to 
improve fetal/ personal outcomes and is unlikely to desire or want to terminate a 
healthy fetus.   
 
16 Mahowald (n13).   
17Legendre (n6) 547. 
18 Legendre (n6), 546. 
19 Stacey Pinchuk, ‘A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice: Multiple Births, Selective Reduction and Abortion’, (2000) 7(29) 
Duke J Gender L & Policy 31.  
20  Judith F. Daar, ‘Selective reduction of multiple pregnancy: lifeboat ethics in the womb’. (1992) 25(4) Davis LR 773, 
779-780. 
21 Cf Jane Fisher and others, ‘Termination for fetal anomaly: Are women in England given a choice of method?’ (2015) 
35(2) Journal of Obs & Gynae 168. 
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In terms of the doctor’s decision-making, the literature shows that there is a clinical 
selection based on medical criteria, access and location.22  However, Patkos argues 
that “embryonic reduction is not a selective procedure but a numerical reduction of 
embryo”,23 relegating the entity to a problem to be managed.  Berkowitz and Lynch 
claim that selective reduction is: 
“innaccurate and may be psychologically damaging because it implies that 
specific fetuses have been targeted”.24   
 
This framing may to be driven by beneficent concern for the women involved, and there 
is some evidence that clinicians prefer to emphasise the positive rather than the 
negative aspects of the fetal reduction procedure.25  Variable moral beliefs and 
differentiated goals probably underpin these different views and the evident 
inconsistency around terminology. 
Thirdly, an important feature of the fetal reduction label is the explicit focus on 
‘reduction’ rather than on the termination of life.  Mahowald argues that the term 
‘reduction’ is misleading or ambiguous26 because it obscures the fact that the 
procedure kills at least one entity, and in rare cases, makes it impossible for the others 
to survive.  Similarly, David Price asserts that: 
 
“Selective reduction/limitation, no matter how justifiable in the circumstances, is 
nothing more than a euphemism for selective abortion. Linguistic juggling 
cannot alter the nature of the act.”27 
 
Mahowald concludes that the “simplest, clear and accurate” terminology is “fetal 
termination with pregnancy preservation”.28  However, this terminology is only 
appropriate where pregnancy preservation is a necessary condition of fetal reduction, 
and again this may be contestable in low order multiples.29  Legendre et al. implicitly 
acknowledge this when claiming that pregnancy preservation “is sometimes conditional 
on the interruption of the development of one or several fetuses”.30   
 
 
22 Cameron (n4); Antsaklis et al. (n11). 
23 P, Patkos, ‘Embryonic reduction, selective termination’ (2003) 3 Ultrasound Rev. Obstet. Gynecol 290.  
24 Richard L. Berkowitz and Lauren Lynch, ‘Selective reduction: An unfortunate misnomer’ (1990) 75(5) Obstetrics and 
Gynecology 873. 
25 Eg, FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of Human Reproduction & Woman’s Health, ‘Ethical Recommendations 
on multiple pregnancy and multifetal reduction’ (2006) 92 International Journal of Gynecologists & Ostetricians 331. 
26 Mahowald (n13), 250. 
27 David P T. Price, ‘Selective reduction and feticide: the parameters of abortion’ (1988) Crim L. R. 199, 206  
28 Mahowald (n13), 251.   
29 See for example, Fanny Kuhn-Beck and others, ‘Fetal reduction of triplet pregnancy: One or two?’ (2012) 32(2) Prenatal 
Diagnosis 122. 
30 (n6), 548 [emphasis added]. 
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These terminological inconsistencies also pervade the associated legal rules and 
professional ethical codes.  UK law does not formally differentiate between the 
procedures, although selective termination requires the authorising ground to apply to 
the target (anomalous) fetus when anomaly is the decisive ground.31  However, fetal 
mortality and the risk of fetal mortality, do not provide direct and lawful grounds for 
termination.  The use of ‘intention’ based crimes to regulate these procedures may also 
contribute to the narrative issue because this mental element encompasses 
consequences that are foreseen as a virtually certain result of conduct (oblique 
intention).32  Consequently, the criminal law may capture conduct where there is a 
primary goal (the preservation of life) and a foreseeable and virtually certain secondary 
outcome (death).   This jurisdictional approach is combined with a general reluctance to 
consider the agent’s motive/ desire, and consequently beneficent purposes ought not 
to shield an individual from criminal liability.  However, the courts have tended to show 
a deferential approach where the key actors are beneficent healthcare professionals, 
again impacting on the overall coherence of the law in this area.33  
This thesis does not dispute that differences can be drawn between fetal reduction and 
selective termination – as to medical indications, context or timing - but the work does 
claim that there is a substantial overlap in many cases.  Indeed, whether these 
distinctions are regarded as important will turn, to some degree, on the ethical framing 
of the procedures involved.34  It is also important that we recognise that healthcare 
professionals may deploy specific language and labels for technical reasons; out of 
beneficent concern for their patient;35 to distinguish these procedures from the 
polarised abortion debate;36 or to distract societal attention from what is being done. A 
good example comes from the FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of Human 
Reproduction and Woman’s Health: 
“Multifetal reduction is not medically considered as terminating that pregnancy 
but rather as a procedure to secure its best outcome”.37 
This definition explicitly emphasises the ends rather than means and is potentially 
misleading if you believe that we should always consider the means to our ultimate 
ends. 
 
31 Abortion Act 1967, s 5(2)(a).  This Act does not apply to Northern Ireland. 
32 The law in England and Wales as per R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025. 
33 Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112; Roger Brownsword and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Compromise 
Medicalisation’ in C. Stanton and others (eds), Pioneering Health Care Law Essays in honour of the work of Professor 
Margaret Brazier (Routledge 2015). 
34 Mark I. Evans and David W. Britt, ‘Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction: Evolution of the Ethical Arguments’ (2010) 28(4) 
Seminars in Reproductive Medicine 295. 
35 Berkowitz and Lynch (n24). 
36 Price (n27), 7. 
37 FIGO (n25), 332. 
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We make repeat reference to ‘embryo’ and ‘fetal’ life in this thesis.  Although these 
terms denote different periods of gestational development, they have been used 
interchangeably on occasion.  Fetal reduction and selective termination procedures 
often occur at the fetal stage but that is not always the case.  There are different 
jurisdictional spellings of ‘foetus’ and ‘fetus’ but the latter scientific usage has been 
adopted for consistency wherever possible.   Whilst the term ‘abortion’ has been used 
in conjunction with ‘termination of pregnancy’, it is recognised that the former carries 
connotations and conveys possible meaning(s) beyond the immediate descriptor.  
Similarly, we have tried to avoid references to ‘mother’, ‘baby’ or ‘child’, and instead, 
used the terms ‘pregnant woman’, ‘embryo/ fetus’ or ‘unborn entity’ wherever possible.  
Finally, we have used the term, or variants of ‘paternalism’ throughout this work to 
denote or describe circumstances or behaviours that create or promote medical 
exceptionalism (ie where special exceptions or rules are made for medical actors/ 
healthcare professionals). 
 
1.4   Research context – some introductory considerations  
 
In Great Britain, fetal reduction sits within the same basic legal framework as singleton 
termination – a model complicated by jurisdictional variation and the separate framing 
of criminal offences and defences.  Section 5 of the Abortion Act 1967 (AA 1967) was 
amended to explicitly address selective termination and fetal reduction in multiple 
pregnancy38.  Clinical research and practice on fetal reduction does consider fetal 
outcome(s), although this specific end is not a ground for termination under the AA 
1967.  Although it is arguable that all multiple pregnancies involve a greater risk to the 
pregnant woman than the termination procedure, there is a potential mismatch 
between medical practice and the legal grounds authorising abortion in this 
context.  Unlike singleton abortions,39 fetal reduction is necessarily a hospital based 
surgical procedure typically undertaken in specialist (NHS) tertiary fetal medicine 
centres.  Although procedures vary, in most cases, feticide by thoracic injection is the 
clinical option employed often in the early second trimester of the pregnancy.40   
 
38 Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990, s 37. 
39 In 2017, 66% of pregnancy terminations were performed by medical as opposed to surgical methods (Department of 
Health and Social Care (DHSC), Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2017: Summary information from the abortion 
notification forms returned to the Chief Medical Officers of England and Wales (DHSC Revised December 2018)).   
40 Legendre (n6). Morris & Kilby (n3).  There are global variations over timing. 
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Considerations around place, method, timing and authorising ground all feed into the 
legal foundation for these procedures in Great Britain. 
Departmental statistics do not differentiate between fetal reduction and selective 
termination, and the following references to ‘selective termination’ encompass both 
sets of procedure.41  Although there has been some variation, the overall number of 
procedures in England and Wales has remained under 150 per annum: 
• The numbers of selective terminations increased from around 50 to 82 per 
annum between 2002-2012,  
• Increased to 125 in 2013,  
• Increased to 132 in 2014,  
• Dropped back to 119 in 2015,  
• Increased again to 141 in 2016, 
• Before dropping back to 111 in 2017.42   
The proportions of reductions (eg 3 reduced to 2, 3 reduced to 1 etc) has stayed 
roughly the same over the years.  In 2017 there were 73 cases (where 2 fetuses were 
reduced to 1), 25 cases (where 3 were reduced to 2), 11 cases (where 3 were reduced 
to 1) and 2 cases (where 4 or more fetuses were involved).  In the same year, 84% of 
the selective terminations were performed under the anomaly ground (ground E) - a 
marked divergence from terminations in singleton pregnancies that primarily utilise 
ground C.43  This data is important because of the distinctive clinical and ethical 
considerations that apply to low order reductions of ostensibly heathy embryos or 
fetuses (see table 2A/ appendix E).   
 
1.5   Contribution to research knowledge  
 
The regulation of healthcare professionals and medical decision-making is a rapidly 
changing and highly topical area. The boundary of human life is under increasing focus 
with technological and clinical advances in maternal and fetal medicine.  These 
advances have already impacted on the evolution of these medical procedures; and 
developments have occurred with fairly limited public discourse.  The availability of 
prenatal testing (and genetic testing generally), and our ability to choose when and 
 
41 DHSC (n39), paras 2.43-2.45. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ground E= Abortion Act 1967, s 1(1)(d) and ground C=Abortion Act 1967, s 1(1) (a) but limited to consideration of the 
pregnant woman. 
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what type of human life we develop, has ethical and regulatory implications that no 
society can sensibly ignore.44  Maternity service frameworks, shared decision-making 
and person-centred care are also important features of the latest NHS Long Term 
Plan.45 
It is important that research concerns and addresses the perspectives of stakeholders 
in this medical ‘theatre’.  Understandably discussion around parental, and specifically 
maternal autonomy features heavily in the reduction narrative, although parental 
choices require medical intervention prior to lawful realisation in the UK.  Our aim is to 
analyse existing research involving a range of relevant stakeholders and to capture 
new perspectives from the healthcare professionals involved directly in these 
procedures.  Although qualitative research has inherent limitations (see chapter 2), this 
study endeavours to make a novel contribution to the discourse by exploring and 
establishing relationships between norms, frameworks and medical decisions.  This 
research is undertaken against the shadow of a distinctive, if not unique legal 
regulatory framework.  By engaging with and obtaining new data from the medical 
participants, we aim to move the discourse and understanding of regulatory impact 
from the abstract.  Ultimately, this research has generated original and illuminating data 
from specialist participants; evidence of regulation in action; and a platform for 
informing future research and regulatory sources. This work connects with the author’s 
wider work on reproductive healthcare and fertility control;46  contributes directly to the 
contemporary debate about patient autonomy and the wider practice ramifications of 
the Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board.47  This thesis 
offers exactly the kind of situational empirical evidence that some commentators have 
called for in light of Montgomery,48 and which is in short supply in the regulatory 
context.49 
 
 
44 See for eg, Roger Brownsword and Jeff Wale, ‘Testing Times Ahead: Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing and the Kind of 
Community We Want to Be’, (2018) 81(4) MLR 646; Jeffrey Wale, ‘Don’t forget the legal framework: the public provision 
of non-invasive prenatal testing in England and Wales’ (2015) 15 Medical Law International 203. 
45 The NHS Long Term Plan (NHS 2019), paras 1.35-1.42 and 3.8-3.15 < https://www.longtermplan.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/nhs-long-term-plan.pdf >accessed 9 January 2019. 
46 Brownsword and Wale (n33; n44); Sam Rowlands and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Sterilisations at delivery or after childbirth: 
addressing continuing abuses in the consent process’, (2019) Global Public Health 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2019.1583265>accessed 10 May 2019; Jeffrey Wale, ‘Regulating disruptive 
technology and informational interests in the arena of reproductive tests”, (2019) 3(1) Journal of Information Rights, Policy 
and Practice <https://jirpp.winchesteruniversitypress.org/articles/abstract/24/> accessed 10 May 2019. 
47 [2015] UKSC 11. 
48 Michael Dunn and others, ‘Between the Reasonable and the Particular: Deflating Autonomy in the Legal Regulation of 
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment’, (2019) 27(2) Health Care Anal. 110. 
49 Oliver Quick, A scoping study on the effects of health professional regulation on those regulated: Final report submitted 
to the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (2011), 3 & 22. 
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1.6 Structure and content of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into 11 chapters, starting with this introduction which begins to 
address the first research question.  Chapter 2 addresses methodology, rationale, data 
collection and all matters related to research design.  Together chapters 3-6 explore 
the norms/ frameworks that influence these procedures and starts to address the 
second research question.  Specifically, chapter 3 examines the relevant moral and 
philosophical ethical frameworks.  A large part of this chapter is concerned with the 
question of the moral status of the embryo/fetus and what this might mean for medical 
decision-making in our research context.  Chapter 4 moves on to consider the relevant 
UK legal regulatory frameworks, with specific focus on England and Wales.  In chapter 
5, we examine regulation using the concept of pregnancy and the wider legal 
framework regulating healthcare providers and professionals.  We also introduce some 
possible reform options that will be developed more fully later in the thesis.  Chapter 6 
examines general principles of medical ethics, and the role of personal, professional 
and cultural norms in healthcare delivery.  We also consider the role of professional 
regulation, medical deference and the complexity of medical decision-making in our 
research context.  Chapters 3 and 6 are interconnected and complement one another 
because they are concerned with the guidance that healthcare professionals might 
derive from the ethical frameworks and general ethical principles. 
We then pick up the first and third (and further develop the second) research questions 
in chapters 7-10.  Chapter 7 frames healthcare professionals as ‘choice architects’ and 
evaluates possible models, mechanisms and priorities for regulating decision-making in 
the clinical encounter.  We also consider contemporary responses to regulation across 
the wider healthcare system.  Chapter 8 examines existing research studies involving a 
range of stakeholder perspectives; helps situate our research and provides a platform 
to identify gaps in knowledge.  In chapter 9, we move on to analyse our interview data 
and to identify emergent themes.   In chapter 10, we complete a triangulation exercise 
before revisiting the research questions and suggesting possible regulatory solutions.  
Finally, in chapter 11, we make some closing remarks.
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Chapter 2 – Research Design  
 
Contents: 
2.1 Primary methodology 
2.2 Ontology 
2.3 Epistemology 
2.4 Data collection method 
2.5 Sampling and research participants 
2.6 Data coding and analysis 
2.7 External verification 
2.8 Steps to enhance quality and trustworthiness 
2.9 Ethical and practical considerations 
2.10 Conclusions 
 
This chapter seeks to address and defend all aspects of the research design, including 
the chosen methodology and data collection methods employed. 
 
2.1 Primary methodology 
 
Qualitative and socio-legal research methodologies have been used in this research 
because they offer the most appropriate strategy for examining how things come about 
in a context – specifically how medical decision-making occurs within and between the 
gaps in the regulatory frameworks.1  This is a correlational study exploring and seeking 
to establish possible relationships and connections between norms, frameworks and 
decision-making.  The chosen methodology enables the research to address “the lived 
experience of those who encounter and subjectively interpret the law,”2 and to examine 
how regulatory arrangements are selectively used or avoided in practice.3  Importantly, 
 
1 For wider discussion of unregulated space, see Samuel Taylor-Alexander and others., ‘Beyond Regulatory 
Compression: Confronting the Liminal Spaces of Health Research Regulation’ (2016) 8(2) Law, Innovation and 
Technology 149. 
2 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal Research 
(Pearson 2007), 90. See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’, (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457; David 
Cowan, ‘Legal Consciousness: Some Observations’, (2004) 67(6) MLR 929. 
3 Salter and Mason (n2), 125. In the abortion context, see Sally Sheldon and others, ‘The Abortion Act (1967): a biography’ 
(2019) 39(1) Legal Studies 18. 
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the research seeks to answer questions that cannot be answered by exclusively (black 
letter) doctrinal legal approaches.4  
Underlying theory influences the nature of any research,5 and theoretical assumptions 
ought to be stated and made transparent whenever possible.6   In this research, we 
have used a critical (legal) theoretical lens7 to analyse and interpret the interview data, 
the regulatory environments and available literature.  Critical legal theory embodies a 
sub set of socio-legal traditions - including critical legal studies, critical legal realism 
and feminist theory - although their overarching purpose: 
“is to contest the universal rational foundation of law which, it maintains, clothes 
the law and legal system with a spurious legitimacy”.8 
These theoretical traditions advance several claims, including the assertion that the law 
is indeterminate, non-autonomous, subjective and reliant on myths.9  Indeterminancy 
challenges the view that the law, either as a system or set of binding and enforceable 
rules, is sufficiently clear and capable of solving every issue.  These claims are often 
misunderstood or overstated, and do not necessarily mean that the law is incapable of 
having any fixed shared meaning or purpose.  Roberto Unger - a key figure in the 
critical legal studies movement - asserts that the central concern of indeterminancy is 
the covert, and occasionally self-interested nature by which legal actors share their 
ways of thinking about the law and society.10  For our purposes, this concern about 
shared thinking might also be extended to the workings of the medical profession or to 
medical teams within a specific healthcare institution.  It is also fair to acknowledge that 
even legal positivists generally accept some scope for the discretionary interpretation 
of the law because: 
 “the will of the state cannot be translated into particular decisions without 
creating space for the conflict among interests and among visions to reappear 
in smaller form at the moment of decision”.11 
Claims that the law is non-autonomous highlight the influence and constraints imposed 
by socio-political, cultural and institutional factors in legal reasoning and outcomes.  It 
is important to consider the operation of these constraints on individual autonomy/ 
 
4 Mandy Burton ‘Doing empirical research. Exploring the decision-making of magistrates and juries’, chp 3 in Dawn 
Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (2nd ed, Routledge 2017); Michael McConville and Wing Hong 
Chui, Research Methods in Law (2nd ed, Edinburgh University Press 2017). 
5 Burton (n4). 
6 Salter and Mason (n2),179. 
7 See for eg, Ian Ward, Introduction to Critical Legal Theory (2nd ed, Routledge Cavendish 2004); Roberto M. Unger, The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement (Verso 2015); William Ewald, ‘Unger’s Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study’ (1988). Faculty 
Scholarship (Penn Law). Paper 1284 < http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1284 >accessed 3 October 
2018. 
8 Raymond Wacks, Philosophy of Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2014),107.   
9 Ibid.,108; Ewald (n7), 668-669.   
10 Unger (n7) 26-28;73-75. 
11 Ibid., 57. 
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liberty, especially when individual human agency is emphasised, and consequently, 
legal realists are keen to emphasise the “operation of law in its social context”.12  The 
interaction between legal and other regulatory mechanisms and professional/ 
institutional culture is especially important in the healthcare context.13 
The claim that the law is subjective - rather than objective - is self-explanatory and 
builds upon the belief that you cannot unravel and disconnect political, cultural and 
social considerations from the interpretative process.14  Further, any claim that social 
norms - even in areas of consensus - are necessarily the sole product of the law or 
legal system can be challenged on the basis that social action is heavily influenced by 
matters external to the law.  It is claimed that the use of myths – most notably the idea 
that the law is an “idealised” and coherent system15 – aims to reinforce the power of 
legal actors in the system.  
Not all of these ideas are especially controversial – certainly legal realism has long 
formed part of modern legal jurisprudence: 
“The idea that law is malleable, a human creation, an instrument for serving 
social ends has been a central tenet of [American] legal thought for 
generations. It is not news.”16  
However, there is a destructive quality to some of these claims when taken to 
extremes;17 and we acknowledge that the law/ legal system does have a legitimate role 
to play in society.  We believe that our chosen methodology offers a suitable vehicle for 
examining the regulatory environment/ frameworks, because of the power imbalance 
between key stakeholders, the importance of culture in healthcare and the wider use of 
critical theory in our research.  Our theoretical perspective is otherwise aligned with the 
central subject matter (termination of pregnancy) in which societal, cultural and 
professional contexts have proved so important to the regulatory environment and 
stakeholder experience.18   
 
12 Wacks (n8), 109.  
13 The Francis Report - Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (HC 947, 2013); Roger 
Cotterrell, ‘Theory and Values in Socio-legal Studies’, (2017) 44(1) Brit J Law & Soc S19-36; 
14 Unger (n7), chp 4.  See also Sheldon et al. (n3), in the context of abortion. 
15 Ibid., 97. 
16 Ewald (n7), 670. (emphasis added) 
17 Unger(n7); Ewald (n7), 671/730.   
18 Sheldon et al. (n3); Cotterrell (n13); Roger Brownsword and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Compromise Medicalisation’, in C. Stanton 
and others (eds), Pioneering Health Care Law Essays: In honour of the work of Professor Margaret Brazier (Routledge 
2015). 
  
24 
 
As a footnote, we rejected the use of ground up theoretical approaches because the 
advance evaluation of sources was considered a valuable preparatory step in light of 
the ‘elite’ nature of the participants in this research.19   
 
2.2 Ontology 
 
In using a critical theoretical lens,20 we accept the existence of an independent reality, 
albeit one shaped by social, political and cultural values (“critical realism”21).  We 
explore the importance of culture and social/professional values in healthcare; and 
critical theory fits with our overall aims of seeking insights, critiquing frameworks/ 
norms, transformation and ethical revelation.22  Critical theorists are concerned with 
equity, justice, construction of knowledge and the organisation of power at a macro, 
meso and micro level;23 offering an appropriate lens for challenging settled norms and 
master narratives,24 with a view to illuminating: 
“the relationship between [these] public and private discourses and the gaps 
between what people say and what they in fact do”.25  
This theoretical lens should address any divergence between regulatory norms and 
practice, is unbound to any single methodological approach and suitable for a 
qualitative research study.26   
We evaluated the possible use of a ‘professional’ theoretical lens due to the nature and 
status of the participants in this research.  Whilst there are various articulations of 
‘professionalisation’ theory, the contemporary focus in medicine has been on the power 
of clinicians, their organising bodies and their interactions with key stakeholders.27  Two 
specific aspects of professional power have been identified - the ability of a profession 
to control their own work activities (at a macro/micro level28) and the ability to control 
 
19 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for Beginners (Sage 2013), 89. 
20 Critical theory has its roots in the Frankfurt School and was later developed by Michael Foucault and others (Stephen 
Bronner, Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction (1st ed, OUP 2011)).  
21 Braun & Clarke (n19), 26-27. 
22 For the importance of culture/ values to regulation and socio-legal investigation, see Cotterrell (n13). 
23 R, Barbour, Introducing Qualitative Research (Sage 2008); S. Reeves and others, ‘Qualitative Research – Why use 
theories in qualitative research?’ (2008) 337 BMJ, <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a949 >accessed 9 May 2019.; Bronner 
(n20). 
24 Bronner (n20) 90/107. 
25 Karen F. Keenan, Edwin Van Teijlingen and Emma Pitchforth, ‘The analysis of qualitative research data in family 
planning and reproductive healthcare’, (2004) 31 J Fam Plan Reprod Health Care 40, 42. 
26 Reeves et al. (n23). 
27 Patrick B. Forsyth and Thomas J. Daniesiewicz, ‘Toward a Theory of Professionalisation’, (1985) 12(1) Work & 
Occupations 59, 60. See also the seminal work of Eliot Friedson, Profession of Medicine (Harper & Row 1970); Eliot 
Friedson, Professional Dominance (Atherton Press Inc 1970). 
28Oliver Quick, Regulating Patient Safety. The End of Professional Dominance? (Cambridge University Press 2017), 12. 
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the work of others.29  Whilst control is important, trust is also required for 
professionalism to flourish,30  an aspect that has proved especially challenging for the 
medical profession in the wake of recent scandals. 
The view of the medical profession as all powerful and dominant, has been attacked by 
the ‘de-professionalisation’ thesis, which maintains that there has been a substantive 
decline in medical professional power and deference to the medical profession, partly 
because of increasing patient expectation, knowledge and choice; and partly due to the 
fractured and institutional delivery of public healthcare and the increasing focus on 
structural and systemic failures.31  Oliver Quick claims that the rise of managerialism in 
healthcare has led to internal and regulatory reforms that may have eroded the 
professional dominance of the medical profession.32  Again, scandal and increased 
public scrutiny of the medical profession have probably played a part in the erosionary 
process.33  Further, the impact of de-professionalisation may have been experienced 
by the medical profession in a fractured manner - with the retention of significant 
control over training and the right to practice, combined with the cessation of power 
over the evaluation and surveillance of actual clinical practice 34.  One response has 
been the development of medical specialisation(s) as a means to preserve power and 
control over others.35  In this research, we are concerned with Maternal and Fetal 
Medicine which is a subspecialty of Obstetrics and Gynaecology.  These 
subspecialisms can have an exclusionary affect within a sphere of practice, although 
there may also be consequential benefits and gains for patient safety due to increased 
clinical knowledge, skills and experience. 
On reflection, professionalisation theory has been used to inform, but not as the sole 
theoretical lens in this research. 
 
2.3 Epistemology 
 
29 Janine Morgall Traulsen and Paul Bissell, ‘Theories of professions and the pharmacist’, (2004) 12 IJPP 107, 108  
30 Quick (n28),11. 
31 Marie R. Haug ‘De-professionalisation: an alternative hypothesis for the future’, (1993) 20 Socio Rev Monograph 195.  
See also Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society – Medical professionalism in a changing world – Report of a 
working party (2015); Royal College of Physicians, Future Physician Changing doctors in changing times (RCP 2010); 
Quick (n28), 24-28; Karen Yeung and Mary Dixon-Woods, ‘Design-based regulation and patient safety: A regulatory 
studies perspective’ (2010) 71 Social Science & Medicine 502. 
32 Quick (n28), 19-21.   
33 Quick (n28), 21-24. 
34 Quick (n28); Haug (n31). See also Sarah Devaney, ‘The Transmutation of Deference in Medicine: An Ethico-Legal 
Perspective’, (2018) 26(2) Med L. Rev 202. 
35 Haug (n31).   For a discussion of the stratification of the medical profession in the context of abortion services, see Ellie 
Lee, Sally Sheldon Sheldon and Jan Macvarish, ‘The 1967 Abortion Act fifty years on: Abortion, medical authority and the 
law revisited.’ (2018) 212 Social Science and Medicine 26,<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.07.010 >accessed 
18 May 2019; Sheelagh McGuiness and Michael Thomson, ‘Medicine and Abortion Law: Complicating the Reforming 
Profession’, (2015) 23(2) Med L. Rev 177. 
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This research acknowledges the subjective nature of knowledge and the value-laden 
findings of the interview process.36  This theoretical approach is consistent with the 
central subject matter (decision-making) and the determination of how things come 
about in a social, cultural and political context.  It is consonant with critical legal theory 
and is an important differentiating approach given the positivist and outwardly objective 
traditions of much legal scholarship.  There is explicit recognition that regulatory 
frameworks cannot exist in isolation, and have to operate in a social, cultural and 
political context.  The aim of this research is to ensure that the structures, institutions 
and relationships of power are reconsidered unobscured by the outwardly objective 
guise of law and regulation.37  This is important where the power dynamic between key 
stakeholders – including relationships between healthcare professionals and patients, 
and between interviewer and interviewee38 - is sensitive and subject to modification 
over time. 
 
2.4 Data collection method 
 
New data has been collected using semi-structured interviews, enabling the capture of 
information that is relevant to both participants and interviewer.  An interview 
framework facilitated the collation of core data (appendix A) but participants were not 
provided any questions in advance, and the actual structure of questioning was 
influenced by the responses during the interview process.  Each interview helped 
shaped the next, and emerging thematic patterns influenced the form and structure of 
subsequent questioning.  However, all participants were given the liberty to expand 
upon or explore any area of choice. 
Face-to-face interviews were the default option although other options were available, 
and one SKYPE interview was undertaken in the research.39  The informed consent of 
participants was managed through advance information sheets and agreement forms 
(appendix A), and these documents were circulated by letter to all participants in 
advance of the interview.  The consent process was addressed at the beginning of 
each interview and no incentives were offered to participants.  Anonymity was 
 
36 Svend Brinkmann and Steinar Kvale, Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing (3rd Ed, Sage 
2014). 106-122. 
37 For discussion, see Unger (n7). 
38 Braun & Clarke (n19), 88-89. 
39 For Skype as a data collection method, see: Paul Hanna, ‘Using internet technologies (such as Skype) as a research 
medium: A research note’, (2012) 12(2) Qualitative Research 239; Hannah Deakin and Kelly Wakefield, ‘Skype 
Interviewing: reflections of two PHD researchers’, (2014) 14(5) Qualitative Research 603. 
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promised to the subspeciality population subject to the usual requirements of the law 
and the terms of the participant agreement.  The pool of possible participants was 
small, and so particular care has been taken to redact any identifying data.  For that 
reason, geographical location and gender identity have not been disclosed, although 
effort was made to secure geographical representation from across England and 
Wales.  Anonymity could not be guaranteed to the membership/ representative 
participants - due to limited population size – and this was made clear before and at 
interview. 
The interview data was captured by protected digital audio media and using written 
field notes.  Ethnography was ruled out for practical access reasons, and because the 
observation of participants was considered unlikely to yield sufficiently useful data in 
relation to decision-making.40  We did consider using focus groups, but this method of 
data collection was not pursued given the practice context, and the practical difficulties 
of organising large groupings of volunteer participants.   
In terms of the existing literature and research data, we concentrated on legal, medical 
and ethical sources. As a starting point, we undertook a range of key word searches 
across the Bournemouth University Library E-Resource database (EBSCO).  Our key 
words included ‘regulation’, ‘medical decision-making’, ‘fetal reduction’, ‘selective 
termination’, multiple pregnancy’, ‘abortion’, ‘professional medical ethics’ and 
‘healthcare regulation’.  Our legal searches included the main law databases including 
Westlaw, LexisNexis and Lawtel.  We carried out additional searches using a wide 
range of medical and sociological databases including Scopus, Science Direct, Web of 
Science, PubMed and Soc Index.  In addition, we set up automated default key word 
searches against the main obstetric, human reproduction, fetal medicine and medical 
law journals and more general databases including Google Scholar.  The findings from 
these automated searches were filtered and sorted on a regular basis, initially by 
abstract review and followed by whole paper reviews where warranted.  In addition, we 
undertook regular online searches against the websites operated by the primary 
representative bodies and related journals (BMJ, Journal of Medical Ethics).  This 
search method enabled us to collate a wide range of relevant literature/ data and 
facilitated the early collation of specialist clinical publications relating to fetal reduction.  
Although we did not exclude material related to medical and regulatory practices 
outside the UK, we prioritised inclusion to relevant domestic sources.  Relevant 
sources are identified and analysed in chapters 3-8 and appendices E and F.  For 
 
40 It also unnecessarily complicates access to participants in this research. 
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completeness, we also undertook additional keyword searches relating to research 
methodology and data collection methods. 
 
2.5 Sampling and research participants 
 
Careful consideration was given to the appropriate research perspective given the 
involvement of multiple stakeholders, including healthcare professionals, parents and 
their proxies. A pilot interview was undertaken with an Obstetric Consultant and this 
enabled the researcher to gain a better understanding of the operation of Maternal and 
Fetal Medicine within the UK.  However, no specific data from this interview has been 
used in this thesis. 
 
As indicated, Maternal and Fetal Medicine subspecialists41  were identified as the 
primary research participants.  The majority undertake medical roles within tertiary 
NHS Fetal Medicine centres operating predominantly in large urban centres within the 
UK.  There are also a few fetal medicine service providers operating in the independent 
sector across the UK.42  There are relatively few doctors qualified in this subspecialism, 
and national statistics reveal that less than 150 multi fetal reduction/ selective 
termination procedures are recorded each year within England and Wales.43  Due to 
the discordant legal frameworks operating across the UK, a decision was made to 
restrict the subspeciality population to those currently practising within England and 
Wales.  Officers from relevant professional membership/ representative bodies were 
also identified as an additional sample population.  All participants from this sub group 
were qualified Obstetricians or Gynaecologists within England and Wales. Accordingly, 
this research was undertaken using a very small and specialist sample population. 
 
Possible participants were identified from information in the public domain, including 
membership details from the British Maternal & Fetal Medicine Society (BMFMS) and 
the Royal College of Obstetricians & Gynaecologists (RCOG).  All participants were 
recruited using a targeted written approach and a staggered regional recruitment 
strategy.  Positive responses were followed up by telephone and/or email as 
appropriate; and all participant interviews were undertaken by the researcher between 
 
41 A subspeciality of Obstetrics & Gynaecology. 
42 Eg Fetal Medicine Centre, <https://fetalmedicine.com/ >accessed 5 November 2018. 
43 Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2017 Summary information 
from the abortion notification forms returned to the Chief Medical Officers of England and Wales (DHSC Revised 
December 2018). 
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2017 and 2018 (see appendix B).  Overall 6 participants were interviewed for this study 
and this appears appropriate given the limited size of the sample population and the 
specific context of this research.44  There was early evidence of data saturation and the 
interview participants claim to have past/ current involvement in a notable proportion of 
the termination procedures undertaken on an annual basis (see chapter 9 – frequency).  
It is clear that the interviews have yielded data not otherwise available and were 
intended to supplement existing data from a range of stakeholders (see chapter 8).  
These further points reinforce the belief that the interviews have yielded a sufficient 
platform for the research.45   
 
It is acknowledged that the research interviews were intended to yield a healthcare 
professional perspective.  This is not a unique approach - there are a wide range of 
quality single perspective/ stakeholder research studies relating to abortion,46 maternity 
care47 and healthcare.48  Single or selective stakeholder perspectives in a multi 
stakeholder scenario are not automatically partisan, subjective or uncritical.  What is 
important is that mechanisms are deployed, wherever possible to enhance the 
trustworthiness of the research,49 which are consistent with the aims, purposes and 
theories being used.50  New interview data from parents (or their proxies51) seemed 
unlikely to yield or validate answers to the first two research questions, and were more 
likely to tell us what was communicated in fact specific scenarios, rather than provide 
information about the underlying rationale.  Although parental perspectives are relevant 
to the third research question, the legality of fetal reduction ultimately rests on the 
operation of the medical exception for proper medical treatment,52 and clinical/ 
technological advances are largely in the gift of the healthcare professionals 
concerned.   
Against this backdrop, it was decided that the ex-ante and ex post perspectives of 
parental stakeholders would be addressed through the use of existing research data, 
 
44 Braun and Clarke (n19),50. Cf also Oliver Quick, A scoping study on the effects of health professional regulation on 
those regulated: Final report submitted to the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (2011), 7-12, 
<https://www.professionalstandards.org.uk/docs/default-source/publications/research-paper/study-on-the-effects-of-
health-professional-regulation-on-those-regulated-2011.pdf?sfvrsn=77c47f20_6 >accessed 20 July 2018. 
45 Braun & Clarke (n19), 55. 
46 See appendix E and chapter 8. 
47Carrie H. Jacobson and others, ‘Nurses’ Perspectives on the Intersection of Safety and Informed Decision Making in 
Maternity Care’, (2013) 42 (5) JOGNN 577. 
48 Oliver P. Thomson and others, ‘Qualitative Research: Exploring the Multiple Perspectives of Osteopathy’, (2011) 14(3) 
Int J Osteopathic Medicine 116, 120 
49 Ibid. 
50 Hope Pius Nudzor, ‘A Critical Commentary on Combined Methods Approach to Researching Education & Social 
Issues’, (2009) 19(2) Issues in Educational Research 114. 
51Paternal, maternal and proxy perspectives may not be aligned as evidenced in Paton v Trustees of BPAS [1979] QB 
276 and C v S [1988] QB 131. 
52 Mary Neal, ‘Locating lawful abortion on the spectrum of “proper medical treatment’, in Sara Fovargue & Alexander 
Mullock (eds), The legitimacy of Medical Treatment:  What role for the medical exception?  (1st ed, Routledge 2015) 
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including material involving singleton terminations of pregnancy.53  This material is 
reasonably current, and in some cases, uses similar qualitative methods and 
methodology.  Although most of this research relates to pregnant women, we have 
included broader parental data where available.  Existing research data addresses a 
range of issues including the decision-making difficulty for those contemplating fetal 
reduction;54 the available choices presented by clinicians;55 and the attitudes displayed 
by healthcare professionals to patients.56  
 
2.6 Data coding and analysis 
 
A thematic analytical approach was employed because it aligns with the selected 
ontology, data collection method and the wider aims of this research.57  It is an 
appropriate analytical method for “identifying themes and patterns of meaning across a 
dataset in relation to a research question”,58  and has been utilised by other 
researchers in the field.59  The chosen method facilitates an interpretation of the 
broader meaning embedded in participant responses.60  Discourse analysis was 
considered as an alternative, but this method did not fit as neatly with the chosen 
ontological approach and primary research aims.  
The Braun and Clarke staged approach to thematic analysis was used:61     
1. Transcription of interviews; 
2. Reading and familiarisation of the interview transcripts; 
3. Coding of the data; 
 
53 See chapter 8. 
54 David W. Britt and Mark I. Evans, ‘Sometimes doing the right thing sucks: Frame combinations and multi-fetal 
pregnancy reduction decision difficulty’, (2007) 65 Social Science & Medicine 2342. 
55 Jane Fisher and others, ‘Termination for fetal anomaly: Are women in England given a choice of method?’ (2015) 35(2) 
Journal of Obs & Gynae 168 
56 Edna Astbury-Ward, Odette Parry and Ros Carnwell, ‘Stigma, Abortion, and Disclosure – Findings from a Qualitative 
Study’, (2012) 9 IJ Sex Med 3137. 
57 Braun and Clarke (n19), 27/46; Marie Crowe, Maree Inder and Richard Parker, ‘Conducting qualitative research in 
mental health: Thematic and Content analyses’, (2015) 49(7) ANZJP 616; Mojtaba Vaismoradi, Hannele Turunen and 
Terese Bondas, ‘Content analysis and thematic analysis: Implications for conducting a qualitative descriptive study’, 
(2013) 15(3) Nurs Health Sci 398. 
58 Braun & Clarke (n19), 175. 
59 Helen Statham, Wendy Solomou and Jasper B. Green, J, ‘Late termination of pregnancy: law, policy and decision 
making in four English fetal medicine units’, (2006) 113(12) BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
1402; Ruth H. Graham and others, ‘The role of feticide in the context of late termination of pregnancy: a qualitative study 
of health professionals' and parents' views’, (2009) 29 Prenat Diagn 875; Katie Gallagher, Davina Porock and Alison 
Edgley  ,‘The concept of nursing in the abortion services’, (2010) 66 Journal of Advanced Nursing 849. 
60 Crowe et al. (n57). 
61 (n19), 202-203. 
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4. Searching for themes; 
5. Reviewing themes; 
6. Defining and naming themes; 
7. Writing the data report and relating back to the research questions. 
It is important to appreciate that this is not a completely linear process – it is necessary 
to cycle through the stages as points and themes arise, and all stages involve ongoing 
analysis of the data.62 
Interviews transcripts were prepared from the audio recordings.  This process was 
undertaken over a concentrated period and assisted the process of transcription, 
coding, searching for themes and subsequent analysis.  The transcription process 
involved at least two complete passes over the audio recordings – on each occasion 
the audio recording was paused regularly to facilitate the accuracy of the typed 
transcript.  During the transcription process, obvious identifying information was 
removed for anonymity purposes.  All participants were allocated a letter in place of 
their name and their real names are known only to the researcher.  Although there are 
different views about the use of pseudonymisation, it was not felt necessary to 
humanise the participants using replacement names or titles on this occasion.63 
The transcripts were read and then re-read to enhance familiarity.  ‘Codes’ (called 
‘nodes’ within NVivo 11) were identified and selected from the interview transcripts, and 
this process was undertaken using NVIVO 11 Pro software64.  Codes are simply 
sections, sentences, phrases or words from the interview data that were considered 
relevant and useful to answering or capturing the essence of the research questions.  
The codes were organised and grouped in a thematic way.  At the beginning these 
themes were selected in a deductive way using existing knowledge of theory and their 
apparent importance to the research questions, and expanded inductively from 
interpretation of the data.65  This approach is consistent with the first cycle coding 
method described by Saldana as “Themeing the Data”.66  These initial themes were 
fairly broad and did not attempt to segment positive or negative responses. The coding 
process and search for themes was further refined, and the transcripts were reviewed 
on several further occasions to develop and maintain a consistent but inclusionary 
 
62 Braun and Clarke (n19), 218; Johnny Saldana, An Introduction to Codes and Coding (3rd ed, Sage 2016), 9-14. 
63 Braun & Clarke (n19), 251. 
64 For an overview of the software, see QSR International, NVIVO<http://www.qsrinternational.com/product >accessed 
22 March 2017.  Version 11 was used in this research. See also Surrey University, NVIVO 11 Distinguishing Features, 
<https://www.surrey.ac.uk/sites/default/files/NVivo11_distinguishingfeatures_Mar2016-FINAL.pdf>accessed 23 May 
2018. 
65 Saldana (n62), 204.   
66 Saldana (n62), 198-206. 
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approach.  Each thematic group was actively reviewed to examine coverage and 
selection across participants looking for areas of similarity and difference.  If a 
participant was missing thematic coverage, the transcript was re-examined to consider 
whether there was a case for inclusion or exclusion. Word cluster and frequency 
analysis was undertaken within NVivo to further refine the thematic groupings (see 
appendix B).  This process of review (stage 5) acted as a form of quality review and 
refinement,67  and enabled the researcher to look for broader patterns including 
connections and relationships.  Some thematic groups contained few concepts, ideas 
or elements, whilst others were much broader and therefore justified the introduction of 
sub themes.  An attempt was then made to define the selective themes – narrowing the 
definition to a few sentences.  Where this was not possible, or where the definition was 
too vague, that thematic grouping was revisited and modified appropriately.  These 
thematic definitions can be found at appendix C (Table 1A).  Consideration was also 
given to the themes developed in other relevant qualitative research studies (see 
appendix E/ chapter 8).  Finally, the write up stage involved more detailed analysis, and 
connection with the research questions, the academic literature and existing research. 
 
2.7 External verification  
 
Participant consent allowed for sample coding and thematic grouping by the research 
supervisors as an objective check on the coding/analysis stage.  Member checks and 
triangulation by data were also undertaken (see 2.8 below). 
 
2.8 Steps to enhance quality and trustworthiness  
 
There is no definitive criteria for assessing the quality and trustworthiness of qualitative 
research but Figure 168 offers a helpful framework contrasting quantitative and 
qualitative research terminology: 
 
67 Braun & Clarke (n19), 233.   
68 Thomson et al. (n48), 119.  Reproduced with permission (Appendix G). 
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Figure 1 – Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Each criterion will be examined using the appropriate qualitative research terminology: 
Credibility  
It is acknowledged that each interview subtly influenced the phrasing of questions/ 
prompts to subsequent participants and is a feature of the qualitative interviewing 
process.  However, steps were taken to enhance the credibility (and dependability) of 
this research through the consistent application of research methods, relatively 
inconspicuous forms of data collection, and the provision of clear pathways from data 
collection to analysis.  High quality transcripts have been produced which facilitate and 
offer an appropriate platform for subsequent analysis.69  A reflective account has been 
produced by the researcher to enhance credibility (and dependability) and to 
acknowledge the capacity for researcher bias and influence on participant contribution 
(appendix B).70  Summary member checks were also undertaken with the participants 
to check the accuracy of interpretation and to offer the opportunity for feedback on the 
research findings (appendix B).71   
Transferability  
Most qualitative research has an indicative, rather than generalisable, value.72  This 
research did use a small but arguably representative sample population.73  Whilst the 
nature of the decision-making process involves elements of individual subjectivity, the 
 
69 Brinkmann and Kvale (n36), 300. See also Braun & Clarke (n19), 287. 
70 Keenan, Van Teijlingen and Pitchforth (n25), 42.  See also Cynthia A. Lietz and Luis E. Zayas,’ Evaluating Qualitative 
Research for Social Work Practitioners’, (2010) 11(2) Advances in Social Work 188   
71 This involves securing participant feedback on findings (Lietz and Zayas (n70),194). 
72 On generalising from interview studies, see Brinkmann and Kvale (n36), 295-300. 
73 Based on estimated number of procedures undertaken and national abortion statistics (n43). 
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use of transparent data collection/coding/analytical mechanisms (including auditable 
pathways74 and interview plans75) were intended to enhance the overall trustworthiness 
of the research.76  Concerns about transferability can be overstated where the aims are 
‘to expand knowledge about the things that can happen and how they are interpreted in 
a particular social world’.77 
Confirmability 
Research should be objective, neutral and unbiased wherever possible, and to the 
extent that such criteria are consistent with the selected research aims, theories and 
purposes.78  However, ‘objectivity’ is a positivist concept that may not make adequate 
provision for the social and subjective construction of knowledge and reality.79  As this 
research recognises and supports the role of subjective construction, it should be 
acknowledged and given pre-eminence at a methodological level.80  For that reason, 
many qualitative researchers prefer the term ‘confirmability’81 in the place of 
‘objectivity’.82  Further, critical legal theory is troubled by objectivity because it can be 
used to mask the social realities manifest in legal discourse.83   
The following active steps were taken to address and demonstrate the connecting 
relationships between the data and research findings: 
1. Clear dissemination of research aims to participants.  
2. Consistent and transparent application of data coding. 
3. The selection and use of a reliable, appropriate and objective method of data 
analysis.84  
4. Summary member checks were undertaken with the participants. 
5. Sample coding was undertaken by a research supervisor and the results were 
considered by the researcher. 
6. Whilst familiarity with ethical theories can help reduce personal bias, ultimately 
it is the ‘integrity of the researcher – his or her knowledge, experience, honesty 
 
74 A written account of the research process (Lietz and Zayas (n70), 196). 
75 Appendix A 
76 Sharan B. Merriam, Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design & Implementation (3rd Edition, Wiley 2014), 222-223. 
77 Burton (n4). 
78 Nudzor (n50), 123.   
79 Vincent A. Anfara, Kathleen M. Brown and Terri L. Mangione, ‘Qualitative Analysis on Stage:  Making the Research 
Process More Public’, (2002) October Education Researcher 28. 
80 Nudzor (n50), 123.   
81 As per Thomson et al. (n48). 
82 Ibid (table 1); Anfara et al.(n79); Merriam (n76), 211. 
83 See for eg, Unger (n7). 
84 Crowe et al. (n57). 
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and fairness – that is the decisive factor’.85  The provision of a reflective account 
aims to provide transparency for the reader (appendix B). 
7. The term ‘triangulation’ is inconsistently defined in the literature but has been 
used to describe alignment at the inquiry and verification phases of the 
research process.  Its central purpose is to enhance the confirmability and the 
overall quality of the research.  Denzin describes 4 distinct categories of 
triangulation - triangulation by data/person, by investigator, by method and by 
theory.86  Although care needs to be exercised when triangulating stakeholder 
perspectives involving a significant imbalance of power (as per fetal 
reduction87), it has been used in following ways.  Triangulation by investigator 
was undertaken at the verification phase to provide an internal check on the 
researcher’s interpretation of data.88  Additionally, triangulation by data was 
undertaken at the verification stage using the interview data and existing data 
from stakeholders.  This process was subject to satisfactory alignment at a 
theoretical and methodological level and looks for divergence/ convergence 
between datasets. 
 
Dependability  
  
Dependability is concerned with whether the research findings “offer a dependable and 
realistic interpretation of the view held by the participants”.89  This was addressed by 
member checks, a reflective account and many of the points already discussed.  We 
have attempted to strike a fair balance between the analytical segments and the data 
extracts used in chapter 9.90  Overall, the theoretical and methodological choices were 
rational and consistent with other qualitative research undertaken in this field of 
research.91 
 
 
2.9 Ethical and practical considerations92 
 
 
 
85 Brinkmann & Kvale (n36), 97.   
86 Norman K. Denzin, Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook (McGraw Hill 1978) 
87 Michael Thomson, ‘Abortion Law and Professional Boundaries’ (2013) 22(2) Social and Legal Studies 191.  
88 See Merriam (n76), 216.  
89 Thomson et al. (n48). 
90 Braun & Clarke (n19), 287 
91 eg John Cresswell and Dana Miller, ‘Determining validity in qualitative inquiry’, (2000) 139(3) Theory into Practice 124, 
126-1277; Merriam (n76), 209-235; Lietz and Zayas (n70), 188-202. 
92 Bournemouth University ethics approval was granted for this research on the 24 February 2014. 
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In this final section, we address a range of ethical and practical considerations: 
 
Funding and conflicts of interest 
 
No external funding has been made available or used in this research.  Internal 
Bournemouth University funding has been made available for certain travel and related 
expenses necessarily incurred in the interviewing process.  There are no known 
conflicts of interest (whether actual or potential) and no gatekeeper controlled our 
access to the medical participants. 
 
Data protection 
 
The requirements of the Data Protection Acts 1988/ 2018, the General Data Protection 
Regulation93 and the data processing requirements of Bournemouth University have 
been complied with. 
 
Subject matter 
 
The topic of fetal reduction is controversial and ethically debated.  Moral, cultural and 
religious considerations feed into this discourse, but should not detract from or prevent 
academic research in this area.  Care was taken around the transcription of participant 
characteristics to provide anonymity (where indicated) and compliance with data 
protection legislation. This included the secure collection, storage, dissemination, 
retention of data and diarised timescales for the destruction of any identifying data.  All 
of this is addressed in the participant information sheet (appendix A).  Those 
documents was modified slightly for representative participants to clarify the point on 
anonymity made earlier. 
 
Human participants 
 
Human participants were involved in this research, but no patient, parent or donor has 
been directly involved/ interviewed and there has been no consideration of specific 
clinical records.  No data on any individual patient, parental, fetal or donor 
characteristics has been captured.  Informed consent was obtained from all human’ 
participants using advance participant information sheets and written agreement forms 
 
93 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
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(appendix A).  Embryos/fetuses have not been treated as human participants for the 
purposes of this research, although their legal and moral status is ethically debated.94  
 
NHS research requirements  
 
Participants were recruited on the basis of their professional qualifications, 
memberships, experience, and not on the basis of any role they currently hold within 
the NHS.  No NHS data has been used or collated in this research save where freely 
available in the public domain.  This was not a research project based within an NHS 
organisation, and did not involve any circumstances where the NHS would have an 
explicit duty of care to the participants as employer.95  NHS REC approval was not 
required in these circumstances96 (the standardised Medical Research Council 
questionnaires are included at appendix D).  NHS Research and Design approval was 
considered unnecessary because no physical NHS systems or non-public domain 
documents were used in this research. There has been no attempt to evaluate 
professional behaviours or the decision-making processes within any identifiable NHS 
body or organisation. 
 
Audio media 
 
Digital audio media and handwritten notes were used during the interview process. The 
audio data was stored in a secure UK based digital environment with suitable password 
protection. Transcription was undertaken in a secure and confidential environment, and 
all paper records are/were held in a locked and secure location. All identifying research 
data will be destroyed within the timescales agreed with participants and future diary 
entries have been made by way of reminder. 
 
 
2.10 Conclusions  
 
We acknowledge that the qualitative elements of this research have some limitations.  
First, we acknowledge that we have used a relatively small sample of clinicians and so 
 
94 Bournemouth University has no explicit policy on the research treatment of embryos/fetuses.   
95 See <https://www.hra.nhs.uk/approvals-amendments/what-approvals-do-i-need/hra-approval/ >accessed 31 October 
2018) 
96 NHS Health Research Authority, Governance arrangements for research ethics committees: 2018 edition (HRA 2018), 
Section 2.3.14. <https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/policies-standards-legislation/governance-
arrangement-research-ethics-committees/ >accessed 31 October 2018. 
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cannot rule out divergence across regional practice.  Secondly, this work highlights the 
importance of local cultural context and this may limit the transferability of some of our 
findings.  Nonetheless, we believe that this research does make an important 
contribution to knowledge and understanding around the central research questions.  
We now move on to consider the normative frameworks and regulatory environment(s) 
(research question 2). 
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Chapter 3 – Moral and Ethical Frameworks 
 
Contents: 
3.1 Introduction. 
3.2 Why does it matter whether an embryo/ fetus has moral status?   
3.3 Human biological development. 
3.4 Who and what should be protected by a moral norm? 
3.5 What ‘properties’ of an entity should we attach moral significance too? 
3.6 Multiple property approaches. 
3.7 Permissibility of pregnancy termination – the arguments. 
3.8 Permissibility of selective termination and fetal reduction in multiple 
pregnancy. 
3.9 The connections between moral norms/ status and legal protection/ interests. 
3.10 Conclusions 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we examine relevant moral and philosophical ethical frameworks.  
These frameworks will become important when we address the role of personal values 
in medicine and wider professional ethical norms in chapter 6.  Both chapters are 
interconnected because they are concerned with the guidance that healthcare 
professionals might derive from the ethical frameworks and general ethical principles.  
In this chapter, our aims are to offer a flavour of the arguments around entity moral 
status, the ethical considerations underpinning pregnancy termination and the possible 
connections to legal regulation.  A large part of this chapter is concerned with the 
question of the moral status of the embryo/fetus and what this might mean for medical 
decision-making in our research context.  Clearly, this is a very important question for 
healthcare professionals because they need to know whether, in their decision-making, 
they should treat an embryo/fetus as having (a) no interest (b) an interest that grows 
with development or (c) an equal interest to a born human.  Whilst, we have evaluated 
many of the competing claims, it is not our intention to resolve any specific moral or 
ethical issue definitively in this work.  Rather, our primary goal is to convey a sense of 
the values and views that might influence stakeholders in our research context; and to 
give an impression of the moral/ethical frameworks in which medical practice operates.  
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Discussion about the morality of abortion, typically starts with consideration of the 
beginnings of human life, and the recognition or ascription of particular moral status to 
the embryo or fetus.   The framing of these issues is vitally important, although too 
often discourse becomes polarised and entrenched in pro-life/pro-choice1 or 
fetal/maternal rights-based arguments.  Such approaches have tended to distort 
debate, made it harder to forge any meaningful consensus, and in many cases the 
“views on the moral status of abortion are part of a ‘package deal’.”2  This can make it 
difficult to make progress or achieve compromise, even when the foundations of 
resistance or support appear unsound or otherwise weak.  Although there have been 
many attempts to overcome these entrenched positions,3 they have found it difficult to 
forge any meaningful and lasting degree of societal consensus.  
At the outset, we should make a distinction between the ethical norms and debate 
applied to the termination of a pregnancy in general and the ethical norms applied 
specifically to the question of fetal reduction and selective termination.  To be sure, 
there is some overlap, but there is also added tension and possible conflict flowing 
from the presence and development of multiple unborn lifeforms.  As we shall see, 
what we make of these circumstances will depend, to a large extent, on the value and 
weight attributed to certain forms of human life and to broader consequentialist type 
arguments.  However, because of the overlap, we will start our analysis in general 
terms, before focussing upon the distinctive issues arising from fetal reduction and 
selective termination. 
 
3.2  Why does it matter whether an embryo/ fetus has moral status?   
 
According to the ethicists, Beauchamp and Childress: 
“moral norms are principles and rules that state obligations and, correlatively, 
rights… criteria of moral status are moral norms in the generic sense of “moral 
norm”. A norm in the most general sense is a (prima facie) standard that has 
the authority to judge or direct human belief, reasoning, or behaviour.  A norm 
guides, commands, requires, or commends.  Failure to follow a norm warrants 
 
1 Claire-Marie Legendre and others, ‘Differences between selective termination of pregnancy and fetal reduction in 
multiple pregnancy: a narrative review’ (2013) (26(6) Reproductive Bio-Medicine Online (Elsevier Science) 542; M L. 
Maroto, ‘The Never-Ending Dispute: How Framing and Language Have Prolonged the Abortion Debate in America’, 
Conference Papers – American Sociological Association. 2005 Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, 1, available via SocINDEX 
(accessed 12 January 2015). 
2 Michael Tooley, ‘Philosophy, critical thinking and 'after-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' (2013) 39(5) J Med 
Ethics 266, 267. 
3 Eg Judith J Thomson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’, (1971) (1) Philosophy & Public Affairs 47; Ronald Dworkin, Life's 
Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia (Harper Collins 1993). 
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censure, criticism, disapproval or some other negative appraisal.  Criteria of 
moral status satisfy this description.”4  
So being accorded the moral status of a ‘human person’ ought to provide that entity 
with the same prima facie obligations, rights and protection that apply to other ‘human 
persons’. The issue then becomes whether we categorise all human life in the same 
way or restrict ‘personhood’ to a narrower band of human life.  Warren claims that 
when an entity has moral status, it is: 
“an entity towards which moral agents have, or can have, moral obligations.  If 
an entity has moral status, then we may not treat it in just any way we please; 
we are morally obliged to give weight in our deliberations to its needs, interests, 
or well-being.  Furthermore, we are morally obliged to do this not merely 
because protecting it may benefit ourselves or other persons, but because its 
needs have moral importance in their own right”5 
According to Warren the function of moral status involves the setting of minimum 
standards “towards entities of a given sort” or the establishment of moral ideals.6  This 
means that if embryos hold relevant moral status, it ought to impact on the obligations 
owed and moral protection afforded to these entities.  In the context of pregnancy 
termination, concern about moral status might extend to consideration of the unborn 
entity’s right to life and the right not to be killed or left to die.  Your response is likely to 
be influenced by the priority given to minimum or idealised moral standard setting, and 
according to Warren the “strategies that we use to resolve the tension between these 
two functions…will influence our attitudes towards many practical moral issues”.7  
These tensions and strategies will become evident as we proceed but we now move on 
to consider the stage at which human life might attain moral significance.  
 
3.3  Human biological development 
 
There is a considerable degree of consensus around human biological and related 
developmental issues.  In-vivo human conception takes place when the sperm enters 
the egg.  Fertilisation takes place later when the zygote is formed and the nuclear 
material from the gametes fuse.  The zygote goes on to form the morula, and 
 
4 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, (7th edition, Oxford University Press 2013), 
85. 
5 Mary A. Warren, Moral status: obligations to persons and other living things (Oxford University Press 1997), 3. See also, 
David R. Lawrence and Margaret Brazier, ‘Legally Human? ‘Novel Beings’ and English Law’, (2018) 26(2) Med L. Rev 
309, 313-314. 
6 Warren(n5), 13-14. 
7 Warren (n5), 14.   
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subsequently the blastocyst, as it moves from the fallopian tube to the womb and 
implants (in-utero implantation).  The primitive streak forms approximately 14-15 days 
after fertilisation.8  In-vitro fertilisation (IVF) involves some modification as the process 
takes place outside of the woman in an ex-vivo environment. 
How do we go about timing the start of pregnancy?  The medical profession 
conventionally uses the first day of the woman’s last menstrual period to calculate the 
duration of the pregnancy.9  However, this starting date is approximately 2 weeks 
before ovulation, and consequently, discourse on the duration of fetal or embryo 
development normally runs from 2 weeks after the first day of the woman’s last period.  
For example, 7 weeks of development corresponds to 9 weeks of pregnancy.10   A 
more technical dating exercise may now occur following ultrasound scanning.11  To add 
to the confusion, the legal starting point of pregnancy in the UK is implantation and this 
point cannot be determined precisely.  Timing is particularly important for the regulation 
of medication interfering with the natural processes following conception and prior to 
implantation.   
The human embryonic stage ends after 7 weeks of development/ 9 weeks of 
pregnancy, and the fetal stage starts at 8 weeks of development/10 weeks of 
pregnancy.12  The first trimester covers the first 12 weeks of the pregnancy. The 
second trimester runs between weeks 13 to 28 of the pregnancy.  Viability - when the 
fetus becomes technically capable of independent existence from its mother - is 
currently around 24 weeks in most developed countries.13  This is not a fixed point in 
time, and necessarily depends on a range of socio-economic factors including available 
technology and medical skills.  Fetal pain response is believed to occur sometime after 
24 weeks although the literature is not conclusive on the starting point,14 and moral 
precaution has been claimed for pregnancies between 20-23 weeks gestation.15 The 
third trimester starts in the 29th week of pregnancy and the pregnancy is viewed as full 
term from the 37-38th week. 
 
8 Warnock Committee Report, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HMSO 
Reprint 1988) 66.   
9 See Department of Health and Social Care, Clarification of time limit for termination of pregnancy performed under 
Grounds C and D of the Abortion Act 1967 (DHSC 23 July 2018); Also NHS – Your pregnancy and baby guide, 
<http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/pregnancy-and-baby/pages/due-date-calculator.aspx >accessed 1 June 2017.   
10 Legendre et al. (n1), 544. 
11 In multiple pregnancy, this should take place between 11 and 13 weeks 6 days (Royal College of Obstetricians & 
Gynaecologists, Multiple pregnancy: the management of twin & triplet pregnancies in the antenatal period (NICE Clinical 
Guidance) (RCOG 2011a)). 
12 Legendre et al. (n1), 544. 
13 See for eg, BMA, The Law & Ethics of Abortion, BMA Views (BMA November 2014 (Updated October 2018)), 5. 
14 Royal College of Obstetricians & Gynaecologists, Fetal Awareness: Review of Research & Recommendations for 
Practice (RCOG 2010) 
15 E. Christian Brugger, ‘The Problem of Fetal Pain and Abortion: Toward an Ethical Consensus for Appropriate Behavior’ 
(2012) 22(3) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 263. 
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3.4  Who and what should be protected by a moral norm? 
 
Beauchamp and Childress suggest that the mainstream approach to the question of 
who or what should be protected by a moral norm: 
“has been to ask whether a being is the kind of entity to which moral principles 
or other moral categories can and should be applied and, if so, based on which 
properties of the being”.16  
This assumes that moral status or principles should and can be determined by the 
‘essential nature of beings’ or intrinsic considerations.17  In turn, this raises an issue 
over the appropriate emphasis to be placed on ‘what an entity is’ and ‘what that entity 
can do’.  Whilst some philosophers have suggested that a simple shift in ontological 
status can result in a change in moral rights,18 it can be problematic to use a fixed-point 
reference in a transformative physiological process.19  Others have claimed that moral 
status can be determined by circumstances external to the nature of the being,20 
asserting that moral protection can be independent of intrinsic moral status and value.21  
Once again, framing is critical – we need to understand how the terms are being 
deployed,22  and be alert to the possible narrative message(s) conveyed by terms like 
‘abortion’, ‘human being’ and ‘human person’.  
In the next section, we examine some of the core arguments advanced in relation to 
gestational development: 
Conception 
Religious, quasi-religious23 and secular24 arguments have been advanced that claim 
full human moral status should and does start from conception.  Conception is the point 
at which the sperm penetrates the egg, and some secular claims maintain that the 
 
16 Beauchamp & Childress (n4), 65 [emphasis added]. 
17 Alan Clune, ‘Deeper problems for Noonan's probability argument against abortion: On a charitable reading of Noonan's 
conception criterion of humanity’ (2011) 25(5) Bioethics 280, 283. See also Lawrence and Brazier (n5), 317-318. 
18 John T. Noonan, ‘An Almost Absolute Value in History’, In the Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, 
(Harvard University Press 1970) 51; Stephen Smith, ‘Dignity: The difference between abortion and neonaticide for severe 
disability’ chp10 in C A. Erin & S Ost (eds), The Criminal Justice System and Health Care (Oxford University Press 2007). 
19 See generally Samuel Taylor-Alexander and others, ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression: Confronting the Liminal Spaces 
of Health Research Regulation’ (2016) 8(2) Law, Innovation and Technology 149. 
20 Thomson (n3) 57. 
21 Beauchamp & Childress (n4); Carson Strong, ‘Overview: a framework for reproductive ethics’, chp 2 in Donna 
Dickenson (ed), Ethical Issues in Maternal-fetal Medicine, (Cambridge University Press 2002). 
22 Tooley (n2), 269. 
23 Peter Kreeft, ’The Apple Argument Against Abortion’ (2001) 27(1) Human Life Review 81. 
24 Francis J. Beckwith, Defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice (Cambridge University Press 2007); 
Christopher Kaczor, The ethics of abortion: women's rights, human life, and the question of justice (Routledge 2011) 
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genetic components of human life are complete at this stage of creation.25  For 
example, Beckwith argues that at conception we have: 
“a unified organism with its own intrinsic purpose and basic capacities, whose 
parts work in concert for perfection and perpetuation of its existence as a 
whole.”26  
Marquis counters that there is biologically human life before conception - the sperm 
and unfertilised egg - although moral claims are rarely made for the gametes in 
isolation.27  Opponents of the conception starting point, often advance a moral 
distinction between human life and the human person – the latter occurring some after 
conception.  The typical counter response argues that we should still recognise the 
potential human person that the conception entity will become irrespective of the low 
statistical certainty of birth at that juncture.  For Noonan, conception should be the 
criterion of moral rights due to the ‘sharp shift’ in the probability of the entity becoming 
possessed of human reason at that point.28.  Others have claimed that even if we 
cannot be sure or definite about status, we should play it safe and use conception 
because it is the clearest place to draw the line.29  
Fertilisation 
Fertilisation is often confused with conception but involves the actual creation of the 
zygote and the fusion of the nuclear material (the chromosomes) from each gamete.30  
Whilst it is notable that fewer than 15% of fertilised eggs actually result in birth ,31 
Kaczor maintains that this fact should not have any bearing on moral status.32  
However, one obvious problem for fertilisation as a starting point is that a zygote gives 
rise to a placenta and a human being and “it cannot already be both a human being 
and a placenta.”33  It might also be possible for the zygote to split prior to implantation 
and give rise to multiple embryos,34 although this may not preclude independent moral 
status for the zygote.35/36 
 
25 Ibid. 
26 Beckwith (n24), 182. 
27 Don Marquis, ‘Abortion and the beginning and end of human life’, (2006) 34 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 16, 
19. 
28 Noonan (n18); For a critique of Noonan’s argument, see Clune (n17). 
29 C E., Koop, ‘The Sanctity of Life’ (1978) 75(1) The Journal of the Medical Society of New Jersey 62.   
30 Michael Tooley, Celia Wolf-Devine, Philip E. Devine and Alison M. Jaggar, Abortion: Three Perspectives (OUP 2009) 
45 
31 Highlighted in R (John Smeaton on behalf of the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children) v Secretary of State for 
Health [2002] EWHC 610. 
32 Kaczor (n24), 131-133.   
33 John A. Burgess, ‘Could a zygote be a human being’, (2010) 24(2) Bioethics 61. 
34 Ibid., 62. 
35 Kaczor (n24), 127-130. 
36 The language we deploy here is also critical: terms like zygote, embryo and fetus distinguish and separate those entities 
from human persons with full moral status. 
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Implantation  
The UK criminal law offers some qualified legal protection following implantation of the 
fertilised egg in the uterus, and the pregnancy is then recognised as being 
established.37 However, the ex-vivo embryo does have some legal protection prior to 
implantation,38 and neither legal position necessarily reflects the moral status of the 
embryo at this point of gestation.  As we have seen, it may be difficult to establish the 
timing of this point with absolute certainty. 
Formation of the ‘primitive streak’ 
Following the formation of the primitive streak – a base or foundation from which the 
embryo develops - we can definitively identify the number of embryos.  Many abortion 
opponents recognise the inherent difficulties presented by claims for earlier starting 
points for moral status.39  The formation of the primitive streak has been used as a 
legally significant point for embryo protection in the context of in vitro storage and 
research in the UK.40  Again, whilst formation occurs approximately 14 days after 
fertilisation, it is not a precise point in time. 
Heartbeat and formation of the cardio-vascular system 
At approximately 6 weeks of gestation, a rudimentary cardio-vascular system develops 
in the embryo.41  It has been argued that there should be symmetry between our 
conceptions of when and what causes life to begin and end.42  However, as we now 
tend to use brain stem death as the definitive test for the end of human life, a more 
consistent approach might be to focus on the formation and subsequent functioning of 
the fetal brain stem which occurs at a later stage of development.43   
Quickening 
The concept of ‘quickening’ has historical significance in the abortion debate and 
denotes the point when embryo movement is first detected by the pregnant mother.44  
Again, quickening does not occur at a fixed point in time and relies on external 
perception by the pregnant woman.  It is therefore a potentially problematic starting 
 
37 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 58-59; R (Smeaton) (n31).   
38 Cf Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990 
39 Wolf-Devine & Devine in Tooley et al.2009 (n30), 87-88. 
40 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 3(3); Warnock (n8), 66.   
41 Burgess (n33), 69.   
42 For critique, see Marquis (n27). 
43 For critique of the brain stem test, see Jeff McMahan, The ethics of killing: problems at the margins of life (Oxford 
University Press 2002), 426. 
44 For discussion, see John Keown, The Law and Ethics of Medicine: Essays on the Inviolability of Human Life (Oxford 
University Press 2012) and R (John Smeaton) (n31). 
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point for moral status or protection and is rarely argued in modern ethical discourse.  
We will consider the moral relevance of external or extrinsic factors shortly. 
Fetal stage and appearance 
From about 8 weeks of development the embryo starts to look human and to possess 
some physical human characteristics.  However, Kaczor says that we should base our 
judgements on moral status “not on what appears to be the case, but on what is in 
reality the case”.’45  One of the reasons that the use of 3/4D scan imagery has become 
so contentious during pregnancy is because of its impact and role in constructing the 
fetus as a human person through physical similarity to early neonates.46/47  
Achieving capacity 
A popular claim is that human personhood and full moral status is only achieved once 
life become viable and has the capacity for independent existence.  Herring points out 
that viability relativises moral status, and even a child born at full term could not survive 
if left alone without support.48  Marquis correctly highlights that ‘independence is not a 
necessary condition of being alive’,49  and the future prospect of ectogenesis poses 
practical challenges for moral claims built on the capacity for separate existence.50  
Although there is some evidence of survival at 22 weeks gestation, the BMA has 
maintained that survival rates and the rates of severe disability have not improved 
amongst babies born at 23 weeks or less in recent years.51  
Others base moral status on the existence of sentient life – where there is the capacity 
to experience discomfort, sensation or desires.  Warren describes sentience as the 
capacity to feel pleasure or pain; and something more than a consciousness.52  Again it 
is difficult to pin down a precise starting point, and capacity based claims do need to be 
able to address fluctuations in capacity and the exercise of capacity over time.53  
Boonin claims that we should use organised cortical brain activity as the measure of 
moral significance,54 treating the start of life in the same way we measure the end of 
 
45 Kaczor (n24), 79. 
46 Kristin L. Savell, ‘Life & death before birth: 4D ultrasound & the shifting frontiers of the abortion debate’, (2007) 15(1) 
Journal of Law & Medicine 103. 
47 Cf embryo research in France (Stephanie H. Hennette-Vauchez, ‘Words count: how interest in stem cells has made 
the embryo available--a look at the French law of bioethics’, (2009) 17(1) Med L. Rev 52, 69-70.) 
48 Jonathan Herring, Medical Law & Ethics (4th edition, Oxford University Press 2012) 322. 
49 Marquis 2006 (n27), 18. 
50 Amel Alghrani and Margaret Brazier, ‘What Is It? Whose It? Re-Positioning the Fetus In the Context of Research’, 
(2011) 1 Cambridge Law Journal 51. 
51 BMA, The Law and ethics of abortion: BMA Views (BMA November 2014), 4. Nb not asserted in the updated version 
(n13). 
52 Warren (n5), 52-56. Cf. Lawrence and Brazier (n5), 312-213. 
53 Beauchamp & Childress (n4),75-76. Warren (n52). 
54 David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge University Press 2002) 
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life.55  He argues that prior to conscious experience, a being has no desires but claims 
dispositional conscious experience is present from the point of organised cortical brain 
activity.  
Lawrence and Brazier prefer to use ‘sapience’ because the term ‘sentience’ focuses 
primarily on whether an entity is capable of suffering.56  Whilst they accept that 
suffering or the potential to suffer may be a relevant factor for the determination of 
moral protection, sapience as a concept goes further, and includes consideration of the 
capacity for reasoned thought and insight.57  However, it is important to recognise that 
sapience has a greater exclusionary effect meaning certain forms of adult human life 
will potentially fall outside it’s remit. 
Birth and post birth 
Birth is the obvious point at which the ‘child’ becomes an entirely separate entity from 
its mother but why should physical separation be morally significant?  The obvious 
point is that the child’s interests and any associated rights can be asserted and 
enforced independently, and without direct physical impact on the mother.  McMahan 
adds: 
"Because infants exist independently, the sacrifices that they may require from 
others in order to survive and flourish are of a fundamentally different and 
usually less burdensome kind”.58  
Herring raises the issue of relativism - why should the 30-week (in-utero) fetus have a 
different moral status from a similar aged child born and kept alive in an incubator?59  
On the face of it, extrinsic (environmental) factors separate the two cases, but Greasley 
claims that that the intrinsic qualities of the unborn fetus and the born neonate are not 
the same - birth produces intrinsic transformative physical changes in the entity that 
cannot be ignored, and that account should be taken of the individuation of 
embodiment.60 
Some philosophers claim that full human personhood may not be achieved until after 
birth because only at this point does the entity possess the morally relevant features of 
 
55 Julian Savulescu, ‘Abortion, Embryo Destruction and the Future of Value Argument’ (2002) 28 Journal of Medical Ethics 
133 -135. 
56 Lawrence and Brazier (n5), 312-313. 
57 Ibid. 
58 McMahan 2002 (n43), 344. 
59 Herring (n48), 323; Jeff McMahan, ‘Infanticide and moral consistency’, (2013) 39 J Med Ethics 273. Cf, Kate Greasely, 
Arguments about Abortion: Personhood, Morality and Law (Oxford University Press 2017), 191-195. 
60 Greasley (n59), 191-199.      
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a human person.61  For example, John Harris claims that the moral status of a human 
entity: 
“is determined by its possession of those features which make normal adult 
human individuals morally more important than sheep or goats or embryos”62  
For Harris, that core feature is the capacity of an entity to value ones’ own existence 
and life.63  Similarly, Tooley says we should focus on the capacity for thought,64 an 
attribute that needs to be more than a momentary experience.65  These cognitive 
properties may not exist until after birth and later in infancy, potentially deferring full 
moral status for the new born child.  We might also infer from these positions, that full 
human personhood can, in certain circumstances, be lost prior to formal death.66  
Tooley seeks to address concern about this potential loss of moral status by utilising a 
‘neo-lockean’ person - someone who has variable conscious states at different times 
that are nonetheless “psychologically connected by such things as memories, desires 
and intentions”67 - although ultimately he defers questions of cognition and capacity to 
the scientists.68   
Alternative cognitive approaches have been developed, including McMahan’s Time 
Relative Interest Account (TRIA) that we will consider shortly.69 
 
3.5  What ‘properties’ of an entity should we attach moral significance 
to? 
 
In this section, we examine some of the arguments that have been advanced claiming 
moral significance for specific or aggregated ‘properties’ of an entity. 
Membership of a biologically defined species 
Some opponents of abortion claim that moral significance should attach to those 
entities possessing genetic or biologically human characteristics, but Burgess rejects 
 
61 For eg, Alberta Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, ‘After Birth Abortions: Why should the baby live?’ (2012) J Med ethics 
2011-100411. 
62 John Harris, Clones, Genes & Immortality: Ethics and the Genetic Revolution (Oxford University Press 1998), 79. 
63 John Harris, ‘The concept of the person and the value of life’, (1999) 9(4) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 293. 
64  Tooley 2013 (n2), 272.  See also Lawrence and Brazier (n5). 
65 Tooley 2009 (n30), 60. 
66 Daniel R A. Cox, ‘The problems with utilitarian conceptions of personhood in the abortion debate’ (2011) 37(5) Journal 
of Medical Ethics 318.  
67 Tooley 2013 (n2) 271. 
68 Tooley 2009, (n30) 61-64; Tooley 2013 (n2). Tooley has shifted his position on this issue (Wolf-Devine & Devine (n39), 
198-202). 
69 McMahan 2002 (n43), 360. 
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the notion that the formation of the human zygote can be a morally significant event.70  
Indeed, species centric claims to moral status are generally contested71 because they 
involve an arbitrary selection of species “without reference to morally differentiating 
characteristics”.72  The obvious alternative is to concentrate on morally significant 
characteristics that exclude species membership – for example, Peter Singer prefers a 
sentience test for moral status encompassing some higher functioning creatures (but 
not all animals) within its remit.73  These speciest considerations are likely to become 
especially important, when and if, we are confronted with genetically modified or 
enhanced humans (posthumans), synthetic humanoid life and artificially intelligent 
beings.74   
Potentiality 
The focus of potentiality is on the future human person that the entity will become, and 
the importance of not depriving the future life of that being.75  This interest in the 
protection of future potential life permeates many important legal rulings, including 
Blackmun J’s judgment in the seminal US case of Roe v Wade.76  A leading supporter 
of potentiality, Donald Marquis, claims that it is morally wrong to deprive “futures of 
value”.77  Ronald Dworkin rejects this approach because the human embryo is neither 
a current rights bearer or interest holder.78  There is also an important difference 
between saying that an entity may or will become a future human being.79  Further, 
Savulescu highlights the potential of many precursors to human life - including the egg 
and sperm - in an attempt to show the absurdity of Marquis’ approach.80  Smith claims 
that the fact that all humans have the potential to be a corpse, does not necessitate 
treatment of the current person as a future corpse.81  Potentiality arguments also 
present a problem for the equality of all human beings - anomalous embryos may 
never have the capacity to become a human person - and cannot be applied equally 
without some form of qualification.82   
 
70 Burgess (n33). 
71 Peter Singer, Practical ethics (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press 1979); Marquis (n26); Tooley ((n30); (n21)). 
72 Greasley (n59), 110. 
73 Singer (n71). See also Tooley 2009 (n30), 21-33. 
74 For discussion, see Lawrence and Brazier (n5). 
75 See Warnock (n8), 66. For wider discussion, see Lynn M. Morgan, ‘The Potentiality Principle from Aristotle to Abortion’, 
(2013) 54: S7 Current Anthropology S15-S25. 
76 [1973] 410 US 113 (US Supreme Court); See also In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 27, [119] (Lord Mance). 
77 Marquis (n27), 23. 
78 Dworkin (n3). 
79 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Clarendon Press 1984). 
80 Savulescu (n55). 
81 Stephen Smith, ‘Precautionary reasoning in determining moral worth’, chp 11 in M, Freeman (ed), Law & Bioethics 
(OUP 2008) 
82 Tooley 2009 (n30), 36. 
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Various counter responses have been advanced.  Nobbs claims that the increasing 
likelihood of human personhood should be linked to increasing moral value.83  Finnis 
requires active potentiality - the ability of the entity to develop/ activate their potential 
without external interference - to circumvent the Savulescu argument because 
becoming an entity would no longer rely upon extrinsic causes.84  Marquis limits his 
potentiality claims to the deprivation of “futures of value’” in respect of the “very same 
individual”.85  McMahan counters that Marquis’ argument fails “to take account of the 
difference in the ways that fetuses and adults are related to their own future selves”.86  
Further, McMahan concludes that  we never existed as a pre-sentient fetus - that such 
entities are not the very same individual - and instead offers his TRIA (Time-Relative 
Interest Account) theory which considers the extent to which an entity is 
psychologically invested in or connected with its possible future.  By doing so, he seeks 
to play to our intuitions on the relative ‘wrongness’ of killing at different stages of a 
pregnancy and post birth life.87  However McMahan does not rely on a single property 
or characteristic to advance his claims, and this is an issue to which we will return. 
Moral agency 
These approaches claim that moral status comes from the capacity of an entity to act 
as a moral agent, involving the capacity to make judgements about the rightness or 
wrongness of actions and the ability to hold motives that can be judged morally.88  
Again this has exclusionary implications for adult human beings that do not have the 
relevant capacity.  One response has been to distinguish between ‘potential’ (someone 
who we think might be an agent) and ‘ostensible’ agents (someone we are fairly certain 
is an agent).89  This distinction is combined with a ‘precautionary principle’ requiring 
agents, as far as possible, to extend generic rights to anything that is even conceivably 
a moral agent.90  On this basis, we might claim that the late stage fetus is a ‘potential’ 
moral agent, although any fetal rights would remain subject to the rights of ostensible 
agents (the pregnant woman) when there is real and significant risk to that individual’s 
life (by continuance of the pregnancy). 
Capacity or cognitive properties 
 
83 Christopher Nobbs, ’Probability Potentiality’, (2007) 16(2) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 240. 
84 John Finnis, ‘The rights and wrongs of abortion’, (1973) 2 Philosophy and public affairs 117. 
85 Marquis (n27), 24. 
86 McMahan (n43), 271.  See also Greasley (n59),154-159. 
87 For critique of McMahan and defence of Marquis, see P, Nichols, ‘Abortion, Time-Relative Interests and Futures Like 
Ours’, (2012) 15 Ethic Theory Moral Prac 493. 
88 Beauchamp & Childress (n4), 72. 
89 Derek Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford University Press 2001). 
90 Ibid. See also Stephen Smith, ‘Dignity: The difference between abortion and neonaticide for severe disability’, chp 10 
in Charles A. Erin and Suzanne Ost (eds), The Criminal Justice System and Health Care (OUP 2007). 
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These theoretical approaches claim that full moral status and human personhood 
should be reserved to those entities possessing certain capacities (eg viability or 
sentience) or specific cognitive properties (eg self-awareness, control, consciousness, 
reason).91  There has been criticism that such theories create inequality for the very 
young, elderly and mentally disabled if applied consistently across human life.92  Some 
of these arguments may unnecessarily conflate moral status with moral/legal 
protection, because there are cases when we afford greater moral/legal protection than 
might otherwise be justified by strict entity status (eg for prevention of animal cruelty).  
Some assume that capacity needs to be exercised in a continuum to count, although 
such arguments fail to adequately account for repetitive and temporary variations in our 
consciousness due to sleep, anaesthesia etc.  However, capacity or cognitive 
approaches do have the potential for over inclusion (when applied beyond human life) 
unless they are able to defeat the speciest objections discussed earlier.93 
Relational properties 
With relational properties, the focus is on the relationship between the pregnant woman 
and developing entity; and the consequential affect on the moral and legal 
consequences of pregnancy.  Judith Thomson points out that opponents of pregnancy 
termination: 
“have tended to overlook the possible support they might gain from making out 
that the fetus is dependent on the mother, in order to establish that she has a 
special kind of responsibility for it, a responsibility that gives it rights against her 
which are not possessed by any independent person” 94 
This statement links fetal dependence with moral responsibility on the part of the 
pregnant woman.  Herring has suggested that this relationship reflects the way women 
look at pregnancy in the real world,95 and Dworkin frames the relationship in the 
following emotive terms: 
“her foetus is not merely ‘in her’ as an inanimate object might be, or something 
alive but alien that has been transplanted into her body. It is ‘of her and is hers 
and is hers more than anyone’s’ because it is, more than anyone else’s, her 
creation and her responsibility; it is alive because she has made it come 
alive.”96  
However, this narrative shifts the emphasis away from dependence and infers that the 
pregnant woman can assume moral responsibility for the unborn entity because of her 
 
91 We have already addressed many of the key arguments (eg from Harris; Tooley; Singer).   
92 Elizabeth Wicks, ‘Terminating life & Human Rights: The fetus and the neonate’, chp 11 in C A. Erin and S. Ost (eds), 
The Criminal Justice System in Health Care (OUP 2007); Cox (n66); Beauchamp & Childress (n4), 69-75.   
93 Greasley (n59), 160. 
94 Thomson (n3), 58. 
95 Herring 2012 (n48), 325.  
96 Dworkin (n3), 55. 
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role in its creation.97  Clearly, this has no place in non-consensual pregnancies, and is 
controversial in conceptions arising from contraceptive failure.   
 
Boonin distinguishes responsibility for an entities’ existence from the continuing 
neediness for care and support; claiming that pregnant women are not responsible for 
the latter.98  Any responsibility is not open ended - even if a pregnant woman has some 
moral obligation for the development of the unborn entity, it ought not be converted into 
a legal duty to maintain life at all costs.99  However, the real challenge is whether 
relational approaches in isolation provide a sufficient and necessary condition for moral 
status.  Some claim that extrinsic properties are neither sufficient or necessary,100 and 
even if extrinsic properties can supply a sufficient moral criterion, few are prepared to 
accept that such properties can be an exclusive and necessary criterion for full moral 
status.101  By example, Warren claims that our moral obligations are not “entirely 
contingent upon the prior existence of social or ecological relationships between 
ourselves and them”.102 
 
3.6 Multiple property approaches 
 
Whilst there is an obvious simplicity to these unitary property approaches, they tend to 
unduly narrow the exclusion process, artificially separate the constituent properties of 
life, and fail to adequately recognise the various states in which human life functions.103  
Two key points are emphasised by supporters of an alternative multiple property 
approach.  First, whilst individual properties may provide “a sufficient basis for a 
particular sort of moral status”, none of them “in isolation from the others yields a 
plausible account of moral status”.104  Secondly, singular property approaches tend to 
use intrinsic factors or properties as a sole criterion of moral status.105  Warren defines 
intrinsic properties as those which the entity has and “which it is logically possible for it 
 
97 Francis J. Beckwith, ‘Defending Abortion Philosophically: A Review of David Boonin’s ‘A Defense of Abortion’’, (2006) 
31 Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 177, 191.  For discussion of parental responsibility for multiple pregnancy following 
fertility enhancement, see Helen Watt, The Ethics of Pregnancy, Abortion and Childbirth: Exploring Moral Choices in 
Childbearing (Routledge 2017), 109. 
98 Boonin (n54), 175. 
99 Laura Purdy, ‘Genetics and Reproductive Risk: Can having children be immoral’, chp 11 in Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer 
(eds), Bioethics: An Anthology, (Blackwells 2006); Bonnie Steinbock, ‘Mother-Fetus Conflict’, chp 15 in Helga Kuhse & 
Peter Singer(eds), A Companion to Bioethics (Wiley 2009). 
100 Beauchamp & Childress (n4), 76; Greasley (n59). 
101 Warren (n5), 241-242. 
102 Ibid., 123. 
103 Elizabeth Wicks, The State and the Body: Legal Regulation of Bodily Autonomy (Hart 2016), 12; Beauchamp & 
Childress (n4), 79; Warren (n5), 17; Greasley (n59), chp 7-8. 
104 Warren (n5), 122. 
105 Ibid. 
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to have even if it were the only thing in existence”.106  Extrinsic properties, however, are 
not “logically possible for it to have had were it the only thing in existence”.107  On this 
basis, relational aspects – including the relationship between embryo and pregnant 
woman – are extrinsic considerations.  Multiple property theories often combine 
intrinsic and extrinsic properties to reach conclusions about the moral status of an 
entity.108  In doing so, they acknowledge the importance of intrinsic properties to the 
evaluation of extrinsic factors.  Warren claims, with some force, that: 
“Only a multi-criterial account of moral status can incorporate the sound ethical 
considerations that underlie each of the uni-criterial accounts, while avoiding 
the distortions of moral common sense that result from the attempt to make all 
valid judgements about moral status follow from a single principle”.109 
Gradualism is closely linked to multi-property approaches and we will come to these 
theoretical positions shortly.  Further, it is claimed that intrinsic centred approaches 
tend to distort the discussion of abortion: 
“Opponents of abortion commonly spend most of their time establishing that the 
fetus is a person, and hardly any time explaining the step from there to the 
impermissibility of abortion. Perhaps they think the step too simple and obvious 
to require much comment. Or perhaps instead they are simply being 
economical in argument. Many of those who defend abortion rely on the 
premise that the fetus is not a person, but only a bit of tissue that will become a 
person at birth; and why pay out more arguments than you have to? Whatever 
the explanation, I suggest that the step they take is neither easy nor obvious, 
that it calls for closer examination than it is commonly given, and that when we 
do give it this closer examination we shall feel inclined to reject it.”110 
For that reason, we now move on to examine the arguments around the permissibility 
of pregnancy termination. 
 
3.7  Permissibility of pregnancy termination – the arguments 
 
Moral permissibility does not necessarily require normative action or mean that 
permissible acts cannot be subject to criticism.111  Similarly, moral permissibility does 
not dictate that a State should offer no legal protection against actual or threatened 
harm, even in circumstances when it might be technically permissible to inflict or 
 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid, chp 6. 
109 Ibid., 177. 
110 Thomson (n3), 48.  For a contrary view emphasising the importance of personhood, see Greasely (n59). 
111 Boonin (n54), 5-8; Greasley (n59), 180. 
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threaten that harm.   In this section, we will concentrate on the key arguments that 
have been advanced in relation to pregnancy termination: 
No moral status and no right to life 
If a human embryo/ fetus has no moral status, or at least no status as a ‘human 
person’, it should follow that there is no right to life and any consequential termination 
of that entity would be prima facie permissible.  In Tooley’s early work, he defended the 
killing of early neonates on the basis that they were not yet ‘human persons’,112 
although his argument has become more nuanced over time.113  More recently, 
Giubilini and Minerva have asserted that neither a human fetus or newborn child “is a 
‘person’ in the sense of ‘subject of a moral right to life”,114 generating a largely adverse 
global response.115  Indeed, it is rare to see contemporary denials of ‘personhood’ 
coupled with unqualified opposition to legal protective mechanisms.116 
Rights oriented 
This ethical discourse centres on the existence of rights and the resolution of rights-
oriented conflict between the pregnant woman and her unborn baby(ies); 
encompassing a range of claims including opposition to the termination of innocent 
beings with a right to life, to maternal rights as trumps, through to the blanket denial of 
unborn entity interests or rights.  Such arguments require clarity about the content and 
scope of any claimed right to life, and the conflicting maternal rights in play (eg the right 
to bodily integrity, to autonomy or to privacy).  In our context, we might want to consider 
whether a distinction should be made between a possible right to avoid continued 
pregnancy/ birth and a possible right to determine the type or future of an unborn entity.  
The latter might prove important should removal of an unborn fetus prove a viable 
alternative to termination. 
Your theory of rights is likely to prove important in this discourse.  The choice (or will) 
theory of rights,117 is unlikely to assist an entity without the necessary understanding 
and capacity to exercise or waive choice.  However, if you subscribe to the interest (or 
benefit) theory,118 it is likely to prove easier to treat these entities as rights holders, 
 
112 Michael Tooley, Abortion & infanticide (OUP 1983) 
113 Tooley 2013 (n2). 
114 Giubilini and Minerva (n61), 2. 
115 Tooley 2013 (n2). 
116 For example, McMahan 2002 (n43). 
117 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (OUP, 1984). 
118 Joseph Raz, ‘Right-based Moralities’ (1982) in J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of Rights (OUP 1984). 
  
55 
 
although any approach would still need to address the interests at play and the content 
of any embryo/ fetal right.119  Either way, we should never forget that: 
“a considerable amount is on the line for women in securing reproductive 
control, and that denying them that control is inexorably damaging – damaging 
to their health, life, happiness, and equality”.120 
 
In her seminal paper, A Defense of Abortion,121 Judith Thomson claims that even if we 
assume that the human embryo/ fetus has a prima facie moral status and a right to life, 
it does not follow that it is always morally impermissible to act in a way that results in 
the death of that entity.  Using a series of analogies - the hooked-up violinist, the 
burglar and the people seeds/plants - she sets out to demonstrate that there is no 
automatic conflict between maternal and fetal rights.  Essentially, Thomson maintains 
that any embryo/fetal right to life does not include an open-ended right to life support, 
or unqualified use of the woman’s body; casting pregnancy as an act of good 
samaritanism.122  However, Thomson does not maintain that termination is always 
permissible,123 or claim an unqualified “right to secure the death of the unborn child”: 
“You may detach yourself even if this costs him his life; you have no right to be 
guaranteed his death, by some other means, if unplugging yourself does not kill 
him.” 124  
So, whilst it may sometimes be permissible to terminate a pregnancy, it does not follow 
that the mother has a right to terminate viable fetal life.  This has implications for the 
the termination method, the permissibility of late stage terminations and for the cost of 
supporting life.125  Whilst there are many attacks on Thomson’s paper,126 there is no 
doubting the central force, creativity and longevity of her central claims. 
If the unborn entity is not a rights bearer, the position appears to be much clearer.  The 
pregnant woman - as an autonomous rights bearer - should be able to make her own 
decision about the continuance of the pregnancy unless there is some basis for 
legitimate state interference with that right.  Interventions restricting bodily autonomy 
(and specifically reproductive choices) and based upon a Millian concept of harm 
prevention, would only be justified if the actual or threatened harm to the ‘other’ is both 
 
119 Joseph Millum, The Moral Foundations of Parenthood (OUP 2018),15-17. For hybrid theories, see Rosamund Scott, 
‘Choosing between Possible Lives: Legal and Ethical Issues in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis’, (2006) 26(1) OJLS 
153. 
120 Kate Greasley (n59), 5-6. 
121 Thomson (n3). 
122 Greasley (n59), 37; Boonin (n54).   
123 Thomson (n3), 65-66. 
124 Thomson (n3), 66. 
125 McMahan (n43),157. 
126 For a comprehensive summary, see Boonin (n54), chp 4.   
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morally indefensible (neither excusable or justifiable) and rights violating.127  The former 
(moral indefensibility) gives rise to the arguments advanced by Thomson above, and 
the latter (rights violating) is of no concern on the basis of our intial assumption.128  
Further, it should make no difference that the exercise of private reproductive choice 
will “cause offence to others, or harm to the person making the autonomous choice”.129  
However, there might still be grounds justifying State intervention in reproductive 
choices, for example, to prevent adverse consequences for the dignity or future of the 
human species as a whole.130  
Maternal permission and responsibility 
Discourse on maternal permission focuses on how specific life was created.131  Clearly, 
there will not be any permission in pregnancies that arise from sexual crime.  However 
when the pregnancy arises from consensual sexual intercourse, it has been argued 
that the woman has given permission and/or assumed the foreseeable risk and 
responsibility for that pregnancy.132  These are distinct arguments - the former will be of 
no concern for those who claim that a woman’s rights outweigh those of the unborn 
entity, or to those who say that consent/ permission is a conditional thing that can be 
withdrawn at any time.  Also, Wilkinson stresses that we should not conflate parental 
obligations owed to current children with those that might be owed by prospective 
parents.133  Whilst it might make sense to have some degree of convergence, much will 
depend on the extent to which obligations have been voluntarily assumed by the 
parents concerned.  In the case of unwanted pregnancy, it is probably artificial to claim 
that voluntariness extends to the continuation of the pregnancy.  Of course, the point 
about current/ prospective parents is a circular one for those that maintain that the 
fetus is a current child with existent and correlative rights against their parents. 
What about the parental role in creation of the unborn entity? Although Thomson does 
not explicitly consider a failure to take reasonable precautions,134 she does address 
pregnancy following a failure of contraception using her people seed/plant analogy.  In 
those circumstances, she claims that the embryo/ fetus does not have a right to use of 
the woman’s body.135  Indeed a key facet of Thomson’s thesis is that a special 
 
127 Wicks (n103),48-52; Joel Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP 1984). 
128 For Wicks, the issue turns on viability ((n103), 52). 
129 Ibid., 157. 
130 Ibid., 58/155. 
131 Boonin (n54),188. 
132 Wolf-Devine & Devine (n39), 93.  Cf competing arguments advanced by Millum (n119), chp 4. 
133 Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children: the ethics of selective reproduction (Oxford University Press 
2010), 55.   
134 She talks in terms of ‘reasonable precautions’ (n3), 65. 
135 Thomson (n3), 59. A right to unplug does not extend to a right to terminate life (Boonin (n54), 233). 
  
57 
 
responsibility to support/aid the unborn entity only exists if it is explicitly or implicitly 
assumed and, in most scenarios, that will not be the case.136  This volunteer theory of 
obligations leaves a vulnerable entity (potentially) unprotected,137  although it does 
create space for social conventions to play a role in the acquisition of parental 
responsibilities.138  Finally, Scott makes this telling observation about the 
interconnection between fetal interests and maternal duties: 
“The moral status of the fetus cannot be settled ‘in advance’, without regard to 
its location inside a pregnant woman: the question of the interests and rights, if 
any, of the fetus is related to the question of the duties, if any, that the pregnant 
woman owes it.”139 
Killing and letting die 
In this discourse, the focus is on how the embryo/ fetal life is brought to an end.140  In 
an attempt to differentiate Thomson’s violinist analogy from the termination of 
pregnancy, Finnis draws upon the claimed moral distinction between killing and letting 
die.141  He argues that Thomson needs to establish that the unhooking of the violinist142 
is a direct killing before it can be used as an analogy for abortion.  He claims that 
unhooking life support is a case of letting someone die, whereas abortion always 
involves direct killing.  The claimed moral distinction between killing and letting die is 
controversial - Thomson claims that there is no relevant or meaningful moral 
distinction, 143 whilst others contend that letting die can be morally worse than killing.144   
In any event, does the termination of a pregnancy or specific entity life necessarily 
involve a positive act to end life, or is it more akin to a refraining or a failure to rescue 
or otherwise volunteer support?  Some methods of termination (eg surgical dilation and 
evacuation) do not closely resemble the ‘unplugging’ analogy offered by Thomson, and 
arguably “involve something more like a direct attack on the body of the fetus”.145  
Similarly feticide by lethal injection (prevalent in fetal reduction) may give rise to 
different considerations to medical termination by drugs (prevalent in the majority of 
 
136 Kaczor (n24), 149. For discussion of the difference between ‘special’ and ‘general’ responsibilities (Millum (n119),18-
22). 
137 Wolf-Devine & Devine (n39).   
138 Millum (n119), chp 4. 
139 Rosamund Scott, ‘Reproductive Health: Morals, Margins and Rights’, (2018) 81(3) MLR 422.  See also Watt (n97) on 
the importance of relational considerations. 
140 Boonin (n54), 188. 
141 Finnis (n84). See also Greasely (n59), 39-56. 
142 The analogy uses a scenario where a person wakes up to discover they have been hooked up effectively as life 
support to an unconscious violinist.  Thomson argues that it is permissible for you to unhook that support even though it 
will result in the violinist’s death. 
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singleton terminations).146  Wider extrinsic considerations may impact on our 
perspective and assessment of moral responsibility.  For example, if we contrast the 
direct administration of a lethal fetal injection with circumstances where a doctor 
prescribes abortifacient medication which is taken or administered directly by the 
pregnant woman.  Here, extrinsic factors undoubtedly feed into whether we frame 
these as direct or assisted killings, or as a failure to prevent the death of the unborn 
entity.147  If we presume, for one moment, (1) that there is a moral distinction between 
killing/ letting die, (2) relevant personhood and (3) that termination of pregnancy is a 
“prima facie violation of a strict duty not to kill other people” then:148 
“its moral and legal responsibility depends on the applicability of a special 
dispensation to kill in order to end a pregnancy, rather than on the absence of a 
duty to volunteer gestational services”.149 
An alternative distinction is between ‘harming’ and ‘not helping’,150 although this 
probably does not resolve the issues already highlighted. The existence of pre-existing 
obligations to assist or rescue may be central to the ‘not helping’ category, but in the 
absence of positive duties to act, we probably have to question whether it is ever 
permissible to kill when the option to let die is also available without additional burden 
on the agent.151  Ultimately, these considerations have implications for the termination 
methods selected and become important when external fetal support becomes a 
routine reality. 
Self or private defence 
If termination of pregnancy is characterised as a positive act (killing), it might be 
morally permissible for the pregnant woman to defend herself against an imminent 
threat to her life.  If we set aside the woman’s potential responsibility for the creation of 
that threat, this would limit permissible termination to circumstances involving an 
imminent threat to the life of the agent bringing about the death of the entity.  For 3rd 
party intervenors, the moral foundation cannot be based on the defence of their own 
personal right to life because the threat is not being made against them.  In any event, 
the intervening agent is limited to a necessary, immediate and proportionate response, 
which may not involve bringing about the death of the viable fetus.  It is also doubtful 
whether self/ private defence can provide a moral excuse or justification, when the 
 
146 cf Greasley (n59), chp 3.   
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150 Philippa Foot, ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect’, (1967). Oxford Review, No. 5; cf 
Greasley (n59), 54.   
151 See Greasley (n59), 55-57. 
  
59 
 
threat comes from an innocent, non-culpable and potentially ‘non-responsible’ entity.152  
It is also problematic to characterise the embryo or fetus as an active aggressor.153  
Gradualist and aggregation theories 
Gradualism challenges any claim or belief that human personhood occurs or is 
otherwise acquired at a single determinate point in time.154   Gradualist theories claim a 
progressive shift in moral status rather than using a single fixed point in development.  
For example, Michael Lockwood claims that there is a gradual progression from human 
organism to human being to human person with differential rights and moral status 
acquired during development.155  He is unable to state precisely when these shifts 
occur and offers a graduated rather than an ‘all or nothing’ approach.  On the face of 
things, gradualism offers a pragmatic approach, avoids arbitrary cut offs and plays to 
our intuitions about pregnancy.  However, these theoretical positions will never satisfy 
those who argue for clear and determinate lines around moral status.156   
Notably, Kate Greasley asserts that many gradualist accounts are not actually claiming 
that the unborn entity is “continuously accruing moral status” during pregnancy.157  In 
many cases, it is the acquisition of specific attributes or capacities that tip the balance 
in favour of human personhood.  Indeed, Greasley claims that chronological closeness 
to personhood cannot (on its own) provide a sufficient basis for a change in moral 
status.   Gradualism needs to demonstrate the basis for a progressive shift in moral 
status,158 and the answer may come from the aggregated cluster or multi-property 
approaches discussed earlier.  For her part, Greasley attaches specific weight to the 
concept of individuated human embodiment – the extent to which the unborn entity 
takes on the archetypal form of an embodied human person - claiming that this helps 
explain why we might regard “earlier and later developed fetuses differently”, and 
associate increasing moral respect to growing human embodiment.159  Similarly, 
Carson Strong connects increasing moral status with the “the acquisition of an 
increasing number of morally relevant similarities to the paradigm”.160  These specific 
approaches enable gradualists to answer speciest claims challenging capacity or 
attribute centric theories of moral status.   
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The other significant difficulty for gradualism to overcome is the fact of variation in 
capacity and attributes during the course of human life.  As discussed, transient 
variation may be easier to address than more permanent states of affair.  Greasley 
attempts to circumvent the issue by claiming that personhood is a “range property” 
which allows for some variation across the human race,161 thereby avoiding the 
impression of arbitrariness when selecting a single point (eg birth) as the basis for 
making moral distinctions.  This does not provide a solution without some consensus 
on the scope of the “range property” but it does provide a broader platform for 
negotiating compromise. 
Procreative beneficence162  
Beneficent theories claim parental (moral) obligations to create children with the best 
possible chance of the best life and these obligations can be divided into negative 
duties not to cause harm and positive duties to maximise available benefits. These 
theories assert that there are circumstances (eg certain anomalies) when causing 
death, or allowing an entity to die, provides a positive benefit and involves no actual 
harm to the entity involved.  The concept of ‘best life’ is contentious because it involves 
ostensible moral judgements about different kinds of human life and exposes these 
approaches to accusations of unwarranted discrimination and the expression of hurtful 
beliefs.  Indeed, ethicists like Savulescu and Kahane are keen to distance themselves 
from such attacks and reject any claim that their articulation ‘expresses a discriminatory 
and hurtful attitude towards people with species atypical traits.’163  .   
The concept of ‘death as a benefit’ maintains that the wrongness of killing is 
fundamentally due to the harm it inflicts on the victim.  So, if death brings benefit to that 
entity, killing that being should not be a prima-facie wrong.  However, these 
approaches require an assessment of benefit/ harm for an entity that is unable to 
communicate or exist independently.  Anomalous conditions might cause suffering but 
not all such conditions involve immediate or continuous pain and discomfort.  Things 
get even more complicated if we introduce possible future disability or deterioration, or 
the risk of false positive diagnostic findings prior to termination.  Of course, there is a 
danger in using abstract or consequential concepts of harm or benefit to justify the 
ending of life; and any satisfactory theory needs to address the appropriate degree of 
harm that would qualify for the “better off dead” outcome.164  Consequential 
 
161 Greasley (n59), 183.   
162 Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane, ‘The moral obligation to create children with the best chance of the best life’, 
(2009) 23(5) Bioethics 274; Guido Pennings, ‘Selective termination, fetal reduction and analogical reasoning’ (2013) 26(6) 
Reproductive Bio-Medicine Online (Elsevier Science) 525. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Wilkinson (n133), Chp 3. 
  
61 
 
articulations may dwell on broader societal good or benefit, but still run the risk of being 
pejoratively labelled ‘eugenic’.165  However, if the entity has no relevant moral status, 
there is no need to count or assess the benefit or harm to that being when taking or 
omitting to takes steps against it. 
Private v public morality 
The basic claim here is that reproductive health decisions should be a matter for 
private rather than public morality, and accordingly, it is inappropriate to regulate 
terminations and the pregnancy relationship using public law.166  However, the 
private/public dichotomy is problematic because it is not always possible to draw a 
precise boundary between the two areas.167  Indeed, Wicks argues that an activity can 
remain private “even when conducted partially in public”,168 and to determine the issue: 
“it is necessary to question the nature of the activity, the nature of the choice 
made by all parties, and the potential consequences of the conduct.”169 
Further, she claims that where “choices about the body…cause harm to others”, it is 
unnecessary to “dismantle the entire dividing line between public and private 
spheres”;170 instead determining the issue by reference to the impact on ‘other’ entities.  
Wick’s approach still leaves the difficulty of determining that impact and the status of 
those ‘other’ entities.   
MacKinnon claims that that there are clear public interests at stake in this arena - the 
need to secure gender equality – and confining matters to the private sphere is 
problematic if women are not actually free and equal in that domain.171  Greasley 
counters that the sex equality interest is insufficient (by itself) to justify terminations of 
pregnancy172 because she maintains that it is child rearing and related obligations, and 
not pregnancy that chiefly undermine or disadvantage women.  However, Greasley’s 
argument takes a fairly broad view of disadvantage and discounts any impact during 
the pregnancy period. 
Intuition 
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Intuitive approaches claim that moral status is a matter of common sense,173 rely upon 
substantial consensus within a community,174 and clearly link to extrinsic 
considerations.  These approaches do not provide a solid moral foundation or establish 
the correctness of any moral theory without independent justification;175 and fail in 
circumstances where there is significant cultural or religious variation around the value 
of specific life.176 
Intrinsic value of human life 
In Life’s Dominion, Ronald Dworkin claims that there are two distinct questions that are 
often, and mistakenly, conflated in the abortion debate: (1) when does a human 
creature acquire interests and rights; and (2) when does the life of a human creature 
acquire intrinsic value independent of use and with what consequences?177  The first 
question generates polarised answers to the question of human personhood.  
However, Dworkin claims that there is a large degree of agreement over the second 
question, although, we interpret the idea of ‘intrinsic value’ in different ways.  
Ultimately, what we deplore is the frustration of life, not its mere absence and and any 
wrong involves a disregard of that intrinsic value.  This approach seeks to highlight 
where and why we disagree, and to demonstrate that those disagreements are “as at 
bottom spiritual”.178  Dworkin argues that the interpretation of ‘intrinsic value’ will 
determine our legal and moral responses to abortion.  
McMahan claims that this approach (if restricted to humans) is speciest because it 
“groundlessly attributes greater value to a human organism than to comparable 
organisms”.179  He also challenges Dworkin’s assessment of value by the reference to 
investments in life by those other than the entity itself.  Greasley’s principally objects to 
Dworkin’s circumvention of the personhood issue and claims that his second question 
still requires us to: 
“hypothesize a point in the development of human life when terminating that life 
for anything other than saving the lives of a greater number is an impermissible 
affront to life’s sacred value, the obvious question then being just what it is that 
ushers in this enhanced moral status.  In other words, whose life is sacred, and 
why?”.180 
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Conferred moral standing 
If an entity has no intrinsic moral status, can we confer moral standing on them for 
consequentialist or other reasons?181  Some precautionary theories answer in the 
affirmative - for example, the ‘golden rule’ claims:  
“my life is worth living; I was once like you; you are the vehicle through which I 
came into existence; I am glad I was not terminated”.182  
This has links to potentiality, although the focus is on a backward, rather than a 
forward-looking assessment of the value of life.  Interestingly, the Roman Catholic 
Church have claimed that a human embryo ‘must be treated from conception as a 
person’,183 a statement attempting to confer moral personhood to that entity.184   
Avoiding the issue of moral status 
David Boonin contends that two separate questions need to be addressed in the 
debate: (1) is abortion moral or immoral and (2) should abortion be legal or illegal.185  
So far, we have concentrated on the first question but Boonin claims there are 
legitimate reasons for offering legal protection to the fetus even absent any moral claim 
to that protection.186  One of the key societal issues is whether the law should compel a 
person to be a good samaritan or even a minimally decent one.187  Is it legitimate for 
the law to compel a woman to continue a pregnancy and can we go to Boonin’s second 
question, without properly addressing the first?188  Agreement on the former is unlikely 
within pluralistic society but this has not prevented many States from addressing the 
second question.  Keown accuses the Warnock Committee189 of fudging the question 
of embryonic human status and going “straight to the question of how it is right to treat 
the embryo”,190 although Scott reminds us that the “language of rights is not the only 
valid moral or legal currency”.191 
Combined approaches 
Some theories combine permissibility arguments in an attempt to deliver the decisive 
blow.  For example, McMahan seeks to combine his TRIA theory with Judith 
 
181 Strong (n160). Cf Watt (n97), 24. 
182 Boonin (n54), chapter 5.4; see also McMahan 2002 (n43), 269.   
183 Roman Catholic Church, The Catechism of Church (1997) 2274. 
184 Tooley 2009 (n30), 16. 
185 Boonin (n54), 4. 
186 Boonin (n54), 7. 
187 Thomson (n3), 65. 
188 Cf Greasley (n59), Part 1. 
189 Warnock (n8). 
190 Keown (n44), chapter 8. 
191 Scott, (n119) 161. 
  
64 
 
Thomson’s rights-based theory.192  The most effective combined theories work hard to 
address the following issues: (1) what entities and with what properties have a moral 
status and a right to life and when? (2) what does that right to life entail/include?;(3) is 
killing an entity with a right to life and letting that same entity die a prima facie wrong?; 
(4) if so, are any exceptions morally justified and in what circumstances?; (5) what do 
we do when moral and/or metaphysical status is unclear or controversial?; (6) should 
assessment of moral status, value etc focus solely on the entity or on matters extrinsic 
to that entity?; (7) what matters should we take into account when assessing the 
‘wrongness’ of killing and/or letting die?; (8) when and in what circumstances do 
humans no longer possess the full moral status of a human person? 
 
3.8 Permissibility of selective termination and fetal reduction in multiple 
pregnancy 
 
In this section, we examine the permissibility arguments for selective termination and 
fetal reduction in multiple pregnancy.  First, we should consider whether the ethical/ 
moral issues for selective termination differ from singleton terminations on the grounds 
of fetal anomaly?  In many cases, the only distinguishing feature will be the technical 
issues associated with managing a ‘selective’ procedure, but there may be differences 
associated with the maternal health risks of multiple pregnancy, the targeted fetus and 
the clinical procedure.   The health risks for the unborn entity may differ because 
multiple pregnancy elevates fetal mortality and prematurity rates and those risks 
increase with the numeric order.  The termination procedure may involve some risk for 
the planned survivors especially in monochorionic pregnancies.  We also find ourselves 
confronted by uncomfortable beneficent arguments seeking to differentiate the value of 
certain unborn life.  Our working definition of selective termination also embraces 
conditions in the anomalous fetus that could be “prejudicial to the development” of the 
ostensibly healthy ones.193  These procedures may therefore entail mixed or 
differentiated goals - to avoid future suffering for the anomalous fetus and at the same 
time preserve/ protect the life of the healthy remainers.  Socio-economic (extrinsic) 
considerations may also feature – are the parents likely to cope and afford the caring 
responsibility of a child with disability in combination with their responsibility for 
additional and existing children.   
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Again, the distinguishing features of fetal reduction may be technical/ numerical, but 
may engage consideration of ‘if and when’ it is ever appropriate to terminate a healthy 
fetus to save the ‘lives’ of others?194  This is frequently characterised as the ‘lifeboat 
dilemma’,195 although the analogy is often misapplied and presupposes relevant moral 
status for each entity in the scenario.196  The analogy is essentially deployed to support 
a goal orientated, and specifically utilitarian argument, about achieving the greatest 
good for the least harm.  Pennings contends that the lifeboat analogy can only be 
deployed in a utilitarian argument if the chances for the remaining fetuses increase 
significantly by the termination; the termination does not hold a significant risk for the 
surviving fetuses; and scarcity is such that all cannot survive.197  These conditions may 
not be satisfied in lower order multiples, especially where singleton preservation is 
planned.198   
These procedures involve multiple participants: the pregnant woman, the healthcare 
professionals and the embryo/fetuses. Realistically, the treating clinicians cannot be 
said to be in or on the lifeboat.  The embryos or fetuses may be on the lifeboat but they 
do not have the capacity or liberty to decide whether to stay or go.  The pregnant 
woman usually requires medical assistance but is she in the boat or is her body the 
lifeboat in this analogy?  Users of the analogy need to make the position clear.  If we 
take one oft-cited example: 
“After the loss of a vessel at sea, when a life boat is absolutely full, but some 
passengers remain in the water, a decision must be made about whether it is 
appropriate to refuse admission to one or more people who are in danger of 
drowning.  In that situation, if additional passengers are brought on board, the 
life boat might sink and the lives of all those in the boat may be lost.  On the 
other hand, refusing to lift someone out of the ocean may very well be a 
condemnation to death for that individual.”199 
This variant does not make things clear because even if the lifeboat is the womb, it is 
artificial to suggest that the fetuses are capable of making decisions or letting others on 
board.  If the analogy places the fetal lives at ‘sea’, who or what is the lifeboat and who 
is the person making the decision to save?  
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However, the real problem with the lifeboat analogy is that it presupposes that the 
participants have a morally relevant status.  Without this status, there is no conflict 
between the pregnant woman and the unborn entities or between them.200  In the 
absence of relevant moral status, the permissibility arguments come back to maternal 
rights, intrinsic value and conferred moral protection.   If some moral status is assumed 
or otherwise conferred to the unborn entities, the interaction between fetal and 
maternal rights and interests becomes far more complex than in a singleton pregnancy.  
In many terminations there will be an autonomous choice; but with high order multiples 
the choice to terminate may not be an entirely free one due to the health risks 
associated with the multiple pregnancy.  The fetuses will probably have equal moral 
status (and comparable rights) but a determination will still need to be made as to 
which entity to reduce.  In artificial conception, we might focus on possible parental 
foresight of the risk of multiple gestation to maintain a special obligation to gestate, 
although we would still need to address competing considerations threatening that 
pregnancy and wider entity survival or health. 
So, can it ever permissible to terminate the life of an ostensibly healthy life to save, 
preserve or improve the life of another, and how should we go about resolving any 
conflict?  
[The following discussion presupposes relevant moral fetal status] 
A goal orientated and specifically utilitarian ethical approach would claim that it is 
legitimate to achieve the greatest good for the least harm, subject to the limitation 
identified by Pennings above.201  It is legitimate to count the benefit/harm in relation “to 
all those affected by an action” but on one account, only “to those judged capable of 
experiencing pain or pleasure, having preferences and so on”.202  It is unlikely that the 
doctor can count as an affected party, although the pregnant woman will not be able to 
access the procedure without significant medical assistance.   
A differentiated goal argument based on the preservation of life would exclude cases 
where there is a primary socio-economic reason for the reduction.203   These 
arguments focus on the ‘end’ or outcome rather than the ‘means’ or side effects of an 
action, and are frequently advanced under the guise of the ‘double effect’ doctrine 
which claims that it is sometimes permissible to undertake an act that has a bad 
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effect.204  The doctrine rests on a particular definition of good/bad effect, and relies 
heavily on maintaining a  moral distinction between intention and foresight.  These are 
matters that are heavily contested in the academic literature,205 and difficult to justify at 
a practical level. 
Duty based ethical theory also presents a challenge for these procedures.  For 
example, deontological theory requires that no one should be treated merely as a 
means to an end.  Doctors might claim a right to protect the life of the pregnant woman 
or fetus, but even if this was possible, they would be limited to immediately necessary 
and proportionate protection, and they would not be able to ground their actions on a 
threat against their own right to life.  Similarly, the pregnant woman could only 
terminate, if life is immediately and substantially threatened by the pregnancy, and 
termination was the only realistic option to avert or materially reduce the risk of that 
outcome. Alternative duty-based articulations206 are unlikely to assist unless the 
pregnant woman’s life is at substantial risk.  The relevance of rights based ethical 
theory will ultimately turn on the priority given to maternal autonomy and liberty.207 
 
3.9 The connections between moral norms/ status and legal protection/ 
interests208 
 
In this section, we consider the second of Boonin’s questions, namely whether 
termination of pregnancy should be lawful.209  We will put to one side any technical 
difference between legality and lawfulness.  To address Boonin’s question, we need to 
explore the connection between moral norms/status and legal protection/liability.  A 
direct connection between morality and the law is rooted in natural law theories, whilst 
legal positivists take a separationist approach to the issue to varying degrees.210  
Responding to criticism by Dworkin (who conceptualised legal rights as a species of 
moral rights), Hart claims that: 
“Legal rights and duties are the point at which the law with its coercive 
resources respectively protects individual freedom and restricts it or confers on 
individuals or denies to them the power to avail themselves of the law’s 
 
204 Beauchamp & Childress (n4), 165. 
205 Paula Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Blackwells 1978). 
206 Eg Dignitarianism (Beyleveld and Brownsword (n89)). 
207 Wale (n194). 
208 For discussion of of the connection between moral status and moral protection, see Beauchamp & Childress (n4), chp 
3.   
209 Boonin (n54), 4. 
210 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence (4th ed, OUP 2015), 126-131. 
  
68 
 
coercive machinery.  So whether the laws are morally good or bad, just or 
unjust, rights and duties demand attention as focal points in the operations of 
the law which are of supreme importance to human beings and independently 
of moral merits of the laws.  It is therefore untrue that statements of legal rights 
and duties can only make sense in the real world if there is some moral ground 
for asserting their existence”.211 
However, there are dangers in adopting an entirely separatist stance because laws that 
are incompatible with moral norms are likely to be viewed as unjust by the communities 
on which they are imposed with consequences for acceptance and enforcement.  From 
a practical perspective, we should also consider whether the law is the most 
appropriate vehicle for pursuing moral ‘ideals’ - as opposed to setting minimum 
standards – and, for prioritising community rather than individualist goals.  We may 
also want to distinguish between the issue (public or private domain), type of law 
(criminal or civil) or the social goals of regulatory intervention.  Divergence may not be 
acceptable in sensitive areas with far reaching ramifications for individuals within the 
community.  In the context of end of life decision-making, Hoffmann LJ asserted: 
“This is not an area [in] which any difference can be allowed to exist between 
what is legally and morally right. The decision of the court should be able to 
carry conviction with the ordinary person as being based not merely on legal 
precedent but also upon acceptable ethical values” 212  
Even in less significant cases, Hoffmann LJ claimed that law must still be decided with 
“regard to the general moral considerations”,213   although his framing clearly affords 
the judiciary with a degree of discretion.  This may not be problematic in our context 
because: 
“the law may have the elbow-room to frame its permissions more loosely than 
those of morality if the moral cost of abortion does not entail murder, but 
involves some less grave kind of wrong”214 
The acceptable gap between what is legal and ethical will be an issue to which we 
return. 
So far, we have been assuming that it is possible to determine clear moral norms but 
how might the law respond where there is clear polarity within a community or sections 
thereof?  One response might be to attempt to broker a consensus, although this will 
probably easier, if the divergence is narrow or otherwise lacking sensitivity.  This 
process may be facilitated by framing the dispute in a way that emphasises points of 
 
211 Leslie Green, Joseph Raz and Penelope A. Bulloch, HLA Hart’s ‘The Concept of Law’ (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 
2012), 269. 
212 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL). 
213 Ibid. 
214 Greasley (n59), 4. 
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convergence rather than divergence.215  Although divergent opinions “must be 
accommodated within the law”,216  it may not be possible to achieve sufficient 
agreement on core moral issues or legal rules/ethical codes capable of resolving all 
moral conflict.217  Law makers have to decide how to mediate between competing 
views and there is an inherent danger that one view is enforced or preferred over 
another.218  In Great Britain, that accommodation has taken place by fudging the issue 
of entity status and by medicalising the lawful access and decision-making processes 
around termination of pregnancy.219  
Further, not all aspects of a legal system necessarily have the same functions or 
objectives.  The criminal and civil law have distinct roles and objectives; the former 
being concerned with punishment, retribution and deterrence; and the latter upon 
remedies for the wronged/ loss sufferers.  Notwithstanding overlap, there are differing 
priorities, and we need to be cognisant of the most appropriate/ effective vehicles to 
impose liability or to secure protection for the stakeholders involved.  The social goals, 
degree of likely harm, and the culpability of the individuals concerned, all feed into this 
discourse.  Even if the embryo or fetus have no status as a ‘human person’, a State 
might still legitimately impose barriers to protect women, the possible future person and 
the wider societal interests associated with human reproduction.  There may also be 
societal consequences for removing legal protection or barriers,220  and ultimately, legal 
rules in areas of moral controversy are often the product of political resolution.221  Scott 
makes this telling comment: 
“but as a matter of public policy it may be important to give the embryo some 
legal protection so as to accommodate to some degree differing moral 
perspectives on it.  Further, that the law can protect the embryo (or fetus) to 
some degree even though it lacks moral and legal rights reminds us that the 
language of rights is not the only valid moral or legal currency”.222 
 
3.10 Conclusions 
 
215 Eg, as per Dworkin (n3). 
216 Amel Alghrani, Rebecca Bennet and Suzanne Ost, Bioethics, Medicine, and the Criminal Law, Volume I, The Criminal 
Law & Bioethical Conflict: Walking the Tightrope (Cambridge University Press 2013), chp12. 
217 Beauchamp & Childress (n4). 
218 Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost, Bioethics, Medicine, and the Criminal Law, Volume III, Medicine and Bioethics in 
the Theatre of the Criminal Process (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
219 See Roger Brownsword and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Compromise Medicalisation’ in C. Stanton and others (eds), Pioneering 
Health Care Law Essays: In honour of the work of Professor Margaret Brazier (Routledge 2015) 
220 For example, R v Morgentaler [1998] 3 SCR 463 effectively decriminalised abortion in Canada but produced more 
legal battles and greater barriers for women seeking terminations in that State (Brazier & Ost (n218)). 
221 Brazier and Ost (n218). Cf Greasley (n59), Chp 9. 
222 Scott (n119),161. 
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There are clearly divergent positions on the appropriate moral responses to these 
medical procedures.  This poses a challenge for law makers and legal actors especially 
when the ramifications are so personal, significant and varied.  One principal difficulty 
for law makers, is striking an appropriate balance between flexibility and determinancy 
(eg in setting standards and resolving disputes) so as to influence and direct 
professional behaviours in this context.  It also raises an interesting question about the 
extent to which personal values and beliefs should be accommodated in professional 
medical practice.  These are matters that we will further examine in later chapters.  
Our analysis reveals a significant overlap in the ethical considerations around the 
termination of singleton and multiple pregnancies, but the presence/ development of 
multiple unborn lives generate additional tensions, possible conflict and considerations 
for the key decision-makers.  What we make of the multiple factor will be influenced by 
the value and weight we place on intrinsic/ extrinsic and consequentialist 
considerations.  If your starting point, is that there are no significant interests at stake 
other than those of the pregnant woman, there will be limited moral divergence 
between the singleton and multiple procedures.  However, if fetal interests are 
recognised and linked to the quality of future life, we have a number of specific ethical 
considerations in play. 
What does this background mean for doctors wanting to do the right thing in relation to 
fetal reduction and selective termination?  First, moral conflict, tension or ambiguity 
cannot be avoided entirely because the moral/ethical norms are neither stable, or 
agreed across society.  Secondly, this context makes it very difficult for doctors, and 
healthcare professionals generally, to work in fetal medicine unless they have a 
permissive attitude to termination or otherwise feel able to exclude their personal views 
from daily professional practice.  Thirdly, any legal framework necessarily involves a 
degree of compromise within a divergent moral framework.  As such, doctors cannot 
avoid the consequences of working within the conditions of that compromise.223  
Fourthly, the societal conditions and moral responses to these procedures are 
potentially subject to change over time and this has consequences for rigid and 
inflexible professional or legal frameworks.  This in turn puts pressure on the people 
that have to work in and around those frameworks. 
In closing, we should make our own ethical position clear as this may become 
important in responding to the third research question.  We are generally in favour of 
 
223 Brownsword and Wale (n219) 
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multi-property and gradualist accounts of moral status.  Implantation or formation of the 
primitive streak appears to be a logical, albeit slightly indeterminate point for the start of 
human life.  We do not accept that the intrinsic conditions immediately before and after 
birth are the same; and therefore, acknowledge human birth as a significant moral 
event.  Nonetheless, we do not exclude the relevance of extrinsic factors but agree that 
such considerations are an insufficient basis for establishing moral status in the 
absence of intrinsic features.   
This still leaves us to resolve three major issues.  First, does the implanted human 
embryo or fetus have any morally significant interests prior to birth and is this subject to 
variation during the pregnancy?  Secondly, if we recognise relevant interests, how 
should we address and balance them against the interests of the pregnant woman?   
Thirdly, how should we address any conflict or tension between different embryo or 
fetal interests in any decision to terminate? 
In answer to the first question, we are influenced by capacity considerations and the 
aggregation of characteristics.  As such, we are willing to accept that fetal interests 
change and become relevant in the latter stages of the pregnancy.  At the very least, 
we are persuaded of the case for moral protection changes post viability or the 
acquisition of sentience. This flows into the second question, which is dependent on 
whether we acknowledge that there is a conflict of interests arising from the termination 
of pregnancy.  We are not persuaded that there is an inevitable clash of rights but 
acknowledge that the characterisation of feticide as an omission is problematic.  In any 
event, we have no real hesitation that the woman’s rights and interests should act as 
the trump in the pre viable/ sentient scenario.  Thereafter, the position is less clear but 
if the continuation of the pregnancy is likely to cause serious harm or threat to the life of 
the woman, termination would appear to be a permissible outcome.  In answer to the 
third question, if faced with a straight forward moral choice between no or some 
survivors, we are relatively untroubled by the consequential choice in favour of the 
latter.  However, once we dilute the certainty of outcomes and remove the binary 
nature of the choice, we start to equivocate, at least in isolation to maternal interests.  
We are more certain about selection based on perceived quality of life arguments.  
Whilst, we accept that it might be permissible for parents to take these considerations 
into account, we do not accept that this should be converted into a moral obligation to 
terminate for anomaly / disability, whether significant or otherwise.  Further, whilst 
consideration of fetal interests may be morally permissible, this should not convert any 
concern about anomaly or disability into a legal basis for termination.  This is an issue 
that we will return to. 
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Chapter 4 – Legal Frameworks (1) 
 
Contents: 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Criminal Liability 
4.2.1 Offences (by region) 
4.2.2 Defences (by region).  
4.2.3 Fetal reduction and selective termination in multiple pregnancy. 
4.3 Civil liability. 
4.4 The ‘in utero’ embryo/ fetus. 
4.5 The ‘ex vivo’ embryo. 
4.6 Human rights. 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter maps out the general legal landscape, and in particular, the legal 
framework governing the termination of pregnancy, fetal reduction and selective 
termination.  It also examines the legal treatment of in-utero/ ex-vivo human life and the 
wider human rights jurisprudence.  Our central purpose is to examine how fetal 
reduction and selective termination decisions fit against the general backcloth of the 
law.  We cannot get away from the broader legal framework, from its difficult parts or 
from the fact that there is a fair amount of law to draw upon.  However, what we have 
strived to do, is to unpick the legal features, norms and issues that have particular 
relevance to these specific medical procedures.  From there, we will hopefully have a 
clearer foundation to evaluate how the relevant legal norms align with professional 
norms and clinical practice. 
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4.2  Criminal Liability 
 
4.2.1 Offences: England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
 
The key abortion related offences are found in sections 58/ 59 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861), apply to England, Wales and Northern Ireland,1 
and have a maximum sentence on conviction of life imprisonment.  Section 58 make it 
unlawful to administer certain substances, or to use instruments or other means with 
the intent to procure a miscarriage: 
 
“Administering drugs or using instruments to procure abortion 
Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage, 
shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or shall 
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, 
and whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether 
she be or be not with child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be 
taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any 
instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of 
felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable ... to be kept in penal 
servitude for life.” 
 
The section 58 offence can be committed by the pregnant woman or a third party – the 
former can only commit the offence if ‘with child’ but there is no similar requirement for 
other principals.  As we shall discover, the answer to what it means to be ‘with child’ is 
far from straightforward.  
 
The actus reus of section 58 requires the unlawful administration of ‘poison or other 
noxious thing’ or the use of ‘any instrument or other means’ by the pregnant principal.   
Third party principals need to administer or ‘cause to be taken’ the poison or noxious 
thing, or to use an instrument or other means with intent.  The requisite mens rea is 
‘intent’ to procure a miscarriage.  For third party principals, the prosecution must also 
prove that they believed that a pregnancy did exist – not that it did in fact exist – 
although mere suspicion of pregnancy will not suffice.2   
 
Although section 58 is headed ‘to procure abortion’, this phrasing is absent in the 
textual wording which makes explicit reference to the term ‘miscarriage’.  There is no 
explicit mention of in-utero fetal harm, and the focus of the mens rea element is on the 
 
1 But not Scotland.  These provisions no longer extend to the Republic of Ireland (Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
2013, s5 (EIRE)). 
2 R (John Smeaton on behalf of the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children) v Secretary of State for Health [2002] 
EWHC 610 [234].    
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miscarriage of the pregnancy, rather than actual harm to the fetus or embryo.  
Miscarriage is not defined in the Act and it is unclear whether this term applies to the 
physical miscarriage of the whole pregnancy, or to one or more fetal life. There may be 
occasions where the bi-products of termination will not be physically expelled, and/or 
where there is a lack of intention to procure expulsion (eg in first trimester embryo 
reductions).3  Grubb has suggested that: 
 
“The better view is, however, that the term “miscarriage” does not require 
expulsion of the contents of the womb but merely that some or all of the 
contents cease to be carried alive within it…In any event the argument 
overlooks the fact that ultimately, the withered and dead products of the fetus 
will be expelled at the time the remaining fetuses are delivered” 4 
 
Munby J reviewed the legal authorities in R (Smeaton)5 and ultimately agreed with 
Wright J in the earlier (unreported) case of R v Dhingra6/7 (involving a doctor charged 
under section 588 for fitting an IUD prior to the implantation of a fertilised egg): 
 
“It turns, as it seems to me, upon the true construction in section 58 of the word 
“miscarriage”. Does it have the wider meaning of any external interference with 
the process of reproduction from the time of fertilization; or does it have the 
narrower meaning of the displacement from the woman’s womb, and 
subsequent loss of, an established pregnancy? It is this more restricted 
meaning that is used by the medical profession in modern times… I have come 
to the conclusion that I should adopt the narrower interpretation of this part of 
section 58, and hold that the word “miscarriage” in this context relates to the 
spontaneous expulsion of the products of pregnancy”’9 
 
Grubb claims that the amendments to the Abortion Act 1967 (AA 1967) (as per section 
37 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA 1990)) put the whole 
issue beyond doubt, because fetal reduction and selective termination in multiple 
pregnancy are now treated as ‘miscarriage’.10  Indeed, the AA 1967 now directly and 
explicitly couples the termination of a ‘foetus’ with ‘miscarriage’. 
 
Section 58 does not to apply during the process of birth.  There has been historic 
debate over whether these provisions apply from fertilisation or implantation of the 
 
3 See Alison Hall, ‘Selective Reduction of Pregnancy: A Legal Analysis’, (1996) 5 Journal of Medical Ethics 304.; Margaret 
Brazier, ‘Unfinished Feticide: a legal commentary’, (1990) Journal of Medical Ethics 16; Andrew Grubb, A., ‘The new law 
of abortion: clarification or ambiguity?’ (1991) Crim L.R. 659. 
4 Grubb (n3), 667. 
5 R (Smeaton) (n2), [231]. 
6 (1991) (unreported). 
7 R (Smeaton) (n2) [243]-[255]. 
8 OAPA 1861. 
9 R (Smeaton) (n2), [249]. 
10 Abortion Act 1967 (as amended) s 5(2); Grubb (n3) 668. 
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egg.11  Ultimately, Munby J decided that the term ‘miscarriage’ must be construed by 
‘what it means today’ and the term now means the “termination of an established 
pregnancy, and there is no established pregnancy prior to implantation.”12  So, the 
criminal law conceives the start of a legal pregnancy as implantation - an interpretation 
that is consistent with the statutory provisions governing ex-vivo human life,13 but 
problematic in a legal sense because the timing cannot be established with certainty.  It 
also means that the criminal law only prohibits contraceptive mechanisms that interfere 
with the natural pregnancy processes post implantation. 
 
What does the section 59 offence add if anything to the criminal framework?  
 
“Procuring drugs, etc., to cause abortion 
Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or other noxious thing, 
or any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be 
unlawfully used or employed with intent to procure the miscarriage of any 
woman, whether she be or be not with child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and being convicted thereof shall be liable . . . to be kept in penal servitude . . 
.”14 
 
The section title refers to abortion but again the text employs the term miscarriage.  It is 
aimed at suppliers or procurers of substances/ instruments with knowledge of unlawful 
use or employment against ‘any woman’, irrespective of actual pregnancy.   The 
principal must know that the ‘thing’ is intended to be used or employed unlawfully with 
intent to procure a miscarriage of any woman.  This is clearly important to drug 
manufacturers and wholesalers who produce/ supply abortifacient products, and to 
manufacturers and suppliers of surgical equipment.  Again, there is no clarity on the 
starting point for protection and knowledge is not defined but is likely to be construed 
as more than mere suspicion.15 
 
Finally, we have the seminal case of R v Bourne,16 involving a teenage girl (aged 15) 
who had been raped and subsequently fallen pregnant.  The case is important to our 
understanding and interpretation of the criminal framework prior to the implementation 
of the AA 1967.  Dr Bourne performed a termination of pregnancy on the girl without 
remuneration and was subsequently charged/ tried under section 58 OAPA 1861.  
 
11 See for eg John Keown, ‘Miscarriage: a medico-legal analysis’, (1984) Crim L Rev 604. 
12 R (Smeaton) (n2), [17] [emphasis added]. 
13 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 2(3) states “a woman is not to be treated as carrying a child until the 
embryo has become implanted”. 
14 OAPA 1861, s 59.  See R v Gurpreet Kaur [2015] (unreported) for a recent conviction:  
(<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/woman-sentenced-to-27-months-for-selling-abortion-pills-illegally>access17 
January 2019). 
15 As per Munby J in R (Smeaton) (n2). 
16 R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 (HC) 
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Ultimately, he was found not guilty, but during the trial, Macnaghten J gave the 
infamous direction to the jury, qualifying section 58 with the meaning of section 1(1) of 
the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (ILPA 1929): 
 
“the burden rests on the Crown to satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not procure the miscarriage of the girl in good faith for the 
purpose only of preserving her life. If the Crown fails to satisfy you of that, the 
defendant is entitled by the law of this land to a verdict of acquital.”17 
 
Accordingly, section 58 should be construed so that there can be no conviction where 
the act - the administration or use - is performed in good faith for the sole purpose of 
preserving the life of the woman.18  Further, Macnaghten J went on to direct the jury 
that this requirement “ought to be construed in a reasonable sense”19 and made it clear 
that it was not restricted to cases where there was a risk of instant death: 
 
“if the doctor is of opinion, on reasonable grounds and with adequate 
knowledge, that the probable consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy 
will be to make the woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury are quite entitled 
to take the view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in that 
honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of preserving the life of the 
mother”. 20  
 
His interpretation of this section is therefore a broad one. 
 
The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 applies to England and Wales but not Scotland.  
The terms of this Act were materially replicated in Northern Ireland via the Criminal 
Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945.  The original legislation was introduced because of 
a perceived loophole - section 58 did not offer any protection during the birth process, 
and domestic homicide law21 requires the fetus to have acquired independent existence 
from the mother before applying.22  It was therefore technically possible to kill a baby in 
the course of delivery without committing any criminal offence.  The introduction to the 
Act states it is to “amend the law with regard to the destruction of children at or before 
birth” and has been used in relation to terminations of pregnancy and fetal killing at and 
before birth.23  Section 1(1) provides: 
 
“Punishment for child destruction 
 
17 Ibid., 691. 
18 According to Lord Mance this interpretation would extend to OAPA 1861, s 59 (In the matter of an application by the 
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 27, [77]). 
19 Bourne (n16), 693-694. 
20 Ibid., 694. 
21 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
22 Paton v Trustees of British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1979] QB 276; Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) 
[1998] AC 245 (HL). 
23 For an example of the latter, see The Guardian (17 December 2015),<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/dec/17/man-convicted-of-killing-unborn-baby-by-kicking-pregnant-ex-girlfriend >accessed 22 May 2017. 
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Subject as hereinafter in this subsection provided, any person who, with intent 
to destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive, by any wilful act causes 
a child to die before it has an existence independent of its mother, shall be 
guilty of felony, to wit, of child destruction, and shall be liable on conviction 
thereof on indictment to penal servitude for life: Provided that no person shall 
be found guilty of an offence under this section unless it is proved that the act 
which caused the death of the child was not done in good faith for the purpose 
only of preserving the life of the mother.” 
 
The Act title focuses on “infant life preservation”, whereas section 1 is headed 
“Punishment for child destruction”.  This couples protection with sanction and, unlike 
the OAPA 1861, explicitly directs its focus to a “child capable of being born alive”, a 
concept that appears to correlate with viability.  The ILPA 1929 is silent about what 
“capable of being born alive” means, although section 1(2) does include a presumptive 
feature: 
 
“evidence that a woman had at any material time been pregnant for a period of 
twenty-eight weeks or more shall be primâ facie proof that she was at that time 
pregnant of a child capable of being born alive.” 
 
This provision assists the prosecution and forces defendants to adduce evidence on 
viability in the latter stages of pregnancy.  However, the provision does not provide any 
assistance in calculating the starting point for protection, or any minimum duration for 
the pregnancy.  In C v S, the claimant (the defendant’s former partner) argued that the 
ILPA 1929 applied to a pregnancy of 21 weeks duration.24  The claimant unsuccessfully 
attempted to obtain injunctive relief to prevent a termination although, in any event, the 
defendant carried the child to term and gave the baby to the claimant after birth.  In the 
Court of Appeal, Sir John Donaldson MR said: 
 
“We have no evidence of the state of the foetus being carried by the first 
defendant, but if it has reached the normal stage of development and so is 
incapable ever of breathing, it is not in our judgment "a child capable of being 
born alive" within the meaning of the Act and accordingly the termination of this 
pregnancy would not constitute an offence under the Infant Life (Preservation) 
Act 1929’”25 
 
In Rance & Rance & Others v Mid Downs Health Authority, the doctors had failed to 
pick up an abnormality at the ultrasound scan in the 26 or 27th week of the Claimant’s 
pregnancy.26  The child was subsequently born with abnormalities and the parents 
sued the health authority claiming that they were effectively denied the option of a 
lawful abortion by virtue of this omission.  The health authority argued that by the 
 
24 C v S [1988] QB 135 (CA). 
25 Ibid., 151 H. 
26 Rance & another v Mid Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 QB 587 (HC). 
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26/27th week of pregnancy, the child was capable of being born alive and so any 
termination would have been unlawful under the 1929 Act at that time.  Brooke J 
accepted this view and the claim was dismissed on the following basis: 
 
“In my judgment the meaning of the words "born alive" are clear, and the 
meaning of the words "capable of being born alive" are also clear… is each 
born alive if, after birth, it exists as a live child, that is to say, breathing and 
living by reason of its breathing through its own lungs alone, without deriving 
any of its living or power of living by or through any connection with its mother. 
For the purposes of this judgment I do not have to consider the case of life 
before breathing, which was referred to in Rex v. Brain, 6 C. & P. 349. Once the 
foetus has reached a state of development in the womb that it is capable, if 
born, of possessing those attributes, it is capable of being born alive within the 
meaning of the Act of 1929” 27 
 
He explicitly rejected any suggestion that section 5(1) of the AA 1967 changed or 
modified the meaning of the ILPA 1929.28 
 
Before the AA 1967 was amended29, the ILPA 1929 imposed a possible time restraint 
for lawful terminations once viability was achieved.  Further, C v S made it clear that 
the 28 week time limit was only presumptive, and a pregnancies under 28 weeks could 
still fall under the protection of the ILPA 1929 if the fetus was ‘capable of being born 
alive’.30  However, a time limit has now been imposed for the principal ground for 
termination by the AA 1967.31  Grubb claims that Parliament may have inadvertently 
extended the time limit for legal terminations by the subsequent amendment to section 
5(1) AA 1967 because now, even if a fetus is capable of being born alive, a termination 
will be lawful providing the doctors comply with their obligations under the AA 1967.  
However, the ILPA 1929 still covers situations which is not otherwise authorised by the 
AA 1967.32  The imposition of a time limit via the AA 196733 has the effect of fixing (at 
least for S1(1)(a)) what would otherwise be a variable time limit dependent on available 
technology, knowledge and competence.  Given that 90% of the terminations 
undertaken in England and Wales occur below 13 weeks, most singleton procedures 
are unaffected by these time restrictions in any event.34 
 
The ILPA offence requires an ‘intent to destroy the life of a child capable of being born 
 
27 Ibid., 621 A. 
28 Ibid., 621 F/G. 
29 By the HFEA 1990, s37. 
30 See also Grubb (n3), 664; Rance (n26). 
31 S1(1) (a). 
32 Grubb (n3), 664. 
33 S 1(1)(a). 
34 Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC), Abortion Statistics, England & Wales, 2017 (DHSC Revised December 
2018), para 2.24. 
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alive’ and a ‘wilful act’ causing death.  The term ‘wilful’ is likely to require a deliberate 
rather than a careless act, although the phrase adds little given the requirement of 
intent.35  It is unclear whether an intention to cause some harm to the fetus would 
suffice although foresight of death as a virtual certainty of an act is likely to suffice.36  
Poor drafting also extends into the caveat in section 1(1) with the repeat use of 
negative terms: ‘no person’, ‘unless’ and ‘not done’.  What that section appears to be 
saying is that there can be no conviction if the act that causes the death of the ‘child’ 
was undertaken in good faith and with the sole purpose of preserving the life of the 
mother.   
 
There are also distinct common law provisions governing criminal offences against the 
person that result in death.  In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, criminal homicide 
liability can only arise if a child dies after having obtained independent existence from 
the mother.   Without independent existence, there is no ‘reasonable creature in being’ 
for the purposes of the crime of murder - should the entity die before or during birth, 
there can be no conviction.  In Attorney General’s Reference (No3 of 1994),37 a 
pregnant woman was stabbed in the abdomen causing her baby to be born 
prematurely and the child subsequently died from the consequences of that 
prematurity.  The House of Lords affirmed that the defendant could not be convicted of 
murder and there was no basis for extending the doctrine of transferred malice to a 
case where there had been no intention to injure the fetus.  However, the defendant 
was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter – it was enough that the defendant had 
perpetrated an unlawful act that was objectively dangerous to a 'person', and (for the 
court’s purposes) it did not matter that the unlawful act had been done prior to birth.  
 
This should be contrasted with the subsequent Court of Appeal decision in CP (A 
Child) v Criminal Injuries Compensation.38 This case concerned a child that had 
developed fetal alcohol spectrum disorder as result of maternal alcohol consumption 
during pregnancy.  The legal issue was whether the child could claim under the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme as a victim of a crime.  CP argued that her 
mother had committed an offence under section 23 of the Offences against the Person 
Act 1861 - namely that she had unlawfully administered to “any other person any 
poison or other destructive or noxious thing”, and had inflicted grievous bodily harm as 
a result. There was no dispute that the mother had administered the relevant “thing” 
 
35 Michael Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law (11th ed, Oxford University Press 2011), 90-91.   
36 R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 
37 Attorney General’s Reference (No3 of 1994) (n22). 
38 CP (A Child) v CIC [2014] EWCA Civ 1554 
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(excessive alcohol), or that CP had sustained the necessary degree of harm.  What 
was in issue was whether CP was “any other person under the Act”. The Court of 
Appeal determined that CP did not satisfy the criteria and ruled against CP’s alternative 
argument that equated her situation with the common law offence of unlawful act 
manslaughter. This argument relied on the premise that a fetus becomes a person 
when born. However, the problem for CP was that the unlawful act39 required the 
administration and the infliction of harm to be on “a person” - infliction of harm on an 
embryo or fetus would not suffice.  CP’s attempt to circumvent this problem - by 
arguing that some harm was caused after birth - was also rejected because the fetal 
alcohol spectrum disorder had been factually caused before her birth.  Any post-birth 
suffering was treated as a consequence of the harm suffered in the womb.40  So a child 
once born, cannot claim they are a victim of crime as result of any injuries sustained 
during pregnancy and has no entitlement to criminal injuries compensation.41  This 
means that a pregnant woman can lawfully cause some harm to her developing child 
(subject to civil liability42) but cannot otherwise terminate her pregnancy without lawful 
authority.43 
Offences: England and Wales only 
The Births and Deaths Registration Act 195344 imposes post death registration 
requirements with criminal sanctions in England and Wales45 for ‘still born’ children 
defined as: 
 
“a child which has issued forth from its mother after the twenty-fourth week of 
pregnancy and which did not at any time after being completely expelled from 
its mother breathe or show any other signs of life, and the expression “still–
birth” shall be construed accordingly”46 
 
This statutory provision has three distinct requirements: (1) a child has issued forth 
from its mother; (2) after the 24th week of pregnancy and (3) at no time after expulsion 
did the child breathe or show any signs of life.  The statute uses the language of ‘child’ 
rather than ‘fetus’ and is consonant with the workings of the ILPA 1929.  The 
registration requirements do not apply to an unexpelled entity, or to one that has been 
 
39 The conduct element of the section 23 offence. 
40 Jeffrey Wale, ‘Drinking can harm a foetus, but court finds girl born with disorder wasn’t victim of crime’, (2014b) The 
Conversation,<https://theconversation.com/drinking-can-harm-a-foetus-but-court-finds-girl-born-with-disorder-wasnt-
victim-of-crime-35119 >accessed 16 January 2015. 
41 Cf, civil liability under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976. 
42 An exception applies to women driving when pregnant as per Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, s2. 
43 Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost, Bioethics, medicine, and the criminal law, Volume III, Medicine and bioethics in the 
theatre of the criminal process (Cambridge University Press 2013).  
44 As amended. 
45 ss 35-38. 
46 s 41. 
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completely expelled at/before the 24th week.  The statute is also silent whether the 
expulsion needs to be a natural event although a broad construction is taken in 
practice.  Although, there are no specific registration requirements where still birth 
expulsion occurs at or before the 24th week of pregnancy, regulatory guidance from 
the Human Tissue Authority still governs the handling and disposal of fetal and 
pregnancy remains.47    
 
Whilst there are some synergies with the AA 1967, this is another example of the 
patchy legal framework addressing the legal status of the embryo/fetus.  These 
provisions have specific implications for fetal reductions carried out in the later stages 
of pregnancy.  The requirements for registration and burial permits (even when fetal 
products cannot be identified) are contentious.  There have various calls for legislative 
amendment, including registration based on the timing of fetal death rather than 
expulsion, and for registration at/ before 24 weeks of pregnancy.48 
Offences: Scotland 
In Scotland, procuring a woman’s miscarriage has long been a common law criminal 
offence.49  Lawful abortions were possible before 1967, and there was some 
uncertainty whether it was necessary to include Scotland within the ambit of the AA 
1967.  Ultimately that Act was applied to Scotland although the Bourne scenario was 
unlikely to have provoked litigation because of the specific need for ‘evil intent’ in this 
jurisdiction.50  Further, attempted abortion was only an offence if it could be proved the 
woman was actually pregnant because: 
 
“The victim of the crime of abortion or attempted abortion in Scots Law was the 
potential child, so that if there was no potential child there was no crime”51 
 
This position should be contrasted with sections 58/59 OAPA 1861 where the legal 
sanction is applied against third parties irrespective of whether the woman is pregnant.  
Whilst the protective provisions of the ILPA 1929 do not apply in Scotland, the death 
registration requirements are replicated via the Registration of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965 (as amended).52 
 
47 Human Tissue Authority, Guidance on the disposal of pregnancy remains following pregnancy loss or termination (HTA 
March 2015). 
48 K S. Joseph and others, ‘Rationalising Definitions and Procedures for Optimising Clinical Care and Public Health in 
Fetal Death and Stillbirth’ (2015) 125(4) Obstetrics & Gynaecology 784.  See also Civil Partnerships, Marriages and 
Deaths (Registration Etc.) Act 2019, ss 3-4. 
49 Gayle Davis and Richard Davidson, ‘A fifth freedom’ or ‘hideous atheistic expediency? The Medical Community and 
Abortion Law Reform in Scotland, c 1960-1975’, (2006) 50 Medical History 29, 31-32. 
50 John Mason and Graeme Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s ‘Law & Medical Ethics (OUP 2013), 335. 
51 Davis and Davidson (n49), 32. 
52 s 56 
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Summary 
 
It is apparent that fetal reduction and selective termination are subject to the general 
criminal law framework.  Our analysis reveals that there is a patchwork quilt of criminal 
offences making up the ‘law relating to abortion’,53 obfuscated by inconsistent 
approaches to legal protection and statutory terminology.  Although non-literal 
approaches to statutory interpretation have helped, there are ongoing tensions created 
by the failure to update and consolidate the different pockets of legislation. 
 
4.2.2 Defences 
 
We now move on to examine the wider defence framework in more detail. 
Defences: Northern Ireland 
 
The AA 1967 does not apply in Northern Ireland but the material provisions of the ILPA 
1929 are replicated by section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945.  
The law in Northern Ireland is summarised in the appellate decision in Family Planning 
Association of Northern Ireland v Minister for Health & Social Services & Public Safety: 
 
“Operations in Northern Ireland for the termination of pregnancies are unlawful 
unless performed in good faith for the purpose of preserving the life of the 
mother; 
·The ‘life’ of the mother in this context has been interpreted by the courts as 
including her physical and mental health;”54   
 
This settled and restrictive position was challenged by the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission for Judicial Review claiming that the law was incompatible with 
Article 3 (the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 8 (right 
to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the NIHRC case).  Their challenge was 
limited to the legal prohibition of terminations of pregnancy (a) involving fetal 
abnormality, and (b) arising from sexual crime and (c) from incest.  The challenge 
partially succeeded in the High Court – a declaration of incompatibility for pregnancies 
resulting from sexual crime or involving fatal fetal abnormality was made for a breach of 
Article 8 (but not Articles 3 and 14).55  However, the challenge subsequently failed in 
 
53 Abortion Act 1967, ss 1(1) and 6.   
54 [2004] NICA 37 [12] (Shiel LJ). 
55 The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application [2015] NIQB 96.  
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the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal.56  Although the court accepted that the 
Commission had standing to bring the claim, these matters were ultimately an issue for 
the Northern Ireland Assembly to decide.  However, the Northern Ireland Assembly has 
not supported a change to the law57 and has been unable to consider the matter again 
since it ceased legislative activities in January 2017.  
 
Executive guidance to healthcare professionals has continued to be restrictive,58  but 
the 2016 version now makes it clear that it is lawful to give advice on the lawful use of 
abortion services outside of Northern Ireland.59  In R (on the application of A and B), 
King J rejected a challenge claiming free NHS abortion services for Northern Ireland 
nationals not ordinarily resident in England.60  This judgment was subsequently upheld 
by the UK Supreme Court,61  although in a subsequent U turn, the UK Government 
confirmed that they would be making public funding available for Northern Ireland 
residents accessing termination services in England.62  
 
This takes us onto the NIHRC appeal in the UK Supreme Court.63  It proved critical that 
the appeal/ action had been brought in the name of the Commission rather than named 
victims.  The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal had forwarded a reference from the 
Attorney General of Northern Ireland challenging whether the Commission had 
standing to bring the proceedings and to seek a declaration of incompatibility under 
section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.  The Supreme Court ultimately decided there 
was no legal standing, and the Commission’s appeal was dismissed by a majority of 464 
to 3 on this issue.  However, the Court did go on to express obiter views on the law in 
Northern Ireland that may be important when individual victim claims are issued.  The 
specific divisions within the Supreme Court were as follows: 
 
• A 4/3 majority65 considered that the law in Northern Ireland is disproportionate 
and incompatible with Article 8 in relation to the prohibition for pregnancy 
resulting from rape and incest.   
 
56 The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s Application [2017] NICA 42. 
57 The last relevant Assembly vote was on the 10 February 2016. 
58 DHSSPS March 2016 Guidance, para 1.2,  
<https://www.health-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/dhssps/guidance-termination-pregnancy.pdf>accessed 22 
May 2017. 
59 Ibid., para 5.13. 
60 R (on the application of A and B) v Secretary of State for Health [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin) 
61 R (on the application of A and B) v Secretary of State for Health [2017] UKSC 41 
62 See BBC – Northern Ireland women to get free abortions in England (29 June 2017),  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-40438390 >accessed 20 June 2017. 
63 NIHRC (n18). 
64 Lord Mance, Lord Reed, Lady Black and Lord Lloyd-Jones. 
65 Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson. 
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• A 5/2 majority66 considered that the law in Northern Ireland is disproportionate 
and incompatible with Article 8 in relation to the prohibition in cases of fatal fetal 
abnormality.67  The Court found that legal prohibitions on serious fetal 
abnormality were not incompatible with Convention rights.  
• A 4/3 majority68 concluded that the current law, in abstract, is not incompatible 
with Article 3. The minority were split – Lord Kerr and Wilson took the view that 
the law was presently incompatible, and Lady Hale did not consider it 
necessary to decide the issue in light of her decision on Article 8. 
 
Although the case may not have achieved the intended outcome, it does provide a 
platform for future challenges.  Lord Mance made his position abundantly clear: 
 
“the present law clearly needs radical reconsideration. Those responsible for 
ensuring the compatibility of Northern Ireland law with the Convention rights will 
no doubt recognise and take account of these conclusions, at as early a time as 
possible, by considering whether and how to amend the law, in the light of the 
ongoing suffering being caused by it as well as the likelihood that a victim of the 
existing law would have standing to pursue similar proceedings to reach similar 
conclusions and to obtain a declaration of incompatibility in relation to the 1861 
Act.”69  
 
The outcome of the constitutional referendum and the subsequent legal reforms in the 
Republic of Ireland will undoubtedly add pressure for legal change north of the Irish 
border.70 
 
Defences: England, Wales and Scotland 
 
The Abortion Act 1967 (AA 1967) applies to England, Wales and Scotland.  It came 
into force on the 27 April 1968, and was the product of a Private Members’ Bill 
introduced by Mr David Steel in June 1966.71  Section 1(1) AA 1967 specifically 
provides a defence to any criminal offence under ‘the law relating to abortion’ and one 
interpretation is that it renders what would otherwise be unlawful into lawful conduct.72  
Section 6 clarifies that ‘the law relating to abortion’ means sections 58/5973 and “any 
 
66 Lady Hale, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lady Black. 
67 The minority said it was not possible to conclude, in the abstract, that the current law is disproportionate or incompatible 
with Article 8 (Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lady Black in relation to rape/ incest). 
68 Lord Mance, Lord Reed, Lady Black and Lord Lloyd-Jones. 
69 NIHRC (n18), [135]. 
70 See BBC – Irish Abortion Referendum (26 May 2018), <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
44256152>accessed 7 June 2018; Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 (Act No. 31 of 2018) (EIRE). 
71 Taking over an earlier attempt to introduce legislation by Lord Silkin (Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bills HL (1965-
1966)) 
72 Doogan and Wood v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2014] UKSC 68 
73 OAPA 1861 
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rule of law relating to the procurement of abortion” (ie the ILPA 1929 and the separate 
criminal provisions in Scotland).  In any event, section 5(1) AA 1967 was amended so 
that no offence is committed under the ILPA 1929 by a registered medical practitioner 
who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of the AA 1967.74  
 
The current version of section 5(2) AA 1967 provides: 
 
“For the purposes of the law relating to abortion, anything done with intent to 
procure a woman’s miscarriage (or, in the case of a woman carrying more than 
one foetus, her miscarriage of any foetus) is unlawfully done unless authorised 
by section 1 of this Act and, in the case of a woman carrying more than one 
foetus, anything done with intent to procure her miscarriage of any foetus is 
authorised by that section if–  
 
(a) the ground for termination of the pregnancy specified in subsection (1)(d) of 
that section applies in relation to any foetus and the thing is done for the 
purpose of procuring the miscarriage of that foetus, or (b) any of the other 
grounds for termination of the pregnancy specified in that section applies”. 
 
The question is whether this section modifies what is unlawful conduct?  The response 
by Munby J in R (Smeaton) was as follows: 
“Parliament when it originally enacted the 1967 Act did so, as section 6 shows, 
expressly by reference to sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Act. Section 5(2) of 
the 1967 Act, read in conjunction with section 6, provides avowedly for the 1967 
Act to define that which is (un)lawful for the purposes of the 1861 Act. The 1861 
Act and the 1967 Act operate as a statutory code in relation to the procuring of 
abortions or miscarriages – the two words being used synonymously – the 1967 
Act defining that which is lawful and the 1861 Act that which is criminal.”75. 
 
In R v Smith,76 Scarman LJ placed emphasis on the Act’s conversion of the unlawful 
into the lawful but Lord Edmund Davies (dissenting) in Royal College of Nursing of the 
UK v Department of Health and Social Security (‘RCN’ case) claimed that the AA 1967 
had ‘both restricted and amplified the existing abortion law’.77  In the subsequent 
Doogan case, the focus was once again on the AA 1967 as a vehicle for converting the 
unlawful to the lawful, rather than as a concurrent means of defining criminality.78  Lady 
Hale stated: 
“Hence, as the House of Lords decided in the Royal College of Nursing Case, 
what is authorised by the Act is the whole course of medical treatment bringing 
about the ending of the pregnancy. By virtue of section 5(2), any other conduct 
which is prohibited by sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Persons 
 
74 As per HFEA 1990, s 37. 
75 Smeaton (n2), [358]-[361]. 
76 R v Smith (John) [1974] 1 All ER 376, 378. 
77 Royal College of Nursing of the UK v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800 (HL), 830f. 
78 Doogan (n72), [33]-[34] & [38]. 
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Act 1861 in England and Wales or by any rule of law in Scotland remains a 
criminal offence.”79 
The problem with this interpretation is that it makes the erroneous assumption that the 
law - and what was unlawful - was in a state of clarity in 1967.  Indeed, the preamble to 
the 1967 Act highlights that the legislation was enacted to ‘clarify’ existing law and 
there is abundant evidence in Hansard of the ambiguous state of the criminal law at the 
time of enactment.80  This discussion also begs the question why Parliament did not 
simply start from scratch and produce a single statute. 
The 1967 Act explicitly provides a defence to a ‘pregnancy’ terminated by a registered 
medical practitioner and applies to the “whole course of medical treatment bringing 
about the termination of the pregnancy”.81  It covers medical and surgical means of 
termination - for the former, the Act will cover steps from the administration of drugs up 
to the ending of the pregnancy, and possibly those situations requiring immediate 
aftercare.82  Protection will extend to other healthcare professionals acting under the 
immediate direction and control of the registered medical practitioner in connection with 
the medical treatment authorised by the Act.83  It does not offer legal protection to more 
remote participants in the termination process,84 although that is probably unnecessary 
in light of the criminal framework that has been analysed.85  It remains unclear whether 
nurses acting under the control of registered medical practitioners have the same legal 
protection under the ILPA 1929.  Section 5(1) AA 1967 now states that no offence 
under the ILPA 1929: 
“shall be committed by a registered medical practitioner who terminates a 
pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of the Act”.    
 
Montgomery argues that this protection may extend to nurses,86 and it seems logical 
that “terminates a pregnancy” in the ILPA 1929 should be construed consistently with 
the decision in the RCN case.  This interpretation is reinforced by the relevant 
Departmental guidance which makes no distinction between the protection afforded in 
 
79 Doogan (n72), [33]. 
80 Jeffrey Wale, ‘Commentary: Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan’, UK Health Care Law, (2015a) < 
https://ukhealthcarelaw.wordpress.com/2015/01/20/commentary-greater-glasgow-health-board-v-doogan-another-2014-
uksc-68/ >accessed 20 January 2015; Mary Neal, ‘The Scope of the Conscience-Based Exemption in Section 4(1) of the 
Abortion Act 1967: Doogan and Wood v NHS Greater Glasgow Health Board [2013] CSIH 36’, (2014) 22(3) Med L Rev 
409. 
81 RCN (n77); Doogan (n72), [33]-[34]. 
82 Doogan (n72), [34].   
83 RCN (n77); Department of Health, Guidance in relation to requirements of the Abortion Act 1967, (DOH 2014a); Royal 
College of Nursing (RCN), Termination of Pregnancy: An RCN nursing framework (RCN 2017); Sally Sheldon and Joanne 
Fletcher, ‘Vacuum aspiration for induced abortion could be safely and legally performed by nurses and midwives’, (2017) 
J Fam Reprod Health Care 1. 
84 Doogan (n72) [38] 
85  We will address remoteness in participation in later sections. 
86 Jonathan Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford University Press 2003) 
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respect of either Act.87 
 
Section 1 AA 1967 is headed “Medical Termination of Pregnancy” but has been applied 
to medical and surgical methods of termination.88  The statutory language refers to 
‘pregnancy’ rather than ‘fetal life’ and the inconsistent use of terminology (termination, 
terminated and treatment) has caused many problems for judicial interpretation.  The 
amended section 5(2) makes it clear that for the purposes of the “law relating to 
abortion”, anything done with intent to procure a “miscarriage of any foetus” is unlawful 
unless authorised by section 1, extending coverage to multiple pregnancy.89  Section 
5(2) does not address whether there needs to be an intention to do an act which results 
in the expulsion of fetal product,90 but where a miscarriage is foreseen as a virtual 
certainty of an act, that can be used as evidence to infer the requisite intention for 
liability under section 58 OAPA 1861.91  Again, the AA 1967 does not specifically define 
the term ‘miscarriage’.   
 
The AA 1967 is understandably silent about acts done with the intention to procure 
fetal harm short of death/miscarriage because of the connections with the OAPA 1861.  
However, does the AA 1967 offer protection if there is an intention to procure a 
miscarriage but the termination fails with or without consequential fetal harm?  Lord 
Diplock considered there would be legal protection under the 1967 Act: 
 
“Furthermore if “termination” or “terminated” meant only the event of 
miscarriage and not the whole treatment undertaken with that object in mind, 
lack of success which apparently occurs in one or two per cent of cases, would 
make all who had taken part in the unsuccessful treatment guilty of an offence 
under section 58 or 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. This 
cannot have been the intention of Parliament.”92  
 
However, Lord Edmund-Davies (dissenting in the same case) claimed that there would 
be no freestanding criminal liability under the OAPA 1861 in these circumstances, 
irrespective of the AA 1967.  
 
Section 1(1) makes it clear that ‘a person’ will not be guilty of an offence under the law 
relating to abortion, when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical 
practitioner “if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good 
 
87 DOH 2014a (n83), para 29. 
88 RCN (n77). 
89 As per HFEA 1990, s37(5); AA 1967.  Note – AA 1967, s5(2)(a) and (b) extends the reach of AA 1967, s1. 
90 Ie will an intention to procure fetal death suffice?
 
91 R v Nedrick (n36). 
92 RCN (n77), 828a (Lord Diplock). 
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faith” that at least one of the lawful grounds for termination is made out.93  Although the 
statutory provision is silent on the point, the Departmental Guidance for completing the 
HSA1 certificate (which needs to be completed, signed and dated by both medical 
practitioners pursuant to the Abortion Regulations 1991) requires a statement that “at 
least one and the same ground for abortion in section 1(1) of the 1967 Act exists”.94  A 
subsequent guidance note has confirmed this position.95  
 
The section 1 ground does not have to factually exist - it is enough that two medical 
practitioners form their belief in good faith that such a ground exists: 
 
“The Act…has introduced the safeguard of two opinions: but, if they are formed 
in good faith by the time the operation is undertaken, the abortion is lawful. 
Thus a great social responsibility is firmly placed by the law upon the shoulders 
of the medical profession...”96  
 
Although Scarman LJ thought there was an important residual role for the court when 
addressing the bona fides of medical assessment, a more restrictive view was 
articulated in the case of Paton: 
 
“Not only would it be a bold and brave judge (I think Mr Rankin used that 
expression) who would seek to interfere with the discretion of doctors acting 
under the Abortion Act 1967, but I think he would really be a foolish judge who 
would try to do any such thing, unless, possibly, there is clear bad faith and an 
obvious attempt to perpetrate a criminal offence.”97  
 
In any event, Keir Starmer QC (as Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)) highlighted 
the practical hurdles of prosecuting doctors on the platform of inadequate risk 
assessment.98  One immediate obstacle is that the statutory HSA1 form does not 
explicitly require the doctor to examine or even see the patient before making their 
assessment under the AA 1967.99  In his published reasons for not prosecuting two 
doctors for inadequate risk assessment, the DPP conceded: 
“The prosecution would have to be in a position to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt, that the assessments carried out by the doctors was carried out in bad 
faith or carried out in such a way that fell below a standard which any 
reasonable doctor would consider adequate. In the absence of any considered 
medical guidance it is extremely difficult for the prosecution to undertake this 
exercise.  Equally, it would be very difficult for a jury to assess what may or may 
 
93 AA 1967. 
94 Department of Health, Guidance on HSA1 & HSA2 (DOH 2013), 1 
95 DOH 2014a (n83), para 11. 
96 R v Smith (n76), 378f - 381e (Scarman LJ) (emphasis added). 
97 Paton (n22),282b. 
98 Keir Starmer, Letter to Dominic Grieve, Attorney General dated 7 October 2013.   
99 See Abortion Regulations 1991, s 3 and sch 1. 
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not be an “adequate” assessment by the doctor.”100 
 
Successful prosecutions against doctors are very rare because of the difficulty in lifting 
the veil of discretion afforded to medical professionals in this context.  R v Smith is a 
rare example of a successful prosecution against a doctor – the conviction occurring 
because (1) the medical record evidence in the case; (2) the defence of ‘inevitable’ 
abortion appears to have been disbelieved by the jury.101  The veil of protection is 
further extended by the wide discretion afforded to doctors by section 1(2) AA 1967 for 
lawful terminations under sections 1(1) (a) and (b).102   
 
The Department of Health sought to address concerns about medical accountability in 
their 2014 guidance note - pre-signing the HSA1 form, or signing without adequate 
patient information, will be indicative of non-compliance with the AA 1967.103  The 
guidance also recommends that registered medical practitioners should be prepared to 
justify ‘how they considered information specific to the woman when forming their 
opinion’ and requires a record of that assessment.104  The prosecution may be able to 
use non-compliance to infer or supply evidence of ‘bad faith’, although this is 
technically Executive rather than medical guidance.  It remains to be seen whether this 
guidance will have any real impact on professional conduct or prosecutorial outcomes. 
 
Lawful grounds 
 
The lawful grounds for termination in section 1(1) of the AA 1967105 can be broadly 
classified as medical,106 fetal abnormality and emergency grounds.  In relation to the 
medical classification, Grubb subdivides section 1 (1) (a) into ‘maternal medical’ and 
‘familial medical’ grounds.107  Rather confusingly, the mandatory HSA4 return uses a 
different lettering system to the Act which is replicated in the national reporting of 
abortion statistics: 
 
A - Section 1(1) (c) 
B - Section 1(1) (b) 
C - Section 1(1) (a) (limited to consideration of the pregnant woman). 
 
100 Starmer (n98). Nb the Attorney General subsequently stopped a private prosecution against these doctors. 
101 R v Smith (n76). 
102 For discussion of the breadth of discretion afforded to medical gatekeepers, see Sally Sheldon and others, ‘The 
Abortion Act (1967): a biography’ (2019) 39(1) Legal Studies 18. 
103 DOH 2014a (n83), para 10. 
104 DOH 2014a (n83), para 14. 
105 As amended by the HFEA 1990, s37. 
106 AA 1967, ss 1(1) (a) to (c). 
107 Grubb (n3), 660. 
  
90 
 
D - Section 1(1) (a) (limited to consideration of any existing children of the 
family). 
E - Section 1(1) (d). 
F – Section 1(4) (risk to the the life of the pregnant woman). 
G – Section 1(4) (to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental 
health of the pregnant woman). 
 
In 2017, approximately 98% of all abortions in England and Wales were certified on 
ground C, 1% on ground D, 2% on ground E with a small balance distributed to the 
other grounds.108 These lettering classifications will be used for subsequent analysis:  
 
Grounds C and D (Section 1 (1) (a)) 
“That the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance 
of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of 
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of 
her family”. 
 
Only this ground is subject to a specific time limit - the pregnancy must not have 
exceeded its 24th week. The latest Departmental guidance makes it clear that all 
treatment related to the termination must be completed by 23 weeks and 6 days.109  In 
fact, only 0.1% of terminations were actually undertaken at 24 weeks or over in 
2017.110  Unhelpfully, the Act does not specify a method for calculating the start of the 
pregnancy but Grubb suggests 4 possibilities: the first day of the woman’s last period, 
the date of conception, the date of implantation or the first day of the woman’s missed 
period.111  He points to the: 
 
“attraction of the symmetry of interpreting the Abortion Act so that the defence 
to the offence in section 58 operates from the point in time when that crime 
could first be committed ie at implantation”112 
 
We know that implantation is already used as a starting point for statutory protection 
under the HFEA 1990,113  but in reality, the timing issue will be determined by accepted 
medical practice and Departmental Guidance (ie the first day of the woman’s last 
 
108 Abortion Statistics (n34) para 2.14 (due to rounding these figures do not add up to 100%). 
109 Department of Health, Detailed guidance note for completing the abortion notification form HSA4 for abortions 
performed in England and Wales (DOH 2013a) but now clarified by Department of Health and Social Care, Clarification 
of time limit for termination of pregnancy performed under Grounds C and D of the Abortion Act 1967 (DHSC 23 July 
2018) and Department of Health and Social Care, Further clarification of time limit for termination of pregnancy performed 
under Grounds C and D of the Abortion Act 1967 (DHSC 28 March 2019). 
110 Abortion Statistics (n34), para 2.26. 
111 Grubb (n3), 665. 
112 Grubb (n3), 666. 
113 S 2(3); see also R (Smeaton) (n2). 
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menstrual period). The original version of the HSA4 form114 required an estimate for the 
length of gestation but the current English/ Welsh version115 only requires doctors to 
state the number of completed weeks.116 
 
Section 1 (1) (a) and 1 (1) (c) require a comparative risk assessment to be made - 
whether the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the 
pregnancy were terminated.  The latest Departmental guidance on assessing and 
recording risk provides some assistance.117  Although there is no requirement for an 
examination of the pregnant woman pre-certification, prior examination/meeting 
(whether in person or by technological means) by at least one of the certifying doctors 
is considered good practice.118  The relevant risk must be of injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of the family.  Section 
1(2) states that “account may be taken of the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably 
foreseeable environment”, affording wide discretion to the certifying doctors and adding 
weight to the ‘social ground’ descriptor often associated with this provision.119   
 
In many cases, the physical health risks to the woman of continuing a pregnancy 
necessarily outweigh the minimal risk entailed in the modern termination procedure.  
Indeed, some evidence suggests that termination in the first trimester is nearly always 
safer than continuing pregnancy to term,120  and the inclusion of mental health as a risk 
factor makes it easier to tip the balance in favour of termination.121  Arguably this 
ground creates termination on demand - the threshold being so low that it is easily 
made out subject to the 24 week limit.122  However, doctors must still certify in good 
faith that the ground “applies to this individual and not solely on the basis of abstract 
statistics”.123/124 
 
What the doctors cannot consider under section 1 (1) (a), are the specific risks to the 
health of the fetus/ embryo, because they are not treated as existing children of the 
 
114 Abortion Regulations 1991, sch 2. 
115 Revised September 2006. 
116 See the Abortion (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2002 and the Abortion (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 
2002/8 
117 DOH 2014a (n83), para 12-15. 
118 DOH 2014a (n83), para 6. 
119 Montgomery 2003 (n86) 
120 Abortion Statistics (n34): no maternal deaths were reported following termination in 2017 (para 2.42).   
121 Grubb (n3) ,660.  Indeed, the 2017 Abortion statistics show that the vast majority of abortions using ground C relate 
to the mental health factor (n34, para 2.15). 
122 Emily Jackson, ‘Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis’, (2000) 29 Social Legal Studies 470; Emily Jackson, 
‘The legality of abortion for fetal sex’, <http://www.reproductivereview.org/images/uploads/Britains_abortion_law.pdf 
>accessed 24 May 2018. 
123 Grubb (n3), 661. 
124 See also BMA’s The Law and Ethics of Abortion (BMA 2014 updated October 2018), 6-7; DOH 2014a (n83), para 11. 
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family.  This is an important point in multiple pregnancy when concern for fetal 
mortality/morbidity may be a central consideration,125 although Herring claims that the 
risk of the fetuses being lost in multiple pregnancy nearly always involves some risk of 
harm to the woman.126  No explicit provision is made for the health of the paternal 
parent (or male donor in assisted conception), although there might be scope for 
indirect consideration of their interests via section 1(2) AA 1967 for grounds B, C and 
D. 
 
Ground A (section 1 (1) (c)) 
“That the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant 
woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated” 
 
A comparative risk assessment is also required by section 1(1) (c) - this time the 
comparative exercise is between the risk to the life of the pregnant woman of 
continuance and the risk of termination.  There is no time limit but section 1(1) (a) is 
more likely to be used by doctors up to the 24th week; and this provision does not have 
the benefit of section 1(2).  Importantly, sections 1(1) (a) and (c) do not specify the 
degree of divergent risk required – all that is needed is an assessment that the relevant 
risk arising from continuance of the pregnancy is greater than the risk if the pregnancy 
were terminated. 
 
Ground B (Section 1 (1) (b)) 
“That the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman” 
 
Section 1(1) (b) does not require a comparative risk assessment to be made between 
continuance and termination - the requirement is simply that the termination must be 
necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the 
pregnant woman.  It is unclear whether a small risk of grave permanent injury would be 
sufficient, but it has been suggested that the term ‘necessary’ requires foresight of such 
harm as a practical certainty.127  Grubb doubts whether a termination will be 
‘necessary’ if it: 
 
“does not involve a lower risk of permanent injury to the mother’s health than 
would exist if the pregnancy continued”.128  
 
 
125 Claire-Marie Legendre and others, ‘Differences between selective termination of pregnancy and fetal reduction in 
multiple pregnancy: a narrative review’ (2013) (26(6) Reproductive Bio-Medicine Online (Elsevier Science) 542, 547-8. 
126 Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (7thth ed, OUP 2018), 310. 
127 Marc Stauch and Kay Wheat, Text, cases and materials on medical law & ethics (4th edition, Routledge 2012), 383. 
128 Grubb (n3), 662. 
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The text speaks to prevention not the reduction of injury,129  and this may be relevant to 
fetal reductions in multiple pregnancy where the latter may be more applicable.  
Although there is no time limit, section 1(2) does apply.  ‘Grave’ is not defined but is 
likely to be construed as ‘serious’.  The requirement of permanent injury is not required 
by the other medical grounds, and the thresholds for grounds A/B are clearly higher 
than for grounds C/D. 
 
Ground E (S 1(1) (d)) 
“That there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped”130 
 
This is a highly contentious ground that has no time constraint and is often used in fetal 
reduction and selective termination in multiple pregnancy in Great Britain.  Whilst, this 
is the only ground that directly refers to the health, state or interests of the unborn 
entity, it is arguable whether the primary purpose is for the benefit of the unborn 
entity,131 the future child or the pregnant woman that would have to care for the child if 
it were born alive.132  ‘Substantial risk’ is not defined but plainly does not require a 
certainty.  A medical practitioner may have to defend his certification but in practice 
challenges are very rare.  The phrase ‘would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities’ is essentially a medical question.  Grubb queries whether a HIV positive 
baby would suffer from ‘physical abnormalities’ - given the likelihood that it would be 
asymptomatic at birth133- before concluding that the HIV infection could be construed 
as a physical abnormality.134  He also raises another important issue - would that child 
suffer from abnormalities so ‘as to be seriously handicapped’?  Clearly, the subsection 
links abnormality with a certain degree of handicap/ disability, and the mere presence 
(or substantial risk) of an abnormality is insufficient without any link to disability.  
Consequently, there is uncertainty whether the subsection covers the situation where 
the risk involves an asymptomatic child with a definite135 or possible future risk of 
handicap.136 
 
Although the strict legislative wording requires a high degree of risk (substantial) and 
high magnitude of outcome (‘seriously handicapped’), the actual medical emphasis 
 
129 Hall (n3), 307. 
130 Now contained in AA 1967, s 1(1)(d) 
131 As per Stephenson LJ in McKay v Essex AHA [1982] QB 1166 (CA), 1179H. 
132 Jane E S. Fortin, ‘Legal Protection for the Unborn Child’, (1988) 51 MLR  54, 72; Sally Sheldon and Stephen Wilkinson, 
‘‘Termination of Pregnancy for Reason of Foetal Disability: Are There Grounds for a Special Exception in Law?’’, (2001) 
9 Med L. Rev 85. 
133 Grubb (n3), 662-663. 
134 Grubb (n3), 663. 
135 Eg Huntington’s Chorea. 
136 Eg HIV positive. 
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may be on severity rather than certainty of prognosis.137  In places, the relevant Royal 
College guidance equates ‘substantial risk’ with ‘likely’,138 and associates the degree of 
risk ‘with the seriousness and consequences of the likely disability’.139   Indeed, 
Sheelagh McGuiness claims this section of the AA 1967 may be ‘operating beyond any 
plausible legitimate interpretation of the ground’,140 and highlights the presumptive 
effect that it may have on parental choices following prenatal screening.141 The 
suggestion here is that professional and practice norms are out of step with the legal 
normative framework. 
 
These issues were brought into sharp focus by the judicial review litigation in 
Jepson.142  Reverend Joanna Jepson challenged a police decision not to investigate 
the certification of a termination for a bilateral cleft lip and palate at 28 weeks gestation. 
Following initial court permission, the judicial review proceedings were suspended 
pending a police investigation.  Subsequently, the CPS declined to prosecute the 
doctors and the judicial review proceedings were not pursued any further.  Although the 
doctors involved were never prosecuted, Reverend Jepson had, to some extent, made 
her point to the medical profession - lawful abortions on the ground E ought to be 
restricted to cases of serious not trivial disability.  However, defining the scope of what 
is ‘serious’ remains unresolved.  The case also highlights the scrutinising effect of the 
statutory notification provisions,143 because Jepson was able to access material data 
on the disability ground.144  
 
Interpretative issues arise partly from a medical reluctance to produce a definitive list of 
conditions capable of meeting the requirements of section 1(1)(d).  The Royal College 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) argue that: 
“It would be unrealistic to produce a definitive list of conditions that constitute 
serious handicap. Precise definition is impractical for two reasons.  Firstly, 
sufficiently advanced diagnostic techniques capable of accurately defining 
abnormalities or of predicting the seriousness of outcomes are not currently 
available. Secondly, the consequences of an abnormality are difficult to predict, 
not only for the fetus in terms of viability or residual disability but also in relation 
to the impact in childhood as well as on the family into which the child would be 
 
137Helen Statham, Wendy Solomou and Jasper B. Green, J, ‘Late termination of pregnancy: law, policy and decision 
making in four English fetal medicine units’, (2006) 113(12) BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
1402, 1406. 
138 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG), Termination of pregnancy for fetal abnormality (RCOG 
2010b), 10.   
139 Ibid., 10.   
140 Sheelagh McGuiness, ‘Law, Reproduction, and Disability: Fatally ‘Handicapped’?’, (2013) 21 Med L. Rev 213, 227. 
141 Ibid., 213. 
142 Jepson v The Chief Constable of West Mercia Police Constabulary [2003] EWHC 3318. 
143 As per Abortion Regulations 1991 (as amended). 
144 The decision in Department of Health v Information Commissioner [2011] EWHC 1430 has ensured ongoing public 
access to ground E abortion statistics. 
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born”.145 
 
This view has been supported by some academic research146 and by the House of 
Commons, Science and Technology Committee.147  However, a subsequent 
Parliamentary Inquiry into Abortion on the Grounds of Disability (although rejecting a 
list approach) recognised the potential for “differences between doctors on which 
disabilities fall within the scope of the law” and recommended a review of legal 
application beyond viability.148  This reinforces the perspective of a legislative provision 
which is unpredictable and uncertain in scope. 
 
Interpretative issues also arise from the outdated term 'handicap' and the role played 
by medical practitioners in defining their own legal defence.  Jepson claimed that 
‘seriously handicapped’ should be understood by reference to the remediability of that 
condition, having suffered childhood disability that had been successfully treated.149  
Rosamund Scott  highlights that it is the medical profession that determines the degree 
of medical input that the future child is likely to require; and questions whether disability 
should be seen as a solely medical or social concept.150  The medical approach sees 
disability situated within the individual as a medical condition; whereas social framing 
conceives disability as social prejudice and discrimination.  The UK Parliamentary 
Inquiry recommended that consideration should be given to removing what some 
perceive as discrimination against persons with disability.151  
 
The medical/social distinction also has implications for Jepson’s argument about the 
remedial nature of the condition or disability.  Do we look at those conditions that 
cannot be medically corrected or restrict serious handicap to those conditions that 
cannot be ‘alleviated’ by other social means?152  Scott claims that if you view disability 
using the medical model, the term ‘seriously handicapped’ has a much wider meaning 
than a social interpretation that takes into account the possibility of alleviation by 
medical and social means.  Some conditions will result in significant problems by 
themselves but, for others, social factors may be relevant, and ultimately Scott prefers 
a combined model of interpretation.153 
 
145 RCOG 2010b (n138) 9-10. 
146 Staham, Solomou & Green (n137), 1407-8.  
147 House of Commons, Scientific Developments Relating to the Abortion Act 1967 (Twelfth report of session 2006/07), 
31. 
148 Parliamentary Inquiry into Abortion on the Grounds of Disability (2013), 4/19 
149 Rosamund Scott, ‘Interpreting the Disability Ground of the Abortion Act’ (2005) 64(2) Cambridge Law Journal 388, 
393. 
150 Ibid., 393.   
151 (n148), 49. 
152 Scott (n149), 394. 
153 Scott (n149), 395. 
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RCOG define ‘seriously handicapped’ as a physical or mental disability which would 
“cause significant suffering or long-term impairment of their ability to function in 
society”.154  They identify several factors that should be considered during the 
assessment process: 
 
• The potential for effective treatment in-utero or after birth, 
• The probable degree of self-awareness and ability to communicate with others, 
• The suffering that would be experienced,155 
• The probability of being able to live alone and to be self-supportive as an adult. 
• The extent to which actions performed by individuals without disability that are 
essential for health would have to be provided by others.156 
 
What is unclear, is whether doctors should consider the pregnant woman’s own 
perception of abnormality/disability, and the extent to which her wishes (and those of 
her partner) should be taken into account in the determination of severity.157  Whilst 
RCOG acknowledges that the woman’s right to decline termination must be fully 
supported,158 it is the medical profession who ultimately control the assessment and 
communication process.  Statham et al. found some variation amongst healthcare 
professionals concerning the relevance of the woman’s view on disability, but with third 
trimester requests, the focus appeared to be on the legality of the procedure rather 
than supporting patient autonomy.159 This finding is corroborated by our own research 
interviews. 
 
There is an obvious link between ground E and antenatal screening/ testing.  As 
technology advances it become possible to diagnose a wider range of conditions with 
different degrees of certainty.  It also raises a number of issues including the legitimacy 
and accuracy of testing, and the communication of information/ scan imagery to 
parents.160  Again, the UK Parliamentary Inquiry into the disability ground highlighted 
the importance of the information sharing/ counselling/ support phases161 and 
 
154 RCOG 2010b (n138) 8. 
155 The first three points are explicitly supported by the BMA 2014 (updated October 2018) (n124), 6. 
156 RCOG 2010b (n138), 9. 
157 Scott (n149), 397. See also Rosamund Scott, ‘The Uncertain Scope of Reproductive Autonomy in Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion’, (2005) 13 Med L. Rev 29. 
158 RCOG 2010b (n138), 26. 
159 Staham, Solomou & Green (n137), 1406. 
160 See O. Graham, S. Ankrett and S R. Killick, ‘Viewing ultrasound scan images prior to termination of pregnancy: Choice 
for women or conflict for ultrasonographers?’ (2010) 30(5) Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology 484; Scott Woodcock, 
‘Abortion counselling and the informed consent dilemma’, (2011) 25 Bioethics 495; Scott (n150), 412. 
161 (n148). 
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subsequent Departmental guidance has sought to address some of these issues.162/163  
Of course, doctors can sidestep the difficulties associated with ground E by relying on 
grounds C/D up to 24 weeks;164 a practice supported by RCOG;165 and frequently 
exercised in practice.166  Although, ground E provides an important avenue in a few late 
diagnosis cases, there have been continuing parliamentary attempts to remove this 
subsection.167 
 
Emergency - Grounds F and G (Section 1(4) AA 1967) 
“Subsection (3) of this section, and so much of subsection (1) as relates to the opinion 
of two registered medical practitioners, shall not apply to the termination of a 
pregnancy by a registered medical practitioner in a case where he is of the opinion, 
formed in good faith, that the termination is immediately necessary to save the life or to 
prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant 
woman.” 
 
These grounds require that the procedure must be ‘immediately necessary’ to save the 
life or prevent grave permanent injury to the pregnant woman but is otherwise a 
replicant of sections 1(1) (b) and (c) without comparative risk assessment.  In these 
circumstances, the strictures of certification by two doctors and place of treatment are 
relaxed. 
 
Treatment – methods, place and participants  
 
The main surgical method used in fetal reduction/ selective termination of multiple 
pregnancy is feticide.  The principal surgical methods for singleton termination are 
vacuum aspiration, dilation and evacuation, and feticide with evacuation in later 
pregnancies.168  The principal medical method of termination in the UK involves either 
the administration of mifepristone169 in combination with the drug misoprostol or the 
sole use of misoprostol.  With the combined option, mifepristone is administered first, 
followed by misoprostol (usually) a few days later.  Medical methods now dominate 
 
162 Department of Health, A Framework for Sexual Health Improvement in England (DOH 2013e), 35-37; Department for 
Health, Procedures for the Approval of Independent Sector Places for the Termination of Pregnancy (DOH 2014b). 
163 For discussion of non-invasive prenatal testing, see Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Non-invasive Prenatal Testing: 
Ethical Issues (NCOB 2017); Roger Brownsword and Jeff Wale, ‘Testing Times Ahead: Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing 
and the Kind of Community We Want to Be’, (2018) 81(4) MLR 646. 
164 Scott (n149), 391. See also Scott (n157). 
165 RCOG 2010b (n138), 8. 
166  See for eg, Abortion Statistics (n34). 
167 Abortion (Disability Equality) HL Bill 16 (2016-17). 
168 The 2017 abortion statistics identify vacuum aspiration as the predominant surgical procedure (n34), para 2.38. 
169 Drug name mifegyne/ RU486. 
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singleton terminations,170 and the restriction of surgical termination in some private 
clinics in 2016, is likely to increase the uptake of medical methods in the future.171  This 
shift in practice has access implications for late stage terminations although there may 
be consequential gains for patient safety by restricting surgical interventions to 
specialist centres. 
 
Section 1(3) AA 1967 provides that “any treatment for the termination of pregnancy 
must be carried out in” a designated NHS hospital or other approved place, save in 
emergency cases.   Section 1(3)A extends ministerial power in relation to the approval 
of place and treatment specification, where that treatment consists primarily of 
medicinal methods.172  These sections have been scrutinised in relation to substantive 
nursing engagement in the medical termination process.  The term 'treatment' also 
appears in section 4 but not in sections 1(1) or 5(1) of the AA 1967.   Lord Roskill was 
prepared to treat ‘termination of pregnancy’ and ‘treatment for termination of 
pregnancy’ as virtually synonymous in the context of whether nurses were acting 
lawfully when administering abortifacient (Prostaglandin) drugs to pregnant women in 
the RCN case.173   That decision establishes that nurses acting under the direction and 
control of registered medical practitioners have legal protection when administering 
abortifacient drugs: 
 
“the doctor need not do everything with his own hands; the requirements of the 
subsection are satisfied when the treatment for termination of a pregnancy is 
one prescribed by a registered medical practitioner carried out in accordance 
with his directions and of which a registered medical practitioner remains in 
charge throughout”174  
The decision in British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS) v Secretary of State for 
Health175 establishes that ‘treatment for the termination of pregnancy176’ is not limited to 
the actual prescription of abortifacient substances like mifepristone.  Accordingly, 
abortifacient drugs need to be administered in an ‘approved place’ although it is then 
permissible for the woman to leave and for the physical termination to take place at 
home.  From October 2017, women in Scotland were allowed (but not obliged) to take 
the second dose (misoprostol) at home as part of their termination treatment, subject to 
 
170 Abortion Statistics (n34).  
171 Abortion Statistics (n34), para 2.34. 
172 AA 1967. 
173 (n77) 
174 (n77), 828H-829A (Lord Diplock). 
175 [2011] EWHC 235. 
176 As per AA 1967, s 1(3). 
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requirements concerning their health and home circumstances.  These arrangements 
were subsequently extended into England and Wales in 2018.177  
 
All providers of abortion services must be registered with the Care Quality Commission 
(CQC)178 and meet essential standards of quality and safety as per the Health and 
Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014.  Regulation 20 of the 
Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009 imposes additional 
obligations on independent providers of terminations of pregnancy in England, and 
regulatory sanctions and penalties may be imposed for non-compliance.179  The 
Department of Health issued new procedures for independent sector provision in May 
2014,180 and these emphasise timely access to services, a choice of method for the 
pregnant woman at all stages of gestation and the on-going offer of qualified 
counselling services.  
 
Conscientious objection181  
 
That brings us on neatly to section 4 AA 1967 and the right to conscientiously object to 
participation in abortion. The statutory provision is phrased in negative terms: “no 
person shall be under any duty… to participate in any treatment authorised by this 
Act”,182  and does not apply where treatment is “necessary to save the life or to prevent 
grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman”.183  
There is no requirement of immediate necessity, and section 4 does not apply to 
terminations authorised by sections 1(1) (b), (c) or 1(4) AA 1967.   
 
Close reading of the two key legal cases - Janaway and Doogan184 - highlight the 
significant problems caused by poor and inconsistent drafting in the AA 1967.  
Janaway concerned a GP receptionist who refused to type appointment letters for 
terminations.  She claimed section 4 protection following dismissal, but the House of 
 
177See Gov.UK (25 August 2018),<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-confirms-plans-to-approve-the-
home-use-of-early-abortion-pills >accessed 14 December 2018; Department of Health & Social Care, The Abortion Act 
1967 - Approval of a Class of Places 27 December 2018 (DHSC) 
178 Health & Social Care Act 2008 
179 See for eg, CQC action against Marie Stopes International,  
<https://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/new_reports/AAAG6589.pdf>accessed 22 March 2019. 
180 DOH 2014b (n162); Department of Health, Changes to the procedures for the approval of Independent Sector Places 
for Terminations of Pregnancy: Responses to Proposals in Consultation (DOH 2014c). 
181 This section is adapted from: Jeffrey Wale, ‘Commentary: Greater Glasgow Health Board (Appellant) v Doogan & 
Another (Respondents) [2014] UKSC 68’, (2015), <https://ukhealthcarelaw.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/commentary-
greater-glasgow-health-board.pdf >accessed 18 June 2018. 
182 AA 1967, s 4(1) 
183 AA 1967, s 4(2) 
184 R v Salford AHA Ex P Janaway [1989] AC 537; Doogan (n72) 
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Lords dismissed her judicial review application.  This case establishes that protection 
does not extend to remote participants in the termination process outside of the 
hospital context.  In Doogan, the court was concerned with the hospital context, and 
specifically two labour ward co-ordinators working within an NHS hospital.  Their role 
entailed tasks including the admission of patients, the allocation of staff and the 
supervision/ support of other midwives.  They objected to undertaking these tasks in 
connection with patients undergoing terminations of pregnancy and mounted a judicial 
review challenge against the handling of their grievance on the issue.  The appeal 
worked its way through to the Supreme Court which eventually found in favour of the 
Health Board.  The court found that the only question to be decided was the meaning 
of the words ‘to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a 
conscientious objection’.185 The previous House of Lords judgment in Janaway had not 
specifically considered what those words meant in the context of hospital treatment.186 
 
The court in Doogan found that human rights’ issues (for example, the right to refuse 
the performance of employment duties as a manifestation of religious belief) gave rise 
to difficult questions relating to an employer’s aims/ means that are context specific; 
and did not assist the interpretation of section 4.187  Instead, they found that issues of 
discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 (including reasonable adjustment claims) 
were more appropriately addressed in employment tribunal proceedings.188  As there 
was no available evidence, the court would not address any consequential arguments 
relating to any particular statutory interpretation, including the risk to abortion access.189 
 
The court found that the policy or purpose of the AA 1967 was to broaden the grounds 
for lawful terminations; to ensure patient safety via proper skill and hygienic conditions; 
and to avoid the mischief of back street abortions.  According to Lady Hale, there was 
also a policy to provide the service within the NHS and approved clinics in the private 
and voluntary sectors.190 
 
Ultimately, the court found that sections 1 and 4 should be read together – the 
termination of pregnancy in section 1 must be the treatment referred to in section 4.191 
The RCN case established that what is authorised by the AA 1967 is the “whole course 
 
185 Doogan (n72), [11]. 
186 Ibid., [11]. 
187 Ibid., [23]. 
188 Ibid., [24]. 
189 Ibid., [25]-[27]. 
190 Ibid., [27]. 
191 Ibid., [28]. 
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of medical treatment bringing about the ending of the pregnancy”.192  It follows that 
section 4 (and the right to object on the basis of that section) applies to the whole 
course of medical treatment bringing about the termination of the pregnancy.  In 
medical terminations, it begins with the administration of the drugs and normally 
concludes with the ending of the pregnancy by expulsion of the fetus etc.  It includes 
medical and nursing care connected to the process of labour/giving birth and the 
disposal of any tissue bi products.  Lady Hale acknowledges there may be aftercare 
required as a process of birth but section 4 would not extend to ordinary nursing and 
pastoral care of a patient who has just given birth because “it was not unlawful before 
the 1967 Act and thus not made lawful by it”.193 Doctors signing the statutory HSA1 
forms are not covered by section 4(1) – the forms are a necessary precondition but are 
not part of the treatment process. Lord Keith in Janaway had suggested this 
interpretation could extend to the forming of opinions by doctors as required by section 
1,194 and although Lady Hale is not explicit, she appears to agree with this view. 
 
In conclusion, the court found that a narrow meaning to the words ‘to participate in’ was 
more likely to have been in the contemplation of Parliament when the Act was 
passed.195 This interpretation restricts the words in section 4 to those ‘actually taking 
part’ in a ‘hands-on capacity’ and relates to those acts made lawful by section 1.196  
Consequently, ancillary, administrative and managerial tasks associated with those 
tasks are outside the acts made lawful by section 1, and the tasks carried out by the 
ward co-ordinators were closer to the latter types of roles. The court made it clear that 
any conscientious objector is under an obligation to refer a patient/case/task to a 
professional who does not share that objection.197  The case is notable because the 
Court’s narrow interpretative stance does not sit comfortably with previous broader 
interpretations of the Act.  It also neatly side steps much of the historic background 
leading to the implementation of the AA 1967.198  We will come back to conscientious 
objection in terminations of pregnancy in chapter 6. 
 
Certification and notification provisions199 
 
 
192 Ibid., [33]. 
193 Ibid., [34]. 
194 Janaway (n184). 
195 Cf with the broad statutory construction in the RCN case (n77). 
196 Doogan (n72), [37] - [38]. 
197 Ibid., [40]. 
198 For discussion, see Wale (n181). 
199 AA 1967, s 2. 
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The certification and notification provisions in the AA 1967 provide some degree of 
external scrutiny, and deliberate failure to comply with these provisions and their 
accompanying regulations may result in conviction for a summary criminal offence.200  
Any medical practitioner authorising termination must certify their section 1 opinion in 
prescribed form and the doctor undertaking the termination must give external notice 
(again in prescribed form) to the relevant medical officer.201  
 
Certification of section 1 opinions is made using an HSA 1 or 2 paper form.  HSA 1 
(Certificate A in Scotland) is used for section 1(1) terminations and HSA 2 (Certificate B 
in Scotland) for emergency terminations. Both forms should be kept locally by the 
medical practitioners for 3 years.202  These forms must be signed and dated by both 
practitioners before the termination is performed,203 and the Abortion Regulations 1991 
state that the certificate of opinion should be given for section 1(1) terminations “before 
the commencement of the treatment for the termination of the pregnancy to which it 
relates”204 and for section 1(4) terminations “not later than 24 hours after such 
termination”.205  
 
Notification of the termination procedure is made via the HSA4 form and can be 
completed/ submitted online or in paper format.  In England and Wales, the HSA4 form 
must be submitted to the relevant Chief Medical Officer (CMO) for every completed 
termination within 14 days of the procedure.206  In Scotland, the equivalent form must 
be sent to the Chief Medical Officer within 7 days.  The registered medical practitioner 
who performed the termination is the person legally responsible for giving notice to the 
CMO,207 and the HSA4 form must record the original number of fetuses/embryos and 
the number preserved in multiple pregnancies.  The Departmental guidance notes for 
completing the paper HSA4 form indicates that all forms relating to selective 
termination are scrutinised by a medical practitioner and more information can be 
requested on these cases.208 
 
 
200 AA 1967, s 2(3). 
201 See the Abortion Regulations 1991, Abortion (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2002, Abortion (Amendment) 
(Wales) Regulations 2002/8 and DOH 2014a (n83).  The 2002 Regulations changed the prescribed forms. 
202 DOH 2014a (n83), para 11. 
203 DOH 2013 (n94), 2; DOH 2014a (n83), para 11. 
204 S 3(2) 
205 S 3(3) 
206 DOH 2014a (n83), para 26-27.   
207 DOH 2014a (n83), para 28. 
208 Department of Health, Detailed guidance note for completing the abortion notification form HSA4 for abortions 
performed in England and Wales (DOH 2013a).   
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The Care Quality Commission (CQC) undertook a series of unannounced inspections 
on abortion providers in 2012.  14 NHS hospitals were found to be pre-signing the HSA 
1 forms, and although subsequent CQC inspections found no additional evidence of 
pre-signing, the Department of Health has subsequently confirmed that this practice is 
unacceptable.209  A Departmental/RCOG data matching exercise comparing the 
Department’s records and the National Down’s Syndrome Cytogenetic Register 
(NDSCR) highlighted a number of discrepancies in relation to ground E notifications.210  
RCOG found no: 
 
“evidence or impression that there was wilful failure to comply with the law, but 
rather a lack of understanding of the statutory requirements, which in turn 
produced a lack of organisation and accountability”.211 
 
Although a number of explanations are offered for these discrepancies (including the 
alternative use of Ground C), a deferential approach appears to have been taken to 
investigation212 and the subsequent Departmental response.213  Notwithstanding the 
lack of evidence on ‘guilty mind’,214 it is of concern that some doctors may have been 
unaware of their statutory obligations and that the Executive placed reliance on a 
representative body in this context.215  Clearly, the certificate and notification provisions 
are an inadequate protective mechanism without independent/robust investigation and 
enforcement. 
 
For completeness, we should mention the blanket duty to report any information a 
person may have about the commission of an offence in Northern Ireland.216  This duty 
requires doctors in Northern Ireland to report unlawful terminations or any reasonable 
suspicion thereof. 
 
Consent  
 
 
209 Department of Health, Matching Department of Health Abortion Notifications & Data from the National Down’s 
Syndrome Cytogenetic Register & recommendations for improving notification compliance (DOH 2014d).; DOH 2014a 
(n83), para 17.  
210 DOH 2014d (n209) 
211 DOH 2014d (n209),11. 
212 Using RCOG for the fact-finding rather than the police. 
213 Issuing guidance and not prosecuting. 
214 As per s AA 1967, s2(3). 
215 DOH 2014d (n209), 11. 
216 Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, s5. 
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Medical and surgical methods of termination need valid maternal consent although 
additional legal foundation may be required depending on the nature of the 
intervention.217  Although, maternal consent is not an explicit requirement of the legal 
defence under section 1 AA 1967,  RCOG states that “wherever possible, women 
should be offered the choice of method”,218 and the BMA emphasises the need for 
competent and voluntary decisions made on the basis of “sufficient, accurate 
information".219  In terms of paternal consent, the BMA says: 
“a woman’s partner has no legal right to demand or refuse a termination.  
However, it is good practice to encourage women to discuss the decision with 
their partner”220 
In terms of the obligation to disclose information, this will turn on the specific legal 
context221 and we will consider recent developments in the law in chapter 6.  If we set 
aside the legal issues for one moment, pre-procedure counselling remains a delicate 
and polarising subject matter because even truthful information “can have a detrimental 
impact on the decision making of patients considering abortion”.222  Domestic attempts 
to mandate counselling prior to termination have failed,223 and the Executive has 
persistently rejected this requirement for independent providers,224  albeit with caveats 
relating to the provision of “impartial and accurate information”.225  For some, the AA 
1967 entrenches the rights of doctors and offers a system of medical control over 
fertility,226  whilst for others, it facilitates termination on demand until the 24th week of 
pregnancy.227 
 
Safeguards and medical monopoly 
 
On paper, the AA 1967 created a medical monopoly - the medical profession largely 
control access and, to some extent, the decision to terminate - although the practical 
 
217 See Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 (CA); R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75 (HL). 
218 RCOG 2010b (n138), 27.  See also NICE, Termination of Pregnancy – NICE Guideline – Draft for Consultation (NICE 
April 2019), 36-37. 
219 BMA 2014 (Updated October 2018) (n124), 15. 
220 Ibid., 17. 
221 Jonathan Herring and others, ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice? Montgomery, Patients Values, and Balanced Decision-
Making in Person-Centred Clinical Care’ (2017) 25(4) Med L. Rev 582. 
222 Woodcock (n160). 
223  For example, the failed attempt by Nadine Dorries MP to amend the Health and Social Care Bill in 2011.  See also, 
NICE (n218), 25.
 
224 DOH 2014b (n162),12. 
225 DOH 2014a (n83), 11. 
226 Sally Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power & Abortion Law (Pluto1997), 42. 
227 Herring 2018 (n126), 320-323.  
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realities of this gatekeeping role may have shifted over time.228  To be lawful the 
procedure must be carried out, or at least implemented by doctors with the assistance 
of nursing staff.  In the case of fetal reductions/ selective terminations, the procedure 
must take place on NHS hospital premises or other approved place, and regulations 
are in place to ensure appropriate/ safe standards of treatment.  Certification is 
required from a second medical practitioner (save in emergency), opinions must be 
their own and external notification is required.  Only pregnant (or formerly pregnant) 
women can easily and realistically challenge the legality of a procedure or have the 
legal standing to do so.229  Reverend Jepson’s attempt to force the hand of the 
prosecuting authorities ultimately failed, as did attempts to prosecute doctors for 
inadequate risk assessment.  Similarly, attempts by genetic fathers to secure injunctive 
relief against planned terminations have failed.230   Jonathan Montgomery frames the 
AA 1967: 
“as enshrining a set of positions on the lens through which it is thought by 
Parliament to be appropriate to consider a decision to terminate a pregnancy; 
that is, what constitutes a legally acceptable ground for an abortion. This is 
partly constructed by reference to clinical issues about risk and prognosis, and 
partly by reference to social judgements; for example, about which injuries are 
‘grave’, what constitutes an ‘abnormality’, and the ‘seriousness’ of ‘handicap’. 
These frame the choices that are to be made available to women, setting 
boundaries of acceptability. Although they do not deﬁne these boundaries, 
medical professionals are their guardians. Clinical discretion, exercised in good 
faith, links the political settlement reached by Parliament with the decisions in 
individual cases.”231 
 
What is of specific concern, is whether the legal lens by which Parliament framed fetal 
reductions and selective terminations synchronises with the exercise of professional 
discretion in this context.  This is something that we will return to shortly. 
 
Interpretation 
 
Our analysis demonstrates that the legislative framework is patchy, lacking clarity, in 
places badly drafted and hard to access and understand.  There is evidence of 
inconsistent statutory interpretation232 and multiple sources are needed to access the 
 
228 Montgomery 2003 (n86); Sheldon et al. (n102). For discussion of the media portrayal of medical power in this context, 
see Ellie J. Lee, ‘Constructing abortion as a social problem: “Sex selection” and the British abortion debate.’ (2017) 27(1) 
Feminism and Psychology 15. 
229 Grubb (n3), 661. 
230 Paton (n22); C v S (n24). 
231 Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Conscientious Objection: Personal & Professional Ethics in the Public Square’, (2015) 23(2) 
Med L. Rev 200, 209-210. 
232  Cf RCN (n77) and Doogan (n72). 
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relevant legal rules.  Whilst it could be argued that the UK has failed to provide 
effective means for assessing the scope of lawful activities,233 legislative change seems 
unlikely in the short term.  Future judicial challenges may come from technological 
disruption, pressure for home-based terminations, rights-based attacks in the European 
Court of Human Rights234, or substantive abuse by stakeholders.  In the meantime, the 
courts are left to interpret this messy patchwork and whilst clarity and consistency 
ought to be a priority,235 social and political considerations continue to impede the 
overarching determinancy of the law.  Despite these reservations, the AA 1967 works 
reasonably well in practice and medical delivery affords most patients the type of 
access not immediately apparent from the legal fiction. 
 
4.2.3 Fetal reduction/ selective termination and the criminal framework 
 
Both fetal reduction and selective termination involve surgical intervention - the main 
method is feticide via inter cardiac injection of potassium chloride236 or occasionally 
Lignocaine.  In 2017, there were 111 recorded procedures in England and Wales and 
84% were performed using ground E.237  The courts have not drawn a clear distinction 
between the procedures, for example, in Doogan the term ‘selective abortion' is used to 
describe: 
 
“Where a woman is carrying more than one foetus, either in order to abort a 
foetus which may be seriously handicapped or because the reduction in the 
number of fetuses she is carrying is justified on one of the other grounds”238 
 
Although Lady Hale also refers to “selective reduction in the number of fetuses”,239 she 
makes no terminological distinction between the ending of anomalous or healthy fetal 
life.  Her approach is consistent with the BMA’s guidance to their members.240 
 
There is no evidence that either procedure was expressly contemplated when the 
OAPA 1861 or AA 1967 were enacted, but there was growing concern about the 
 
233 See A, B, C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032. However, cf the views of Rosamund Scott, ‘Risks, Reasons and Rights: The 
European Convention on Human Rights and English Abortion Law’, (2016) 24(1) Med L. Rev 1. 
234 See Tysiac v Poland [2007] 45 EHRR 42; Scott (n233) 
235 Brazier 1990 (n3); Grubb (n3). 
236 In 2012, 74 out of 82 cases In England & Wales were by this method. 
237 Abortion Statistics (n34), para 2.44. 
238 Doogan (n72), [6]. 
239 Ibid., [8]. 
240 BMA 2014 (n124). Relevant RCOG guidance expressly excludes the topic of embryo reduction from its remit (RCOG, 
Multiple pregnancy: the management of twin and triplet pregnancies in the antenatal period (NICE Clinical Guidance) 
(RCOG 2011a)).  
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legality of selective termination and fetal reduction by the time that Parliament debated 
the 1990 amendments.241  There was some uncertainty whether the prosecution could 
demonstrate an intention to procure a ‘miscarriage’ in early reductions without 
immediate expulsion of body parts.242  Others were concerned that there might not be 
protection under the AA 1967 if there was an incomplete termination of the 
pregnancy.243  The HFEA 1990 sought to address these concerns and implemented 
amendments to section 5(2) AA 1967.  This section now makes it clear that anything 
done with intent to procure a miscarriage of any fetus in a multiple pregnancy will be 
unlawful unless authorised by that section. Although, Grubb agrees that the section is 
effective at bringing both procedures within the ambit of the AA 1967,244 Alison Hall is 
less confident: 
 
“Section 37(5) of the 1990 act confirms that an abortion of one of a number of 
fetuses is legal if it complies with the amended Abortion Act – but the amended 
Abortion Act only offers protection where, in the words of section 1(1) “a 
pregnancy is terminated”.  There has been considerable debate about whether 
the condition of pregnancy is specific to each individual fetus.  If pregnancy 
means “the state of being with child” or “the state of the uterus in being 
pregnant” then the technique will fall outside the amended Abortion Act and can 
never be other than a criminal act.”245 
 
However, Grubb’s interpretation appears to be more realistic, attentive to the statutory 
language used and in keeping with parliamentary intention. 
 
The amended section 5(2)(a) does address our working definition of selective 
termination.246  A medical practitioner can only act lawfully if the thing done with intent 
is for the purpose of procuring a miscarriage of a fetus that meets the ground E criteria 
in section 1 (1)(d) AA 1967.  Section 5(2) (b) authorises fetal reduction provided any of 
the other section 1(1) grounds can be made out but there is no requirement for any 
specific fetus to be targeted.  Grubb says this makes sense because: 
 
“no one fetus can be singled out as the threat to the mother; rather it is the 
cumulative effect of their presence which creates the risk to her.”247  
 
 
241 HFEA 1990, s37.  See also David Price, ‘Selective reduction and feticide: the parameters of abortion’ (1988) Crim. 
L.R. 199; Brazier 1990 (n3). 
242 Price (n241) 3; Hall (n3), 306. 
243 Price (n241); Brazier 1990 (n3) 68; Grubb (n3), 667-668. 
244 Grubb (n3), 668. 
245 Hall (n3), 306. 
246 Legendre et al.(n125). 
247 Grubb (n3), 668. 
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However, these changes do not address the elevated risks posed by the multiple 
pregnancy to the fetuses themselves.248  Statistically, multiples have a higher 
probability of adverse maternal/ fetal outcomes than singleton pregnancies249 but the 
fetal outcomes are not a lawful ground for termination.  Fetuses are not ‘existing 
children of the family’250 and the Act makes no provision for addressing competing 
interests within the womb.  Further, it is unlikely that general elevated risks of 
prematurity/ abnormality automatically equate with a substantial risk of serious 
handicap in any specific entity in low order multiple pregnancies. 
 
Hall highlights that section 1(1)(b) AA 1967 speaks of prevention not reduction of risk – 
when used, the reduction must be assessed as necessary to prevent grave permanent 
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman.251  A fetal reduction may 
reduce but not completely obviate the risk to the woman if a multiple pregnancy is 
maintained.252  Hall argues that a comparative exercise must be made between 
continuing with different types of multiple pregnancy although this requirement is not 
expressly provided for in the relevant subsection.  However, in most cases, treating 
doctors will be able to validly certify fetal reductions under the alternate social ground253 
- a practice clearly envisaged in associated BMA guidance.254  Arguably, section 5 (2) 
(b) AA 1967 also covers the alternative definition of selective termination255providing 
the medical or emergency grounds can otherwise be made out. 
 
4.3  Civil Liability 
 
Civil liability for in-utero harm  
 
In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, civil liability is governed by the Congenital 
Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 (CDCLA).  This Act holds tortfeasors liable for pre-
natal injuries but crystallises the cause of action on the birth of the child.  The 
embryo/fetus derives no rights pending birth and there is no civil cause of action for 
death in-utero.256  Fortin points out that: 
 
248 Hall (n3), 306. 
249 Alan Cameron, Fetal medicine for the MRCOG and beyond (2nd ed, RCOG Press 2011).  
250 AA 1967, s 1(1)(a); Brazier 1990 (n3), 69. 
251 Hall (n3), 307. 
252 Eg a reduction from quads to triplets. 
253 AA 1967, s 1(1)(a).  There is corroborating evidence of this practice from our research interviews. 
254 BMA 2014 (updated October 2018) (n124), 8. 
255 Ie. Fetal pathologies that do not meet the criteria in AA 1967, s 1(1)(d) but which could be prejudicial to the 
development of the other healthy fetus(es) (Legendre et al. (n125), 543). 
256 Jane E S. Fortin, ‘Legal Protection for the Unborn Child’ (1988) 51 MLR 77. 
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“The 1976 Act also avoids the illogicality of maintaining that the tortfeasor owes 
a duty of care to a legal non-entity, the unborn child. Instead, a formula of 
derivative liability is used whereby a third person is only liable to a child born 
disabled if he had been ‘liable in tort to the parent or would, if sued in due time, 
have been so’.”257 
 
Although the fetus has no general cause of action against the mother, the Act does 
impose a limited duty of care in relation to the driving of a motor vehicle.258  Overall, the 
civil law is largely coherent with the criminal law jurisprudence in this context.259  The 
common law remains relevant for events prior to the enactment of the CDCLA - a child 
who has suffered pre-natal injuries because of a negligent act occurring during the 
pregnancy, has a cause of action at birth and can recover in respect of damage 
suffered since the birth as a result of the pre-natal injuries.260  There is no statutory 
equivalent of the CDCLA in Scotland. 
 
Civil liability for wrongful conception/ birth/ life 
 
Essentially these claims maintain that but for the defendant’s negligence, the child 
would not have been conceived or born at all.261 Although the domestic common law 
has resisted wrongful life claims by the child (the McKay exclusion),262 there are some 
compensatory avenues open to the parents of the child in relation to wrongful 
conception/ birth cases.263  In Parkinson264 the court was willing to compensate for the 
special costs associated with bringing up a disabled child following a negligently 
performed sterilisation (wrongful conception). The emphasis here was on 
compensating the parents for the extra costs associated with the disability, rather than 
providing the child with damages for the disability. One important statutory exception to 
the McKay exclusion provides a born child (with disability arising from licensed fertility 
treatment) with a remedy against the person whose negligence caused the disability.265 
 
 
257 Ibid. See CDCLA 1976, s 1(3). 
258 CDCLA 1976, s2.   
259 See CP (n38), [47] and [66] - [67] (CA). 
260 See Dillon LJ in Burton v Islington HA [1993] QB 204 (CA). 
261 For the distinction, see Samuel Walker, ‘Applying the actual/potential person distinction to reproductive torts’, (2014) 
14(1-2) Medical Law International 3. 
262 McKay v Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166 (HL). 
263 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [1999] 4 All ER 961 (HL); Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 
1 AC 309 (HL). 
264 Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2002] QB 266 (CA). 
265 See CDCLA, s1A; Stauch & Wheat 2012 (n127), 411. 
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Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (CICA) 
 
We have already examined the ruling in CP (A Child)266 that a child with fetal alcohol 
spectrum disorder was not a victim of crime.  In any event, the CICA rules have been 
amended to exclude those children damaged by alcohol in the womb from the ambit of 
‘victim of crime’.267 
   
4.4  The ‘in-utero’ embryo/ fetus  
 
The Scottish approach to in-utero fetal status has already been highlighted.268  Sir 
George Baker P summarised the English Law approach in Paton: 
 
“The foetus cannot, in English law, in my view, have any right of its own at least 
until it is born and has a separate existence from the mother.”269 
Similarly, in Re MB (Medical Treatment), the Court of Appeal stated: 
“The foetus up to the moment of birth does not have any separate interests 
capable of being taken into account when a court has to consider an application 
for a declaration in respect of a caesarian section operation”270 
However, that does not mean that the fetus has no legal status and Lord Mance has 
recently suggested that the (aforementioned) statement in MB may be “too 
dogmatic”.271  In Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994), Lord Mustill rejected:  
“the reasoning which assumes that since (in the eyes of English law) the foetus 
does not have the attributes which make it a "person" it must be an adjunct of 
the mother. Eschewing all religious and political debate I would say that the 
foetus is neither. It is a unique organism. To apply to such an organism the 
principles of a law evolved in relation to autonomous beings is bound to 
mislead” 272 
Similarly, Lord Hope emphasised that: 
“an embryo is in reality a separate organism from the mother from the moment 
of its conception. This individuality is retained by it throughout its development 
until it achieves an independent existence on being born. So the foetus cannot 
be regarded as an integral part of the mother in the sense indicated by the 
 
266 CP (n38). 
267 Ministry of Justice (MOJ), The Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (MOJ 2012), Annex B 4(1)(e). 
268 Chapter 4.2. 
269 Paton (n22), 989. 
270  [1997] EWCA Civ 3093. 
271 NIHRC (n18), [93]. 
272 AG Ref No3 (n22), 256-7. 
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Court of Appeal, notwithstanding its dependence upon the mother for its 
survival until birth”.273 
In S, Judge LJ concluded that a 36-week fetus ‘is not nothing: if viable it is not lifeless 
and is certainly human’.274  However, an embryo or fetus cannot be made a ward of 
court,275 nor can they bring legal proceedings until birth.   
So, whilst the embryo or fetus is not seen as an integral part of the mother, neither is it 
an autonomous human person for the purposes of the law.  European human rights 
jurisprudence has repeatedly side stepped the issue of status,276 although fetal 
interests have been afforded a measure of protection by the domestic criminal law 
linked to development or viability.277  Once a child is born it can bring a civil action for 
in-utero harm using the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976.  A person can 
only be convicted of a criminal offence for causing in-utero harm that results in the 
death of a child once born.278  The overall legal position is arguably incoherent but does 
offer a pragmatic solution in the absence of further consolidation and clarity.   
There has been a general reluctance by the domestic judiciary to tackle ethical or 
moral issues head on.  Sir George Baker P in Paton said: 
“In the discussion of human affairs and especially of abortion, controversy can 
rage over the moral rights, duties, interests, standards and religious views of 
the parties. Moral values are in issue. I am, in fact, concerned with none of 
these matters. I am concerned, and concerned only, with the law of England as 
it applies to this claim. My task is to apply the law free of emotion or 
predilection”279 
In Bland v Airedale NHS Trust,280 Hoffmann LJ claimed that judicial decisions should 
be based upon “acceptable ethical values”, whilst asserting that he “would expect 
medical ethics to be formed by the law rather than the reverse”.  However, in the 
House of Lords, Lord Browne-Wilkinson showed more reluctance and questioned 
whether complex moral issues would be better resolved by Parliament.281  More 
recently, Munby J stated: 
“It is no part of my function as I conceive it to determine the point at which life 
begins. In the view I have taken of the 1861 Act there is no need for me to do 
so. It is, as it seems to me, undesirable that I should do so. Even were I to 
attempt to do so, the effect of my decision would be limited. In the nature of 
things all I could do would be to determine as a matter of law an issue which 
 
273  Ibid., 267F. 
274 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26, 45f. 
275 Re F (In Utero) [1988] Fam 122 
276 See Paton v UK [1981] 3 EHRR 408; Vo v France [2004] 2 FCR 577 and A, B, C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032. 
277 AA 1967, s 1(1)(a); ILPA 1929, s 1. 
278 AG Ref no3 (n22). 
279 Paton (n22), 278c-d. 
280 Bland v Airedale NHS Trust [1993] AC 789 (HL), 825G. 
281 Ibid., 878C.  
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has much wider ramifications and which in other contexts may well have to be 
determined by reference to quite different criteria”282 
 
The reluctance of the judiciary to engage in this realm is an important regulatory 
consideration when gaps or uncertainty are created or left open by the legislature.    
 
4.5  The ‘ex-vivo’ embryo  
 
 
The HFEA 1990 paved the way for the creation and storage of ex-vivo embryos for 
both reproductive and research purposes; and made it possible to undertake research 
on spare embryos produced in consequence of assisted reproduction treatment (ART) 
and those created specifically for research.  Understandably, this Act aligns the start of 
pregnancy with the in-vivo environment,283 and avoids any interpretation that could link 
the concept with the free-standing creation of embryo life independent of context.  
Legal pregnancy is therefore restricted to the implanted embryo, and the effect of the 
HFEA 1990 is to create an entirely separate regulatory regime for the ex-vivo embryo.  
The Warnock Committee284 eventually concluded that the embryo was a separate 
entity with a ‘special status’ albeit one that has never been adequately defined.285 The 
majority concluded that the ex-vivo embryo warranted some degree of legal 
protection,286 but the subsequent legislation (HFEA 1990) left open some gaps around 
the treatment of human gametes287 and pre-implantation fertilised eggs. The European 
Tissues and Cells Directive288 aimed to address the former and was subsequently 
implemented by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008289 and Human 
Fertilisation & Embryology (Quality & Safety) Regulations 2007.290  Importantly, these 
provisions no longer restrict the creation of human embryotic life to fertilisation.291  
 
The associated regulatory regime works through a combination of prohibition and 
authorised conduct subject to licences issued by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (the Authority).  A human embryo cannot be stored for more 
 
282 R (Smeaton) (n2), [54]. 
283 HFEA 1990, s 2(3). 
284 Warnock Committee Report, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HMSO 
Reprint 1988). 
285 Ibid., para 11.17/18 at 63-64.  
286 Ibid. 
287 Both in-vivo and ex-vivo. 
288 Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004, Setting standards of quality 
and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and 
cells. 
289 HFEA 2008. 
290 See also HFEA Code of Practice (8th and 9th editions HFEA). 
291 Section 1(2) HFEA 2008 
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than 14 days after mixing of gametes,292  preventing use of the embryo following 
formation of the ‘primitive streak.293  The storage or use of an embryo under any 
circumstances which is prohibited is made unlawful unless otherwise licenced by the 
Authority. 294  It is unlawful to alter the genetic structure of any cell while it is part of an 
embryo,295 and this restriction includes the alteration of DNA, subject to some 
exceptions permissible under licence.296  The consent of the gamete provider to the 
continued storage or use of any resulting embryo is an absolute requirement, and the 
‘bright-line’ for consent is placed at the point of embryo transfer.  This means that until 
the embryo is transferred, the gamete provider has an unqualified right to withdraw that 
consent.  If the consent has been withdrawn, the licence holder has no other option but 
to destroy the embryo, and the statutory framework does not permit any discretion.297  
 
The Authority makes decisions and grants licences for embryo creation, research and 
treatment; and in respect of research uses a ‘principles’ or defined purposes 
framework.298  Licences for IVF treatment should not be granted unless account has 
been taken of the welfare of any child that may be born as a result of the treatment or 
any child affected by the birth.299  Unlike the AA 1967, we have a clear statutory 
expression of purpose in section 13(5) HFEA 1990, namely the welfare of the possible 
future child and any child affected by the birth.   
 
In summary, the creation, treatment, research and storage of the ex-vivo embryo is 
subject to some level of restriction and control; the law offers some degree of 
protection for that entity without granting or recognising any express legal rights or 
interests.  One oddity is that ex-vivo embryos appear to have greater legal protection 
than the in-vivo counterparts prior to implantation. 
 
4.6  Human rights 
 
The operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the public funding of UK termination 
services300 necessitates analysis of jurisprudence concerning the European Convention 
 
292 HFEA 1990, s 4A (3). 
293 At this point we can definitively identify the number of embryos. See Warnock (n284), 6.6. 
294 HFEA 1990, s 4(2). 
295 HFEA 1990, Sch 2, para 1.4. 
296 HFEA 1990, s 3ZA (5); see also Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015. 
297 Sonia Harris, ‘Regulating Reproduction: Frozen Embryos, Consent, Welfare & the Equality Myth’ at 50, Chp 3 in Ronan 
Deazley & Stephen Smith (eds), The Legal, Medical, and Cultural Regulation of the Body: Transformation and 
Transgression, (Ashgate Publishing, 2009).  Cf ARB v IVF Hammersmith Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2803 
298 HFEA 1990, sch 2, para 3A 
299 HFEA 1990, s 13(5) 
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on Human Rights (ECHR).301  At the outset, we should make it clear that the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Commission have repeatedly side stepped the 
issue of embryo or fetal status.  In Paton v UK, the Commission avoided an absolutist 
interpretation of Article 2 (right to life) because: 
 
“The 'life' of the foetus is intimately connected with, and cannot be regarded in 
isolation from, the life of the pregnant woman. If Article 2 were held to cover the 
foetus and its protection under this Article were, in the absence of any express 
limitation, seen as absolute, an abortion would have to be considered as 
prohibited even where the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a 
serious risk to the life of the pregnant woman. This would mean that the 'unborn 
life' of the foetus would be regarded as being of a higher value than the life of 
the pregnant woman.”302 
Ultimately, the Commission concluded that it was not being called upon to decide 
whether Article 2 covered the fetus, or whether it should recognise a 'right to life' with 
implied limitations. In any event, the Commission found that the termination in that case 
was covered by an implied limitation protecting the life and health of the woman at that 
stage of gestation. 
 
In Vo v France (a case involving 3rd party harm to a fetus),303 the Court decided it was 
for each individual member state to determine the appropriate degree of legal 
protection for the fetus using a wide margin of appreciation.  The perceived absence of 
consensus appears to have proved decisive in granting States a wide margin of 
appreciation.304  Scott points out that the facts of the case are important because of the 
subsequent reliance on this precedent by the ECtHR.305  Vo was not about any conflict 
of fetal/ maternal rights or any moral/ legal balance; and the interests of the mother and 
baby were aligned against the 3rd party doctor that had negligently caused the fetal 
harm.  Put simply, Scott claims that Vo should not be used as a benchmark for 
deciding cases where maternal/ fetal conflict arises, and in contexts that otherwise 
create difficulties for the recognition of rights and interests.306  Potential fetal rights 
(under Article 2) and actual maternal rights (under Article 8) are interconnected in 
abortion cases because they cannot be exercised independently due to the physical  
connection between woman and unborn entity.307 
 
 
301 1950 (Council of Europe) 
302 [1981] 3 EHRR 408, [19]. 
303 Vo (n276). 
304 Rosamund Scott, ‘Reproductive Health: Morals, Margins and Rights’, (2018) 81(3) MLR 422, 431. 
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In Tysiac v Poland,308 the applicant succeeded in her Article 8 challenge after having 
been denied the opportunity for a lawful termination on health grounds.  The court 
decided that the State had failed to provide the applicant with an effective mechanism 
for determining her entitlement to a therapeutic termination.  In A, B, C v Ireland,309 the 
court whilst noting that: 
 
“not every regulation of the termination of pregnancy constitutes an interference 
with the right to respect for the private life of the mother” 
 
found that the prohibition on terminations310 amounted to an interference with the first 
and second applicants’ right to respect for their private lives (Article 8). The central 
question was whether there had been an unjustified interference with their Article 8 
rights and the court answered that question in the negative.  However, for the third 
applicant, the issue was (as per Tysiac) whether the State had provided effective 
means for determining the entitlement to a lawful termination.  The court concluded that 
the Irish State had failed to comply with their positive obligation to secure effective 
respect for the applicant’s private life – there was no accessible and effective 
procedure for establishing the qualification for lawful termination.   
 
Further successful actions were brought against Poland for their access provisions in 
RR v Poland 311 and by a victim of sexual crime in P and S v Poland.312  In these cases, 
the court ruled that there had been breaches of Articles 8 and 3 (inhuman and 
degrading treatment).  These cases demonstrate that when access mechanisms are 
highly restrictive or unclear; and/or where the State fails to support a person 
adequately, it is possible to bring a successful human rights action.  However, Fenwick 
has described the ECtHR’s approach as highly deferential and avoidant of substantive 
issues like reproductive health, dignity and autonomy.313  He claims that the court is 
framing these cases as one of effective delivery of healthcare rather than substantive 
determination of the “nationally struck balance between fetal and maternal interests”.314  
Scott also notes the continuing failure by the ECtHR to give legal recognition to patient 
autonomy or to fully develop the importance of psychological integrity in cases 
concerning termination.315  She claims that the flawed use of a wide margin of 
 
308 Tysiac v Poland [2007] 45 EHRR42. 
309 [2010] ECHR 2032. 
310 Sought for reasons of health and well-being. 
311 [2011] 53 EHRR 31.
 
312 P & S v Poland [2012] App No 57375/08. 
313 Daniel Fenwick, ‘“Abortion jurisprudence” at Strasbourg: Deferential, avoidant and normatively neutral’, (2014) 34(2) 
Legal Studies 214. 
314 Ibid., 239. 
315 Scott (n304),446-447. 
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appreciation cannot be justified in cases of direct maternal/ fetal conflict,316  and is 
critical of judicial responses to ‘moral’ attacks by those who have “no need for a given 
reproductive intervention – and thus no interest in choosing it ”.317  Scott also argues 
elsewhere, that the requirements of section 1(1)(a) AA 1967 may be incompatible with 
Article 8 ECHR because criminalisation is unnecessary and offers unnecessary hurdles 
for pregnant women in the majority of first trimester cases where the risk of continuing 
the pregnancy is higher than the risk of termination.318 
 
Before closing, we return to the NIHRC case,319 which involved challenges under 
Articles 3, 8 and 14 ECHR to the Northern Ireland prohibition on termination for fetal 
abnormality and of pregnancies resulting from sexual crime or incest.  Although, the 
challenge failed due to a lack of standing, the Supreme Courts’ views on compatibility 
are worthy of consideration.320  Whilst the unborn entity was not considered a rights 
holder under the ECHR,321 the majority agreed that the current domestic law pursues a 
legitimate aim, namely “the moral interest in protecting the life, health and welfare of 
the unborn child”.322  According to Lady Hale, there is also a similar community interest 
relating to pregnant women.323  The core issue became whether the interference with a 
woman’s qualified Article 8 rights is necessary in a democratic society in away that 
strikes a fair balance between maternal rights and fetal interests.  The majority agreed 
that the interference was unnecessary and unjustified in relation to all three categories 
but distinguished fatal fetal abnormality (an unnecessary interference) from serious 
fetal abnormality (a necessary interference based on equality grounds and associated 
international obligations).324  Arguably, the concentration on fetal anomaly shifts 
emphasis away from maternal bodily autonomy to the status of the unborn entity.  
However, the majority fixed on the maternal obligation to carry to term thereby 
maintaining focus on the protection of bodily autonomy:325   
 
“Where the unborn child cannot survive, in contrast to the other categories of 
pregnancy with which we are concerned, there is no life outside the womb to 
protect. In those circumstances, even if allowance is made for the intrinsic value 
of the life of the foetus, the moral and ethical views of society cannot, it seems 
to me, be sufficient to outweigh the intrusion upon the autonomy of the pregnant 
 
316 Ibid., 451. 
317 Ibid., 424. 
318 Rosamund Scott, ‘Risks, Reasons and Rights: The European Convention on Human Rights and English Abortion 
Law’, (2016) 24(1) Med L. Rev 1. 
319NIHRC (n18). Cf also R (on the application of A and B) v Secretary of State for Health (n61). 
320 See the summary in this chapter at pages 82-84. 
321 NIHRC (n18), [21], [24], [94] and [305]-[306]. 
322 Ibid., [21], [105] and [278] 
323 Ibid., [21]. 
324 Ibid., [31], [133] and [331]. 
325 Ibid. [28], [133], [326], [368] and [371]. 
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woman, and her suffering, if she is obliged to carry to term a pregnancy which 
she does not wish to continue.”326 
 
The majority took a different position in relation to Article 3, reflecting the fact that this 
is an absolute rather than a qualified right and due to the need to test the severity of 
the (mis)treatment in a fact specific rather than abstract environment. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
The overarching impression is of a jurisdictionally complex, and occasionally opaque 
legal environment that healthcare professionals must navigate at their own risk.  At 
face value, the termination framework pays scant regard to maternal rights and 
reproductive choice.  However, others have been more generous describing the AA 
1967 as a “benign fiction”327 because reproductive services are delivered in spite of this 
framework, and women in Great Britain are generally afforded access to publicly 
funded terminations.  There is some evidence of evolutionary development following 
the implementation of the AA 1967, a process that can be explained by the use of 
vague (or flexible) legal rules, the generous exercise of professional discretion, clinical/ 
technological advances, changes in societal opinion, the decline of religious norms or a 
combination of these factors.328  Either way, we have a general legal framework that 
accommodates most scenarios, but which also offers a degree of flexibility for the more 
difficult case.  
Domestic and international law has fudged the question of legal personhood for the 
unborn entity and created a framework that offers a half way house – one which neither 
recognises unqualified maternal rights or open-ended legal protection for the unborn 
entity.  This static compromise is likely to be challenged by disruptive societal and 
technological changes329 and may be reaching the end of its legitimate and workable 
life span.  
We should recognise that legal frameworks have the capacity to shape relationships - 
between patients, healthcare professionals and the healthcare system – and 
 
326 Ibid., [371] (Lady Black). 
327 Herring (n126), 320. 
328 Roger Brownsword and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Compromise medicalisation’, in C. Stanton and others (eds), Pioneering Health 
Care Law Essays: In honour of the work of Professor Margaret Brazier (Routledge 2015); Sheldon et al. (n102), 33. 
329 David R. Lawrence and Margaret Brazier, ‘Legally Human? ‘Novel Beings’ and English Law’, (2018) 26(2) Med L. Rev 
309. 
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sometimes in unexpected ways.330  Sally Sheldon makes this telling observation about 
the impact of medical power and control on women in abortion care: 
“first at the level of a technical control of the means of avoiding reproduction, 
secondly at the level of decisional control-policing who should (and who should 
not) be allowed the possibility of an abortion, thirdly at the level of paternalistic 
control (where the benevolent doctor will enforce her views through 
‘persuasion’), and lastly at the level of a normalising control exercised in the 
medical interview over women seeking abortion.”331 
These features should not be discounted when evaluating the impact of this legal 
framework on patient encounters. 
Whilst fetal reduction and selective termination are governed by the general legal 
framework, they generally fall into the category of the difficult case.  These procedures 
involve problematic choices for clinicians and prospective parents requiring specialist 
surgical intervention in fetal medicine (tertiary) centres.332  Choices are often being 
made at a later stage than singleton terminations and involve complex assessments of 
competing medical risk.  Decisions may also be made against a background of IVF 
treatment and a longstanding desire for children.   
There are also two major problems with the general legal norms as they apply to these 
procedures.  First, these procedures often engage or are justified by ground E – a 
problematic legal provision that in practice may stretch the boundaries of reasonable 
statutory interpretation.  This ground333 arguably requires doctors to go beyond their 
field of expertise and make social judgements about the ‘seriousness’ of ‘handicap’.334  
The legal text contains some outdated terminology and is open to (mis) interpretation 
and disagreement over meaning and scope.  There is also some evidence of 
discordance between the legal and professional norms in this context. 
Secondly, fetal reductions may involve decision-making considerations which the 
general law does not authorise.  In high order multiples, the rationale for reduction may 
be pregnancy preservation or pregnancy maximisation.  Whilst the law recognises 
inherent risks to the pregnant woman, it does not explicitly authorise the weighing of 
general fetal interests or provide for pregnancy preservation.  This puts pressure on the 
interpretation of the lawful grounds for termination – most notably C and E335 - and the 
resulting space between professional and legal norms.   Indeed, the current legal 
framework makes divergent professional/ practice norms more likely in multiple 
 
330 Sheldon et al. (n102). 
331 Sheldon (n226), 73. 
332 Cf the medical methods dominating singleton terminations in the UK. 
333 AA 1967, s 1(1)(d). 
334 Jonathan Montgomery (n231). 
335 AA 1967, s 1(1)(a) and (d) respectively. 
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pregnancies and has the capacity to place significant pressure on key decision-makers 
at a critical juncture.   
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Chapter 5 – Legal Frameworks (2) 
 
Contents: 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Legal regulation using the concept of pregnancy. 
5.3 Regulatory options - termination of pregnancy. 
5.4 Legal regulation of healthcare professionals and providers. 
5.5 Compelling medical treatment. 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we develop our analysis of the legal normative frameworks and start 
with an examination of legal regulation using the concept of pregnancy.  Here, our 
focus is on how pregnancy is used by the law, and regulation more generally “as a 
distinctive marker according to which pre-and post-events are deﬁned and analyzed”.1  
In the preceding chapter, we established (albeit with some equivocation around 
precision) that a legal pregnancy starts from implantation of the fertilised human egg 
and ends following birth and complete expulsion from the woman.  Specifically, we now 
address how the concept of pregnancy has been used in legal regulation and examine 
whether pregnancy (and decision-making by the pregnant woman about her 
pregnancy) should be the sole or primary criterion for regulating pre and post 
implantation activities.2 
We then move on to outline some possible reform options before closing with an 
examination of the broader legal frameworks governing healthcare professionals, 
healthcare providers and the delivery of medical treatment.   We have two central aims 
in this chapter.  First, to examine whether and what changes might be made to the 
existing legal norms to better accommodate terminations of pregnancy, and specifically 
fetal reductions and selective terminations.  Secondly, to gain a clearer picture of the 
broader legal framework regulating doctors, and more generally healthcare 
professionals and service providers.  This will provide a foundation for addressing the 
 
1 Judith Daar, ‘The outdated pregnancy: Rethinking traditional markers in reproductions’, (2014) 35(4) Journal of Legal 
Medicine 505, 507. 
2 Ibid., 509. 
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wider options for regulating medical decision-making and assist the development of 
responses to the third research question. 
 
5.2 Legal regulation using the concept of pregnancy 
 
The possibility of ex-vivo existence necessitates consideration of entity status and the 
appropriate degree of legal protection that ought to be afforded to the independent 
embryo.3  Disconnected physically from the pregnant woman, the embryo exists as an 
independent entity, albeit one where there are widely divergent views over its nature 
and moral status.  In the case of a pre-implanted but in-vivo embryo, there is no legal 
pregnancy even though the embryo is developing within an internal environment.  
Offering freestanding legal protection or status to that entity could create issues for 
medication or other devices designed to interfere with the implantation process and 
initiate wider implications for female autonomy and gender equality.4   
The environmental context of the embryo is central - pregnancy embodies a physical 
state of existence (‘being with child’) and a direct relationship between the growing 
entity and the pregnant woman.  The implanted embryo cannot be easily protected 
without some potential or actual violation of the pregnant woman’s autonomy.5  
Conversely, any interests that the ex-vivo embryo may possess, or that can be 
ascribed to it, can be asserted and enforced independently without direct physical 
impact on the woman.  The physical separation of the ex-vivo embryo from the parental 
donors cannot be ignored, although there might be good societal interests independent 
of physical location that demand some consistency of approach.  Genetic, gender or 
racial profiling might be typical cases where a unified approach to legal regulation is 
warranted, although, we would still need to address matters relating to development 
and the degree of invasion/ harm to the entities involved.6  The parental role in the 
creation of the entity is a further consideration although this does not establish a neat 
‘bright line’ and may only separate the in-vitro embryo created for research from those 
 
3 Amel Alghrani and Margaret Brazier, ‘What Is It? Whose is It? Re-Positioning the Fetus in the context of Research’, 
(2011) Cambridge Law Journal (1) 51. 
4 Sonia Harris, ‘Regulating Reproduction: Frozen Embryos, Consent, Welfare & the Equality Myth’, chp 3 in Ronan 
Deazley and Stephen Smith (eds), The Legal, Medical, and Cultural Regulation of the Body: Transformation and 
Transgression, (Ashgate Publishing, 2009). 
5 Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost, Bioethics, medicine, and the criminal law, Volume III, Medicine and bioethics in 
the theatre of the criminal process (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
6 Eg, Rosamund Scott, ‘Choosing between Possible Lives: Legal and Ethical Issues in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis’, 
(2006) 26(1) OJLS 153. 
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created for reproductive purposes.7  There are also practical differences between 
selective termination/ fetal reduction and embryo research that may justify different 
approaches to paternal consent, especially relating to the withdrawal of reproductive 
permission.8  
The role of the law and the legitimacy of State interference in reproductive choice also 
needs to be addressed. Whilst the criminal law may have a limited role in the regulation 
of reproductive choice,9 few States have allowed unfettered access to abortion or 
unqualified freedom in embryo research.10  States might want to protect pregnant 
women and gamete providers from potential harm although this may not legitimise 
interference in Millian terms.  The criminal law may have a legitimate role to play in the 
wider protection of genetic characteristics and unsanctioned interferences with the 
human genetic code; or perhaps in avoiding the commodification of the creation 
process.11  States may have a role to facilitate and secure particular variations in 
reproductive autonomy;12 decriminalised frameworks may still require legitimisation,13 
and the absence of restrictive regulation is not a guarantee of reproductive access or 
choice.   
This takes us on to examine whether termination procedures should be regulated 
solely by reference to the pregnancy, the pregnant woman, or by direct legal protection 
of the unborn entity or through a combined approach.  This has very real implications 
for fetal reduction and selective termination, when distinct entity interests are possibly 
in play.   UK law ceded exclusivity to the legal concept of pregnancy when it amended 
the Abortion Act in 1990.   Whilst the original anomaly ground included reference to “if 
the child were born”,14 the 1990 amendments extended protection to the gestational 
pregnancy of any “foetus”,15 and added the requirement that the anomaly ground 
should apply to procuring the “miscarriage of that foetus”.16  Although the ILPA 1929 
offered a measure of independent protection for the unborn entity from viability, the 
1990 amendments extended qualified and divergent protection from implantation based 
 
7 For a discussion on the ethical distinctions between the in-vitro embryo created for research and reproductive purposes 
see Katrien Devolder, The ethics of embryonic stem cell research (OUP 2015). See also David R. Lawrence and Margaret 
Brazier, ‘Legally Human? ‘Novel Beings’ and English Law’, (2018) 26(2) Med L. Rev 309. 
8 Alghrani and Brazier (n3). 
9 Kerry Petersen, ‘Classifying Abortion as a Health Matter: The Case for De-Criminalising Abortion Laws in Australia’, 
chp 22 in Sheila McLean, First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate 2006)).  See for eg, the Abortion Bill 
2018-19 (HC Bill 276). 
10 Canada is a rare example of a State where abortion has been decriminalised. 
11 Heather Widdows, ‘Persons and their parts: new reproductive technologies and risks of commodification’, chp 4, (79-
86) in Ronan Deazley and Stephen Smith (eds), The Legal, Medical, and Cultural Regulation of the Body: Transformation 
and Transgression (Ashgate 2009). 
12 Erin Nelson, Policy and Reproductive Autonomy (Hart 2013). 
13 Mary Neal, ‘Locating lawful abortion on the spectrum of proper medical treatment’, in S. Fovargue and A. Mullock (eds), 
The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment:  What role for the medical exception? (Routledge 2015). 
14 Abortion Act 1967 (original version), s1(1)(b). 
15 AA 1967, s 5(2). 
16 AA 1967 (as amended), s 5(2)(a).  The reference to the term “foetus” in AA 1967 (original version), s5(1) is also 
acknowledged. 
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on gestational time limits.  The anomalous fetus now has less explicit legal protection 
than a healthy post 24-week fetus17 - a conceptual variation driven by considerations 
external to the infringement of maternal bodily autonomy.  Although fetal status might 
be interconnected with the exercise of maternal autonomy, legal variation exists 
because of intrinsic changes in the physical status of the unborn entity. 
Regulation using the concept of pregnancy has some practical advantages because it 
acknowledges the interconnected relationship between the pregnant woman and her 
developing fetus.  The concept promotes the values of the pregnancy over individual 
entity interests and diverts our attention away from heavily contested definitional/ status 
issues.   It shifts the focus onto decisions made by the pregnant woman about her 
pregnancy, and would, for example, facilitate the drafting of rules authorising fetal 
reduction for the protection of the wider pregnancy.  We create difficulties when we try 
to justify or base legal rules on the kind of entity the embryo/ fetus is or may become, 
or otherwise introduce considerations external to the pregnancy.  These may be 
legitimate considerations for parental decision-making (whose autonomy interests 
might be invoked upon discovery of serious anomaly) but challenge the coherence of 
regulation based on the concept of pregnancy.18  So, if the law permits selective 
termination based on individual anomaly or impact on “children of the family”,19  it 
necessarily engages a decision-making criterion other than the pregnancy or the 
pregnant woman.20  Of course, the birth of a disabled, premature or unwanted child 
may have an adverse impact on the woman, but by allowing the ‘entity’ or external 
factors to play any role in the decision-making or regulatory process, we have ceded 
exclusivity from the concept of pregnancy.  Conflicting or ambiguous public narratives 
are important here.21  Although coherence could be achieved by making the wishes of 
the pregnant woman the sole legal criterion for lawful termination, it is unclear whether 
there is broad societal support for unrestricted third trimester terminations.22  Open 
ended entitlement may also prove problematic for healthcare professionals unwilling or 
unable to respond to unrestricted patient demand.  Whilst we accept that a balance 
needs to be struck, we would be reluctant to endorse a legal framework supporting 
unqualified or unrestricted patient autonomy.  One possible solution is the use of a time 
limit that is not qualified by considerations other than the pregnancy/ pregnant woman. 
 
17 As AA 1967, S1(1)(a) is no longer available as a ground of termination. 
18  For discussion on the possible engagement of parental interests in such cases, see Rosamund Scott, ‘Interpreting 
the Disability Ground of the Abortion Act’ (2005) 64(2) Cambridge Law Journal 388. 
19  AA 1967, s 1(1) (a). 
20  For example, when the decision to terminate is made to avoid or reduce the risk of fetal prematurity. 
21 Jeffrey Wale, ‘Don’t forget the legal framework: the public provision of non-invasive prenatal testing in England and 
Wales’ (2015) Medical Law International 203. 
22 UK Parliamentary Inquiry into Abortion on the Grounds of Disability (HMSO 2013). 
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This background creates a potential dilemma for supporters of a more liberal 
termination framework and for parents facing difficult decisions in the late stages of 
pregnancy.  The current arrangements involve a compromise23 but attempts to improve 
the coherence of the law (removing ground E) run the risk of restricting rather than 
extending maternal choice.  This dilemma may intensify as clinical and technological 
advances direct increasing attention to entity status, further disrupting the 
interconnection between mother and unborn entity.24  Having different regulatory 
regimes for ex/in-vivo environments is not necessarily incoherent,25 but differentials 
may shine a spotlight on discrepancies within each framework.   Some degree of 
coherence seems to be important for the overarching public narrative in cases of legal 
compromise.26  Further, given the apparent societal polarity around the nature of fetal 
interests, we believe that the regulatory emphasis should be placed on the relational 
aspects of pregnancy whenever possible.  In taking this position, we recognise that 
such positions will ultimately have to address advances disrupting the current relational 
aspects of pregnancy (eg ectogenesis). 
 
5.3 Regulatory options - termination of pregnancy 
 
In this section, we introduce some possible regulatory responses to the termination of 
pregnancy and attempt to pin down where we stand more explicitly.  At the outset, we 
highlight two preliminary considerations.   First, we should recognise the difference 
between an explicit right to terminate a pregnancy and a permissive liberty to do so.27  
The latter will not guarantee access to termination services - we know from experience 
that public funding has been so critical to securing access for women living in Northern 
Ireland.  Although explicit maternal rights (or liberties) to terminate are frequently 
qualified, States do need to be clear about the precise circumstances when regulatory 
interference is warranted.28  The US experience highlights the danger of uncertainty 
around overly qualified exceptions and the importance of the wider political framework 
 
23 Roger Brownsword and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Compromise medicalisation’, in C. Stanton and others (eds), Pioneering Health 
Care Law Essays: In honour of the work of Professor Margaret Brazier (Routledge 2015); Jeffrey Wale, ‘Commentary: 
Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan’, UK Health Care Law, (2015a) < 
https://ukhealthcarelaw.wordpress.com/2015/01/20/commentary-greater-glasgow-health-board-v-doogan-another-2014-
uksc-68/ >accessed 20 January 2015. 
24 Samantha Halliday, Autonomy and Pregnancy (Routledge 2016); Daar (n1); Lawrence and Brazier (n7). 
25 For discussion, see Scott (n6); Roger Brownsword and Jeff Wale, ‘Testing Times Ahead: Non-invasive Prenatal Tetsing 
and the Kind of Community We Want to Be’, (2018) 81(4) MLR 646. 
26 See Wale (n21). For the balance to be struck between regulatory coherence and effectiveness, see Roger Brownsword, 
Infosoc 2018: Informational Rights, Informational Wrongs, and Regulatory Responsibilities, (Bournemouth University 
Working Papers in Law, No 1/201 2018),  <https://microsites.bournemouth.ac.uk/law-review/files/2018/03/Infosoc-2018-
wps.pdf >accessed 28 March 2019. 
27 Kate Greasely, Arguments about Abortion: Personhood, Morality and Law (Oxford University Press 2017), 205.   
28 Elizabeth Wicks, The State and the Body: Legal Regulation of Bodily Autonomy (Hart 2016), 48. 
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in securing abortion access.29  Greasley also points out “the optimal regulatory 
framework for securing the substantive abortion right will likely be jurisdiction-specific”30 
although cross border threats should be anticipated in specific areas including medical 
methods of termination. 
 
Secondly, there is the specific issue of how we accommodate fetal reduction and 
selective termination in any regulatory framework.  Should we construct a bespoke 
model, or might it be better to accommodate within or otherwise adapt more general 
legal rules?  The answer will be influenced by the breadth and specificity of the 
authorising grounds, and the extent to which the unborn entity is given specific 
recognition in the regulatory model.  Our law currently adopts a hybrid (and ambiguous) 
entity approach combining general legal rules with specific modifications aimed at 
terminations in multiple pregnancy.  We know that grounds C and E are the most 
important legal criteria in clinical practice for fetal reduction and selective termination. 
Accordingly, we are probably going to need to address how these grounds operate in 
practice and whether they need to be replaced, modified or supplemented. 
Criminalise non-emergency terminations 
A criminal prohibition model was operated by the Republic of Ireland before 2019 
although previous restrictions had been relaxed by the Protection of Life During 
Pregnancy Act 2013 allowing terminations for a real and substantial risk to the life of 
the pregnant woman.  This criminal model arguably forced terminations underground, 
encouraged procedural tourism and presented serious issues for female equality and 
bodily autonomy.  The Republic’s legal position has now liberalised considerably 
following the outcome of a constitutional referendum and the implementation of 
amending legislation.31 
Amended existing criminal offences32  
Brazier and Ost say we should focus on the intrinsic value of all human life and protect 
the unborn entity absent conflicting interests.33  They moot replacing the current legal 
framework with two new criminal offences - unlawful feticide before 24 weeks and child 
destruction from 24 weeks.  Recent legislative efforts have also used the 24-week cut 
off as a foundation for amendment.  For example, Diana Johnson’s Abortion Bill34 
attempts to repeal sections 59/60 OAPA 1861, modify section 58 so that it is restricted 
 
29 Greasley (n27), 205-208. 
30 Greasley (n27), 208. 
31 Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 (Act No. 31 of 2018) (EIRE). 
32 Offences Against the Person Act 1861; Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. 
33 Brazier & Ost (n5). 
34 Clause 1, Abortion Bill 2018-19 (HC Bill 276). 
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to terminations after 24 weeks; and combines these changes with a new offence of 
non-consensual termination.35  There is much to commend here although the model 
effectively decriminalises consensual termination up to 24 weeks and ducks the ground 
E coherency issue. 
Amend the ‘medical’ model 
Whilst significant criticism has been directed at the medical model used in the AA 
1967,36 the medical profession has arguably played an important role in mediating 
between polarised extremes.37  Although many continue to argue for formal statutory 
recognition of maternal rights,38 there is potential danger in making doctors mere 
technicians acting on patient instructions without limits.39  There might be scope to 
modify the need for dual certification without removing external scrutiny, although these 
modifications would not address concern that the medical gatekeepers are susceptible 
to practice change, internal opinion and represent a poor guarantee of access over the 
longer term.40  These may be important considerations if abortion is decriminalised 
although periodic positive legislative review might mitigate some of these concerns.41 
Modify oversight  
The publication of annual national statistics provides a measure of public scrutiny and 
oversight that is not apparent for other medical procedures.  Although there is 
additional scrutiny of medical practice via the notification process,42 there is some 
evidence of continuing professional abuse in terms of under and misreporting.43  One 
response is a more robust and independent mechanism for investigating and enforcing 
regulatory failures – indeed, recent CQC and departmental responses have suggested 
that existing oversight mechanisms will be policed more robustly going forwards.  
Alternative options could target regulatory measures at institutional service providers, 
in combination or as an alternative to those directed at healthcare professionals.  
Additional scrutinisation measures might also be applied in the latter stages of 
pregnancy.  Of course, reporting failures do not necessarily signify wholescale 
regulatory non-compliance, and educational/ system solutions directed at healthcare 
 
35 Ibid., clause 2. 
36 Michael Thomson, ‘Abortion Law and Professional Boundaries’, (2013) 22(2) Social and Legal Studies 191; Sheena 
Meredith, Policing pregnancy: The law and ethics of obstetric conflict (Ashgate 2005); Sally Sheldon, Beyond Control: 
Medical Power & Abortion Law (Pluto1997). 
37 Brazier & Ost (n5). 
38 Shelley Day Sclater and others, Regulating Autonomy: Sex Reproduction & Family (Hart 2009), chp 13. 
39 Brazier & Ost (n5). 
40 Greasley (n27), 204. 
41 Brownsword & Wale (n23). 
42 AA 1976, s2.  See also Serious Crime Act 2015, s84. 
43 Department of Health, Guidance in relation to requirements of the Abortion Act 1967, (DOH 2014a); Jeffrey Wale, 
‘Mismatch in notifications reveal a worrying problem in our abortion statistics’, The Conversation (2014), < 
https://theconversation.com/mismatch-in-notifications-reveal-a-worrying-problem-in-our-abortion-statistics-28565, 
>accessed 16 January 2015; Brownsword and Wale (n23). 
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providers/ professionals might be more effective at increasing notification compliance 
than punitive sanctions.  ‘Name and shame’ mechanisms are also powerful media and 
commercial tools that can be used effectively against private service providers. 
Time limits 
Another option is to impose a single time limit for all terminations save for emergency 
situations.44  At present, there is no upper time limit on terminations based on fetal 
abnormality to cater for late diagnosis (following structural anomaly screening at 18-20 
weeks) and delays arising from medical referrals.45  Imposing a single inclusive time 
limit would leave a small number of difficult cases to resolve but could improve 
legislative coherence and avoid decision-making centred on criteria related to the 
unborn entity.  Time limits may also prove helpful for clinicians in reconciling their 
personal and professional values - we should not discount adverse professional 
reaction to an unrestricted termination model.  However, we should recognise that time 
limits force some women to resort to self help or unregulated options to end their 
pregnancy.46  There would be a small but important impact on late selective 
terminations in multiple pregnancy.   On reflection, we can see the merit of a general 
time limit, with a few exceptions based on maternal health or pregnancy impact striking 
the kind of balance articulated in the NIHRC case.47  
Viability criterion 
There is scope to clarify or replace the viability criterion used in the ILPA 1929.48  
Alternatively, we could shift emphasis to sentience as a criterion of legal significance,49 
although this change is unlikely to make much of a difference in practice.  However, 
ongoing clarification would support a legal model authorising unrestricted patient 
choice before viability/ sentience with qualified restriction thereafter to / during birth.50  
This would have the advantage of recognising the bodily autonomy of pregnant women 
during the early stages of pregnancy, acknowledging the changing status of the unborn 
entity and aligning with many gradualist accounts of moral status.  Such an approach 
would facilitate the majority of fetal reductions, leaving a small batch of difficult cases to 
address. 
 
44 Sjef Gevers, ‘Abortion legislation and the future of the 'counseling model'’, (2006) 13(1) European Journal of Health 
Law 27. 
45 Eg, UK Parliamentary Inquiry (n22) and Lord Shinkwin’s Abortion (Disability Equality) HL Bill 16 (2016-17). 
46 See for example, R v Catt [2013] EWCA Crim 1187. 
47 In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) 
[2018] UKSC 27 
48 Nuffield Council of Bioethics, Critical care decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine: ethical issues (Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 2006), 153. 
49 Kristin L. Savell, ‘Life and death before birth: 4D ultrasound and the shifting frontiers of the abortion debate’, (2007) 
15(1) Journal of Law & Medicine 103. 
50 Wicks (n28), Chp 8. See also Brazier and Ost (n5). 
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Compulsory counselling51  
Some jurisdictions have introduced mandatory counselling or instruction sessions prior 
to termination. This approach is often pursued under the guise of enhancing informed 
consent and has proven popular in some countries (eg United States).  The UK has 
consistently rejected this approach52  because, even if well intentioned, mandatory 
counselling can act as an unnecessary hurdle to patient choice and access.53  The key 
thing from our perspective is that parents have access to balanced and non-directive 
information about their options. This inevitably requires adequate time/space for proper 
dialogue and deliberation.  It also requires an information exchange process that is 
sensitive to situational variations including patient knowledge and understanding. 
Amended regulation of medical methods of termination  
Successful lobbying has enabled the lawful part administration of abortifacient 
medication at patient homes in England, Wales and Scotland.  There may be some 
scope to extend this further, but the absence of on-site medical supervision might 
heighten the risk of harm to the women involved.  This concern might be managed 
partly through technological solutions and added risk-based control measures aimed at 
high risk pregnancies and women.  However, unsupervised home terminations might 
generate other issues for vulnerable women that would otherwise benefit from hospital 
support.  The shift from surgical to medical methods of termination may also alter the 
dynamics of the relationship between pregnant women and healthcare professionals 
and this may not be an unqualified good.54  Either way, this is unlikely to be a realistic 
option for fetal reduction or selective termination in the short term. 
Decriminalise abortion 
There is a growing clamour for abortion to be classified as an ordinary health matter 
and decriminalised.55  There are two direct arguments in favour of reform: (1) the 
unwelcome prosecution of women and healthcare professionals, and (2) the adverse 
public narrative communicated to pregnant women and prospective mothers by 
criminalisation.  Picking up on the latter point, there is potential stigmatisation from the 
imposition of the criminal law, although the actual effect on patient access/ experience 
is not entirely clear.  If decriminalisation occurs, it would leave these procedures to be 
 
51 Gevers (n44).   
52 Eg, Nadine Dorries MP’s failed amendments to the Health & Social Care Bill in 2011. 
53 Scott Woodcock, ‘Abortion counselling and the informed consent dilemma’, (2011) 25 Bioethics 495.  See also NICE, 
Termination of Pregnancy – NICE Guideline – Draft for Consultation (NICE April 2019), 25. 
54 Carrie Purcell and others, ‘The changing body work of abortion: A qualitative study of the experiences of health care 
professionals’, (2016) Sociology of Health and Illness ISSN 0141-9889:1, 10-11. 
55 Peterson (n9); Sheldon (n36); Abortion (Decriminalisation): Ten Minute Rule Bill 2017 (HC Bill) (introduced by Diana 
Johnson MP). 
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regulated by general legal principles and professional regulatory rules; and would 
probably dispense with the need for dual certification.  Decisions would need to be 
made about the broader role of healthcare professionals - if terminations are reduced 
to non-technical activities, the central role of medical decision-making would be 
relegated from the termination process.56  However, fetal reduction/ selective 
termination procedures are very technical - making doctors mere technicians may have 
unexpected/ unwanted consequences on the patient relationship.57  We would also 
need to decide whether decriminalisation should apply generally, or only to pregnant 
women and/or healthcare professionals acting in accordance with good medical 
practice and good faith.  We would want to ensure that healthcare professionals acting 
outside of good medical practice were subject to any general criminal sanctions. 
Some have recommended a shift in emphasis to reproductive responsibility, prompting 
a wider and more central role for educational and organisational policies instead of 
restrictive rules.58  It is clear that good information systems can influence access and 
impact upon critical time limits.  We also know from the Canadian experience that there 
may be unexpected consequences from deregulation, and there is no guarantee that 
decriminalisation will enhance patient access or maternal rights.  Quick claims that 
using the criminal law risks increasing secrecy and jeopardising patient safety,59  
arguing that it might be more effective to target healthcare institutions rather than 
individual professionals.60   
Accordingly, one possible regulatory solution could involve the continued imposition of 
criminal sanctions on institutional providers for breaches of care/ notification 
requirements; the decriminalisation of terminations carried out by registered healthcare 
professionals in accordance with good medical practice; and the maintenance of a 
general criminal prohibition in all other circumstances.  The Human Medicines 
Regulations 2012 would continue to make it illegal to supply abortifacients without a 
medical prescription.  Any reform would have to address how and whether to treat 
pregnant women as criminal principals.   
However, there must be a risk that without a clear legal framework, pressure would be 
applied on healthcare professionals to offer termination procedures on demand.  On 
balance, we would be reluctant to endorse blanket decriminalisation, although we can 
 
56  Jose Miola, ‘Making Decisions About Decision-Making: Conscience, Regulation, and the Law’, (2015) 23(2) Med L. 
Rev 263. 
57 Ibid.; Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Conscientious Objection: Personal & Professional Ethics in the Public Square’, (2015) 
23(2) Med L. Rev 200. 
58 Martin Richards, ‘Which children can we choose: Boundaries of reproductive autonomy’, chp 11 in S D. Sclater and 
others, Regulating Autonomy: sex reproduction & family (Hart 2009); Brazier & Ost (n5). 
59 Oliver Quick, Regulating Patient Safety. The End of Professional Dominance? (Cambridge University Press 2017), 108. 
60 Ibid., chp 6. 
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see the merit of a more lightly regulated criminal framework covering consensual 
terminations before viability.  This might reduce the gap between the legal and 
professional norms, and address many of the concerns about criminalisation in the vast 
majority of singleton and multiple terminations. 
Separate legal regulation for multiple pregnancy 
The case has been made for separate legal regulation of terminations in multiple 
pregnancy.61  Whilst, Great Britain has made some changes to reflect the specific 
circumstances of multiple pregnancy,62  there is no provision for general embryo/ fetal 
interests to be considered.  Nevertheless, there is evidence that terminations are being 
undertaken with the primary aim of pregnancy preservation or improving fetal outcomes 
(see chapter 9) and this divergence gives us cause to revisit the legal framework and 
medical practice.  The main pressure for separating the legal frameworks is the 
increasing divergence between medical and surgical methods, although the issue is 
directly linked to the breadth and flexibility of the general termination framework.   
Update/ consolidate the legal framework 
Much has changed since the termination framework was formulated:63  medical 
terminations are ascendant in singleton pregnancies,64  the balance between private/ 
public sector delivery has shifted and the institutional environments/ professional 
frameworks have changed significantly.  In these circumstances, there appears to be a 
prima facie case for a revised unitary legal framework; and an opportunity to revisit 
criminal/ professional regulation and to reassess the balance between individual and 
organisational responsibility.  Fetal reduction and selective termination warrant 
additional consideration given their divergence from the medical model used in most 
singleton procedures. 
 
5.4   Legal regulation of healthcare professionals and providers 
 
This section sketches out the legal regulatory regime for healthcare professionals 
(HCP) and healthcare providers (HCProv).  We should start with a word of caution - 
this is a fluid and rapidly changing area, and despite some important developments 
 
61 Judith F. Daar, ‘Selective reduction of multiple pregnancy: lifeboat ethics in the womb’, (1992) 25(4) Davis L R 773.   
62 Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990, s37. 
63 OAPA 1861, ILPA 1929 and AA 1967 
64 66% of all terminations were medically induced in 2017 (Department of Health & Social Care (DHSC), Abortion 
Statistics, England & Wales, 2017 (DHSC Revised December 2018), para 2.35). 
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following the Francis Inquiry,65 remains a dense, complicated and challenging statutory 
framework.66  As fetal reduction and selective terminations are mainly elected surgical 
procedures undertaken within the NHS system, we will concentrate on the regulation of 
NHS providers in England and Wales.   We will also differentiate between ‘system’ 
regulators (that regulate the NHS system/ bodies/ HCProv) 67 and ‘professional’ 
regulators (that regulate HCP).68  In turn, professional regulators should be 
differentiated from representative professional bodies.69  
System regulators70   
The current NHS system has its legal origins in the National Health Service Act 2006.  
‘System regulation’ in the NHS has been in a state of flux, most notably following 
publication of the Francis Report on the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust in 
2013.71  Although some of the legislative changes were already in place - for example, 
creation of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and the internal NHS market72 - 
further legal modifications were made after publication of the report.  The most notable 
change has been the imposition of a statutory duty of candour on HCProv by the Care 
Act 2014.73  In essence this mandates the supply of relevant information by the 
provider to the patient/ their family whenever an “incident of a specified description 
affecting a person’s safety occurs in the course of the person being provided with a 
service”.74  The Act also makes it a criminal offence for providers to supply, publish or 
make available certain information that “is false or misleading in a material respect”, 
subject to a due diligence defence.75 
 
The two main system regulators are the CQC (the Healthcare Inspectorate in Wales) 
and NHS Improvement.  Sitting alongside these two system regulators are Public 
Health England,76 NHS England and their equivalent organisations in Wales.  The 
CQC’s role is to ensure the NHS meets national standards of quality and safety, and to 
promote health, safety and welfare of those using the system.77  It attempts to deliver 
this objective through a registration and inspection process. The private healthcare 
sector is also subject to the CQC registration and inspection requirements in England.78  
 
65 Robert Francis QC, The Francis Report - Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (HC 
947,2013) 
66 Professional Standards Authority (PSA), Rethinking regulation (PSA August 2015). 
67 Eg Care Quality Commission (CQC). 
68 Eg General Medical Council (GMC), Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC). 
69 Eg British Medical Association (BMA), Royal College of Obstetricians & Gynaecologists (RCOG). 
70 There are also arms length regulators including the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. 
71 (n63). 
72 Health and Social Care Act 2012 
73 Part 2.  Part 3 establishes Health Education England and the Health Research Authority. 
74 Care Act 2014, s 81. 
75 Care Act 2014, s 92. 
76 Created by the Health & Social Care Act 2012. 
77 Health and Social Care Act 2008(as amended), s 3. 
78 Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014. 
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The CQC use a risk-based approach to inspections and take information obtained 
between inspections into account.  This mechanism can have ex ante and ex post 
effects – it may identify risks leading to improvements but may also identify harm/ fault 
after the event. 
 
Monitor was originally created to protect and promote the interests of service users and 
to ensure that NHS services were effective and value for money.79 Monitor was 
absorbed (with Patient Safety and the NHS Trust Development Agency) into NHS 
Improvement in 2016.  This combined organisation is responsible for: 
 
“overseeing foundation trusts and NHS trusts, as well as independent providers 
that provide NHS-funded care. We offer the support these providers need to 
give patients consistently safe, high quality, compassionate care within local 
health systems that are financially sustainable. By holding providers to account 
and, where necessary, intervening, we help the NHS to meet its short-term 
challenges and secure its future.”80 
 
NHS improvement places emphasis on supporting HCProv (albeit with intervention 
powers if necessary) but also has a performance and financial management function in 
relation to foundation trusts and NHS trusts.  Within this organisation there is the 
Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch that has the power to carry out some 
independent inspections and to support trusts in carrying out their own internal 
investigations.  It remains to be seen to whether there will be any substantive overlap 
with the functions of the CQC. 
 
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) provides guidance 
and quality standards for HCP and other health and social care professionals.81   
Section 233 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 sets out its general duties: 
 
“(1) In exercising its functions NICE must have regard to—  
(a) the broad balance between the benefits and costs of the provision of health 
services or of social care in England, 
(b) the degree of need of persons for health services or social care in England, 
and  
(c) the desirability of promoting innovation in the provision of health services or 
of social care in England.” 
 
Technically NICE does not operate in Wales but there is a sharing arrangement with 
the Welsh Assembly that ensures that Wales benefits from any NICE guidelines and 
quality standards.82 
 
79 Created by part 3 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, s 62. 
80 NHS Improvement<https://improvement.nhs.uk/about-us/who-we-are/ >accessed 19 June 2018. 
81 Health and Social Care Act 2012, part 8. 
82 NHS Wales< http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sites3/page.cfm?orgid=465&pid=5396 >accessed 19 June 2018. 
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Finally, there is the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman who makes final 
decisions on complaints that have not been resolved by the NHS in England, UK 
government departments and other public organisations.83 The Ombudsman offers a 
free complaint handling service is free, operates independently and reports to a 
Parliamentary sub-committee.  The Public Services Ombudsman for Wales offers a 
broadly equivalent service.84 
 
Professional regulators 
There are currently 9 ‘professional’ regulators85 who are ultimately responsible for 32 
healthcare professions within the UK.  They focus on the regulation of individuals rather 
than systems or organisations, and according to the Law Commission, each regulatory 
body has the same overarching functions: 
 
(1) Setting the standards of behaviour, competence and education that 
professionals must meet; 
(2) Dealing with concerns from patients, the public and others about 
professionals who are unfit to practise because of poor health, misconduct or 
poor performance; and 
(3) Keeping registers of professionals who are fit to practise and setting the 
requirements for periodic re-registration (and in some cases revalidation) for each 
profession.86 
 
Historically, there has been limited convergence between these bodies and repeat 
concern about inconsistency and fragmentation in the regulatory framework.87  The 
Professional Regulators are now overseen and scrutinised by the Professional 
Standards Authority for Health and Social Care (PSA)88 whose overarching 
objective is the protection of the public.  The PSA is independent of the Executive, 
accountable to Parliament and has an oversight role for regulator performance (via 
annual performance reviews) and fitness to practice decisions and decisions not to 
investigate.  In certain cases, the PSA may challenge fitness to practice decisions.  It 
also shares good practice, generates important policy reports on the regulation of 
 
83 Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudmsan< https://www.ombudsman.org.uk/ >accessed 20 June 2018. 
84 Public Service Ombudsman for Wales< https://www.ombudsman.wales/making-a-complaint/ >accessed 20 June 2018. 
85 General Chiropractic Council; General Dental Council; General Medical Council; General Optical Council; General 
Osteopathic Council; General Pharmaceutical Council; Health and Care Professions Council; Nursing and Midwifery 
Council; Pharmaceutical Society of Northern Ireland. 
86 Law Commission, Regulation of Health Care Professionals, Regulation of Social Care Professionals in England (Law 
Comm No 345, 2014), 3 < http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/lc345_regulation_of_healthcare_professionals.pdf >accessed 26 January 2016. 
87 For discussion of the issues generated by duplicated professional regulation, see R (On the application of Vesna 
Mandic-Bozic) v British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy [2016] EWHC 3134 (Admin). 
88 Created by the NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002 as the Council for the Regulation of Healthcare 
Professionals, then changed to the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence, and subsequently rebadged as the 
PSA by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, s222. 
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healthcare and may respond to comments made against individual regulators.  Quick 
argues that the PSA is: 
 
“an important alteration to the traditional structure for regulating healthcare 
professionals.  The creation of an organisation that supervises the work of 
individual regulators reflects a growing distrust of those regulators and a greater 
emphasis on accountability, external scrutiny, public protection and consistency 
of decision making”. 89 
 
The emphasis on protection and consistency are probably the most important functions 
of this organisation.  In Rethinking Regulation, the PSA made this stark statement 
about the existing regulatory framework: 
 
“Health and care regulation is incoherent and expensive and there is little 
evidence for its effectiveness; if it was going to improve care it would have done 
so by now. It’s time to rethink regulation”.90 
 
Even before the Francis Public Inquiry report, the Government had consulted on the 
regulatory framework,91 resulting in the publication of the Law Commission report on 
the Regulation of Health Care Professionals in 2014.92  The key recommendations 
were: 
 
1. A single, overarching objective of public protection should be placed on each 
regulator. 
2. To introduce a single legal framework for the regulation of all health care 
professionals and for all social care professionals in England 
3. Deliver greater consistency between regulators in certain key areas (eg 
composition and fitness to practice) 
4. Otherwise provide more autonomy to the regulators (when in the public interest 
to do so) to deliver their functions subject to oversight by the PSA. 
 
The Government published its response in 2015 and accepted the main thrust of these 
recommendations and made a promise to legislate.93  At the time of writing, these 
legislative changes are still outstanding, and the outcome of the latest Departmental 
consultation is awaited.94 
 
 
89 Quick 2017 (59),77. 
90 PSA, Rethinking Regulation (PSA 2015) < http://www.professionalstandards.org.uk/docs/default-source/psa-
library/rethinking-regulation.pdf?sfvrsn=2 >accessed 22 January 2016.  See now PSA, Right Touch Reform: A new 
framework for assurance of professions (PSA 2017) < https://www.professionalstandards.org.uk/docs/default-
source/publications/thought-paper/right-touch-reform-2017.pdf?sfvrsn=2e517320_5 >accessed 19 June 2018. 
91 DOH, White Paper, “Enabling Excellence” Autonomy & Accountability for Health Care Workers, Social Workers and 
Social Care Workers (DOH 2011). 
92 Law Com (n86). 
93 Department of Health (Dr Daniel Poulter), Government Response to Law Commission Report No 345: Written 
Statement (HCW 5235 CM 8995, 2015). 
94 Department of Health, Promoting Professionalism, Reforming Regulation (DOH 2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/promoting-professionalism-reforming-regulation>accessed 19 June 
2018. 
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As this research is primarily concerned with registered medical practitioners (doctors), 
we will summarise how the General Medical Council (GMC) regulates these 
professionals, with specific focus on the associated legal framework.  Although the 
GMC was created in 1858,95 the current legislative framework can be found in the 
Medical Act 1983 (as amended).  It has modernised over recent years, particularly in 
response to adverse public inquiries96and now has some lay membership.97  Its role is 
not to represent doctors but to ensure that public and healthcare users are protected.  
It does this through a system of professional registration, standard-setting guidelines,98 
and the prosecution of fitness to practice proceedings where appropriate.  
 
The Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) was launched in 2012 with the 
aim of separating the investigation and prosecution of fitness to practice proceedings 
from their subsequent adjudication.99  In 2015, further legislative changes were 
introduced to increase the degree of separation between the MPTS and the GMC, 
including putting the MPTS on a statutory footing.100  However, the MPTS is still funded 
by the GMC and reports to their council (twice annually) as well as to Parliament 
(annually).  The tribunals now consist of medical and lay members who are appointed 
following open competition.  They require a legally qualified chair or a separate legal 
assessor who may give legal advice to the tribunal in relation to the proceedings.101 
 
Medical practitioners are required to renew their licence and fitness to practice on a 
regular basis. 102 Under the Medical Act 1983,103 a registered medical practitioner’s 
fitness to practise may be found to be impaired by reason of one (or a combination) of 
the following criteria: misconduct, deficient performance, criminal conviction/ caution, 
adverse physical or mental health, inadequate English or a determination by another 
regulatory body.  Upon referral, the GMC registrar can make an initial determination not 
to proceed or refer the case for further investigation or adjudication before the 
MPTS.104  Following investigation, the case examiners may refer the case for 
adjudication before the MPTS or instead issue a letter of advice (for minor departures 
 
95 Via the Medical Act 1858. 
96 See for eg, <http://www.gmc-uk.org/Yearly_update_Francis_and_others_Nov15_final.pdf_63486491.pdf >accessed 17 
July 2018. 
97 There are 6 lay and 6 medical members (January 2019). 
98 Most notably Good Medical Practice (GMC 2013, updated April 2014 & April 2019) < https://www.gmc-uk.org/-
/media/documents/good-medical-practice---english-1215_pdf-51527435.pdf >accessed 3 April 2019. 
99 See MPTS < http://www.mpts-uk.org/ >accessed 24/ May 2017. 
100 The General Medical Council (Constitution of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service) Rules Order of Council 
2015. 
101 The General Medical Council (Legal Assessors and Legally Qualified Persons) Rules Order of Council 2015.  
102 The GMC (Licence to Practice and Revalidation) Regulations Order of Council 2012 (No 2685); The General Medical 
Council (Fitness to Practise) (Amendment) Rules Order of Council 2014 
103 s35C (2). 
104 General Medical Council (Fitness to Practice) Rules Order of Council 2004 No 2608 (as amended). 
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from the Good Medical Practice guidelines105 or minor cause for concern); issue a 
warning (for more significant departures not necessitating registration changes) or 
accept an undertaking from the practitioner concerned.  Adjudication should be 
considered where there are registration changes and/or public protection issues are at 
stake; and the standard of proof has been reduced from the criminal to the civil 
standard in these cases.106  Fitness to practice mechanisms operate ex post (ie after 
complaint/ adverse event) although early intervention may have ex ante effects (by 
preventing reoccurrence or more serious harm). 
 
Following adjudication, the MPTS may impose conditions on registration; suspend or 
erase registration; issue warnings or accept undertakings from the medical practitioner.  
Appeals from MPTS decisions can be brought by the medical practitioner, the GMC or 
the PSA.107 The GMC’s standing to bring appeals is likely to be short lived and is 
considered duplicative of the powers already vested in the PSA.108  It is noteworthy, 
that many disciplinary actions against doctors address conduct in the private sphere 
said to bring the medical profession into disrepute.109  Some concern has been raised 
that this unnecessarily undermines the interests of individual doctors for the sake of 
protecting the wider interests of the medical profession.110  
 
 
5.5 Compelling medical treatment 
 
In this final section, we consider whether the law can be used to compel a doctor to act 
contrary to their professional judgement.  The decision in Re J111 makes it clear that 
ordinarily a court cannot order a doctor to act against their own professional judgement: 
 
“The… issue… is whether the court in the exercise of its inherent power to 
protect the interests of minors would ever require a medical practitioner or health 
authority acting by a medical practitioner to adopt a course of treatment which in 
the bona fide clinical judgment of the practitioner concerned is contra‐indicated 
as not being in the best interests of the patient. I have to say that I cannot at 
present conceive of any circumstances in which [it] would be other than an abuse 
 
105 GMC (n434). 
106 Health & Social Care Act 2008, s 112. 
107 Health and Social Care Act 2008.  See also John Martyn Chamberlain, ‘Malpractice, Criminality, and Medical 
Regulation: Reforming the Role of the GMC in Fitness to Practice Panels’, (2017) 25 (1) Med L. Rev 1. 
108 See the recommendations of Professor Sir Norman Williams in his rapid policy review of gross negligence 
manslaughter in healthcare (<https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/professor-sir-norman-williams-review>accessed 22 
June 2016)). 
109 Sarah Devaney, ‘The Transmutation of Deference in Medicine: An Ethico-Legal Perspective’, (2018) 26(2) Med L. Rev 
202, 220-225. 
110 Quick 2017 (n59), 73. See also Devaney (109). 
111 Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) (1993) Fam 15. See also An NHS Trust and Others v Y [2018] 
UKSC 46. 
[92] (Lady Black). 
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of power as directly or indirectly requiring the practitioner to act contrary to the 
fundamental duty which he owes to his patient. This… is to treat the patient in 
accordance with his own best clinical judgment, notwithstanding that other 
practitioners who are not called upon to treat the patient may have formed a quite 
different judgment or that the court acting on expert evidence may disagree with 
him.”112 
 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal made the position abundantly clear in R (Burke) v GMC: 
 
“Autonomy and the right of self-determination do not entitle the patient to insist on 
receiving a particular medical treatment regardless of the nature of the 
treatment”.113/114   
 
Clinical judgement about the effectiveness or efficacy of a treatment or procedure 
remain central.  However, doctors are still expected to explain their reasons for refusing 
a request and identify other reasonable options that might be available, including the 
possibility of a second opinion.115  Jonathan Montgomery, offers one explanation why 
society might want to preserve professional discretion in the clinical encounter: 
“The normative legitimacy of this extensive respect for professional discretion lies 
principally in the belief that protecting this embodied tradition provides a reliable 
protection for patient interests. These are understood as being more than merely 
the expression of individual patient wishes. Some desires that patients might 
have are not respected by the law, such as requests for ineffective treatments, 
see Burke v GMC as discussed above. Consequently, the choices available to 
patients can properly be limited to those offered by professionals. For this reason, 
the legal construction of the relationship between patients and health 
professionals is one in which the conscience of professionals is generally 
privileged over that of patients.”116 
 
However, one area where doctors can be compelled to act against their better 
professional judgement involves the disclosure of ‘material’ information about the risks, 
benefits and reasonable alternatives to a clinical procedure.  The decision in 
Montgomery117 requires doctors to disclose this information - subject to a narrow 
therapeutic exception and a patient’s right of refusal.118  Even when the therapeutic 
exception could apply, doctors may be reluctant to call upon and bear the burden of 
proving that exception if there is a risk of subsequent legal challenge.  The impact of 
this court decision has been addressed by the research participants and will be 
examined in further detail in the next chapter. 
 
112 Re J (n111) [Lord Donaldson] [26]-[27].  See also Charlotte Wyatt [2005] EWHC 2293 (Fam) [Sedley J] and MB 
[2006] EWHC 507 (Fam). 
113 R (Burke) v GMC [2005] 3 FCR 169, [31]. 
114 This statement is consistent with draft GMC guidance (GMC, Decision making and consent: Supporting patient choices 
about health and care, draft guidance for consultation (GMC 2018), 5). 
115 Ibid., para 42. 
116 Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Conscientious Objection: Personal & Professional Ethics in the Public Square’, (2015) 23(2) 
Med L. Rev 200, 209 
117 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
118 Ibid., [85]. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the specific (termination of pregnancy) and general legal 
frameworks in which Maternal and Fetal Medicine consultants must operate.  The 
former is a compromise solution which seeks (although probably fails) to accommodate 
a polarity of diverse views.  In particular, we have identified an issue with the framing of 
ground E119 and consequential impact for the certainty, clarity and coherency of the 
law.120  This has a distortionary effect on those procedures that rely heavily on this legal 
ground, including fetal reductions and selective terminations in multiple pregnancy.121  
Importantly, ground E directs attention to and offers divergent protection founded on 
the intrinsic status of the unborn entity.  In doing so, it reduces the significance of 
relational and autonomy considerations, and puts significant pressure on a professional 
normative framework that already show signs of divergence.   We have suggested that 
relational considerations and maternal autonomy should be placed front and centre in 
the legal framework, albeit with some limits.  We also question whether we ought to 
place the burden for social judgements about the value of different forms of human life 
on the shoulders of doctors.  The medical control of terminations is oft criticised, 
although little is said about the burden that this role places on obstetricians and others 
in reproductive care, especially in areas of uncertainty.  This is a point that we will 
develop in later chapters. 
We have questioned how fetal reduction and selective termination should be 
accommodated in the legal framework.  The answer cannot be finalised until we agree 
how the general rules for pregnancy termination should be framed. At this point, we 
argue that there is still a legitimate role for the criminal law albeit in a more limited form 
than the current framework.  Finally, we have introduced the legal framework for 
professional and system regulation.  The immediate impression is of an overly complex 
and fragmented system, and this has important ramifications for the professional 
regulation of these procedures.  
 
119 AA 1967. S1(1)(d). 
120 For discussion of the arguments for/ against ground E, see Sally Sheldon and Stephen Wilkinson, ‘‘Termination of 
Pregnancy for Reason of Foetal Disability: Are There Grounds for a Special Exception in Law?’’, (2001) 9(2) Med. L. Rev 
85. 
121 DHSC (n64), para 2.44. 
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Chapter 6 – Personal, Professional and Cultural 
Frameworks 
 
Contents: 
6.1 Introduction 
6.2 Moral norms and status 
6.3 Professional norms, personal values and decision-making:  
6.3.1 The role of professional norms 
6.3.2 Medical decision-making: influences and constraints 
6.3.3 Multiple pregnancy – decision-making and patients 
6.3.4 The role of medicalisation 
6.3.5 Personal values, conscientious objection and professional candour 
6.4 Workplace and cultural norms 
6.5 Executive and public standards 
6.6 The role of professional ethical regulation 
6.7 Professional medical ethics - recommendations, codes and guidance 
6.8 Deference in medicine 
6.9 Conclusions 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As previously indicated, this chapter is interconnected and complements our earlier 
discussion in chapter 3.  Both chapters are concerned with the guidance that 
healthcare professionals might derive from the ethical frameworks and general ethical 
principles.  Here the focus of the chapter is broader, examining the general principles 
of medical ethics and and the role of professional ethical regulation and national public 
standards in healthcare.  It also considers the role of workplace/ cultural norms, 
personal values and the specific complexities of medical decision-making in the context 
of our procedures.  The chapter closes with an examination of the evolving relationship 
between patient autonomy and medical deference and the implications for future 
healthcare practice.  Our overarching aim is to give a clearer sense of how personal, 
professional and practice norms might impact upon and guide decision-making in fetal 
reduction and selective termination. 
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6.2 Moral norms and status 
 
Having attempted to unpick the status of the human embryo/ fetus in chapter 3, we 
return to examine moral norms in a broader societal, workplace and professional 
context.  Beauchamp and Childress have described the ‘common morality’ - a set of 
universal norms that are learned and shared by all members of each human 
community1 – embodying not only rules and obligations, but also moral character traits 
and virtues.2  Bernard Gert claims that basic or common norms of morality cannot 
change or be invented over time.3  However, Beauchamp and Childress argue that 
even basic moral norms are refined, if not created, with the scope of application 
changing over time as “(we) handle social change through allowing exceptions to one 
or more stable norms” in the common morality.4  Critically any: 
 
“theory of the common morality that denies our capacity to criticize and even 
condemn traditions or communities whose viewpoints are morally unacceptable 
would be an ineffectual and indefensible theory”.5  
 
Fixed positions are difficult to maintain when there are strongly held and polarised 
moral views within society;6 and termination of pregnancy and assisted death are two 
obvious examples.  Conflicting moral stances can be fuelled by widely divergent 
religious, philosophical, political and cultural beliefs, although differences can occur 
because of variable application of common beliefs.   
 
Divergent moral positions raise several questions. Should society7 reject one moral 
approach or belief because that position commands less popular support; or should 
conflicting moral norms within a community (or parts thereof) demand equal or 
appropriate respect?  If the latter, how might that respect manifest in practice?  Should 
society be obligated to forge a compromise in these circumstances, creating a new 
societal norm, or might that compromise simply be a product of an existent societal 
norm?  For example, it might be argued that the legal compromise delivered by the AA 
1967 facilitated or created a shift in the normative (domestic) response to abortion.  
 
1 Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th edition, Oxford University Press 2013), 
3-4 
2 Ibid., 3. They define a ‘moral virtue’ as a dispositional trait of character that is morally valuable and reliably present (at 
310).  For a qualified defence in the healthcare context, see Raanan Gillon, ‘Defending the four principles approach as a 
good basis for good medical practice and therefore for good medical ethics’, (2015) 41 Journal of Medical Ethics 111. 
3 Bernard Gert, Morality: Its nature and justification (OUP 2005)114-115.  Cf Beauchamp & Childress (n1),413. 
4 Beauchamp & Childress (n1), 413. 
5 Ibid., 415.  
6 See Beauchamp & Childress (n1), 23 for a discussion on what might happen where universal norms conflict. 
7 We recognise that the term ‘society’ can be used to refer to defined regional community areas or more universal contexts. 
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Alternatively, the Act might simply be the product of existent societal change.  These 
are not matters that can fully be answered in this work, but we shall pick up relevant 
issues as we go along.8    
 
Whilst there are undoubtedly some universal moral norms, disagreement about 
aspects of our moral life makes the gravitation towards group or fragmented moral 
norms within diverse communities much more likely.  It is those group norms that have 
specific resonance in this research.   At this point, we should remind ourselves of the 
possible connections between moral norms and legal rules: 
 
“Legal decisions often express communal moral norms and stimulate ethical 
reflection that over time alters those norms”9 
 
Whatever the jurisprudential view, tracking morality can provide societal benefit, ease 
tensions, aid compliance and ultimately, divergent moral views across communities 
need to be addressed, and hopefully accommodated within the law to some degree.   
This work endorses the view that what constitutes proper medical treatment in a 
normative and descriptive sense has fluctuated over time representing a complex 
interplay between the internal morality of medicine and the social context in which it 
operates.10  This interplay arguably extends to the internal morality of individual 
healthcare professionals and their operative regulatory environment.   
 
In the following sections, we shall attempt to unpack some of these ideas, with a view 
to identifying: (1) the ‘internal morality’ of contemporary western medicine;11 (2) the 
general ethical framework in which contemporary medicine and healthcare 
professionals operate; 3) the role of individual, professional and cultural norms, with 
specific reference to fetal reduction/ selective termination; and 4) the relationship 
between individual autonomy and deference in contemporary healthcare. 
 
6.3 Professional norms, personal values and decision-making 
 
 
 
8 For discussion of compromise, see Roger Brownsword and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Compromise Medicalisation’, in C. Stanton 
and others(eds), Pioneering Health Care Law Essays: In honour of the work of Professor Margaret Brazier (Routledge 
2015). 
9 Beauchamp and Childress (n1), 9; Martin Freeman argues that secularisation has left us increasingly dependent on the 
law as a ‘working source of morality’ (Law and Bioethics (Oxford University Press 2008), Chp 9). 
10 Lucy Frith, ‘What do we mean by proper medical treatment?’, Chp 3 in Sara Fovargue and Alexander Mullock (eds), 
The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment:  What role for the medical exception? (Routledge 2015). 
11 See for eg, Stephen McAndrew, ‘Internal morality of medicine and physician autonomy’, (2019) J Med Ethics 1. 
doi:10.1136/medethics-2018-10506. 
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6.3.1 The role of professional norms 
 
Professional norms have an important role to play in medicine and the healthcare 
professions – they relate to responsibility inside/ outside of a profession and can 
facilitate the delineation of the acceptable and proper from the unacceptable and 
improper.  These norms can provide a yardstick to measure performance and enable 
action to be taken against members that persistently flout standards.  Importantly, 
these norms provide a framework for the profession and its members to assert power 
within society.  By setting boundaries of restricted interest, professional norms can 
serve to exclude others from participation or entry to that profession12 and membership 
can (on occasion) offer protection against the reach of the criminal law.  Finally, 
professional norms can provide a foundation to address issues affecting specific 
occupational groups, further fragmenting the normative framework(s).   For example, 
subspecialisms within medicine can be affected by distinct dilemmas, leading to calls 
for discipline or issue centric guidance. 
 
Professional norms can be represented in various forms, ranging from vague and 
aspirational ideals to formal codified standards demanding adherence from the 
members of that profession.  The content and scope of these norms may be influenced 
directly by the profession, by specific disciplines within that profession,13 by 
occupational culture and the wider societal context.  When looking at professional 
ethical sources, we should also be careful to separate out the description of normative 
ideals (‘what ought to happen’) from normative standards imposing specific profession 
obligations,14 because they have a layering effect, meaning that norms are working at 
different levels to varied ends and effects.  In short, we need to be clear whether these 
documents are describing minimum standards requiring compliance, aspirational goals 
or a combination of both. 
Jose Miola15 divides the ethical discourse on professional medical norms (or 
professional medical ethics) into three distinct categories: (1) Formal, for example, the 
standards promulgated by statutory bodies like the General Medical Council (GMC); (2) 
Semi-Formal, for example, the guidance issued by representative bodies like the 
British Medical Association (BMA) and the Royal College of Obstetricians & 
Gynaecologists (RCOG) where they have no explicit disciplinary powers or statutory 
 
12 That is particularly prevalent in learned professions that require a degree of specialist knowledge and skill. 
13 Sheelagh McGuiness and Michael Thomson, ‘Medicine and Abortion Law: Complicating the Reforming Profession’, 
(2015) 23(2) Med L. Rev 177, 197-198. 
14 Jose Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A symbiotic relationship (Hart 2007), 7.   
15 Ibid., 6. 
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mandate; and (3) Unofficial discourse, from academics, pressure groups, charities and 
religious bodies.  Miola claims that unofficial discourse has proved especially 
problematic because it has encouraged fragmentation, and has tended to be 
discursive, rather than directive in nature.16  Of course, this analysis conceptualises 
professional norms as simple products of the professions,17 although the medical 
“profession must seek trust and make themselves deserving of trust” by the public.18  
However, a more cynical view is that medical claims for trust are really about the 
profession seeking control.  From this perspective, the assertion of therapeutic 
legitimacy via a model of good faith represents a professional desire for exclusivity, 
rather than a model for delivering effective patient rights.19  
Iain Brassington claims that the terms ‘professional (medical) ethics’ and ‘morality (as 
used by Miola20 and Hoffmann LJ21) are distinct concepts.22  Whether professional 
ethics is a descriptive or normative term is up for debate,23 but it is evident that the law 
and morality have some role to play in shaping professional ethical frameworks.  There 
is some debate around whether there is an internal morality to medicine or medical 
practice,24  but our view is that there is likely to be interplay between the internal and 
external concepts of morality in our specific research context. 
Professional ethics as a mask for self-interest25 
The exclusionary effect of professionalism and professional rules can impact on other 
actors, including the members of discrete disciplines within a profession.  Any lack of 
clarity around the boundaries or scope of professional rules is capable of creating 
jurisdictional friction - the absence of professional consensus over abortion has meant 
that the exclusionary effect has not been an entirely unified process in this context.26  
According to Michael Thomson, the medical profession created abortion as an ethical 
issue and subsequently placed themselves at the centre of the social response;27  
arguing that abortion law has remained the object of medical professionalism rather 
 
16 Ibid.,15. 
17 Iain Brassington, ‘On the Relationship between Medical Ethics and the Law’, (2018) 26(2) Med L. Rev 225. 
18 Frith (n10); See also Royal College of Physicians (RCP), Doctors in Society – Medical professionalism in a changing 
world – Report of a working party (RCP 2005).  
19As per the AA 1967.  See also McGuiness and Thomson (n13), 181. 
20 Miola (n14); Charles Foster and Jose Miola, ‘Who’s in charge? The relationship between Medical law, Medical ethics, 
and Medical Morality?’, (2015) 23(4) Med L. Rev 505. 
21 Bland v Airedale NHS Trust [1993] AC 789 
22 Brassington (n17); Bland (n21), 858. 
23 Brassington (n17). 
24 Cf R. M. Veatch, The impossibility of a morality internal to medicine’, (2001) 26 J Med Philos 621 and McAndrew (n11). 
25 See, Iain Brassington ‘What’s the point of Profesional Ethical Codes?’, (2017) BMJ Blogs, 
<http://blogs.bmj.com/medical-ethics/2017/06/13 >accessed 14 June 2017. 
26 Constance Nathanson and Marshall Becker, ‘Professional Norms, Personal Attitudes, and Medical Practice:  The Case 
of Abortion’, (1981) 22 J of Health & Soc Beh 198; McGuiness and Thomson (n13) 191. 
27 Michael Thomson,’ Abortion Law and Professional Boundaries’ (2013) 22(2) Social and Legal Studies 191. 
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than its subject, with normative responses based on the changing objectives of each 
medical discipline.28  Indeed, he conceptualises abortion as a boundary issue: 
“a key site where professional jurisdiction is asserted. A dynamic model of the 
processes of professionalisation, and an identification of the role of abortion in 
medicine’s professionalisation project, is essential in order to understand the 
contemporary social and legal reality of abortion.”29   
This suggests that the practice and professional norms as they relate to abortion offer 
an atypical framework but focal point for the wider practice of contemporary medicine. 
Medical norms 
The seminal publication Principles of Biomedical Ethics30 provides a good starting point 
for identifying and examining the core norms of contemporary western medicine.  The 
authors identify four moral principles that have specific relevance to the medical 
profession.  First, there is ‘respect for autonomy’ which has its roots in the libertarian 
philosophy of J S Mill.31  In medical practice, this principle often has more to do with 
preventing unwanted infringements to the person, than it does in securing specific 
right(s) to medical treatment.  Indeed, respect for autonomy can cut both ways in 
clinical practice and can be used to justify concurrent patient rights and the assertion of 
medical supremacy.32  Of course, autonomy has more than one meaning, including the 
right to self determination and self governance,33 and respect on any level may be 
impossible to achieve in any real practical sense in medical care.34 
Secondly, the principle of ‘non-maleficence’ is a demand that doctors and healthcare 
professionals “above all do no harm”;35 not doing something that has or may have an 
unjustifiable adverse effect on a person (ie refraining from acts or taking steps that 
might cause harm).36  This principle requires clarity over the concept of harm - for 
example, a Millian account may provide exceptions for threats or conduct causing 
unjustifiable and rights violating harm on another. 
Thirdly, the principle of ‘beneficence’ requires positive steps by the moral agent and 
concerns the moral obligation to act for the benefit of others.  Benefit can be 
considered from an individual or utilitarian perspective encompassing the prevention/ 
removal of harm and/or the promotion of good.  Discourse around the sanctity or 
 
28 Ibid., 193-194. 
29 Ibid., 191. 
30 Beauchamp & Childress (n1). 
31 J S Mills, On Liberty (Penguin 1982). 
32 Charles Foster, Choosing life, choosing death: The tyranny of autonomy in medical ethics and law (Hart 2009). 
33 Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (7th ed, Oxford University Press, 2018), 205-208. 
34 N. C. Manson and O. O’Neil, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
35 Herring (n33), 27. 
36 Cf McAndrew (n11): “the internal morality of medicine prohibits any physician being forced to cause a pathology if in 
their medical judgement that is not justified”. 
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inviolability of human life often appeals to this moral principle.  Finally, we have the 
nebulous moral principle of ‘justice’ which also incorporates notions of fairness and 
equality.  Associated medical discourse includes the social utility of treatments; the fair 
allocation of healthcare priorities and the appropriate rationing of scarce public 
resources.   
The moral principles of beneficence and non-maleficence have ancient roots in the 
practice of medicine; the Hippocratic work of Epidemics proclaimed: 
“As to disease, make a habit of two things - to help, or at least to do no harm”.37 
However, autonomy and justice have become increasingly important principles in 
modern healthcare - the former being driven by societal focus on individual patient 
rights,38/39 and the latter by expansionary state funded healthcare40.  Although, some 
claim that professional autonomy affords greater benefit than harm to society,41 there is 
the potential for conflict between patient autonomy and the principle of beneficence 
(often disparagingly labelled ‘paternalism’).42  In the field of obstetrics, there are many 
examples of perceived conflict involving patient capacity, understanding and choice.43  
The UK abortion framework highlights the possible tension between patient autonomy 
and beneficence44 with an absence of explicit maternal rights and a gatekeeping role 
for doctors using a duty of good faith and a list of indicative grounds.45  However, it is 
possible that the perceived conflict between paternalistic medical practices and patient 
autonomy presents something of a false dichotomy - these moral principles do not 
always have to be seen in opposition.46 
 
6.3.2 Medical decision-making: influences and constraints 
 
Decisions to undertake or receive specific medical treatment, tests or interventions, 
typically engage a range of stakeholders including the patient, their family, the treating 
healthcare professional(s), the healthcare provider and any funder.  We might also add 
 
37 Epidemics, 1:11, in W H S Jones (ed) Hippocrates, vol 1, (Harvard University Press, 1923). 
38 Foster (n32). 
39 See the subsequent discussion on Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
40 Eg the introduction of the NHS in the UK after the 2nd World War. 
41 McAndrew (n11). 
42 See for eg, E D. Pellegrino and D C. Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good: The Restoration of Beneficence in Health 
Care (OUP 1988); David Avitzour and others, ‘Nudging in the clinic: the ethical implications of differences in doctors’ and 
patients’ point of view’, (2018) J Med Ethics DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2018-104978. 
43 See for example, Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11; Re S (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) 
[1993] Fam 123; MB (An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426; St George’s Health Care NHS Trust v S [1999] 
Fam 26 
44 Most notably the Abortion Act 1967. 
45 Ibid., s 1. 
46 March Stauch and Kay Wheat, Text Cases and Materials on Medical law & Ethics (5th Ed, Routledge 2015), 34. 
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society, or sections thereof, as an additional layer of possible participation.47   Respect 
for bodily autonomy should dictate that medical decisions by the patient are made on 
free and informed basis, but this may not always be straightforward.  It presupposes 
that real choices are available, that options have been presented in an informed and 
digestible form, and that the patient is free to act upon those options without 
impediment or restriction. Lady Hale claims that: 
“it is not possible to consider a particular medical procedure in isolation from its 
alternatives. Most decisions about medical care are not simple yes/no answers. 
There are choices to be made, arguments for and against each of the options to 
be considered, and sufficient information must be given so that this can be 
done” 48  
In our context, we know that there is evidence that patients are not always provided 
with a real choice on the method of termination when ending pregnancy.49   
The complexity of medicine provides healthcare professionals with a platform for 
asserting ‘exclusivity’, but many decisions/ interventions will fall into a category where 
that superior and restricted position is hard to justify.50  McAndrew observes that “some 
of the things that an obstetrician may do during labour and childbirth do not involve 
treating disease”51 and could be undertaken by a non-doctor.  Of course, there will be 
some obstetric activities and decisions that warrant technical knowledge and expertise; 
and precautionary monitoring will be required for some pathologies that could not 
otherwise be undertaken by non-qualified persons.52  Professional discretion may still 
be valuable if it provides a reliable mechanism for protecting patient interests, although 
discretion is liable to attack on the grounds of opacity and potential abuse.53 
Foster and Miola also examine the regulatory constraints imposed on medical decision-
making and divide medical decisions into three basic categories - those that are 
essentially legal, ethical or moral.54  Legal decisions are those involving situations 
where the healthcare professional has limited or no choice because the law mandates 
a specific course of action.55   For example, this would include the legal obligation to 
notify terminations to the Chief Medical Officer.  With ethical decisions, the law leaves 
the profession to dictate how specific decisions are made using group rather than 
 
47 Mark E. Cowen and Michael W. Kattan, Encyclopaedia of Medical Decision Making (Sage 2009). 
48 Montgomery (n43), [109]. 
49 Jane Fisher and others, ‘Termination for fetal anomaly: Are women in England given a choice of method?’ (2015) 35(2) 
Journals of Obs and Gynae 168.  For a wider discussion in the antenatal context, see Francesca Garrard and others, 
‘Decisions, Choice and Shared Decision-Making in Antenatal Clinics: An Observational Study’, (2015) 98(9) Patient 
Education & Counseling 1106. 
50 Cf Lady Hale in Montgomery (n43), [114]. 
51 McAndrew (n11). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Conscientious Objection: Personal and Professional Ethics in the Public Square’, (2015) 23(2) 
Med L. Rev 200. 
54 Foster and Miola (n20). 
55 Ibid., 507. 
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individual values or norms.   These group values are identified as 'professional medical 
ethics', and should be contrasted with the more abstract discourse prevalent in 
'philosophical medical ethics'.56  Finally, Foster and Miola define moral decisions as 
those choices uninhibited by anything other than the conscience and values of the 
individual decision-maker; although the emphasis is on furthering the interests of the 
decision-maker.57  We shall park (for a moment) the idea that medical decisions can be 
neatly divided into exclusive categories even in areas of consensus, although observe 
that the distinction is not without practical difficulty.   
Brassington argues that professional ethics have tended to develop with “an eye on the 
law”58 without necessarily excluding the impact of other extrinsic influences.59  Of 
course, the law may not always be sufficiently determinate to play any helpful role in 
the development of professional ethics.60  In terms of the counter relationship, 
Brassington claims that what matters is “whether and in what way to take on board 
professional guidance remains the prerogative of the law”.61  Indeed, Foster and Miola 
query whether the law has abdicated too much responsibility to the medical profession 
and tended to be overly deferential in relation to ‘ethical’ decision-making.62  They claim 
that the more ‘ethical’ and non-technical a medical decision is, the more the law ought 
to take control as the medical profession has no special claim to expertise in either 
ethics or ethical decision-making.63  This has ramifications for non-technical decision-
making, especially, if you believe that most important medical decisions fall into this 
category.64  Lord Mustill, for example, saw no reason why “the opinions of doctors 
should be decisive”65 in decisions to withdraw of life support.   We have already 
observed that aspects of the AA 1967 invite partly social judgements – meaning that 
fetal reduction/ selective termination have the scope to fall into this category. 
Although the professional centric Bolam decision66 persists in some aspects of medical 
practice, the Supreme Court has now determined that doctors should no longer be the 
final arbiters of information disclosure in the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board: 
“The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the 
patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended 
treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test 
 
56 See also Brassington (n17). 
57 (n20), 508-511. 
58 Brassington (n17), 7. 
59 Ibid., 8. 
60 See participant E (chapter 9). 
61 Brassington (n17). 
62 See, for eg, NHS Trust v Y [2018] UKSC 46, [77] (Lady Black). 
63 (n20), 511. 
64 Indeed, Ian Kennedy argues that the majority of doctors’ decisions are non-technical and are moral/ ethical (The 
Unmasking of Medicine, (George Allen & Unwin 1981), 78). 
65 Bland (n21), 895. 
66 Bolam V Friern HMC [1957] 2 All ER 118 as modified by Bolitho v City & Hackney HA [1992] PIQR p334. 
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of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware 
that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.”67   
Whilst, the decision leaves open a therapeutic exception - allowing doctors to claim that 
disclosure would be detrimental to patient health - the court made it clear that this 
escape route should be construed narrowly.68   The duty also goes beyond disclosure 
of information – there is a more demanding obligation to use reasonable care to ensure 
that the patient is aware of material risks, and reasonable treatment variants or 
alternatives.  So instead of prioritising medical practices designed, in line with the 
principle of beneficence, the new priority in advising patients appears to be respect for 
their individual autonomy.69  Is this view of Montgomery justified, and how far does the 
decision really advance the primacy of patient autonomy?70  
The first issue is whether Montgomery is a sufficiently determinate legal decision to 
deliver any decisive change in medical practice?  Many commentators have interpreted 
Montgomery as converting patients into autonomous consumers where medical 
decisions are no longer “a matter exclusively of medical expertise”.71  However, Herring 
et al. claim that Montgomery promotes a model of consent based on “autonomy-
through-partnership”, encouraging clinician/patient dialogue and person centred 
decision-making “driven primarily (although not exclusively) by the values of the patient 
concerned”.72  They claim that the need to balance the ‘reasonable person’ (limb 1) and 
’particular patient’ (limb 2) aspects of the materiality test,73 impose some limits on 
patient values in the decision-making process,74 although Montgomery does not 
resolve the residual tension between these limbs.75   
We make four general observations at this juncture.  First, Herring/ Dunn et al. are 
suggesting that instead of giving primacy to respect for patient autonomy, the decision 
is more appropriately understood as a patient centric, rather than profession centric 
approach to information disclosure.76  The second limb of Montgomery only requires 
disclosure if the doctor is reasonably aware that the patient accords significance to the 
 
67 Montgomery (n43), [87] (emphasis added). 
68 Ibid., [91]. There is provision for a patient’s right of refusal [85] and exceptions in cases of necessity [88]. 
69 Roger Brownsword and Jeff Wale, ‘The right to know and the right not to know revisited’ (Two Parts), (2017) 9 Asian 
Bioethics Review 3.   
70 For discussion, see Michael Dunn and others, ‘Between the Reasonable and the Particular: Deflating Autonomy in the 
Legal Regulation of Informed Consent to Medical Treatment’, (2019) 27(2) Health Care Anal. 110. 
71 Jonathan Herring and others, ‘Elbow Room for Best Practice? Montgomery, Patients’ Values, and Balanced Decision-
Making in Person-Centred Clinical Care’, (2017) 25(4) Med L. Rev 582, 585-586.  
72 Ibid., 589-590. 
73 Montgomery (n43), [87]. 
74 Herring et al. (n71), 582-583; 602-603. 
75 Ibid., 602-603. 
76 Dunn et al. (n70). See also Albert Lee, ‘’Bolam’ to ’Montgomery’ is result of evolutionary change to medical practice 
towards ‘patient-centred care’’, (2017) 93 Postgrad Med J 46 (equating patient centred care with the ‘prudent patient test’ 
for disclosure); NICE, NICE Clinical Guidline CG62 Antenatal Care for Uncomplicated Pregnancies (NICE 2019), para 
1.1. 
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risk etc – an obligation that will only have teeth if the patient is active in “disclosing 
relevant information about her values” or otherwise signposts “that she has concerns of 
a particular kind that are relevant to risk disclosure question”.77  It remains to be seen 
how far doctors will be expected to go to uncover any patient values/ priorities, 
although patient passivity may not absolve the doctor of responsibility under the first 
limb of the materiality test. 
Secondly, limited attention has been given to the first limb of the materiality test, 
namely “a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk”. How should the reasonable person test be approached in 
practice? There is some evidence that Lords Kerr and Reed preferred “the reasonable 
as commonly held”78 view,79 notwithstanding the general reluctance of the courts to 
endorse that kind of approach elsewhere in the law (eg the law of torts).  Conversely, 
Lady Hale appears to support a more situationally tailored approach that has regard to 
the specific treatment setting, available treatment options and patient circumstances.80  
If the latter approach is preferred, this will generate greater scope for variation across 
medical disciplines and patient encounters.  It also has the capacity to make the legal 
position increasingly opaque, uncertain and complex. 
Thirdly, our research interviews indicate that Montgomery has not been universally 
interpreted in the subtle and nuanced vein advanced by Herring/ Dunn et al..81  That is 
not to say that the decision is universally unpopular with the medical profession, but 
there is some evidence that it introduces fresh and uncertain variables into the patient 
encounter (see appendix 9). 
Fourthly, there is a residual issue about the extent to which the new test of materiality 
“bleeds into the question of which alternative or variant treatments ought to be made 
available”,82 further diluting the impact of Bolam and emphasising the importance of 
Montgomery. 
What is clear is that the judges in Montgomery were unwilling to leave information 
disclosure to formal professional ethical standards (notwithstanding similar 
approaches) because: 
 
77 Dunn et al. (n70). See also Lee (n76),49. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Montgomery (n43), [94]. 
80 Montgomery (n43), [111-113].  See also Dunn et al. (n70). 
81 (n70/71). See also Chapter 9 
82 Dunn et al. (n70). 
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“It is…is necessary to impose legal obligations, so that even those doctors who 
have less skill or inclination for communication, or who are more hurried, are 
obliged to pause and engage in the discussion which the law requires”83 
This makes the implicit assumption that doctors are more likely to pay attention to legal 
obligations than ethical ones.  This has logical force if the legal rules are sufficiently 
clear and determinate, although the real message may be that doctors should expect 
legal consequences if they flout or pay insufficient heed to rules or standards.  
However, even if these types of decisions/ practices are capable of being made ‘legal’, 
it does not follow that patient decision-making will be enhanced by this change.  
Patients still need to understand the information supplied; and doctors need to provide 
comprehensible information sensitive to individual patient characteristics/ treatment 
setting, as well as undertaking assessments of actual patient understanding.84  None of 
this is an easy task within the resource/ time constraints of medical practice, especially 
when patients are involved in anxiety laden decisions.  Indeed, it has been queried 
whether the real impact of Montgomery will be to limit medical power rather than 
promote patient autonomy,85 although this outcome would be consonant with the views 
discussed earlier.86  Whilst some participants have indicated that information sharing 
(and consent) processes could be used to prioritise the avoidance of legal risk, 
Montgomery anticipates these professional responses.  The decision makes it clear 
that the assessment of materiality cannot be reduced to percentages and risk 
assessment remains a situation specific affair.87   Further, a doctor’s duty is not: 
“fulfilled by bombarding the patient with technical information which she cannot 
reasonably be expected to grasp, let alone by routinely demanding her 
signature on a consent form.”88  
Again, this sounds sensible but the practicality of implementing this mandate in 
technically complex scenarios may well prove impossible.  Further, this statement does 
not tell us what doctors must do - rather it is what they must not do89 - and this could be 
problematic if the change in emphasis encourages doctors to abandon “their patients to 
bad decisions, provided they have given the patient sufficient information”.90  
 
83 (n43), [93]. 
84 Ibid., [90]. 
85 Foster and Miola (n20), 527. See also Ronli Sifris, ‘The involuntary sterilisation of marginalised women: power, 
discrimination, and intersectionality’ (2016) 25(1) Griffith Law Review 49. 
86 Dunn et al. (n70). 
87 Montgomery (n43), [89]. 
88 Ibid., [90]. 
89 Rob Heywood and Jose Miola, ‘The Changing Face of Preoperative Disclosure: Placing the Patient at the Heart of the 
Matter’ [2017] 133 LQR 296. 
90 Alasdair Maclean, ‘From Sidaway to Pearce and beyond: Is the legal regulation of consent any better following a quarter 
of a century of judicial scrutiny’ (2012) 20 Med L. Rev 108. 
  
151 
 
Should the judiciary become the final arbiters of what patients know91 - are judges 
properly equipped to adjudicate in cases like Montgomery?92  First, picking up on an 
earlier remark, the idea that clinical decisions can be neatly divided into exclusively 
medical and non-medical components is contentious: 
“There is a radical shift from the position that everything that doctors do needs 
to be seen as ‘medical’ (the position in Sidaway) to the position that unless 
every aspect of the decision is driven by ‘medical science’ it is not a matter of 
professional expertise. Neither position seems to reﬂect adequately the 
messiness of clinical interactions, which are rarely ‘purely’ anything. The idea 
that scientiﬁc evidence determines (rather than guides) decision making has 
never been the philosophy of the Evidence-Based Medicine movement, which 
promotes ‘the conscientious, judicious and explicit use of current best evidence 
in making decisions about the care of individual patients’. To believe population-
based science might determine individual clinical decisions underestimates the 
challenges of its ‘sheer volume’, which has made using clinical guidelines 
‘unmanageable and unfathomable’, and the very limited degree to which 
participants in trials actually resemble patients in clinics. It also underestimates 
the contribution that values necessarily make to the production and use of 
evidence.” 93 
This is a powerful indictment of segmented decision-making at a practical level,94 and 
at first blush the decision in Montgomery appears to make the professional/patient 
interaction and dialogue even messier.  Some do not see that this as a bad thing, but 
many of these interactions are taking place in a time and resource limited public sector 
environment.  The ambitions of Montgomery may be worthy but requires adequate 
resourcing to be fully realised.  Further, the idea of neatly separating technical/ 
pathogenic and non-technical/ non-pathogenic concerns in the context of fetal 
reduction seem to us to be especially problematic. 
Secondly, on what basis is legal adjudication a better forum for resolving questions that 
fall into the ‘ethical’ category?  Indeed, Lady Black suggests that the judiciary should: 
“exercise the restraint that is required of a court when it ventures into areas of 
social and ethical uncertainty, and especially when it does so in the abstract, 
setting out views which will be of general application (as is necessarily so in this 
case) rather than resolving a clearly defined issue of law or fact that has arisen 
between the litigants appearing before it … Judges have also developed 
experience in dealing with life and death decisions, but it is experience of a 
different sort from that of the medical team which actually treats the patient, and 
of the professional bodies responsible for regulating and guiding them, and this 
limitation must be recognised and taken into account.”95 
 
91 Heywood and Miola (n89). 
92 (n43); see Jonathan Montgomery and Elsa Montgomery, ‘Montgomery on informed consent: an inexpert decision?’, 
(2016) 42 J Med Ethics 89. 
93 Montgomery and Montgomery (n92), 93. 
94 Cf Dunn et al. (n70). 
95 NHS Trust v Y (n62) [115]. 
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Foster and Miola advance a range of arguments to support the involvement of the 
judiciary although none appear to be decisive.96  They claim judges are better equipped 
than bodies like the GMC to respond to shifts in public values.  However, it is not at all 
clear that the judiciary are better equipped to identify and respond to shifts in public 
values, and Lady Black has highlighted a remoteness in judicial perspectives that 
counts against exclusivity.97  They also claim that judges frequently have to make and 
deliver structured decisions, although this is hardly the exclusive domain of the 
judiciary.  Finally, they assert that the judiciary has the authority and obligation to 
decide cases, and the power to review decisions by professional regulators. Again, that 
is not an argument for or against a judicial role because it would be feasible to allocate 
this task and authority to another adjudication body 
Thirdly, we might ask whether judicial deference to medical practice can be avoided.  
For example, in Lady Black’s judgment in An NHS Trust and Others v Y she places 
‘‘significant weight’’ on professional guidance (especially when emanating from the 
GMC) in the context of the cessation of life sustaining treatment.98  We will come back 
to the association between autonomy and medical deference shortly. 
Fourthly, there might be some merit in saving the law and legal adjudication for cases 
where professional ethical regulation has clearly failed or is otherwise insufficient.99  
Having gaps between legal and ethical standards might also serve a valuable purpose: 
“aligning the law to the professional obligations leaves one at the mercy of the other.  
On the one hand, if the Supreme Court’s intention is to follow the ethical standard, 
then the law will rely on that standard remaining high and prioritising patient 
autonomy.  On the other, if the purpose is to force the GMC to maintain its current 
requirements at least – as they cannot be relaxed without the professional standard 
then being less demanding than the law, which would not be reasonable – then the 
law will have essentially performed a takeover of the professional ethical 
standard.”100  
Although recent GMC (draft) guidance provides some evidence that the legal decision 
in Montgomery has influenced the alignment of professional ethical standards, it also 
highlights the importance of flexibility and the practical reality that gaps will need to be 
filled from time to time.101  Of course, the question is then whether and how these gaps 
should be filled pending intervention by the law? 
 
96 Foster and Miola (n20), 524. 
97 NHS Trust v Y (n62), [115]. 
98 NHS Trust v Y (n62), [77].  See also Louise V. Austin, ‘Grimstone v Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals NHS 
Trust: (It’s Not) hip to be square’ (2018) 26(4) Med L Rev 665 and Heywood & Miola (n89). 
99 Heywood & Miola (n89). 
100 Ibid. See also Lee (n76). 
101 GMC, Decision making and consent: Supporting patient choices about health and care, Draft guidance for consultation 
(GMC  2018), 2.  For the importance of ‘elbow room’ for good medical practice, see Dunn et al. (n70); Herring et al. (n71). 
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If we take stock for a moment – what does all of this mean for fetal reduction and 
selective reduction?  First, these procedures require doctors to make decisions (ie 
about whether to recommend or offer surgical intervention) against the backcloth of a 
specific legal framework (eg AA 1967).  However, this does not mean that these 
medical decisions have been made purely legal, because we know that there are social 
and ethical judgements to be made, especially in the context of ground E cases.  
Secondly, we have a possible tension between the medical gatekeeping role (as per 
AA 1967) and the newly constructed legal disclosure obligation (as per Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire Health Board).   This is because doctors’ hands and choices are partly tied 
by the authorising grounds for termination and the wider framework in the AA 1967. 
The reality will be influenced by the scope of any legal constraint, by the available 
professional norms and by a doctor’s willingness to become accountable for a specific 
interpretative path.  Thirdly, we know that situational and contextual factors may 
influence the interpretation of the ‘reasonable patient’.  Our research context usually 
involves patients attending specialist tertiary referral centres with complex multiple 
pregnancies.  These specialist environments offer doctors direct insight into what a 
reasonable patient in this situational context might reasonably want to know.  Fourthly, 
when it comes to fetal medicine and the evaluation of multiple pregnancy risks, doctors 
are unlikely to be able to speak in terms of absolutes.   As such, decision-making will 
be complex and difficult to categorise in black and white terms.  Fifthly, in regulating 
medical decision-making we ought to know what makes doctors pay attention and 
change their behaviours.  So, if we decide to make a medical decision a legal one, how 
can we know that this regulatory response will produce any difference in practice?  The 
answer must be that we need empirical evidence, or at least a clear explanation about 
why doctors in a specific situational context (ie fetal medicine) are more likely to pay 
attention to one normative framework over another.   
 
6.3.3 Multiple pregnancy – decision-making and patients  
 
Unwarranted paternalism is an obvious risk for medical decision-making involving the 
assessment of competency;102 and professional autonomy will only be tolerated as long 
as society perceives that the potential benefits of medical freedom are greater than the 
potential harms.103  However, it may be problematic to perceive medical paternalism 
and patient autonomy as mutually exclusive104  - the GMC now emphasises the 
 
102 Charles Foster, ‘The rebirth of medical paternalism: An NHS Trust v Y’ (2019) 45(1) J Med Ethics 3. 
103 McAndrew (n11).  See also Jonathan Montgomery (n53). 
104 Alison Pilncik and Robert Dingwall, ‘On the Remarkable Persistence of Asymmetry in Doctor/Patient Interaction: A 
Critical Review’ (2011) 72 Social Science & Medicine 1374, 1379.  See also Stauch & Wheat (n46). 
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importance of patients and doctors making decisions together.105 Teff also makes this 
telling point: 
 
“[D]octor-patient relationships are often fraught with uncertainty and ambiguity.  
There is no a priori reason to assume that a doctor or surgeon possesses the 
kind of psychological or moral insight that would enable him to decide unaided 
what is most appropriate”.106 
 
In multiple pregnancy, women may be presented with complex information about the 
statistical likelihood of alternate outcomes (disability, disease, miscarriage etc) with 
shifting risk patterns over short periods in the pregnancy.  This presentation may follow 
referral to a specialist tertiary centre.  The information may be unclear or equivocal, 
and the pregnant woman may be given a wide range of sources addressing the 
available clinical options.  There is likely to be some anxiety about the woman’s life or 
health, family, and unborn babies.  In our context, the parents may have to weigh the 
relative interests of their possible future children in the balance, making choices based 
on the ‘lesser of two evils’.107  There is likely to be influence from healthcare workers, 
family, friends and other patients; the decision-making process might involve ethical or 
cultural considerations and resultant choices may be constrained by regulation or other 
factors.   
 
Against this background, it might be more meaningful to adopt collaborative or shared 
decision-making processes, especially in the complex multiple pregnancy cases.108   
Greater patient participation may have the effect of enhancing trusting relationships 
and improving patient satisfaction,109 although patient centric processes cannot 
guarantee trust110 or primacy for patient autonomy.111  Suggestions have been made 
about how the balance could be struck; and implementing Montgomery may not have 
to involve an arduous set of additional professional obligations.112  Shared decision-
making is now at the heart of the latest (draft) GMC guidance and is littered with a 
range of collaborative descriptors including ‘support’, ‘listen’ ‘share’, ‘understand’, 
‘respect’ ‘recognise’ and involve’.113  Indeed, the GMC expectation is that doctors will 
 
105 GMC, Consent: patients and doctors making decision together (GMC 2008); GMC (101). 
106 H Teff, ‘Consent to medical procedures: Paternalism, self-determination or therapeutic alliance’, (1985) 101 LQR 450. 
107 Where fetal reduction is presented as a choice between the loss of one fetus and the loss of the entire multiple 
pregnancy or between the loss of one to prevent or reduce the risk of anomaly in those preserved. 
108 cf Oliver Quick, Regulating Patient Safety.  The End of Professional Dominance? (2017 Cambridge University Press), 
184. 
109 Ibid., 185.  See also, The Health Foundation, Helping People Share Decision Making: A Review of Evidence 
Considering Whether Shared Decision Making is Worthwhile (The Health Foundation 2012). 
110 McAndrew (n11). 
111 Dunn et al. (n70).  See also Quick (n108), 183-184. 
112 Ibid. 
113 GMC (n101), 5.   
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tailor the information they provide “to reflect their [the patient’s] particular concerns, 
wishes and values”.114   
 
However, we should sound a slight note of caution.  First, healthcare professionals 
need to be able to establish a “dialogue and therapeutic alliance with the patient” to 
ensure a tailored and patient centric approach.115  This will be difficult in resource or 
time poor environments addressing unrestricted consumer demand.  Secondly, 
partnership processes are most appropriate where there are realistic options without 
clear evidence-based outcomes and benefits - so that no one course of action is 
overwhelmingly preferable.  Thirdly, even when shared decision-making is prioritised, it 
does not guarantee more or better patient choice.  Garrard et al. conducted an 
observational study in a single NHS hospital delivering primary antenatal care.116   
Although shared decision-making is an established priority in NHS maternity 
services,117 no treatment choice was offered to patients in 75% of the antenatal 
decisions made.  These findings may not be replicable, but the study does offer a 
possible framework for evaluating patient choices in future research (Figure 2):  
118 
Figure 2 – Decision-Making 
 
 
114 Ibid. (added).  See also NICE, NICE Clinical Guideline CG62 Antenatal Care for Uncomplicated Pregnancies (NICE 
2019), para 1.1. 
115 Dunn et al (n70). 
116 Garrard et al. (n49). 
117 NHS Shared Decision Making Programme<https://www.england.nhs.uk/rightcare/shared-decision-making/ >accessed 
20 June 2018. See also The NHS Long Term Plan (NHS 2019),<https://www.longtermplan.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/nhs-long-term-plan.pdf >accessed 9 January 2019. 
118 Garrard et al. (n49), Figure 1. 
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6.3.4 The role of medicalisation  
 
The criminal offence of procuring abortion119 became explicitly medicalised by the case 
of R v Bourne,120 although the foundation was laid a decade earlier in the Infant Life 
(Preservation) Act 1929.121  The shift in focus to the pregnant woman made it possible 
to medicalise the termination issue, and legally mandated assessments of risk became 
the dominant territory of the medical profession.122  Although medicalisation might exist 
because ‘society delegates its responsibility to the medical profession’, 123 there is 
evidence that the legislative reform (ie AA 1967) reinforced specific professional 
interests at that time.124   
 
There is no legal right to a termination,125 and the explicit recognition of maternal rights 
was rejected because of a perceived risk that doctors would be reduced to mere 
technicians in the process.126  Medicalisation also plays an important role in the 
criminal law - the legality of invasive surgery127 ultimately rests on the operation of the 
‘medical exception’.128  This has two elements - first consent is a necessary but 
insufficient requirement for invasive surgical procedures involving a competent patient.  
Second, a public policy justification (‘proper medical treatment’) will be required to 
make the procedure lawful.  This is a problematic concept in terms of perspective and 
opacity;129 and the doctors will be the primary decision-maker in terms of what 
constitutes proper medical treatment.130  Whilst the operation of the medical exception 
has been criticised on paternalistic grounds,131 Penney Lewis claims that: 
 
“by creating uncertainty about the lawfulness of a particular procedure, the 
medical exception forces a dialogue between doctors and lawyers that would 
otherwise not occur without the (theoretical) risk of criminal prosecution”.132  
 
 
119 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 58. 
120 [1939] 1 KB 687 
121 See the s 1(1) exception based on good faith preservation of the life of the mother. 
122 Michael Thomson (n27), 208. 
123 Miola (n14) 36 
124 Thomson (n27); McGuiness and Thomson (n13). 
125 Although it would be unlawful to undertake termination against the express wishes of a competent patient. 
126 Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost, Bioethics, Medicine, and the Criminal Law, Volume III, Medicine and Bioethics in 
the Theatre of the Criminal Process (Cambridge University Press 2013); McGuiness and Thomson (n13). 
127 In this research, we are concerned with surgical interventions. 
128 See Penney Lewis, ‘The Medical Exception’, (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 355; R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212. 
129 Margaret Brazier and Sara Fovargue, ‘Transforming wrong into right: What is “proper medical treatment”?’, in Sara 
Fovargue and Alexander Mullock (eds), The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment:  What role for the medical exception?  
(Routledge 2015), 22. 
130 Jonathan Montgomery, Health Care Law (Oxford University Press 2003), 232. 
131 See for example, Sara Fovargue and Alexander Mullock, The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What role for the 
medical exception? (Routledge 2015), 10. 
132 Penney Lewis (n128), 375. 
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Although we agree that medical interventions may be influenced by the likelihood of 
criminal prosecution, we are less convinced that the medical exception forces a 
constructive dialogue outside the theatre of the court process. 
Fetal reductions and selective terminations are likely to require a range of 
interconnected decisions to be made.  There will be moral decisions - whether it is 
morally right to undertake the procedure or select an entity for termination; legal 
decisions – whether the authorising ground can be met; and technical decisions – the 
appropriate method, choice to employ etc.  It may be difficult to separate these if 
normative considerations are hidden within, or otherwise confused with technical 
questions.   Further, if professional standards or rules are incomplete or non-directive, 
the resulting space may be filled by the individual values of the healthcare 
professionals involved.133 
 
6.3.5 Personal values, conscientious objection and professional candour 
 
Having considered the role played by professional ethical rules in non-technical 
situations, and the importance of doctors making decisions on a moral basis,134  we 
turn to examine whether the personal values of healthcare professionals should play 
any role in medicine.  First, it is important to understand how private and personal 
values are expressed by these professionals in the healthcare environment.  Niels 
Lynoe claims that private restrictive values are rarely presented openly but nonetheless 
influence the clinical assessment of facts and patient trustworthiness.135  Latent 
concealment can prevent the implementation of patient wishes but may occur 
accidentally because implicit bias can affect the acquisition of information and the 
treatment of minority group patients.136  Further, healthcare professionals may not 
appreciate that their personal values are impacting on decision-making or patient 
treatment.137  Some may consciously reign in their own personal views so that there is 
no functional impact on their clinical practices.138   Either way, there needs to be 
 
133 Foster and Miola (n20), 514. 
134 Jonathan Montgomery (n53). 
135 Niels Lynoe, ‘Physicians’ practices when frustrating patients’ needs: a comparative study of restrictiveness in offering 
abortion and sedation therapy’, (2014) 40 J Med Ethics 306. Cf Lisa Crowe and others, ‘A survey of health professionals’ 
views on acceptable gestational age and termination of pregnancy for fetal anomaly’, (2018) 61(9) European Journal of 
Medical Genetics 493. 
136 Jeff Stone and Gordon B Moskowitz,’ Non-conscious bias in medical decision making: what can be done to reduce it?’ 
(2011) 45(8) Medical Education, < http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-2923.2011.04026.x/pdf >accessed 19 
January 2016. 
137 H. Hermann, M. Trachsel and N. Buller-Andorno, ‘Physicians' personal values in determining medical decision-making 
capacity: a survey study’, (2015) 41(9) J Med Ethics 739 (a quarter of respondents did not appreciate that their values 
impacted on their decision-making); Narinder Kapur, ‘Unconscious bias harms patients and staﬀ’, (2015) BMJ 351:h6347. 
138 Crowe et al. (135). 
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recognition that we are addressing the behaviour of fallible human agents in the 
context of medical care and treatment. 
 
Secondly, it is important that policy makers have in mind the possible impact of 
personal values upon individual stakeholder choices.139/140  Patent personal values are 
easier to regulate than latent ones – the former can be explicitly excluded or 
recognised through ‘conscientious objection’ clauses.  These legal clauses authorise 
individual professionals to manifest choices based on their own personal values, but 
are frequently qualified to ensure reasonable endeavours are employed to save life or 
prevent grave harm when immediately threatened.141  Formal professional ethics can 
also play an important role in the regulation of conscientious objection142 - for example, 
the GMC publication Good Medical Practice indicates that conscience objections 
should be disclosed to patients in a sensitive manner.143  Patients should have the 
opportunity to seek advice or treatment from other professionals who may not hold the 
same objections. 
 
Thirdly, even when values are personal in nature, they may lack the character of being 
‘private’ when manifested through impactful conduct on others.  The GMC explicitly 
directs doctors not to discriminate against patients or colleagues by allowing “personal 
views to affect your professional relationships or the treatment you provide or 
arrange”.144  The GMC Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice adds an overriding duty 
on doctors not to discriminate and to respect the dignity and views of patients.145  
Despite these apparent limitations, Jose Miola claims that the fragmented nature of the 
law and professional ethics has tended to leave more space for personal values than 
would first appear.146  It is also important that professional responses to the 
manifestation of personal values are rationally connected to an ethical framework and 
address individual patient interests, rather than the self-serving needs and reputation of 
that profession.147/148 
 
139  Eg. Lynoe (n135); Nathanson and Becker (n26); Wendy Savage and Colin Francome, ‘British Gynaecologists attitudes 
in 2008 to the provision of legal abortion’, (2011) 31 Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 322; Anastasia Theodosiou 
and Oliver Mitchell, ‘Abortion legislation: exploring perspectives of general practitioners and obstetric and gynaecology 
clinicians’, (2015) 30(2) Reproductive Bio Medicine Online 197; Crowe et al. (n 136). 
140 Oliver Quick, A scoping study on the effects of health professional regulation on those regulated: Final report submitted 
to the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (2011), 7-12.  
141 Eg. Abortion Act 1967, s 4(2). 
142 Doug McConnell, ‘Conscientious objection in healthcare: How much discretionary space best supports good 
medicine?’, (2019) 33 Bioethics 154. 
143 2013 (updated 2019), paras 52 & 54. 
144 Ibid., para 59. 
145 General Medical Council, Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice (GMC 2013), paras 8-16. 
146 Jose Miola (n14) 
147 Brassington (n25). 
148 Cf McAndrew (n11). 
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So, should there be any space left for private values in medical practice?  Miola argues 
for greater legal intervention in non-technical decisions, and in circumstances where 
professional ethics and personal conscience have clearly failed.149  The trajectory of 
modern jurisprudence has generally limited the ability of doctors to exercise personal 
conscience, by identifying and prioritising patient values.150  However increased judicial 
decision-making can only be justified in restricting the exercise of individual conscience 
if they are “preventing poor choices” or “mandating good ones”.151  Further, Jonathan 
Montgomery claims that statutory conscience clauses require specific justification and 
cannot be justified on the basis that: 
“they protect the exercise of conscientious discretion in the deployment of the 
moral tradition of medicine because they permit personal moral agency rather 
than the following of a professional identity. There is, thus, a radical 
inconsistency with the reasons for the general respect for conscientious 
professional discretion.”152   
 
Further, Montgomery claims that healthcare professionals should not ordinarily receive 
special treatment when their personal beliefs conflict with public expectations of their 
role because any exception would be based on their personal moral agency, and not 
their professional status.  In those circumstances, situational factors and balancing 
interests (including those of the patient) should be brought into the balance.153  
However, Mary Neal takes a contrary position arguing that the essence of abortion 
conscience clauses154 is that active participants should not be forced to share in the 
moral responsibility for what they perceive as a wrongdoing.155   
There are further general points that can be made in support of professional 
conscience-based objections.  First, there does appear to be a salient difference 
between an agent objecting to the performance of acts that they regard as immoral and 
an agent objecting to the delivery of services based on moral objection to that 
individual/ class of persons, or the agent’s perception of or belief in the personal 
characteristics of that individual or class.  Secondly, heavy restriction or prohibition of 
conscience-based objection could drive out competing views, disrupt agent integrity,156 
and force doctors to deploy subtle underground practices that could impede patient 
 
149 Jose Miola, ‘Making Decisions About Decision-Making: Conscience, Regulation, and the Law’, (2015) 23(2) Med L. 
Rev 263. 
150 Ibid, 278. 
151 Ibid, 281. 
152  Montgomery (n53), 219 
153 Montgomery (n53). 
154 Eg Abortion Act 1967, s4. 
155 Mary Neal, ‘When conscience isn’t clear: Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan and Another [2014] UKSC 68’, 
(2015) 23(4) Med L. Rev 678-9. 
156 Mary Neal and Sara Forvargue, ‘Conscience and Agent Integrity: A Defence of Conscience-Based Exemptions in the 
Health Care Context’, (2017) 24(4) Med L. Rev 544. 
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choice.157  Thirdly, there is a broader issue whether restriction of conscientious 
objection would eliminate or narrow professional discretion to such an extent that it 
would impair the delivery of optimal medicine.158  Finally, there is a danger in painting 
conscience-based objections as simple binary choices as this telling practitioner 
comment attests: 
“The decision on the part of obstetrics and gynecology [doctors-in-training] to opt 
in or out of abortion training is, for many, a complex one. Although the public 
debate surrounding abortion can be filled with polarizing rhetoric, [doctors-in-
training] often discover that the boundaries between pro-choice and pro-life 
beliefs are not so neatly divided. Our objectives in this commentary are to 
encourage a more nuanced discussion […] and to demonstrate that the clear 
distinction between being pro-life and pro-choice often breaks down when one is 
immediately responsible for the care of pregnant women.”159 
This creates a problem for absolutist regulatory positions which have the potential to 
drive out views and values that might otherwise contribute to the professional and 
public discourse.  Absolutist positions on personal conscience might be clear and 
simple to communicate but are likely to come at a cost and with unforeseen 
consequences.   
 
Taking stock, we know that fetal reduction and selective termination procedures are 
subject to the same statutory conscience provision as singleton terminations.  We also 
know that there may be different moral considerations arising from the termination of 
ostensibly healthy and anomalous life.  What we make of these differences is likely to 
be influenced by our views on disability and entity status.  Doctors engaging in a career 
in fetal medicine are likely to be made aware of these choices during the early stages 
of their subspecialty training if not before.  What we need to address is whether the 
legal norms (ie the statutory conscience clauses) add anything or have any purpose if 
the professional norms already offer a workable balance for doctors and patients.  
Existing qualified GMC opt outs already have patient interests in mind.  The answer 
probably rests on the value placed on these conscience clauses as the political and 
societal price for achieving and maintaining a legal compromise in a polarised moral 
world.  In our view, regular and positive legislative review would ensure that the basis 
of any compromise retained validity and currency. 
 
6.4 Workplace and cultural norms 
 
 
157 Lynoe (n135), 306.  For an ethical discussion, see Special Edition of Journal of Medical Ethics (2017) 43 (4). 
158 Cf D. P. Sulmasy, ‘Tolerance, professional judgment, and the discretionary space of the physician’ (2017) 26 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 18 and McConnell (n142). 
159 Janet Singer and others, ‘Four residents’ narratives on abortion training: a residency climate of reflection, support, and 
mutual respect’, (2015) 126 Obstet Gynecol 56. 
  
161 
 
 
There is strong evidence that clinical practice, behaviours and professional identity are 
shaped and influenced by the dynamics and priorities of occupational environments 
and culture.160  The executive summary to the Francis Inquiry report begins: 
 
“[C]ritical comments will be made about individuals and organisations, policies 
and cultures. It is extremely important that these are seen with these matters in 
mind. Much will be said about culture in the report. Individuals and indeed 
organisations acting in accordance with a culture, even a negative or unhealthy 
one, cannot always be held personally responsible for doing so.”161  
 
The report emphasises the contributory role played by an engrained culture of 
tolerance for poor standards and behaviour in the tragic events that unfolded at the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust.162  In using the term ‘culture’, we have in mind the 
shared understandings, behaviours and practices within a group of people –  in our 
context, within specific healthcare institutions, professional disciplines or sections 
thereof.163   
 
Part of the problem at Mid Staffordshire was that cultural and institutional practices 
were able to flourish because of the vacuum left by the law, professional standards and 
by regulators.  This highlights the need for regulatory frameworks to address and 
delineate the appropriate space for institutional culture; and the best mechanisms for 
influencing/ restricting that space and any consequential impact where necessary.  
Francis called for a fundamental change of culture within healthcare organisations, one 
that puts patients’ interests first; and recommended several core strategies to tackle 
this issue.164  The immediate governmental response was the imposition of a statutory 
duty of candour at an institutional level (on healthcare providers).165   
 
In terms of medical decision-making, the following important observation was made by 
the Supreme Court in Montgomery: 
 
“In addition, a wider range of healthcare professionals now provide treatment and 
advice of one kind or another to members of the public, either as individuals, or 
as members of a team drawn from different professional backgrounds … The 
 
160 See for example, Nathanson and Becker (n26); Professional Standards Authority, Rethinking regulation (PSA 2015), 
13; Professional Standards Authority, The regulator’s role in professional identity: validator not creator (PSA 2018), chp 
5. 
161 Robert Francis, The Francis Report- Executive Summary (2013), para 11 [emphasis added]. 
162 Robert Francis, The Francis Report - Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (HC 947, 
2013), 171. Cf report of Ian Kennedy following the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry  
(<https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090811143822/http://www.bristol-
inquiry.org.uk/final_report/the_report.pdf >accessed 5 April 2019). 
163 Joseph Millum, The Moral Foundations of Parenthood (2018 Oxford University Press), 15.  
164 Summarised as clear standards; openness, transparency, and candour; improved support and training; patient-centred 
leadership; and accurate, useful, and relevant information (Roger Brownsword, ‘Regulating Patient Safety: Is it Time for 
a Technological Response?’ (2014) 6 Law, Innovation and Technology 1-29). 
165 Care Act 2014, part 2. 
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treatment which they can offer is now understood to depend not only upon their 
clinical judgment, but upon bureaucratic decisions as to such matters as resource 
allocation, cost-containment and hospital administration: decisions which are 
taken by non-medical professionals. Such decisions are generally understood 
within a framework of institutional rather than personal responsibilities.”166 
 
This highlights the complexity and overlapping nature of decision-making within the 
NHS and the challenge for regulators when choices are seen to be engaging 
institutional rather than individual professional responsibility. This framing of 
institutional responsibility has the potential to disengage individual agency with knock 
on effects for patient care and private values - in short, the move to bureaucratic 
resource driven models of healthcare has exclusionary implications for private values.  
Whilst this might be seen as a good thing, the shift from individual to collective 
institutional responsibility does have ramifications for the wider regulatory environment. 
 
What do we know about the interface between cultural/ professional norms and 
personal attitudes? Nathanson and Becker make this telling observation about abortion 
practice in the US: 
“Liberal obstetricians will perform abortions irrespective of the normative climate 
in which they are located; however conservative obstetricians will perform 
abortions only if they are located in an environment where abortion is supported 
by prevailing professional norms”.167 
 
This suggests a complex interaction between personal attitudes and cultural norms, 
particularly, if individual clinicians are resistant to specific procedures or choices. The 
research also suggests that personal attitudes have a stronger impact on the initial 
decisions to terminate, than on the subsequent treatment delivered which is “strongly 
determined by the normative climate of the hospital”.168  They conclude: 
 
“[P]hysicians will conform to the professional norms of universalism and affective 
neutrality unless behavior in conformity with these norms is in conflict both with 
their personal attitude and with prevailing norms in their communities of 
practice.”169 
 
Although we should exercise caution given the US context, these findings reinforce the 
importance of changing occupational culture, especially in aftercare.  When regulators 
target clinical activity, they should avoid placing too much reliance on rules that 
completely exclude personal values because this may produce and drive covert values 
in the decision-making process.170  They should also recognise that there is likely to be 
 
166 (n43), (Lords Kerr and Reed) [75] [emphasis added]. 
167 Nathanson and Becker (n26), 204. 
168 Ibid., 207. 
169 Ibid., 208. 
170 Niels Lynoe (n135), 309. 
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an uphill struggle in changing behaviours or outcomes if personal values and cultural 
norms are rallied against proposed changes to professional ethical norms. 
 
6.5 Executive and public standards 
 
The Government influences and directs standards in the healthcare profession and 
service providers through a variety of direct and indirect means.  Governments of the 
day can influence the development of health policy and social discourse by 
commissioning reports171 and constituting public inquiries.  The Department of Health 
and Social Care can issue guidance that can be directive and influencing - for example, 
the Departments’ guidance on abortion published following concerns expressed by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions.172  The NHS can also issue policy guidance and seek 
to establish core principles and values.173  The Government can propose legislation 
that will ultimately set the boundaries under which healthcare professionals operate 
and are regulated.174  Politically the Executive can set agendas, influence societal 
views and engage in ethical discourse.  There is also scope for prosecutorial bodies to 
influence how the criminal law responds to specific medical activities through the 
publication of prosecution policies.175  Media publication of prosecutions are also likely 
to influence professional behaviours at a disciplinary and workplace level. 
 
However, we also have clear evidence of the limits of executive power and influence - 
the events at Mid Staffordshire happened in spite of the wider regulatory regime.  
There is also the danger of excessively complex and contradictory public standards - 
the apparent desire for more oversight and regulatory intervention does not necessarily 
equate with better outcomes for patients or improved decision-making processes.176  
Against this background, a multi layered or faceted regulatory approach may better 
reflect the complexity of the healthcare environment and the reality that there is no 
single effective solution for patient safety.177  Further, it is problematic to direct 
regulatory mechanisms exclusively against fallible human agents. 
 
 
171 Eg Warnock Committee Report, Report of the Committee of inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HMSO 
Reprint 1988) 
172 Department of Health, Guidance in relation to requirements of the Abortion Act 1967 (DOH 2014a). 
173 Eg the NHS Constitution (NHS 2015), 
<http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/NHSConstitution/Pages/Overview.aspx>accessed 4 March 2016. 
174 In the context of Abortion – Offences Against the Person Act, S58 and 59; Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929; Abortion 
Act 1967 (as amended) etc. 
175 See for example, the recent DPP decision not to prosecute two doctors accused of undertaking sex selective 
terminations (chapter 4). 
176 See also Richard B. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective (2006). 
177 Quick (n108),178-9; The Health Foundation (n109), v. 
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6.6 The role of professional ethical regulation 
 
So far, we have discussed ‘regulation’ as if it was an unambiguous term.  It can be 
interpreted narrowly, as the activity of state sponsored or created regulators, or more 
broadly as a:   
“sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to 
defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-
setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification.”178  
We will use this broader definition to develop this section. 
Standard setting 
 
Historically, professional ethical sources have proved to be highly influential on legal 
standard setting,179 but should the law and legal actors be deferring to these sources?  
We have already addressed concern about the medical professions’ exclusive 
involvement in what are essentially ethical or social decisions.  Jose Miola has 
convincingly argued that the relationship between the law and professional ethics has 
not been a mutually beneficial one – often neutralising or cancelling out the effect of the 
other creating a regulatory vacuum.180  Miola highlights three specific issues with 
professional medical ethics: the cultural flaws in the medical profession;181 excessive 
professional autonomy,182 and the fragmentation of professional responsibility with 
adverse impact on standard setting.183  All of these issues resonate to some degree in 
the health scandals that followed the publication of Miola’s work.184   
 
There is also the question of which professional ethical rules should be followed on the 
legal stage - the formal, semi-formal or informal/ unofficial?  Unfortunately, the courts 
have shown no consistent preference for one set over another.185  There is some 
evidence that where the law is unclear, professional guidance will influence subsequent 
decisions by the judiciary.186  It may be reasonable for professions to set standards at a 
higher level than the law – the law can be used to set minimum standards, whilst the 
 
178 Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation Discussion Paper No4 (Centre for analysis of risk and regulation at the 
LSE 2002), 20. 
179 See for eg the deferential approach taken by Lord Goff to BMA guidance in Bland (n21).  See also Jose Miola (n14), 
163. 
180 Miola (n14), 209.   
181 Ibid., 210. 
182 Ibid., 211. 
183 Ibid., 212. 
184 Most notably at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust. 
185 Cf Lord Goff’s deference to BMA guidance in Bland (n21); Lady Hale’s reference to NICE and RCOG guidance in 
Montgomery (n43) [110], [112] and [116] and Lady Black’s deference to GMC guidance in Y [62].  See also Miola (n14), 
84 and Foster (n102). 
186 See for eg, Montgomery (n43) [69] - the DOH and the GMC chose to follow the authority of Chester v Afshar [2004] 
UKHL 41 rather than Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643.   
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profession enacts more exacting rules with professional implications for persistent or 
serious breaches.187  However, the professions need to set those standards clearly, 
consistently and appreciate the difficulties that may arise when they use discursive 
guidance rather than directive codes or rules.  This concern is reflected in the latest 
(draft) GMC guidance on decision-making with a clear differentiation between ‘you 
must’ and ‘you should’.188  ‘You must’ is used to denote “a legal requirement or a 
fundamental standard of ethical conduct applying to all doctors”;189  whereas ‘you 
should’ denotes more flexibility over how doctors meet an overriding duty/ principle, or 
a requirement that will apply to some but not all circumstances or “where there are 
factors outside a doctor’s control that affect whether or how a doctor can follow that 
guidance”.190  Overall, doctors are expected to exercise judgement in the use of this 
(draft) guidance but the GMC suggests that decisions ought to be evidenced in case an 
explanation or justification is later required. 
 
Behaviour modification 
 
As part of a scoping study for the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence, Oliver 
Quick undertook four ‘elite interviews’ with healthcare professionals,191 and participants 
were asked about how professional regulation affected their behaviour.  The findings 
suggested that professional regulation “was not very relevant in terms of impacting 
their clinical work”, with most participants perceiving this type of intervention negatively 
and associating regulation with disciplinary functions.192  Quick also undertook a 
literature review concerning the behavioural effects of regulatory activity and 
interventions on regulatees; and his findings can be briefly summarised as follows: 
 
• There is a shortage of systematic knowledge on the main research question (ie 
how professional regulation affects the behaviour of regulatees) 
• Internal organisational factors may influence compliance more directly than 
external professional or legal regulation. 
• Behavioural change is much more likely to occur when a “combination of factors 
conspire to convince practitioners to alter their practice”. There is a suggestion 
that effective rules work by shifting regulatee attention. 
• Healthcare professionals tend to prioritise clinical judgement over clinical 
governance. 
• Compliance is far more likely when regulation is accepted as legitimate by 
practitioners.193 
 
187 See Foster and Miola (n20); Brazier and Ost (n126), Chp 8. 
188 GMC (n101). 
189 Ibid., 2. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Quick (n140).  Their discipline, role and status are not otherwise identified. 
192 Ibid., 18. See also, Professional Standards Authority (PSA), The Regulator’s Role in Professional Identify: Validator 
not Creator (PSA 2018), para 3.2. 
193 Ibid. 19-22.  See also PSA (n192), para 3.10. 
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These findings feed into our earlier discussion on the value and impact of legal and 
professional norms.  It is intended that this research will contribute or bridge some of 
the identified gaps, albeit within a specific contextual framework. 
 
 
Information gathering 
 
In the context of information gathering, professional regulators and representatives 
have a distinct advantage over the courts.  In compiling ethical rules or guidance, these 
bodies can gather, share and disseminate information about knowledge and practice 
with their membership.  By doing so, they can directly influence future practice and 
enable forums for further discourse including the ventilation of disagreements within the 
membership.  These features probably assist the development of new clinical 
practices, the collation of empirical evidence and are otherwise helpful in areas lacking 
consensus. 
 
Medical ethical rules 
 
The key professional (representative) bodies in our subject area are the British Medical 
Association (BMA), the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) 
and the British Maternal and Fetal Medicine Society (BMFMS).  We have also 
highlighted relevant Royal College of Nursing guidance in table 4A (appendix F). 
 
The BMA is a trade union and representative body for doctors in the UK, publishes the 
British Medical Journal (BMJ), offers a professional community and platform to 
influence associated policy and law.  Its core values are defined as follows: 
“Expert 
We are an indispensable source of credible information, guidance and support 
throughout doctors' professional lives. 
Committed 
We are committed to all doctors and place them at the heart of every decision 
we make. 
Reliable 
We are doctors' first port of call because we are trusted and dependable. 
Challenging 
We are unafraid to challenge effectively on behalf of all doctors. 
Leading 
We are an influential leader in supporting the profession and improving the 
health of our nation.”194 
 
 
194 BMA, Medical Ethics Today:  The BMA’s Handbook of Medical Ethics & the Law (BMA 2016), 
<http://www.bma.org.uk/support-at-work/ethics/medical-ethics-today >accessed15 January 2016. 
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The BMA’s core ethical guidance is contained in Medical Ethics Today: The BMA’s 
Handbook of Medical Ethics and the Law,195  and is supplemented by separate 
publications on specific subject matters.  The most relevant source for our purposes is 
The Law and Ethics of Abortion: BMA Views published in November 2014 and later 
updated in June 2017 and October 2018.  Under the heading ‘Moral Scope’ and in 
relation to the exercise of personal conscience it states: 
 
“In some cases a distinction can be made between legal and ethical obligations. 
There may be some tasks that fall outside the legal scope of the conscience 
clause but morally within it.  
 
Generally, it will not be beneficial for women undergoing termination of 
pregnancy to be cared for by doctors who feel distressed or unhappy about 
their involvement in a procedure, and so providing individual patients are not 
disadvantaged, and continuity of care for other patients can be maintained, 
requests from doctors to opt out of involvement in termination procedures 
should be considered and accommodated wherever possible.  
 
Where such tasks are unavoidable, health professionals must pursue a non-
judgmental approach to the woman concerned.”196 
 
This extract highlights the discursive and equivocal nature of this source and the 
difficulty that might be created when relied upon as a platform for setting legal 
standards.  Further, the promulgation of sources by representative bodies can never be 
regarded as fully objective or independent of associated professional interests. 
 
RCOG provides information for patients, exams and continuing education for its 
members.  It publishes 2 journals,197 has a quality and audit role; and has undertaken a 
data audit for the Government in relation to abortion notification compliance by service 
providers.198  RCOG produces and publishes ‘Green Top’,199 Good Practice200 and 
National Clinical201 guidelines - the latter tend to be the most directive, although points 
are often framed as recommendations.  The most relevant national clinical guideline is 
Multiple Pregnancy: the management of twin and triplet pregnancies in the antenatal 
 
195 Ibid.  See also BMA, Ethics A to Z (BMA), < http://www.bma.org.uk/support-at-work/ethics/ethics-a-to-z >accessed 15 
January 2016.. 
196 BMA, The Law and Ethics of Abortion: BMA views (November 2014) (updated October 2018), 10 (para 2.1.8.3). 
197 BJOG and TOG. 
198 Department of Health, Matching Department of Health Abortion Notifications and Data from the National Down’s 
Syndrome Cytogenetic Register and Recommendations for Improving National Compliance (DOH 2014d). 
199 “Green-top Guidelines provide systematically developed recommendations which assist clinicians and patients in 
making decisions about appropriate treatment for specific conditions. Green-top Guidelines are concise documents 
providing specific practice recommendations on focused areas of clinical practice” (RCOG Guidelines< 
https://www.rcog.org.uk/en/guidelines-research-services/guidelines/about-rcog-guidelines/#gtg> accessed 16 May 
2019). 
200 These provide “practical guidance to clinicians and managers on workplace issues identified through repeated requests 
from providers and managers of the service.” (RCOG (n199)). 
201 “National Evidence-based Clinical Guidelines provide systematically developed recommendations which assist 
clinicians and patients in making decisions about specific conditions.” (RCOG (n199)). 
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period,202 although it excludes the topic of embryo (and implicitly fetal) reduction from 
its remit.  There is also a Green Top guideline called Monochorionic Twin Pregnancy, 
Management that does address reduction and feticide in monochorionic pregnancies 
(see Table 4A/ Appendix F).203  In terms of production, these guidelines: 
 
“contain most up to date data, they are extremely rigorous process in setting… use 
standardised methodology that (are) approved by NICE … A project, a subject is 
proposed by any stakeholder, a topic for a guideline… that proposal goes to (the) 
quality assurance group to look at whether bring a scope for that guideline, if that 
scope is possible, choose a lead developer, goes through process. Systematic 
reviews.  As close to a NICE guideline as possible.  Less economic analysis. I 
guess that is one of the big differences between a green top. And they very much 
drive an awful lot of … standards.”204 
 
There is now a focus on filling gaps and producing shorter more focused Green Tops, 
and “trying to respond, listen to fellows and members, picking up where guidance is 
needed.”205  Good practice papers are based on “expertise rather than 100% evidence 
and practical solutions how that might work”.206  National clinical guidelines can take up 
to 3 years to produce and Green Tops have taken up to 2 years to produce 
historically.207 
 
The BMFMS is a forum and membership organisation aimed at the core participants in 
this research.  It has a number of aims including the dissemination of knowledge, the 
promotion of relevant research and encouraging the development of clinical guidelines.  
The Society runs and participates in consultations and runs events of interest to its 
membership.  It contributes to the work of RCOG/ NICE and there is considerable 
overlap in membership between RCOG and the BMFMS. 
 
 
 
6.7  Professional medical ethics - recommendations, codes & guidance  
 
Table 4A (appendix F) provides a brief summary of the relevant professional ethical 
sources disseminated by representative bodies and regulators pertaining to the 
 
202 RCOG, Multiple Pregnancy: the management of twin and triplet pregnancies in the antenatal period (NICE Clinical 
Guidance) (RCOG 2011a). See also RCOG, Fetal Awareness: Review of Research and Recommendations for Practice 
(RCOG 2010a); RCOG, Termination of pregnancy for fetal abnormality (RCOG 2010b); RCOG, The care of women 
requesting induced abortion (RCOG 2011b); NICE, Twin and Triplet Pregnancy (CG129 Guideline Update) – Draft for 
Consultation (NICE 2019). 
203 RCOG, Green-Top Guideline No. 51 (RCOG 2016). 
204 Participant E 
205 Participant E (emphasis added). 
206 Participant E. 
207 Participant E. 
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termination of pregnancy and fetal reduction/ selective termination in multiple 
pregnancy.  What will be evident is that there are very few domestic sources that 
provide any detail, and which directly address fetal reduction/ selective termination as 
distinct procedures.  Beyond the complexity of monochorionic twin pregnancy, the 
guidance is fairly limited.   
[Note: updated NICE guidance on the Termination of Pregnancy208 and Twin & Triplet 
Pregnancy209 are anticipated later in 2019 following consultation.] 
  
6.8  Deference in medicine 
 
Sarah Devaney distinguishes medical paternalism – the claim that doctors are better 
placed than others to make healthcare related decisions – from deference which she 
describes as “submissive acquiescence to [paternalism]”.210  Devaney argues that 
paternalism and deference to the medical profession have become uncoupled 
producing two primary consequences for medical deference.211  First, the nature of 
deference has changed partly due to recent policy/ legal changes, demonstrated by the 
Supreme Court decision in Montgomery212 with greater recognition of patient interests 
and an increasing desire for shared decision-making.213  Secondly, “the presence of 
deference to the medical profession has become more hidden”214 as paternalism itself 
dwindles or conceals itself following decisions like Montgomery.  However, she argues 
that medical deference is very much alive because clinical encounters still involve an 
imbalance in “terms of knowledge as well as formal and informal social power”, and 
due to the increasing medicalisation (and validation) of “personal and social 
problems”.215  This imbalance will be more prevalent in complex, fast changing, highly 
sensitive and/or personal medical scenarios (eg fetal reductions). 
 
In the healthcare context, deference might be exhibited by legal actors, patients, the 
public and professional regulators/ tribunals.  Bolam is the classic example of legal 
 
208 NICE, Termination of Pregnancy – NICE Guideline – Draft for Consultation (NICE April 2019). 
209 NICE (n202). 
210 Sarah Devaney, ‘The Transmutation of Deference in Medicine: An Ethico-Legal Perspective’, (2018) 26(2) Med L. Rev 
202 [added]. 
211 Ibid., 203-204. 
212 Montgomery (n43). 
213 Devaney (n210), 204-205. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid., 217-220.  See also Samantha Peters and Douglas Bilton, D.,”’Right-touch” trust: thoughts on trust in healthcare’ 
in R H. Searle, A-M I. Nienaber, S. B. Sitkin, (eds) The Routledge Companion to Trust (Routledge 2017); and in the 
abortion context, Sally Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power & Abortion Law (Pluto1997), 73. 
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deference to the medical profession;216  some would argue that the AA 1967 and it’s 
subsequent enforcement also demonstrates continued legal deference to the medical 
profession.217  Although Montgomery218 has now been heralded by some as a victory 
for patient autonomy, it embodies existing GMC guidance (in part) and is therefore 
“suggestive of a traditional deferential approach” by the courts.219   
 
In terms of the traditional clinical relationship between doctor and patient, online 
sources of information have proved important to enhancing patient knowledge, 
although the quality / value of these sources is variable, and subject to the resources, 
education and skills of the patients involved.220  Devaney also claims that deference 
“re-emerges” when using external information in the clinical encounter because, in 
many cases, the patient will need professional co-operation and assistance to access 
any choice(s).221  We would add a further consideration - the sheer volume and 
complexity of available information, and the time limited nature of clinical encounters 
makes deference more likely in practice.222  In addition, patients may be forced to show 
deference to structural factors inherent in the healthcare system, including inevitable 
NHS constraints on funding, treatment choices etc.223  Constraints to access and 
choice are apparent in abortion services across the UK;224 and law makers are subject 
to heavy lobbying and influence by professional bodies in the abortion context.225  Of 
course, deference is not necessarily a bad thing, and given the knowledge/ skills 
imbalance between a doctor and patient, it may be an entirely rational response in 
complex and technical decision making scenarios.226  Further, deference to 
professionals may occur “because our society gives greater weight to their 
autonomy”.227   Again, whilst the space for professional autonomy may have shrunk in 
healthcare, many patients still place weight and value on professional skills/ knowledge 
in certain contexts.228  We can debate how far this should go beyond the delivery of 
technical treatments but from personal experience there are some decisions where 
 
216 Bolam (n66). 
217 Brownsword and Wale (n8). 
218 Montgomery (n43). 
219 Devaney (n210), 208-209. 
220 See for eg, Roger Brownsword and Jeff Wale, ‘Regulating in the Global Village: The Case of Non-Invasive Pre-Natal 
Tests’. In: E Symeonidou-Kastanidou and others (eds) Medicine, Law and the Internet (Greece: Nomiki Bibliothiki S. 
A.2018), XV-378. 
221 Devaney (n210), 212-216. See also Sheldon (n215). 
222 J. S. Blumenthal-Barby, ‘That’s the doctor’s job’: Overcoming patient reluctance to be involved in medical decision 
making’, (2017) 100 Patient Education and Counseling 14. 
223 Devaney (n210), 214-217. 
224 DHSC, UK Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2017 (DHSC Revised December 2018), para 2.34. 
225 Thomson (n27). 
226 Devaney (n210), 224-225.   
227 Dave Archard, ‘Book Review: Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu, Ethics, Conflict and Medical Treatment for 
Children: From Disagreement to Dissensus’ (2019) Med L. Rev,  fwz003, <https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fwz003 
>accessed 4 February 2019. 
228 The Health Foundation (n109), 30. 
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patients will expect a strong medical steer.  Perhaps, the key is whether the patient 
actively chooses to submit to medical control, rather than passive acquiescence to a 
state of affairs, although we accept that this may be difficult to spot or differentiate in 
practice. 
 
6.9 Conclusions 
 
What do we make of the professional, personal and cultural norms as they pertain to 
decision-making about fetal reductions or selective termination?  We make four specific 
observations: 
First, these procedures (and abortion generally) give rise to strong and divergent 
personal views that cannot be ignored, even when the professional normative 
frameworks recognise the legitimacy of such practices.  Indeed, we have highlighted 
the danger of driving out all moral conflict or manifestations of dissent, at least while 
healthcare services are delivered by human agents.  We would argue that society 
should make some space for personal values providing these positions do not 
unnecessarily conflict with the delivery of care and public expectations of the 
professional healthcare role.  Importantly, we should avoid driving personal values 
underground – if moral space can be safely created, then it should be.  This will be 
situation specific and we would argue that these matters are more appropriately 
addressed at a local occupational level rather than through blunt fixed national 
positions.  In this respect, we have questioned the need for separate statutory 
conscience clauses in addition to the professional normative framework.  Ultimately, 
the issue will fall to be determined by broader societal and political considerations 
around the termination of pregnancy. 
Secondly, we have observed that whilst we do have a professional normative 
framework relating to the termination of pregnancy, there are few sources addressing 
fetal reduction or selective termination per se.  This may not be surprising given the 
number of procedures involved but makes it more likely that the legal norms will be 
more directly relevant to medical practice in this area.  It is also evident that the 
professional frameworks do little to obviate the inherent uncertainties built into the 
current legal norms.  The AA 1967 casts an inevitable shadow over medical practice.  
However, these medical decisions have not been made purely legal, because we do 
know that doctors are making social and ethical judgements especially in the context of 
ground E cases.   
  
172 
 
Thirdly, these decisions are being made in specialist tertiary centres and patients will 
know from referral that their pregnancy and related treatment issues are atypical.  We 
also observe that fetal reductions and selective terminations and the surgical methods 
used are atypical within pregnancy care.  This creates a foundation for patient 
deference to the medical decision-makers. 
Fourthly, and linked to our previous point, whilst tertiary centres offer specialist 
knowledge, skills and resources, they also have the capacity to elevate the role of 
workplace and subspeciality practice norms. 
More generally, we have considered whether there is an internal morality to medicine 
and the healthcare profession.  We have argued that there is an internal normative 
framework, albeit one that is influenced by external forces, especially in our research 
context.  Professionalism remains important for standard setting, education and 
enforcement purposes.  There are signs that clinical encounters have generally got 
messier and more is being expected from stakeholders in terms of engagement and 
responsibility.  Increasing societal and legal emphasis on patient autonomy has 
undoubtedly contributed to these changes.  However, there are also wider structural 
and cultural considerations, especially within the NHS framework, that have distorted or 
impacted upon this evolution.  Importantly, the resourcing of healthcare directly 
influences the delivery of change, and successful regulatory reforms are unlikely 
without significant resourcing support.  Bureaucratic and institutional changes have 
also impacted on individual professional autonomy and warrant new, or at least 
reconsidered forms of regulation that address institutional responsibility/culpability.  
However, it is also evident that cultural issues need to be tackled from within and blunt 
external regulatory measures are unlikely to work in isolation. 
We have considered the important role played by professional medical ethics and 
professional regulation. The relationship with the law is complex but there appears to 
be space for divergence providing ethical obligations are kept more demanding than 
their legal counterparts.  The appropriate gap will be influenced by a range of factors, 
including the self regulatory performance of the medical profession but the law should 
be slow to takeover the professional standard unless there are good justifications for 
raising legal standards and only if stakeholder outcomes are likely to improve as a 
result.    
Finally, we are not convinced that medical practice can be neatly sub divided into 
exclusive categories of ownership; many medical decisions will have non-technical and 
ethical components where patient centric and collaborative decision-making processes 
are clearly warranted.   What is less clear is whether the law is an effective vehicle to 
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achieve improvements in decision-making and patient centric care.  Certainly, the law 
provides an incentive and prompt for active change, but the ambitions or threats of the 
law are not enough on their own to deliver change.  Indeed, we have emphasised the 
importance of patients as knowledgeable and active participants in their own care229 – 
something that requires positive encouragement, support and resources from the 
medical profession and funders to achieve.  Shared decision-making can only be 
realised if we create the space for meaningful dialogue between HCP and patients - we 
need to leave some space for medical expertise and cannot boil everything down to 
inflexible rules.  Regulators and legal actors need to think carefully how professional 
guidance/ standards are created/ used in practice and in the adjudication process.  
Greater clarity about mandatory and discretionary components are likely to assist 
regulators and regulatees alike.  It is to the effective regulation of decision-making that 
we now turn our attention. 
 
 
229 Cf Quick (n108), 183 
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Chapter 7 – Regulating Decision-Making in the Clinical 
Encounter 
 
Contents: 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 Healthcare professionals as ‘choice architects’ 
7.3 Regulatory models, legitimacy and effectiveness 
7.4 UK healthcare regulation – the story so far 
7.5 Influencing patient decision-making  
7.6 Priorities: patient centred care and shared decision-making 
7.7 Conclusions  
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter builds upon earlier discussion of clinical decision-making by framing 
healthcare professionals as ‘choice architects’, before evaluating possible models, 
mechanisms and priorities for regulating decision-making in the clinical encounter.  We 
also examine contemporary responses to regulation across the wider UK healthcare 
system.  One of the key considerations, is how best to regulate healthcare services 
with a view to maximising patient safety.  There are general options, but we should be 
aware of our situational practice context.  The safety of pregnant women should be at 
the heart of any decision to ‘reduce’ a multiple pregnancy.  However, there will be an 
overarching and concurrent clinical responsibility to preserve and support human life, 
creating possible tension when professional and personal values diverge.  So, in order 
to maximise patient safety, we need to consider how the situational features of multiple 
pregnancy and fetal reduction might impact on the regulation of decision-making in this 
context.  Conversely, we cannot ignore the broader considerations and difficulties 
involved in regulating for cultural change. 
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7.2  Healthcare professionals as ‘choice architects’ 
 
There are several possible decision-makers and choice facilitators in the clinical 
encounter, including the patient, their family, the hospital/ service provider and the 
treating professionals.1  Although patients should be choosing their treatment, the 
healthcare professionals will be acting as ‘choice architects’2 because it is they who 
decide - subject to any bureaucratic, legal or professional constraint - what and how 
information is communicated, and which treatment options are offered.  Those 
treatment recommendations should be evidence-based and include option(s) which the 
treating professional perceives are likely to offer the patient the best average (or 
perhaps, least bad) outcome in the known circumstances.3  There may be different 
priorities and perspectives around ‘best outcome’, setting up practical and ethical 
tensions in the clinical encounter, especially around information exchange.4  These 
tensions can be exacerbated by consumerism, ambiguity or uncertainty,5  differential 
moral considerations or values that “make it harder for a benevolent doctor to adopt his 
or her patients’ point of view”,6 and by plain conscious bias.7  These tensions and 
differential priorities are not limited to the doctor/ patient relationship but may also 
occur in the relationships with the wider medical team. 
Healthcare professionals will generate a hypothesis when a patient’s condition or 
disease needs to be distinguished from other conditions/ diseases with similar features 
or presentation, with a view to making a differential diagnosis.  They will gather data by 
investigation to test their hypothesis, before selecting/ offering a course of treatment or 
withholding action.  Resource considerations may feed into the investigation, selection 
and offer processes as a result of budgetary limits or constraining institutional policies. 
There is evidence that some healthcare professionals may use their past experiences 
inappropriately during these processes,8 by overestimating risk or prevalence,9 or 
 
1 Harold C. Sox, Michael Higgins and Douglas K. Owens, Medical Decision Making (J Wiley & Sons 2013), 148. 
2 David Avitzour and others, ‘Nudging in the clinic: the ethical implications of differences in doctors’ and patients’ point of 
view’, (2018) J Med Ethics DOI: 10.1136/medethics-2018-104978; I G. Cohen and others., Nudging Health: Health Law 
and Behavioural Economics (John Hopkins University Press 2016). 
3 Sox et al. (n1), 6. 
4 Avitzour et al. (n2); Helena Serra, ‘Gamble on the Uncertain. Negotiating Medical Decision-Making’ (2016) 12(4) QSR 
44-59. For discussion of the clinical encounter as a form of argumentation, see Peter J. Schulz and Sara Rubinelli, ‘Arguing 
‘for’ the Patient: Informed Consent and Strategic Maneuvering in Doctor–Patient Interaction’, (2008) 22 Argumentation 
423. 
5 H Teff, ‘Consent to medical procedures: Paternalism, self-determination or therapeutic alliance’, (1985) 101 LQR 450. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Eg., Niels Lynoe, ‘Physicians’ practices when frustrating patients’ needs: a comparative study of restrictiveness in 
offering abortion and sedation therapy’, (2014) 40 J Med Ethics 306. 
8 Sox et al. (n1). 11. 
9 Ibid., 38. 
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judging probability based on ease of recall.10  Indeterminate or vague professional, 
institutional or other regulatory requirements may also impact on the accuracy of any 
clinical risk assessment. 
As healthcare professionals control how and when they communicate information to 
patients (subject to regulatory/ bureaucratic constraints) this reduces the opportunities 
for a “‘neutral’ choice environment”.11  That is why the legal and professional 
requirements on information disclosure are so important to actual patient choice.  In 
any event, communicating difficult and emotive subjects to patients can be problematic 
and words become “the enemy of clarity in expressing uncertainty”.12  Uncertainty is a 
common feature of prognosis and a prevalent factor in multiple pregnancy where the 
parents are often presented with complicated, emotive and shifting assessments of 
risk.  These are important situational features in our research context.  The GMC 
emphasises that doctors should be upfront and clear with patients in situations when 
the evidence: 
“of the benefits, harms and burdens of a particular option is unclear or there is 
uncertainty about the clinical effect of a particular intervention on an individual 
patient...”13   
Written, visual and non-verbal decision-making and communication aids may be helpful 
for patients in these situations or when addressing difficult/ complex information, 
although the impact/ value may depend upon the type of aid/ decision and the extent of 
the uncertainty involved.14   
We should also recognise that decisions are made in variety of contexts and not just 
inside the formality of the patient consultation.15  As a consequence, decisions will be 
subject to a range of contextual, relational and power considerations.  For example, 
medical decisions to treat may be influenced by social/ workplace pressures and 
behaviours.  A junior doctor may feel that they have to moderate or alter a proposed 
course of treatment for a patient because of feedback from senior members of the 
medical team.  The local culture of decision-making will influence the space and 
freedom that the junior doctor will have to negotiate their position.  In fetal reduction, 
we also need to be alert to the possible decision-making space between (1) referral 
 
10 Ibid., 44. 
11 Avitzor et al. (n2). 
12 Sox et al. (n1), 29. 
13 GMC, Decision making and consent: Supporting patient choices about health and care, Draft guidance for consultation 
(GMC 2018), para 32. 
14 Ibid., para 27; The Health Foundation, Helping People Share Decision Making: A Review of Evidence Considering 
Whether Shared Decision Making is Worthwhile (The Health Foundation 2012). 
15 Serra (n4), 45-46. 
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and consultation at the fetal medicine centre and (2) thereafter until any procedure 
occurs.  How parents use these spaces is likely to be important. 
 
7.3  Regulatory models, legitimacy and effectiveness 
 
In this section, we examine basic regulatory models, policy instruments and the 
essential features of regulatory legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
Regulatory models/ instruments  
There are two basic regulatory models and the chosen form can impact on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of any regulatory intervention.16  Top down regulatory 
models tend to use hard law instruments to direct behaviours and make the explicit 
distinction between regulator and regulatee.17  The AA 1967 is a relevant example 
because this legal framework clearly mandates how doctors behave in a specific 
context.  Bottom up regulatory models generally have less hard law and either blur the 
distinction between regulator/regulatee or involve some element of self-regulation by 
the regulatee.18  Professional body codes for example, illustrate an element of self 
regulation by the professional membership.  In either case, there is evidence that 
reciprocal and co-operative enterprises between the regulator and regulatee tend to 
work best in practice.19   
Policy makers and regulators can use a range of policy instruments to influence/ 
restrict regulatee behaviours and to achieve intended goals.  For discussion purposes, 
we shall divide these into authority, organisational, informational and incentive based 
instruments.  Authority instruments may take the form of hard law or other enforceable 
rules demanding action from the regulatees framed in negative (do not do X) or positive 
(do Y) terms.  Legal constraints or requirements can be combined with sanctions for 
breach, although policy makers/ regulators need to have regard to proportionality and 
to the effectiveness of any behaviour modification/ outcome.20  It should also be 
recognised that sanctions have a ex post effect – they “discourage but do not 
prevent”.21  Further, any regulatory constraint or requirement ought to make enough of 
 
16  Roger Brownsword and Morag Goodwin, Law and the Technologies of the 21st Century: Text and Materials (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 27. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 I. Glenn Cohen, Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism, Law, and Ethics (OUP 2015). 
21 Karen Yeung and Mary Dixon-Woods, ‘Design-Based Regulation and Patient Safety: A Regulatory Studies Perspective’, 
(2010) 71 Social Science & Medicine 502-509. 
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a difference to the given concern to warrant the specific interference with the 
regulatee’s liberty (ie proportional interference).22 
Organisational policies can influence how regulatee services are delivered and 
determine who bears the ultimate responsibility for outcomes.  For example, the 
medical monopoly of pregnancy termination plays an important role in controlling how 
associated services are organised and delivered across the UK.  The arrangements for 
public funding can impact on how ‘authority’ based instruments (ie the AA 1967) 
operate in practice.  Organisational policies can also influence the relationship between 
regulator, regulatee and key stakeholders, and this might include deciding what space 
should be left for self governance. 
Informational policy instruments are usually directed to educating and providing key 
information to stakeholders.  These instruments can place the disclosure burden on the 
regulator, or regulatee, or use a combined approach to shape behaviours and 
outcomes.  The direct involvement of the regulator as an educator is far from 
uncontroversial although not altogether uncommon.  Informational instruments have 
proved important in the abortion debates and patient access to termination services 
North and South of the Irish border.  Greasley suggests that informational policies can 
be used to great effect when combined with negative or prohibitory authority 
instruments.23  For example, combining legal restriction of late terminations of 
pregnancy, with informational programmes designed to encourage early termination, 
with a view to minimising the impact of the authority constraint. 
Finally, incentive policy instruments can influence stakeholder decision-making, by 
using persuasive offers to divert or influence choices, or default rules that require active 
decision-making to avoid an otherwise determined outcome.   In the abortion context, 
there has been some debate about the default use of medical methods for publicly 
funded terminations in the early stages of pregnancy.24  Again, funding and structural 
issues (eg availability and location of service providers) can all influence particular 
reproductive choices in any given context. 
The nature of the relationship between regulator/ regulatee and influencer/ influencee 
is also important.  There is a difference between the anonymous regulation of the 
‘statistical citizen’ by a State regulator and instruments/ behaviours used by healthcare 
professionals to influence known and identifiable patients, not least because of the 
 
22 Kate Greasely, Arguments about Abortion: Personhood, Morality and Law (Oxford University Press 2017), 220. 
23 Ibid., 212. 
24 Jane Fisher and others, ‘Termination for fetal anomaly: Are women in England given a choice of method?’ (2015) 35(2) 
Journals of Obs & Gynae 168. 
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immediacy and directness of the latter relationship.25  There may be differing 
obligations between the parties and trust is usually a more immediate consideration in 
a direct clinical relationship.  The nature of the relationship may also affect the 
objectivity, or at least the external perception of the decision-making. These 
considerations might apply to different types of professional regulator/ regulatee, and 
regulators have increasingly recognised the importance of evaluating ‘distance’ and 
demarking roles in the regulated relationship.26  These factors should be borne in mind 
when using policy instruments to direct or influence regulatee behaviour. In our context, 
the nature of the relationship between the healthcare team and the parents may be 
influenced by the timing of the referral to the tertiary unit. Complex multiple 
pregnancies tend to be referred in the early stages, creating a greater opportunity to 
build a meaningful and trusting relationship with the clinical team.  Urgent or late 
referrals may have reduced opportunities, and a range of situational factors including 
the location of the medical unit and local referral practices will also feed into the 
relational equation. 
Legitimacy 
The broader concern of legitimacy necessitates examination of the normative 
considerations and the political, societal and economic constraints of particular forms of 
regulatory intervention.27  In earlier chapters, we identified several reasons why it might 
be legitimate for a State or a State sponsored regulator to interfere with the creation, 
selection, continuance or ending of human life, albeit in limited circumstances.28  
Specifically, there might be clearly defined benefits for the human race, or specific 
communities, in restricting the commercial exploitation or genetic modification of 
human life.  State regulation also has an important role in facilitating public knowledge 
and providing a transparent forum for public accountability.29 
Whilst, we broadly adopt a Millian position,30 it is our contention that legitimate State 
interference with the freedom of others, whether directly or through delegated agents, 
requires adherence to the following basic conditions: 
1. Policy makers/ regulators need to be transparent and clear about the goals 
and outcomes that they are intending to achieve through interference in the 
 
25 Avitzour et al. (n2) 
26 Professional Standards Authority (PSA), Rethinking regulation (PSA 2015); PSA, The regulator’s role in professional 
identity: validator not creator (PSA 2018), chp3.   
27 Yeung & Dixon-Woods (n21). 
28 In the context of reproduction and reproductive technologies, see Erin Nelson, Law, Policy & Reproductive Autonomy 
(Hart 2013), 268. 
29 Ibid. 
30 As per Elizabeth Wicks, The State and the Body: Legal Regulation of Bodily Autonomy (Hart 2016). 
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freedom of others (for eg, in the freedom of women to make unrestricted 
choices about their pregnancy).31  This requires identification of the intended 
beneficiaries and the specific mischief/ harm the interference is designed to 
prevent/ limit, or the positive behaviours that it is seeking to promote.    
2. Any interference should be proportionate and only involve absolutely 
necessary restrictions upon individual freedom (ie minimal regulation).32 
However, there also needs to be recognition that even small or apparently 
straightforward interventions can be difficult to implement if they disrupt 
“established routines and understandings of professional role.”33 
3. Wherever possible, any intervention and the narrative message conveyed 
by that intervention should be consistent and coherent with associated 
regulatory frameworks.34 
4. There should be clarity about the target(s) of regulation35 - for example, in 
the context of abortion whether legal prohibitions/ sanctions are intended to 
limit the professional power of healthcare professionals, protect the unborn 
entity, protect pregnant women or to have a wider remit.   
5. Wherever possible, any intervention should endeavour to address foreseen 
problems and avoid unplanned consequences or regulatory gaps.36  Of 
course, there might be good reasons to create deliberate gaps or 
differences when “translating moral conclusions in to legal norms”.37  In the 
health context, we also want to keep sufficient space for professional 
judgement and to avoid unnecessary barriers for innovation.38 
6. There should be some mechanism for public accountability, especially for 
the regulator.39 
7. Regulators should be careful to maintain their objectivity and independence 
from the regulatee.  This in turn raises questions about the legitimacy of self 
regulatory models and we agree that, as a general rule, regulators ought to 
avoid “becoming too intimately involved in putting improvement into effect”,40 
or undertaking roles that should be primarily the function of the regulatee.  
In the healthcare context, this condition would make service providers 
 
31 Yeung & Dixon-Woods (n21) 
32 Professional Standards Authority, Right-touch Regulation in Practice: International Perspectives (PSA 2018), 3. 
33 The Health Foundation, Safer Clinical Systems: Evaluation Findings (The Health Foundation 2014), 18. 
34 Yeung & Dixon-Woods (n21); PSA International Perspectives (n32); Jeff Wale, ‘Don’t forget the legal framework: the 
public provision of non-invasive prenatal testing in England and Wales’ (2015) 15 Medical Law International 203. 
35 PSA Rethinking Regulation (n26); PSA, International Perspectives (n32). 
36 PSA International Perspectives (n32), 3-5. 
37 Greasley (n22), 212. 
38 PSA Rethinking Regulation (n26), 9. 
39 PSA International Perspectives (n32). 
40 PSA Rethinking Regulation (n26). 
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responsible for the actual delivery and improvement of patient safety, and 
regulators responsible for the identification/ enforcement of any breach in 
standards. 
We have left open the legitimacy of non-State sponsored regulatory interventions 
although our core conditions would still apply.  An issue for all regulators is whether 
they are acting out of self interest, and whether they are in a position to objectively 
assess the impact and legitimacy of their interference with others.  In our research 
context, we have a mixed model approach with top down and bottom up regulation in 
play.  The top down regulation by the AA 1967 arguably falls foul of our basic 
conditions, most notably around the clarity of the regulatory targets and goals. As we 
have observed, there is arguably a disconnect between the legal and professional 
norms, especially in relation to fetal reductions. 
Efficient and effective models of regulation 
In this section, we are concerned with the most efficient and effective forms of 
regulation for achieving a desired aim or objective.41  We should not automatically 
equate increased regulation with better regulation or stakeholder outcomes, because 
sometimes it can be more effective to deregulate (ie reduce control/ interference) and 
concentrate regulatory efforts on specific targets and outcomes.42  It is also necessary 
to balance out the effort and cost necessary to achieve a desired outcome (efficiency).  
Efficient and effective forms of regulation should strive for longevity – having the fluidity 
and capacity to facilitate early responses to technological change and shifts in public 
opinion may prove advantageous in the longer term.  For example, the Professional 
Standards Authority emphasises the importance of ‘agility’ in their policy concept of 
‘Right Touch Regulation’ in the healthcare context.43  Fixed or static regulatory 
approaches generally require regular oversight by the Legislature or Executive to keep 
them up to date and this tends to create delay and inertia.44   
Standard setting may also influence the longevity and responsiveness of any given 
model, and frameworks operating with precise standards may avoid arbitrariness but 
lack adaptability in changing circumstances.  Vague or broadly defined (loose) 
standards can give greater flexibility and adaptability and may delegate power in ways 
that afford wider discretion to the regulator or regulatee.45  The uncertainty of loose 
 
41 Yeung & Dixon-Woods (n21). 
42 PSA Rethinking Regulation (n26). 
43 PSA International Perspectives (n32), 3. 
44 For discussion of regulatory compromise, see Roger Brownsword and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Compromise Medicalisation’, in C. 
Stanton and others (eds), Pioneering Health Care Law Essays: In honour of the work of Professor Margaret Brazier 
(Routledge 2015). 
45 Timothy Endicott, ‘The Value of Vagueness’, in Andrei Marmor and Scott Soame (eds) Philisophical Foundations of 
Language in the LAW (OUP 2014), 26. 
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standards may also encourage restrictive behaviour by a regulatee fearing the 
consequences of breach.46  However, there are also disadvantages to loose regulatory 
structures because the residual space tends to become filled by personal/professional 
discretion and undesirable human practices.  We have already observed how the broad 
or vague framing of standards in our legislative framework (eg AA 1967, s1(1)) has 
created interpretive difficulties for clinicians and legal actors. 
Effective regulatory frameworks usually engage stakeholders on a regular and 
instrumental basis.  Regular public engagement can be important in establishing or 
maintaining trust in a regulatory framework or body but does not guarantee 
acceptance.  The Professional Standards Authority commissioned research 
highlighting the importance of regulatory alignment when regulatory standards fell in 
line, out of line or short of professional attitudes.47  Interestingly, the evidence 
suggested that when regulatory standards were in line with professional attitudes, the 
standards were seen as valid and valuable but not influencing of practice.  When the 
regulatory standards fell short (but not incompatibly so), they were neither perceived as 
valid or influencing.48  However, when the regulatory standards were out of line with 
professional attitudes, they were dismissed and unlikely to change practices unless 
actively enforced.49  This suggests that regulators/ policy makers need to think carefully 
about regulatory alignment before they introduce changes, and reinforces the need for 
active consultation with stakeholders to assess the extent and risk of divergence.  In 
relation to fetal reductions, we might be concerned by evidence of significant 
divergence between legal regulation and professional practice (see chapter 9).  We 
ought to know why that divergence is occurring but if significant attitudinal and practice 
changes are required, active engagement, inspection and enforcement measures are 
probably warranted until these changes have bedded in.  Of course, excessive 
divergence may also weaken the power and influence of the regulator, and there is 
recognition that local, collaborative and regulatee solutions may be more effective over 
the longer term.50  
Policy makers also need to have an eye on the wider cultural, political and economic 
environments that may constrain or influence regulation,51 and strike an appropriate 
balance between individual values, professional discretion and strict (legal) rules.52  
Striking a balance in an area of ethical and legal compromise is necessarily 
 
46 Ibid., 27. 
47 PSA, Professional Identity (n26), 3.10.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., chp 3. 
50 PSA Rethinking Regulation (n26), 18-19. 
51 Keith Hawkins, Law as a Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford University Press 
2002), 154; Roger Cotterrell, ‘Theory and Values in Socio-legal Studies’, (2017) 44(1) Brit J Law & Soc S19-36. 
52 Oliver Quick, Regulating Patient Safety.  The End of Professional Dominance? (2017 Cambridge University Press), 56. 
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problematic.  Although there is danger in drawing too many comparisons across 
regulatory environments, Professor Macrory’s work on the regulation of business offers 
some helpful pointers.53  He agrees with Quick that we should be looking to regulatory 
offences and mechanisms that focus on behaviour/ compliance modification.54  Whilst 
Macrory acknowledges the importance of sanctions for regulators - including as an 
inducement to compliance - he argues that “advice and incentives should play a key 
role in ensuring regulatory compliance”55  Here the advice and incentives would be 
primarily directed at regulatees rather than stakeholders generally. 
Finally, effective professional regulation usually requires adequate funding, and this 
may require the State to play some role in the process,56 although self funding by 
professional levies, registration charges or enforcement penalties is possible for larger 
professional memberships. 
 
7.4   UK healthcare regulation – the story so far 
 
It is evident that professional and legal regulation has failed to deliver satisfactory 
patient safety in domestic healthcare to date,57 but it is unrealistic to perpetuate the 
idea that we can eradicate the risk of patient harm altogether.58  The Health Foundation 
has identified a range of organisational matters acting as barriers to improved patient 
safety predominantly in the NHS, including inconsistent staffing, problems with support 
systems/ structures, workload pressures, multiple competing priorities, cultures and 
lack of process design and standardisation.59  These organisational factors also create 
a gap or dislocation between regulatory expectations and actual outcomes at ground 
level.  Accordingly, some have suggested that healthcare regulators should “focus on 
governing rather than erasing the gap between regulation and performance.”60  There 
is no doubt that the complex interaction between multiple regulators have contributed 
to a confusing and an unnecessarily bureaucratic regulatory model in the UK.61 
 
53 Richard Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective (November 2006). 
54 Quick (n52). 
55 Macrory (n53), para 1.11. 
56 Nelson (n28). 
57 Robert Francis, The Francis Report - Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (HC 947, 
2013); Quick (n52), 21; PSA, Rethinking Regulation (n26), 21. 
58 PSA Rethinking Regulation (n26), 9 
59 The Health Foundation, Safer Clinical Systems (n33). 
60 R Huising and S Silbey, ‘Governing the gap: forging safe science through relational regulation’, (2011) 5 Regulation & 
Governance 14-15. See also Quick (n52), 55. 
61 PSA, Right-touch Reform:  A new framework for assurance of professions (PSA 2017).   See also Law Commission, 
Regulation of Health Care Professionals, Regulation of Social Care Professionals in England (Law Com No345 2014). 
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Francis suggests that we need to address the issue of patient safety at many different 
levels, including changes to the culture within hospitals and the NHS.62  Regulation 
seems unlikely to deliver changes in clinical behaviour on its own and the most 
effective regulatory mechanisms require a multi-faceted and consistent approach.63  It 
is clear that reliance on individual patient complaint systems has limits, has a largely ex 
post effect and does not address concerns at a system level.64  The introduction of a 
statutory duty of candour and increased consistency across professional regulators 
represents just one possible legal response to these concerns.  Quick argues this type 
of legal regulation can be helpful in directing change, shifting the balance of power and 
establishing the trust necessary for proper patient centred care.65  The court system 
and the threat of litigation also “focuses institutional action to take patient safety 
seriously”,66 but we should not: 
“overstate the capacity of law for improving patient safety.  Reformed medical 
education, training, greater resources and the creation of a shared culture of 
safety are much more integral.”67  
Although, legal actors have continued to be deferential to the medical profession and 
professional sources,68 there is no guarantee that non-deferential legal intervention will 
enhance patient autonomy or improve decision-making because the law is an 
inherently blunt tool for shaping behaviour in a complex bureaucratic system.  We also 
need to be cautious about making doctors or others mere technicians or removing 
professional judgement from the medical process altogether.69  Indeed, the 
Professional Standards Authority acknowledges that “generally patient care benefits 
from a strong professional identity”,70  and identity is linked to the exercise of discretion. 
Due to a combination of scandal, increased external scrutiny and State intervention, we 
now have a more independent and robust regulatory healthcare environment than we 
had in the past.71  Quick argues that we should now move from the idea of regulating 
professions towards the more challenging task of regulating for patient safety and 
trust,72 and emphasises the importance of active patient engagement:73 
 
62 Francis (n57). 
63 Quick (n52); Oliver Quick, A scoping study on the effects of health professional regulation on those regulated (2011) 
(Final report submitted to the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence). 
64 Francis (n57),1011-1016.  See also Craig Kuziemsky, ‘Decision-making in healthcare as a complex adaptive system’, 
(2016) 29(1) Healthcare Management Forum 4. 
65 Quick (n52),182-183.  See also Oliver Quick, ‘Regulating and legislating safety: the case for candour’ (2014) 23 BMJ 
Qual Saf 614. 
66 Quick Scoping Study (n63), 17. 
67 Quick (n52), 182. 
68 For a contemporary example of professional guidance shaping legal duty, see ABC v St George's Healthcare NHS 
Trust & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ 336 
69 PSA Rethinking Regulation (n26), 9. 
70 PSA Professional identity (n26), chp 8.2.   
71 Quick (n52),67. 
72 Ibid.,50.   
73 Ibid., 51. Participant E agrees. 
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“Shifting the focus to regulating patient safety, as opposed to the traditional 
focus on regulating the medical profession, is important. Regulating patient 
safety means that it is both necessary and legitimate to involve patients, and 
this requires regulation to be seen as a collaborative enterprise between 
patients and professionals”.74 
Earlier, we touched upon the use of regulatory offences against healthcare providers 
rather than individual professionals,75  and in this chapter, we have highlighted how 
important organisational factors can be in the delivery of regulatory aims. This focus on 
organisations and systems can also be defended by the ‘fallible agent critique’ which 
recognises that individual professionals are fallible, and human errors are better 
explained by or attributed to systemic/ environmental factors than individual human 
agency.76  Of course, there is scope to use technology to directly regulate human 
behaviour or actions and reduce the fallibility of human operations.77  Clearly, any 
effective regulatory healthcare environment also needs to have an eye on the wider 
management, resource and delivery systems and relational dependencies operating 
within the NHS.78   
 
7.5 Influencing patient decision-making  
 
We have already touched on the use of incentives designed to alter or influence 
behaviours, choices and outcomes.  We can further categorise these forms of 
regulatory intervention as nudges, boosts and other incentive schemes intended to 
benefit the primary decision-maker.  Nudges “seek to affect decision-making by semi-
conscious or unconscious “altering defaults” in the framing of choices”,79 and correct 
any detrimental behaviours impacting on the decision-maker or others.80  In some 
cases, the nudge may be intended to alter an agent’s actual preference albeit for 
beneficent reasons.81   
 
74 Ibid., 52. 
75 Ibid.,181. 
76 Yeung & Dixon Woods (n21). 
77 Roger Brownsword, ‘Regulating Patient Safety: Is it Time for a Technological Response?’ (2014) 6 Law, Innovation and 
Technology 1; Yeung & Dixon-Woods (n21). 
78 Kuziemsky(n64) 4; Huising & Silbey (n60). 
79 Richard Ashcroft, ‘Incentives, Nudges and the Burden of Proof in Ethical Argument’, (2017) 43(3) Journal of Medical 
Ethics 137.  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the Value of Choice (OUP 2015); I G. 
Cohen et al. (n2). 
80 Ralph Hertwig, Beyond nudging: how to boost medical decision making, 16th Biennial European Conference of the 
Society for Medical Decision Making, 13 December 2016. 
81 Ashcroft (n79). 
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We have previously encountered nudges in the context of ‘framing’ - when narrative 
emphasis is placed on specific risks, harms or benefits for a particular end.82  In the 
obstetric context, a nudge might be used to encourage pregnant women to undergo 
natural childbirth by setting this as the default option at antenatal appointments.  
Nudges might also entail collective efforts by regulators, employers and managers that 
all push employees in a unified direction, or at least to prioritise attention to a specific 
issue or goal.83 
Conversely boosts are designed to “extend people's decision-making competence 
rather than co-opting their deficits”.84  Boosts “can target the individual’s skills and 
knowledge, the available set of decision tools, or the environment in which decisions 
are made”.85  In the obstetric context, this might involve the use of informational or 
decision aids; direction to specialist support organisations or the operation of parent 
forums for complex pregnancies.   Boosts might also involve tailored (rather than 
default) consent processes or medical consultations in informal (non-clinical) or 
informational environments.  The use of online support groups86 and informal 
consulting areas are well established in many fetal medicine and fertility units.  These 
mechanisms may be valuable in addressing the decision-making space after referral 
and between consultations. 
Other incentive schemes might offer rewards or other benefits to encourage the 
primary decision-maker to choose a specific option. For example, the offer of free 
transport to clinics or preferential booking arrangements on specific days of the week.  
The difference between incentives and nudges is not clear,87 but some commentators 
distinguish the use of default rules and incentives – with the latter explicitly and openly 
targeting the decision-maker.88   
The concept of ‘boosts’ has become increasingly popular due to the emphasis on 
enhancing existing competence, and because nudges have attracted negative 
criticism89 due to their tendency to treat individuals as “mindless, passive decision 
makers”.90  Even supporters of nudging, accept that limits need to be placed on the use 
 
82Till Gru ¨ne-Yanoff and Ralph Hertwig, ‘Nudge Versus Boost: How Coherent are Policy and Theory?’, (2016) 26 Minds 
& Machines 149, 155/ 173. 
83 Quick Scoping Study (n63), 20-21. 
84 Ashcroft (n79). 
85 ¨ne-Yanoff and Hertwig (n82),152. 
86 J W M. Aarts and others, ‘Patient-focused internet interventions in reproductive medicine: a scoping review’, (2012) 
18(2) Hum Reprod Update 211. 
87 Ashcroft (n79). 
88 Sunstein (n79). 
89 For a comparative analysis, see ¨ne-Yanoff and Hertwig (n82). 
90 Ibid. 
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of personalised default rules91 because of the potential for abuse.92  For example, 
Sunstein accepts that default rules may not be appropriate in circumstances when 
people would prefer to actively choose, when learning is important or where the 
decision-making population is not heterogenous.93  Decisions relating to fetal reduction 
and pregnancy termination appear to be the kind of decision that Sunstein would 
exclude from nudging, although he suggests that familiar and non-technical decisions 
are more appropriate for active choosing.94   
There is also a difference between generalised policy nudges by the State and specific 
nudging activity in the clinical relationship because: 
“the doctor-patient relationship involves a different type of trust from the state-
citizen relationship; a doctor’s moral duties towards the patient are different 
from the state’s duties towards the citizen: a doctor would nudge an actual 
patient personally, while the state would nudge a ‘statistical citizen’ 
anonymously”.95 
This is an important consideration which counts against the use of nudges in the 
clinical encounter.  For these reasons, non-directive information disclosure and 
counselling are an important part of patient care, and professionals should avoid the 
use of default positions when options exist.  Providing patients with up to date and 
balanced informational sources and tools to support decisions is likely to counter any 
default professional practices and may enhance active patient engagement in many 
cases.96 
 
7.6  Priorities: patient centred care and shared decision-making 
 
The NHS long term plan97 aims to address many of the organisational barriers to 
patient safety identified previously,98 including: 
• Recruitment drives, resources and support to address inconsistent staffing and 
workload pressures.99  
 
91 Sunstein (n79) distinguishes between personalised and non-personalised default rules. 
92 See Avitzour et al. (n2). 
93 Sunstein (n79), 18-19. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Avitzour et al. (n2) 
96 The Health Care Foundation (n14), para 3.1. See also J. S. Blumenthal-Barby, ‘That’s the doctor’s job’: Overcoming 
patient reluctance to be involved in medical decision making’, (2017) 100 Patient Education and Counseling 14. 
97 NHS Long Term Plan (NHS 2019). 
98 As per The Health Foundation (n33). 
99 NHS (n97), chp 4. 
  
188 
 
• The introduction of ‘’digitally enabled care’ which includes online appointment 
access and information portals, interoperable networks and telephone/ video 
patient consultations.100 
• The introduction of a new service model (addressing primary and community 
healthcare) with a view to rationalising and streamlining the delivery of local 
care.101 
• Improving public accountability and engagement through the creation of an 
NHS Assembly which draws upon a wide range of stakeholders.102 
• An emphasis on the ‘collective endeavour’ in the delivery of healthcare (ie co-
ordinated systems and services).103 
Patient centred care, shared responsibility for health and shared decision-making are 
at the heart of contemporary regulatory thinking104 and the NHS long term plan.105  We 
have considered the differences between patient centred care and care driven 
exclusively by patient autonomy – the latter leaving little space for professional 
discretion or personal values. We also have spoken of shared decision-making as a 
collaboration between the patient and healthcare professional.  The Health Foundation, 
whilst acknowledging the absence of any fixed single meaning, identifies the defining 
characteristics of shared decision-making as: 
“fostering a real partnership, whereby the health professional is seen as an 
expert on the effectiveness and potential benefits and harms of treatment 
options and the patient is viewed as an expert on themselves, their 
circumstances, attitudes to illness and risk, values, preferences and the extent 
to which treatment options might fit within their lifestyle. Both parties need to be 
willing and able to share information and accept responsibility for joint decision 
making.”106  
This fits closely with the interpretation of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board by 
Dunn et al.107 and the concept of the active engaged patient.  We should also 
appreciate that shared decision-making is a component of several initiatives for the 
delivery of patient centred care.108 
So what strategies are the most appropriate for supporting and delivered shared 
decision-making?  The Professional Standards Authority (PSA) speaks of empowering 
 
100 Ibid., chp 5. 
101 Ibid., chp 1. 
102 Ibid., chp 7.7. 
103 Ibid., chp 7.13 
104 GMC (n13). 
105 NHS (n97), para 1.37-1.38. 
106 The Health Foundation (n14), 2. 
107 Michael Dunn and others, ‘Between the Reasonable and the Particular: Deflating Autonomy in the Legal Regulation of 
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment’, (2019) 27(2) Health Care Anal. 110. 
108 The Health Foundation (n14), 2. 
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patients to ask questions and challenge proposed treatment or service delivery 109, and 
the NHS of empowering patients in their wider role as a key stakeholder.110  This entails 
giving patients a greater voice in their own medical care and in wider structural/ 
institutional decisions (eg NHS Assembly).  The PSA recognises that making patients 
“distrustful” of clinical interactions or decisions may not be a helpful narrative, and have 
recommended additional research on empowerment issues.111  Although Quick says 
we cannot mandate patient involvement in healthcare safety, the Health Foundation 
have suggested a range of patient centric strategies aimed at supporting shared 
decision-making including the use of multi media information sources (including 
personalised information prescriptions);112 patient held/ online records;113 decision aids 
and communication tools;114 agreed action plans;115 group patient sessions;116 and 
individual education/ coaching.117   Blumenthal-Barby makes similar recommendations 
to help engage patients and agrees that they should be encouraged to ‘express their 
values and ask questions’.118  Many of these strategies are already employed by our 
participants (chapter 9). 
In terms of professional centric strategies for supporting shared decision-making, the 
evidence suggests that specific training on the use of decision and communication 
tools might be helpful.119  Training is important if professionals do not have the relevant 
skills for developing shared decision-making without support.120  The Health Foundation 
did not find any empirical evidence regarding system strategies, but they recognised 
the importance of organisational structure and culture in persuading patients and 
professionals that there was value in change.121  They found no clear evidence whether 
active or passive strategies were more effective but the “evidence suggests that 
proactive strategies may be necessary to sustain change”.122   So there is evidence that 
organisational, informational and incentive based policy instruments can be helpful in 
modifying patient/professional behaviours, attitudes and changing priorities at a local 
level.  However, the Health Foundation also highlighted the importance of concordance 
– it is not enough that professionals engage in shared decision-making – patients have 
got to want and be able to use any opportunities for active engagement.123  For the 
 
109 PSA Right-touch (n61), 2.69-2.70. 
110 NHS (n97). 
111 PSA Right touch (n61), 2.70. 
112 The Health Foundation (n14), 14-15. 
113 Ibid., 15. 
114 Ibid., 15-19. 
115 Ibid., 18-19. 
116 Ibid., 20. 
117 Ibid., 19. 
118 Blumenthal-Barby (n96) 
119 The Health Foundation (n14), 20-22. 
120 Ibid., 8. 
121 Ibid., V / 22.  See also Blumenthal-Barby (n96). 
122 Ibid., 22. 
123 Ibid., 28-29. 
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reasons already discussed , some patients may be reluctant or unwilling to take on this 
responsibility in the medical context.124  There is also the need to address the inherent 
tension between the delivery of evidence based medicine and patient driven 
treatment.125  This is likely to be influenced by situational factors and certain types of 
medical care and treatment may be more amenable to shared decision-making 
approaches. 
We have already expressed concern about the removal of professional discretion from 
the clinical encounter.  We agree with Yeung and Dixon-Woods that there is a: 
“need to focus on how professional discretion can be optimally deployed, rather 
than seeking solutions solely in target-hardening and environment-altering 
approaches”126 
There are several strategies that might be helpful in strengthening the role of the 
professional.  First, there is a need to reframe institutional and individual obligations of 
candour, emphasising the positive rather than negative outcomes of disclosure.127  It 
does seem prudent to persuade professionals of the benefit of disclosure, and not just 
the adverse consequences of failure.   
Secondly, the PSA have suggested the use of formative spaces for professionals to 
discuss adverse events and/or difficult cases.128  This is not a new concept in clinical 
medicine, but greater recognition and use of team decision-making and reflective 
spaces might be helpful, especially when combined with greater organisational legal 
responsibility.129  These spaces should not be used just for problem areas but also to 
address changes in system or practice.   
Thirdly, there is a reflective value to decisional regret - when a patient wishes, with the 
benefit of hindsight, that they had made a different decision about a treatment.130  
Professionals should not see this type of regret as a threat – it can help individual/ 
team learning and future patient encounters – and creating space/ mechanisms for 
reflecting on such outcomes may be helpful to professional learning.131  Decisional 
 
124 Samantha Peters and Douglas Bilton, D., ’”Right-touch” trust: thoughts on trust in healthcare’ in R H. Searle, A-M I. 
Nienaber, S. B. Sitkin, (eds) The Routledge Companion to Trust (Routledge 2017); Sarah Devaney, ‘The Transmutation 
of Deference in Medicine: An Ethico-Legal Perspective’, (2018) 26(2) Med L.. Rev 202; Blumenthal-Barby (n96) 
125 The Health Foundation (n14), 29. 
126 Yeung & Dixon-Woods (n21). 
127 PSA, Response to the NHS Improvement’s consultation on developing a patient safety strategy for the NHS (PSA 
2019), para 5.3. 
128 PSA Right touch (n61).  See also Gerry McGivern and Michael D. Fischer, ‘Reactivity and reactions to regulatory 
transparency in medicine, psychotherapy and counselling’, (2012) 74(3) Social Science and Medicine 289. 
129 Royal College of Physicians, Doctors in Society – Medical professionalism in a changing world – Report of a working 
party (RCP 2015) 
130 K. Watson, ‘Reframing Regret’, (2014) 311 JAMA 27. 
131 Sam Rowlands and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Sterilisations at delivery or after childbirth: Addressing continuing abuses in the 
consent process’, (2019) Global Public Health < https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2019.1583265 >accessed 28 February 
2019. 
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regret can be a feature of fetal reduction – either because the parents later regret the 
decision to reduce or because of the subsequent loss of a pregnancy resulting from the 
termination procedure. 
Fourthly, local workplace strategies to support shared decision-making may be more 
effective than top down regulatory strategies especially when there is effective 
consultation and engagement with staff.132  There may also be scope to address the 
structural design and delivery of healthcare within tertiary fetal medicine units so as to 
enhance the quality and process of decision-making.  As we shall see, there appears to 
be evidence of some regional variation in clinical practice. 
Fifthly, when national implementation is required, there should be active dialogue/ 
adaptation that reflects upon and acknowledges the practical difficulty of 
implementation, in preference to authority solutions that fail to recognise these 
issues.133  The positive local promotion of change is much more likely to enacted than 
change from outside that is perceived in negative way.134 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
 
In closing, we make four general points, before considering what our findings might 
mean for the regulation of fetal reduction and selective termination. 
First, it is evident that healthcare delivery in the UK is notoriously complex and 
bureaucratic, and the resulting regulatory frameworks are neither efficient or effective.  
Healthcare professionals have proved resistant or otherwise removed from regulatory 
efforts to change their behaviours and patient outcomes.  Agile, flexible and co-
operative models of regulation appear to offer the best hope for maximising patient 
safety.  Recognition that human agents are fallible, and that health is a collective 
endeavour is important.  On that basis, system-based and organisational accountability 
should be prioritised accordingly. 
Secondly, shared decision-making is a key feature of patient centred care – a concept 
that retains a place for professional discretion providing it supports the effective 
delivery of patient safety and care.  In this chapter, we have identified a range of 
 
132 PSA Right touch (n61), 35. 
133 Described by Huising and Silbey as ‘relational regulation’ (n60). 
134 PSA Right touch (n61), 30-31. 
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supportive organisational, informational and boosting strategies that should be 
prioritised wherever possible.   
Thirdly, the preferred framing of healthcare change should emphasise the benefits for 
stakeholders and not just the penalties or consequences of any breach of standard.  
That is not to say that regulators should hide these consequences, but stakeholders 
need a good reason to change attitudes and behaviours - there will always be those 
individuals who choose to circumnavigate change for their own benefit or other 
unexplained reasons.  Marginalising these counterproductive behaviours is key to 
achieving effective change. 
Fourthly, there is the tricky dilemma of how best to facilitate and develop active patient 
engagement – a factor that we believe is central to the success of any form of 
collaborative decision-making process.  Again, we have highlighted a series of tools 
and strategies that might be developed by healthcare professionals and providers to 
support engagement, although the most effective responses are likely to be 
situationally driven.   
It is this situational concern that is especially pertinent to our research context.  The 
most appropriate and effective strategies for supporting decision-making and patient 
care in tertiary fetal medicine are likely to be subtly different from other medical practice 
areas.  This view recognises the importance of the specific clinical relationship and 
environments in which decisions are made.  These reduction procedures are usually 
undertaken in specialist tertiary referral units, against a distinctive cocktail of ethical 
issues and a background of specific legal regulation.135  These distinctive features 
should not be ignored when we regulate for decision-making process in this arena.  
Clearly, we have to consider the shadow of the Abortion Act 1967, and its regulatory 
impact on professional practice, when examining the wider regulation of healthcare 
services.  It may be that we have to revise both the specific and the general regulatory 
structures to achieve the specific goals of regulation in this context.  Our overarching 
conclusion about situationality also aligns with the specialist delivery of healthcare 
which recognises that the technical/ care needs of patients and their families are likely 
to differ markedly based on medical context.  It is against this background, that we 
move to examine the stakeholder perspectives of these procedures. 
 
135 Eg the Abortion Act 1967 (as amended). 
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Chapter 8 – Existing Research: Stakeholder 
Perspectives 
 
Contents: 
8.1 Introduction 
8.2 Clinical research 
8.3 Qualitative research 
8.4 Quantitative research 
8.5 Other research 
8.6 Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we examine existing research and project data addressing a range of 
stakeholder perspectives focusing on fetal reduction, elective termination and abortion 
generally.  We have used a wide range of clinical, scientific, sociological, psychological 
and professional studies to inform our research; to provide an appropriate foundation 
for reviewing our qualitative data and to enrich the discussion of the subject matter in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
8.2 Clinical research 
 
In Table 2A (Appendix E) we have produced a summary of relevant clinical case 
studies and literature reviews addressing fetal reduction and selective termination in 
multiple pregnancy.  This review helped inform the interview process and enabled us to 
gain a better understanding of the wider clinical context.1  All sources were identified 
using repeat searches across several databases including PubMed, Web of Science, 
Science Direct, Scopus and Google Scholar. This database exercise was 
supplemented by focussed keyword searches against obstetric and human 
 
1 For methodological underpinning, see M Vaismoradi, H Turunen and T Bondas, ‘Content analysis and thematic analysis: 
Implications for conducting a qualitative descriptive study’, (2013) 15(3) Nurs Health Sci 398, 401. 
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reproduction journals and using relevant information from specialist medical 
conferences.2 
The clinical research demonstrates a degree of consensus on the need for these 
procedures with specific emphasis on improving perinatal outcomes.   Very little 
attention is paid to the wider regulatory context or to the ethical issues.   The 
contemporary research appears preoccupied with the case for reducing twin and triplet 
pregnancies; and specifically, the benefits and risks associated with singleton 
preservation where a clear international consensus has yet to emerge.3  Timing 
appears to be critical and the research indicates that there is a key period in multiple 
pregnancies between 11/12 - 16 weeks gestation.4 
There is evidence that artificial reproductive techniques (ART) impact on the need for 
these procedures, with an elevated risk of multiple gestation5 and monochorionic 
pairing6.  ART is also closely associated with maternal age and the use of these 
procedures.7  Monochorionic (MC) pregnancies generate complex clinical management 
issues, including specific complications like TTTS, TAPS and TRAPS.  Whilst it is now 
possible to reduce a single fetus in a MC pair, the risk of fetal death for the co-twin 
remain high8.  In certain triplet pregnancies (Dichorionic (DC) Triplets – with a MC twin 
pair), the central issue is whether to reduce the MC pair or just one fetus in that pair.  If 
the former option is taken, care needs to be taken that the remaining fetus is capable of 
viable birth and is free from hidden anomaly that might otherwise impact on the 
decision-making process. 
 
 
2 RCOG, Management of Multiple Pregnancy conference 16 November 2015; The Royal Society of Medicine and BPAS, 
Decriminalisation and demedicalisation: Rethinking family planning for the 21st century conference 10 June 2015. 
3 Cf J, Haas and others, Pregnancy outcome of early multifetal pregnancy reduction: triplets to twins versus triplets to 
singletons, (2014) 29 Reproductive Biomedicine Online 717; Yaniv Zipori and others, ‘Multifetal reduction of triplets to 
twins compared with non-reduced twins: a meta-analysis’, (2017) (35(1) Reproductive Bio-Medicine Online 
doi.org/10.1016/j.rbmo.2017.04.001: Yaqiong Liu and others, ‘Clinical outcomes of multifetal pregnancy reduction in 
trichorionic and dichorionic triplet pregnancies: A retrospective observation study’, (2019) 58 Taiwanese Journal of 
Obstetrics & Gynecology 133; R Katie Morris. and Mark D. Kilby, ‘Fetal Reduction’, (2010) 20(11) Obs, Gynae & Reprod 
Med 341. 
4 Yan Liu and others, ‘Effect of selective second- trimester multifetal pregnancy reduction and its timing on pregnancy 
outcome’ (2017) 10(3) Int J Clin Exp Med 5533-5537. See also Morris and Kilby (n3) who distinguish ‘selective late feticide’ 
following late diagnosis of anomaly which they claim should be offered in the early 3rd trimester to avoid the risks of 
miscarriage/ preterm labour etc (at 342). 
5 Robert L. Klitzman, ‘Reducing the number of foetuses in a pregnancy: providers’ and patients’ views of challenges’, 
(2016) 31(11) Human Reproduction 2570; Morris and. Kilby (n3). 
6 Mariano Mascarenhas and others, ‘Obstetric outcomes of monochorionic pregnancies conceived following assisted 
reproductive technology: A retrospective study’ (2014) 7(2) J Hum Reprod Sci 119. 
7 Mohamed Satti and others, ‘Selective Fetal Reduction Versus Expectant Management in Triplet Pregnacies After IVF-
ET’ (2016) Obstetrics & Gynecology 127: 64S.; DOH Abortion Statistics, England and Wales (2016), para 2.50. 
8 P Chaveeva and others, ‘Intrafetal laser ablation for embryo reduction from dichorionic triplets to dichorionic twins’, 
(2017) Ultrasound in Obs and Gynae < https://doi.org/10.1002/uog.18834 >accessed 29 May 2018; Xinlu Meng and 
others, ‘Forty-five consecutive cases of complicated monochorionic multiple pregnancy treated with microwave ablation: 
a single-center experience’, (2019) Prenatal Diagnosis DOI.org/10.1002/pd.5423; Morris and Kilby (n3), 342. 
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8.3  Qualitative research  
 
Table 3A (Appendix E) provides an overview of relevant qualitative studies and 
identifies the data collection and analytical methods used by the researchers.  
Qualitative data addressing the perspectives of healthcare professionals is fairly limited 
and tends to focus on terminations on the ground of anomaly,9 generalised attitudes to 
abortion,10 and on practices outside of England and Wales.11  In our analysis, we have 
made it clear when the research participants or procedures are outside of the UK. 
Healthcare professional (HCPs) perspectives 
A study by Statham, Solomou and Green12 has certain similarities to this research 
although the interview data was collected within NHS fetal units and primarily concerns 
termination on the ground of fetal abnormality.  The study is interesting because the 
researchers: 
“aimed to understand the decision-making experiences of fetal medicine 
professionals working within [a] legal framework”.13   
 
The participants acknowledged the difficulty of working within the law and their own 
ethical frameworks.  The researchers found some concern/ perceived inconsistency 
around the differential time limits for lawful termination and this is vividly captured by 
one participant: 
“I think if you extend your argument, then you shouldn’t use fetal abnormality as 
an indicator for termination at all. And I agree that fetal abnormality is an 
indicator for termination. So therefore I must think that there is a difference 
between the two.”14 
 
9Helen Statham, Wendy Solomou and Jasper B. Green, ‘Late termination of pregnancy: law, policy and decision making 
in four English fetal medicine units’, (2006) 113(12) BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 1402; 
Ruth H. Graham and others, ‘The role of feticide in the context of late termination of pregnancy: a qualitative study of 
health professionals' and parents' views’, (2009) 29 Prenat Diagn 875; Melody A. Menezes and others, 'Taking Its Toll': 
The Challenges of Working in Fetal Medicine. (2013) 40(1) Birth: Issues in Perinatal Care 52; Robyn Lotto, Lucy K. Smith 
and Natalie Armstrong, ‘Clinicians’ perspectives of parental decision-making following diagnosis of a severe congenital 
anomaly: a qualitative study’, (2017) 7 BMJ Open e014716; Lisa Crowe and others, ‘Negotiating acceptable termination 
of pregnancy for non-lethal fetal anomaly: a qualitative study of professional perspectives’, (2018) 8(3) BMJ Open  
e020815. 
10 Allyson Lipp, ‘A review of termination of pregnancy: prevalent health care professional attitudes and ways of influencing 
them’, (2007) 17(13) Journal of Clinical Nursing 1683; Katie Gallagher, Davinia Porock and Alison Edgley, ‘The concept 
of nursing in the abortion services’, (2010) 66 Journal of Advanced Nursing 849; Carrie Purcell and others, ‘The changing 
body work of abortion: A qualitative study of the experiences of health care professionals’, (2016) Sociology of Health and 
Illness ISSN 0141-9889:1; J Nicholson, P Slade and J Flethcher, ‘Termination of pregnancy services: Experiences of 
gynaecological nurses’, (2010) 66(10) Journal of Advanced Nursing 2245; Ellie Lee, Sally Sheldon Sheldon and Jan 
Macvarish, ‘The 1967 Abortion Act fifty years on: Abortion, medical authority and the law revisited.’ (2018) 212 Social 
Science and Medicine 26,<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.07.010 >accessed 18 May 2019 
11 Eg., Menezes et al. (n9); Klitzman (n5). 
12 (n9). 
13Statham, Solomou & Green (n9),1402. 
14 Ibid., 1406. 
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However, the absence of time limits for fetal anomaly/ protection of maternal life were 
seen to be serving a range of important purposes,15  and under ground E, participants 
appeared to be more concerned whether “the condition met the ‘severity’ criterion and 
rarely referred to certainty of prognosis.”16  Where uncertainty existed, there was 
evident desire to build consensus amongst colleagues,17  and the input of 
neonatologists and paediatricians on likely treatment options often proved helpful to 
decision-making in this context.18  Importantly, when fetal units decline a termination on 
legal grounds, this can create consequential difficulties for other providers and 
healthcare professionals: 
“Now, that is a very delicate issue. Basically if I and my consultant colleague 
here consider the issue and say, no, it’s not legal, that puts any other unit in the 
country under extraordinary difficult pressure if they’re challenged and they 
decide to do it.”19 
 
Finally, the study notes some important shifts in attitudes around acceptable ground E 
conditions and concludes that “research is needed to monitor attitudes to, and 
interpretation of, UK abortion legislation”.20   
The Carrie Purcell et al. study of Scottish NHS hospitals picks up on the difficulty for 
HCPs in working with abortions in the later stages of pregnancy and the move away 
from hands on intervention to medical methods of termination.21  Lisa Crowe et al. 
explore how HCPs negotiate terminations for non-lethal fetal anomaly so as to make 
them morally acceptable.22  Again, the study highlights perceptions of inconsistency in 
the legal framework: 
“…if you can terminate a healthy baby just because the mother wants to, I don’t 
see why you can’t terminate a baby with a minor abnormality if the mother 
wants to. (Medical Professional 10)”.23 
Whilst this displays some conceptual misunderstanding about the AA 1967, it raises an 
important question about the role of maternal choice in the decision-making process.  
When ground C conditions are met, medical professionals are able to displace some of 
the decision-making burden by claiming respect for maternal choice.24  Whilst rejecting 
a formalised list of ground E conditions, this study emphasises the importance for 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 1407. 
19 Ibid. 1407. 
20 Ibid., 1402. 
21 Purcell et al. (n10), 10-11. 
22 Crowe et al.(n9). The study included hospital consultants and social care professionals. 
23 Ibid.,3. 
24 Ibid., 5. 
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HCP’s in ‘fixing’ patients and of perceptions of pain/ normality in ‘negotiating’ whether a 
condition/ anomaly can fall under ground E. 
Again, Lotto et al. pick up on the issue of legal uncertainly around ground E, with some 
participants perceiving the legislative drafting as a failure to reach consensus rather 
than a flexible solution for practical use.25  Indeed, the potential for decisions to be 
scrutinised and challenged, left some participants feeling vulnerable; and this 
perception of vulnerability may be restricting patient options especially after 24 weeks 
gestation.  The study also corroborates the Statham et al. findings regarding the use of 
multi disciplinary decision-making, or as they frame it, ‘corporate’ approaches to 
complex and difficult cases.  These strategies serve "to remove the responsibility from 
an individual by placing it on a group” and potentially reduces variation within a 
hospital, although not necessarily between institutions.26  Although participants saw 
themselves as facilitators, they also wanted active rational parental engagement in the 
decision-making process, occasionally creating tension or breakdowns in the clinical 
relationship.27    
Richards et al. address HCP perspectives following loss from a twin pregnancy.28  The 
transferability of the study is limited because it only addresses the perspectives of 
those professionals working within a single NHS hospital, but it does highlight the 
importance of bereavement skills and training to facilitate appropriate responses to 
parental needs.  This finding is echoed in the study by Lafarge et al. which found that 
HCPs lacked: 
“insight into women’s long-term coping processes and the potential for positive 
growth following TFA, which is consistent with a lack of aftercare following TFA 
reported by women.”29 
Klitzman provides a US perspective from HCPs, ART providers and patients involved in 
multi-fetal reductions.30  Although, this study combines a range of stakeholder 
perspectives, we will address it here for the ease of presentation.  The study should be 
approached with caution because it concerns multiple pregnancies created by ART and 
communications/ decision-making before and after embryo transfer.  However, what is 
interesting is the way in which patients approached the possible future risk of reduction 
 
25 Lotto et al. (n9). 
26 Ibid.  For the value of reflective spaces away from the regulators, see Professional Standards Authority, The regulator’s 
role in professional identity: validator not creator (PSA 2018).   
27 Ibid. 
28 Judy Richards and others, ‘Health professionals' perspectives on bereavement following loss from a twin pregnancy: 
A qualitative study’ (2016) 36 Journal of Perinatology 529. 
29 Caroline Lafarge and others, ‘Pregnancy termination for fetal abnormality: Are health professionals' perceptions of 
women's coping congruent with women's accounts?’, (2017) 17(1) BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth 60.  TFA=Termination 
for fetal abnormality. 
30 Klitzman (n5). 
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and the actual presentation of a decision to reduce. Those parents desperately wanting 
a family seemed more willing to accept the possible future risk of reduction, than they 
did in factual situations when an actual reduction was recommended and/or warranted.  
For some participants, the risk of multiple pregnancy seemed very remote when set 
against the wider background struggle to conceive.  In many cases, an agreement to 
reduce a high order multiple was a precondition of embryo transfer,31  and funding was 
not always available for the reduction procedure in any event.32  The need to “weigh 
multiple risks and uncertainties” was problematic for “desperate patients” who “cannot 
fully anticipate these tradeoffs”. 33  Despite the intuitive nature of this statement, some 
clinicians still perceive reduction as an “easy, rational decision” without that 
perspective.34  
Klitzman notes that some patients and providers: 
“appear more willing to reduce three fetuses to two than two to one, feeling that 
the data that twins face more risks than singletons are insufficiently 
compelling”.35 
He also notes that twin reductions make some physicians “uncomfortable”36 – a point 
raised by many of the participants in this research.  In terms of actual decision-making, 
the following important points also surface from the study. The ART providers (who 
may require agreement to possible future reduction) are unlikely to be the clinicians 
involved in any subsequent reduction procedure.  Klitzman records the doctors “often 
felt that ultimately, the decision was the patients”, and notes the “tensions concerning 
how much to challenge patients”.37  One physician participant makes this telling 
comment: 
“We wrestle with the competing ethical areas of patient autonomy versus the 
physicians’ social responsibility to do what’s right for society… [Twins] have 
premature delivery and use up resources rapidly.”38 
Klitzman concludes that a combination of education initiatives, updated professional 
guidance and the publication of clinic outcomes are warranted.  However, the paper’s 
most important contribution is the emphasis placed by clinicians on benefits rather than 
 
31 Klitzman (n5), 2572. 
32 Ibid., 2573. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 2573-2574. 
36 Ibid., 2574. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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future risks, in combination with the potentially competing desire that patient autonomy 
should prevail.39 
Finally, there is a recent qualitative study by Ellie Lee at al. considering UK consultants 
undertaking (or having recently undertaken) terminations in their work in 
obstetrics/gynaecology or in sexual/ reproductive health.40  Although the study appears 
to focus on singleton terminations, there are some interesting observations.  First, in 
most accounts there was emphasis on the “primacy of the woman as the decision-
maker”.41  Secondly, decision-making was not seen as the exclusive domain of doctors, 
although medical expertise was valuable in difficult and complex cases, and 
termination services were seen as a part of medical care.42  Thirdly, there was a strong 
sense that the current law “undermines their medical professionalism” in terms of the 
“exercise of clinical judgement, and the ability to act as a ‘good doctor’”.43  The 
participants singled out criticism for dual certification, nurse participation and home 
administration, and the (perceived) threat of criminal prosecution. 
Parental perspectives 
A study by Sarah Meaney et al. addresses parental participants who have lost a co-
twin with congenital abnormality44 and picks up on a matter implicit in the Klitzman 
study - parents were simply “not prepared for the complications they experienced in 
[multiple] pregnancy”.45  Again, clinicians encouraged parents to focus on the “normal” 
rather than the anomalous reduced twin, and consequently parents felt that their 
opportunity to grieve was diminished. The ongoing psychological impact of multi-fetal 
pregnancy loss is well recognised.46  The researchers also note the need for clear 
education provision to parents.   
In a similar vein, Richards et al. looked at UK mothers who had suffered a loss from a 
twin pregnancy but continued to receive hospital support for their surviving twin.47  This 
study preceded their research output addressing HCP perspectives (see above).  
Some of the women connected the emotional support provided by healthcare staff with 
 
39 Ibid., 2575. 
40 Lee et al. (n10). 
41 Ibid., 29. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Sarah Meaney, Paul Corcoran and Keelin O’Donoghue, ‘Death of One Twin during the Perinatal Period: An 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis’, (2017) 20(3) Journal of Palliative Medicine  
<https://doi.org/10.1089/jpm.2016.0264 >accessed 29 May 2018. 
45 Ibid. [Emphasis and context added]. 
46 Jennifer Kelland and Rosemary Ricciardelli, ‘Mothers of Multiple Perspectives on Fetal Reduction and Medical 
Abortion’, (2014) 5(2) J Motherhood Initiative for Research and Community 126; Morris and Kilby (n3); 342. 
47 Judy Richards and others, ‘Mothers' perspectives on the perinatal loss of a co-twin: A qualitative study’ (2015) 15 BMC 
Pregnancy & Childbirth 143. 
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their perception of professional competence.  Overall, the study highlights the vital 
importance of trust, and the continuity of information and staffing.48  Small changes in 
this context had a significant impact on the well-being of patients. The women involved 
also described impairment of perception and their ability to make informed decisions 
following the loss with consequential loss of control.   
Interestingly, Kelland and Ricciardelli did not find support (from 41 women who had 
multiple pregnancies in Canada) for the reduction of twin to singleton pregnancy for 
non-medical reasons.49  The: 
“idea of reducing a twin pregnancy is particularly troubling; for some it appears 
rooted in the bond they note in their twins or even in their personal experiences 
and love they felt for their children.”50 
The authors make the bold assertion that these reductions are “primarily related to 
lifestyle and personal situations”51 although there may be cases where medical risks to 
the woman and twins arise.   
Britt and Evans address the views of pregnant woman in the context of multi-fetal 
pregnancy reduction in the US 52.  This study considers decision difficulty against three 
conceptual “frames” or ways of “describing and thinking about decision options”53: (1) a 
moral belief that life begins at conception; (2) a medical belief in the statistics regarding 
risk, and risk prevention through reduction; and (3) a lifestyle belief that a balance of 
children and career has normative value.  There was some evidence of parents “having 
to reduce, and not having a choice” and using the medical belief frame to construct or 
support their decision to reduce across these conceptual frames.54  Those with an 
intense conceptional frame (frame 1) found significant decision difficulty around fetal 
reduction; and in those cases, frame 2 can be conceived as a medical necessity to lift 
or alleviate: 
 “some of the burden of making the decision to reduce by minimizing the 
discretion that the woman and her partner appear to have in the matter”.55 
This is consistent with the findings of Graham et al. (addressing late terminations of 
pregnancy for fetal anomaly) where feticide was conceptualised by patients as being 
 
48 See also Robyn Lotto, Natalie Armstrong and Lucy K. Smith, ‘Care provision during termination of pregnancy following 
diagnosis of a severe congenital anomaly - A qualitative study of what is important to parents’, (2016) 43 Midwifery 14; 
NICE, NICE Clinical Guidline CG62 Antenatal Care for Uncomplicated Pregnancies (NICE 2019), para 1.2.2. 
49 Kelland and Ricciardelli (n46), 123-140. 
50 Ibid., 134. 
51 Ibid., 127. 
52 David W. Britt and Mark I. Evans, ‘Sometimes doing the right thing sucks: Frame combinations and multi-fetal 
pregnancy reduction decision difficulty’, (2007) 65 Social Science & Medicine 2342.  
53 Ibid., 2343. 
54 Ibid., 2354. 
55 Ibid.,2355. 
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difficult but necessary.56  This is a similar conceptual process used by HCPs,57 although 
with parents, the displacement is to the professionals caring for them.58   
The Kelland and Ricciardelli study (building upon the Britt and Evans approach) divide 
their frames into reductions for medical and non-medical reasons – the latter defined as 
“lifestyle, financial or other personal (reasons)”.59  Their participants were preoccupied 
with situations where “medicine or medical experts were “proven” wrong”.60  In addition, 
many of the participants avoided “the possibility of even making decisions” about 
termination “by opting not to not undergo genetic screening when pregnant”.61  Kelland 
and Ricciardelli also found participants making the distinction between abortion and 
fetal reduction although “some women express feeling conflicted in their own 
responses”.62 
The impact of the internet in obstetric decision making is considered by Lagan et al. in 
relation to woman in the US, Australia and New Zealand.63  The findings confirm that 
the internet is playing an important role in many aspects of pregnancy - online 
information is filling parental needs between appointments and the gaps created by the 
finite time available for antenatal appointments.64  Women reported that the availability 
of online information was both supportive and reassuring.65  The internet also had an 
important role to play in terms of sharing experiences although the quality of 
information was difficulty to evaluate.66  However it was clear that online sites helped 
inform choices and helped share decision-making with HCPs.67  The study therefore 
argues that it is important that this online use is recognised and HCPs should be 
helping women by directing them to suitable and reliable sources of information that 
they need.68  However, NICE have recently highlighted the lack of evidence on the use 
of non leaflet media to communicate information to pregnant women.69 
 
 
56 Graham et al. (n9).  See also Caroline Lafarge, Kathryn Mitchell and Pauline Fox, ‘Termination of pregnancy for fetal 
abnormality: A meta-ethnography of women's experiences’ (2014) 22(44) Reproductive Health Matters 191; Kelland and 
Ricciardelli (n46) 123-140. 
57 Crowe et al. (n9). 
58 Lotto et al. ‘Care provision’ (n48) – this study talks of “offsetting responsibility onto the clinicians” (p18). 
59 (n46), 124 (added). 
60 Ibid., 131. 
61 Ibid., 133.  The double negative appears to be a typographical error. 
62 Ibid., 135. 
63 Briege M. Lagan, Marlene Sinclair and W. George Kernohan, ‘What is the impact of the Internet on Decision-Making in 
Pregnancy? A Global Study’ (2018) 38(4) Birth 336. 
64 Ibid., 339.  See also J. S. Blumenthal-Barby, ‘That’s the doctor’s job’: Overcoming patient reluctance to be involved in 
medical decision making’, (2017) 100 Patient Education and Counseling 14, 16. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 341. 
67 Ibid. 342-343. 
68 Ibid., 344. 
69 NICE, NICE Clinical Guidline CG62 Antenatal Care for Uncomplicated Pregnancies (NICE 2019). 
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8.4  Quantitative research 
In this section, we examine relevant quantitative research relating to the attitudes of 
healthcare professionals,70 parents 71/72 and their proxies.73  Again, many of the studies 
relate to generalised attitudes and perspectives to abortion. 
Healthcare professional perspectives 
In a questionnaire study by Dommergues et al.,74  HCPs working within a French 
maternity hospital with a fetal medicine centre gave their opinion on the use of feticide 
at the second or third trimester. The majority had positive opinions on feticide, 
expecting it would avoid fetal or neonatal pain and this assisted overall patient 
management. 
In a questionnaire study by Theodosiou and Mitchell, GPs, Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists75 affiliated with a single UK NHS hospital gave their views on abortion 
reform.  A signiﬁcant majority felt that abortion law in Northern Ireland should be 
changed to align with the rest of the UK. There was less agreement around broader 
amendment to the AA 1967, although possible areas for amendment included changes 
to the 24-week time limit, the legal definition of fetal abnormalities, termination on 
request, and the dual practitioner certification requirement. The researchers observed 
that many of the participants “justiﬁed their views in terms of personal morality, rather 
than best practice guidelines and evidence.”76 
In a questionnaire survey of UK HCPs working in fetal medicine and associated fields, 
Crowe et al. observed that where fetal anomaly was less serious, gestational age was 
an important consideration.77  Similarly, prognosis was an important factor alongside 
 
70 Eg., Marc Dommergues and others, ‘Feticide during second- and third-trimester termination of pregnancy: Opinions of 
health care professionals’, (2003) 18(2) Fetal Diagnosis and Therapy 91; Anastasia A Theodosiou and Oliver Mitchell, 
‘Abortion legislation: exploring perspectives of general practitioners and obstetric and gynaecology clinicians’, (2015) 
30(2) Reproductive Bio Medicine online 197. 
71 Eg., N Bajos and others, ‘Access to health care for induced abortions: qualitative and quantitative approaches’, (2003) 
51 Revue d’epidemiologie et de Sante Publique 631; Jane Fisher and others, ‘Termination for fetal anomaly: Are women 
in England given a choice of method?’ (2015) 35(2) Journal of Obs & Gynae 168. 
72Eg., Ruth Graham and others, ‘Experiences of Reproductive Loss: the importance of professional discretion in caring 
for a patient group with diverse views’, in: S Earle, C Komaromy, L Layne, (eds) Understanding Reproductive Loss: 
Perspectives on Life, Death and Fertility (Ashgate, 2012), 205. 
73 Eg., NCT and TAMBA, Maternity Services and Multiple Births: A joint report by NCT and the Twins and Multiple Births 
Association,  < https://www.tamba.org.uk/document.doc?id=733 >accessed 11 April 2017.  This report is based on survey 
data from 1338 respondents in 2015. 
74 (n70).  Cf Ronitt Leichtentritt and Galia Weibery-Kurnik, ‘No one sees the fathers: Israeli fathers' experience of feticide’ 
(2016) 168 Social Science Medicine 159. 
75 (n70). 
76 Theodsiou (n70), 201. 
77 Lisa Crowe and others, ‘A survey of health professionals’ views on acceptable gestational age and termination of 
pregnancy for fetal anomaly’, (2018) 61(9) European Journal of Medical Genetics 493. 
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gestational age.  This study is also interesting because some participants clearly 
differentiated between their personal and professional views on these issues 
suggesting that HCPs may be able and willing to work “within a professional paradigm 
despite it being in conﬂict with their own personal opinions.”78  However, this does not 
address the possible impact of unconscious bias discussed in chapter 6. 
Parental perspectives 
Bajos et al undertook a qualitative and quantitative study of women who had 
undertaken abortion in France.79   Their research highlights the importance of visible 
termination services and the promotion of information delivered to healthcare 
professionals. 
A questionnaire survey by Fisher et al. involving members of a UK parent support 
organisation examined the availability of patient choice for medical and surgical 
methods of termination for fetal anomaly.80  Notably, only 14% of parents were offered 
a choice of method with a significant fall after 14 weeks’ gestation (to 8%).  This is a 
very low finding given that national guidance suggests that a choice of methods should 
be offered where appropriate and available.  Although the majority (78%) underwent a 
medical termination, 88% of that group chose that option because it was the only 
method offered.  Interestingly 60% of those who were offered a choice had a surgical 
termination and this might suggest that greater choice could have an impact on the 
statistical trend towards medical abortion in singleton pregnancies.  What is not clear, 
is how much public health resource considerations are playing a role, but if 
consequential factors are restricting patient choice this has obvious ethical implications. 
Parental proxy perspectives 
A joint report by the National Childbirth Trust (NCT) and the Twins and Multiple Births 
Association (TAMBA),81 addresses the implementation of the key NICE guidance in 
relation to multiple pregnancy.82  Headlines from the report include: 
 
78 Ibid., 497. 
79 (n71). 
80 Fisher et al.(n71).  For the value of this choice, see Jane Fisher and Caroline Lafarge, ‘Women’s experience of care 
when undergoing termination of pregnancy for fetal anomaly in England’, (2015) 33(1) Journal of Reproductive and Infant 
Psychology 69; Jane Fisher and Caroline Lafarge, ‘Women’s perceptions of care when undergoing termination of 
pregnancy for fetal anomaly’, (2015) 33(1) Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 69. 
81 (n73). 
82 NICE Quality Standards (QS46) Multiple Pregnancy: Twin and Triplet Pregnancies (NICE 2013). See also RCOG, 
Multiple pregnancy: the management of twin and triplet pregnancies in the antenatal period (NICE Clinical Guidance) 
(RCOG 2011a). 
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• Relevant NICE guidance is still not fully or equally implemented across the UK 
and there is no specific guidance for intrapartum care for multiples.83  Full 
implementation is evaluated at 10-18% of units. 
• Average gestation rates are currently 35.3 weeks for twins and 31.8 weeks for 
triplets 
• The results show that average levels of compliance with NICE measures have 
increased from 58.8% in 2010/11 to 69.1% in 2014/15. 
• The rates of NICE compliance and parent satisfaction vary across the regions 
of England. The North East is the highest performing regions with overall 71.5% 
compliance, whilst the South East and West Midlands are the lowest both with 
61.1%. 
This report highlights that compliance with national guidance/ standards can be patchy, 
incomplete and can take significant periods of time to embed into practice.  Although 
we may be getting close to 70% average national compliance, it still leaves a fair 
number of centres/areas with incomplete adoption, and suggests we probably need 
something else to direct behaviour and compliance.  Of course, we cannot discount 
NHS workload and resources as a partial explanation for the incomplete pattern of 
implementation and compliance. 
A subsequent report by TAMBA on Twin Pregnancy and Neonatal Care in England 
records higher rates of NICE guideline compliance (73%+).84  Interestingly, the report 
also comments that smaller cohorts of multiple pregnancies may result “in poorer care, 
patient satisfaction and outcomes”.85  This could have implications for the number, 
location and size of tertiary fetal medicine units. 
 
8.5  Other research 
 
There is a range of other research around the role of personal attitudes, values and 
professional norms in the wider context of abortion.86  One important consideration for 
 
83 See now NICE, Twin and Triplet Pregnancy (CG129 Guideline Update) – Draft for Consultation (NICE 2019). 
84 TAMBA, Twin Pregnancy and Neonatal Care in England, November 2017 (TAMBA 2017). 
85 Ibid., 6. 
86 Eg., Constance A. Nathanson and Marshall H. Becker, ‘Professional Norms, Presonal Attitudes , and Medical Practice:  
The Case of Abortion’, (1981) 22 Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 198; S L Marshall, D Gould and J Roberts, 
‘Nurses attitudes towards termination of pregnancy’, (1994) 20 Journal of Advanced Nursing 567; W. Savage and C. 
Francome, ‘British Gynaecologists attitudes in 2008 to the provision of legal abortion’, (2011) 31 Journal of Obstetrics & 
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the parental stakeholders is the potential stigma associated with NHS funded but 
independent sector delivered abortion services (eg British Pregnancy Advisory Service, 
Marie Stopes International).  There is a significant discrepancy between Scotland and 
England/Wales - Scotland has a much higher proportion of terminations delivered 
directly within the NHS care framework.87  This has less relevance for fetal reduction 
and selective termination in multiple pregnancy where the procedure is probably going 
to be undertaken within an NHS fetal medicine unit. 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ (NCOB) report on ‘Critical care decisions in fetal and 
neonatal medicine: ethical issues’88 concluded: 
“that the adoption of more stringent legislation would risk introducing new legal 
constraints to the current pragmatic and flexible process of decision making”.89  
The report supported the use of professional guidance “accompanied by a strong 
sense that it should not be too restrictive”.90  They endorsed further clarification of when 
a baby is ‘born alive’ and a code of practice on late terminations and the use of 
feticide.91  They concluded that birth should remain “the significant moral and legal 
point of transition for judgements about preserving life” and decisions for the benefit the 
fetus should only be made with the consent of the pregnant woman.  They also 
proposed that new procedures in fetal surgery should only be offered within a 
protocol approved by a research ethics committee.92 
Finally, there is interesting study that examines multi fetal pregnancy reduction from the 
Shiite perspective within the UK.93  The study concluded that fetal reductions that occur 
in emergency situations (no option or ‘ordinary’ indication) are permitted before the 
time of ensoulment (the point at which a soul is acquired).  Anomaly and importance94 
were appropriate criteria in the selection process. 
 
 
Gynaecology 322; L H Harris and others,  ‘Dynamics of Stigma in Abortion Work: Findings from a Pilot Study of the 
Providers Share Workshop’, (2011) 73(7) Social Science & Medicine 1062; Niels Lynoe, ‘Physicians’ practices when 
frustrating patients’ needs: a comparative study of restrictiveness in offering abortion and sedation therapy’, (2014) 40 J 
Med Ethics 306. 
87 Edna Astbury Ward, ‘Abortion ‘on the NHS’: The National Health Service and abortion stigma’, (2015) 41 J Fam Plan 
Reprod Health Care 168. 
88 NCOB 2006, <http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/neonatal-medicine>accessed 20 July 2018.  For discussion of the role 
of the Nuffield Council, see Roger Brownsword and Jeff Wale, ‘Testing Times Ahead: Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing and 
the Kind of Community We Want to Be’, (2018) 81(4) MLR 646. 
89 NCOB (n88),183. 
90 Ibid., 182. 
91 Ibid., 153. 
92 Ibid.,152. 
93 A Z. Bigdoli and F A. Ardbili, ‘Permissibility of Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction from The Shiite Point of View’ (2017) 
10(4) International Journal of Fertility & Sterility 380. 
94 The example offered is fetal health. 
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8.6   Conclusions 
 
Drawing these sources together, we make five general remarks and one specific 
observation about fetal reduction/ selective termination: 
First, team-based decision-making is encouraged in difficult and complex cases, 
especially when there is some doubt over the legality of a termination.  Whilst this 
approach will not prevent individual prosecution, it probably makes it harder to 
demonstrate bad faith and non-compliance with the AA 1967.  This reinforces the need 
for institutionally focused forms of regulation that encourage the uptake and 
implementation of national rules and guidance.  Shared decision-making within clinical 
teams may make it harder for hidden personal values to take hold, providing care is 
taken to avoid dominance by any single individual.95  It is noteworthy that self 
assessment and reflective spaces for professionals are seen as an important part of 
healthcare reform by the Professional Standards Authority.96 
Secondly, uncertainty over legality may have both positive and negative consequences 
for parental engagement.  On the one hand, it may encourage HCPs to seek active 
patient engagement in the termination decision.  On the other, this process may create 
tension and conflict in the clinical encounter or act as a hurdle to patient access in 
some cases. 
Thirdly, whilst decriminalisation of abortion may alleviate some of the pressure on 
HCPs and patients, regulators would still have to police the concept of ‘proper medical 
treatment’.  The absence of criminal restriction seems unlikely to resolve all issues 
around acceptable anomaly and gestational time limits.  Indeed, decriminalisation may 
force professionals to hide their personal values and increase the degree of regional 
variation, creating unnecessary disparity around access. 
Fourthly, there is a need for balance in the communication of risks/ benefits in the 
patient encounter.  It can be problematic to prioritise patient autonomy whilst placing 
exclusive or primary emphasis on the benefits of a procedure.  Of course, there will be 
cases where the benefits clearly outweigh the risks, but the risks still need to be 
disclosed if they are likely to be material to that patient’s decision-making or a 
reasonable patient in those circumstances. 
 
95 CF also Helena Serra, ‘Gamble on the Uncertain. Negotiating Medical Decision-Making’ (2016) 12(4) QSR 44. 
96 PSA (n26), chp 3. 
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Fifthly, there is a conflict between resource-based decision-making and a public 
narrative supporting open-ended patient choice.  Patient decision-making and choice is 
likely to be constrained by a range of contextual barriers including time or option 
limits.97  The NHS commitment to enhancing patient choice98 is laudable but we should 
not fool ourselves that this without restriction. 
In respect of our specific observation, whilst the need for informed decision-making is 
well established, we should recognise the considerable weight and difficulty of 
decision-making in relation to fetal reduction and selective termination.  The need to 
weigh multiple risks, shifting uncertainties and disclosures, make it important that there 
is a proper dialogue between HCPs and parents, and not just unilateral exchanges of 
information.  Variations in education, intelligence and background knowledge will need 
to be catered for, ideally using a range of media.99  Continuity of care is likely to 
enhance the therapeutic dialogue and facilitate this process.100 
 
 
 
97 Blumenthal-Barby (n64). 
98 NHS, The NHS Long Term Plan (NHS 2019), 24-25. 
99 Cf Blumenthal-Barby (n64). 
100 As per NICE (n69). 
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Chapter 9 – Interview Data and Emerging Themes 
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9.13 Legal framework 
9.14 Decision-making 
9.15 Reform 
9.16 Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we examine the interview data from our research participants.  We have 
divided the discussion under thematic headings emerging from the interview process 
and our cyclical analysis of the raw transcript data.  Outline theme definitions are 
available at Table 1A (appendix C).  Participants are designated ‘P’ with a 
differentiating letter for each individual participant (eg PA = Participant A etc).  Please 
note that all quotes are taken from direct transcriptions of participant interviews and 
have not been edited unless expressly stated. 
 
9.2 Terminology 
 
There was a broad measure of agreement over descriptors and the central goals of 
fetal reduction/ selective termination.  PA identifies a high order multiple as a 
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pregnancy involving “triplets or even more, four or five”,1 and describes the aims of fetal 
reduction as: 
“reducing the morbidity and the adverse outcomes for the baby related to the 
fact that they are higher order to improve their chances of the pregnancy going 
further and reduce the risk of severe and moderate brain (damage)”.2 
For this participant, consequential considerations and the high/ low order distinction 
appears more important than any other procedural distinction: 
“the reason I made the distinction between high order and twins, in higher order 
you are reducing effectively one normal and somehow you don't have an issue 
about that, you are improving two, what's the phrase I can use without putting a 
value on it, without putting a judgement on it, you know you take the heartbreak 
of one”.3 
 
Similarly, PB made no clear distinction between the two procedures but could “see why 
people would use them in that way.”4  When probed about the possible procedural 
distinction, PC responded that the labels are not used consistently enough to be 
important: 
“If there was consistent terminology that was agreed upon where selective 
termination was reserved for anomalies for instance and selective reduction for 
non-anomaly that would not be an unreasonable thing to do I think that so much 
overlap it is not particularly useful distinction.  When you discuss selective 
termination, the word ‘termination’ has, particular implications, whereas a 
‘reduction’ of numbers of babies may be a more…”5 
This suggests that labels are sometimes being used to frame the discussion in less 
emotive terms. However, they acknowledge that the term ‘reduction’ might involve 
“equivocation”6 and “some people might find it confusing” because it “(d)oesn’t really 
tell you exactly what is happening.”7  The only participant to make the formal distinction 
was PD:  
“Fetal reduction is where …. we use it where we are trying to reduce the risks 
attributable to a multiple pregnancy.  We use selective termination as 
terminating pregnancy for one baby usually abnormal baby … the stated 
intention is different.”8 
 
1 Participant A. 
2 Participant A (added). 
3 Participant A. 
4 Participant B. 
5 Participant C. 
6 Participant C. 
7 Participant C. Cf Jeffrey Wale, ‘Selective termination of pregnancy and fetal reduction in multiple pregnancy: terminology, 
blurred lines and ethical discourse’, < 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303882409_Selective_termination_of_pregnancy_and_fetal_reduction_in_mult
iple_pregnancy_terminology_blurred_lines_and_ethical_discourse >accessed 20 July 2018. 
8 Participant D. PD identifies 2 roles for selective termination: “one to prevent the birth of the baby who will suffer or will 
be abnormal be handicapped according to the law but also to prevent that baby from compromising the other baby". 
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However, PD later concedes that this is a “fairly arbitrary” distinction.9  Overall, these 
findings are consistent with views expressed elsewhere, namely whilst terminology is 
not unimportant, fixed categorisation is not terribly helpful in actual medical practice.10   
 
9.3 Problem areas 
 
The participants were asked to provide examples of problem areas – specifically, those 
circumstances which tended to generate complex decisions and considerations.  PC 
recognises the inherent tension and finely balanced considerations involved in triplet 
reductions: 
“With dichorionic triplets you win and you lose by doing a reduction.  If do a 
reduction you increase the risk of miscarriage, you have stuck a needle into 
someone but if they don’t miscarry you reduce the risk of very premature births 
and death.  If you leave them alone, lower risk of miscarriage and slightly higher 
risk of premature birth and subsequent death.  If you do simulation based on 
the numbers, the results are in the two arms… actually the same. On one you 
take on 3 babies and in other you take on 2.  You may reduce the risk of 
handicap in the reduction group because the gestational is a little bit longer- 
finely balanced.”11  
Against this background, the participant would not: 
“direct to reduction…outcomes for our triplets tends to be very good.  Often 
comes down to how parents cope with triplets.  If they come holding their head 
in hands.  This is really terrible news. So difficult for our family unit to cope and 
actually got 3 other kids ... or whatever… might be the… rather than the 
medical.  Very finally balanced.”12 
This makes it clear that non-medical (socio-economic) factors may often be decisive in 
triplet pregnancies. The opening statement also fits with our earlier description 
characterising doctors as choice architects. 
PA singles out reductions involving triplet pregnancies with a monochorionic pair: 
“yes often there only say reduce only 1 then you'll have to talk to them and say 
actually yes we can reduce one but we are not completely out the woods 
because you're carrying twins and you're carrying the ones that are associated 
with higher problems, try and sort one out and then 5 weeks later we may find 
out we can't predict if we go down that route we just got to be aware”13 
 
9 Participant D. 
10 Wale (n7); C M. Ogilvie, ‘Multiple pregnancy, fetal reduction and selective termination’, (2013) 26 (6) Reproductive Bio-
Medicine Online (Elsevier Science) 52. 
11 Participant C. 
12 Participant C (emphasis added). 
13 Participant A. 
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Again, consequential considerations dominate the concern.  PC also highlights the 
difficulty of chorionicity in twin pregnancies: 
“They are so much more complicated…  there is a temptation to try and make 
things fits into neat boxes and protocols.  Many things are amenable to that but 
I also believe strongly that some things are really difficult.  Maybe this is one of 
those areas”14 
This highlights the importance of discretion/ flexibility and the practical difficulty created 
by fixed rules. 
PA articulated some hesitancy about the reduction of a twin pregnancy with a healthy 
pair:  
“(I) would want to understand the reason underpinning the request.  I would try 
to understand at least. I would offer a second opinion and even sometimes, an 
external second opinion because I think it is very hard sometimes. It is not a 
value-based.  I'm not making any judgements on expecting parents but I guess 
sometimes it can be very difficult to make very very tough decisions in very 
short period of time”15 
Is this paternalistic resistance, recognition of the uncertainty of clinical benefit or simply 
the creation of a reflective space based on past experience of parental regret?  PD has 
a similar reticence about healthy twin reduction: 
“clearly the benefits are clearly less than they are with triplets because the pre-
existing risk is not very high. So, we tend to say we don't usually do it. We have 
done it and it's been my sort of policy to say yes we’ll do it if the alternative is a 
total termination and that's people who have usually said if you don't do it I'll 
terminate the whole pregnancy.  In which case I have done it under those 
circumstances”16 
Again, this appears to highlight resistance to parental demands based upon 
consequential considerations either for the pregnant woman or the unborn entity.  
Similarly, PB did not believe there were medical indications for reducing twins to a 
singleton, although their primary concern was the risk of a live birth after attempted 
reduction.   
PD notes an interesting upward trend in the number of IVF related pregnancies from 
abroad and a corresponding increase in chorionicity: 
“the proportion of multiple pregnancies that contain monochorionic twins has 
undoubtedly increased ... I'm sure there are figures but I haven't seen them, but 
 
14 Participant C. 
15 Participant A. 
16 Participant D. 
  
212 
 
they have increased.  So probably 50% of our ... have got monochorionic 
twins”17 
Finally, PD admitted that where there were limits to the technical evaluation of risk: 
“several ifs down a decision tree or the what might happen tree and we are not 
that good at predicting the future.”18 
Again, consequential considerations dominate. 
 
9.4 Timing 
 
One of the key clinical themes for the participants was the timing of intervention during 
the pregnancy.  There are competing risks/ considerations, and the window of 
opportunity appears to be small, limiting time for reflection and deliberation.  
Nonetheless, there appears to be a broad measure of agreement over timing.  PA 
says: 
“everyone should have a scan between 11 and 14 weeks most people … 12-13 
weeks.  They will be referred up to immediately to have a chance to discuss, 
they will then you give them a week or something like that to make a decision”19 
PB tries to see pregnant woman: 
“a bit before around the 11 week mark to float the idea see if that's something 
they wish to pursue.  If it is something they wish to pursue we may end up doing 
it a little after 12 weeks because part of the decision-making process would be 
… are there … is there one of the fetuses that is clearly anomalous”20 
Similarly, PC says that most patients are seen around 11-12 weeks: 
“There are different pockets…. One fetus has an abnormality or suspected 
abnormality, that’s one one bunch of patients we would see and there the 
discussion is around the effect that the abnormality will have on the baby and 
whether you want a selective termination based on that in the same way that 
you would have for a singleton and that kinda bye the bye. Something to take 
into account if it’s a very minor abnormality, some parents will want a 
termination for pretty minor things.”21 
This suggests that the participant may be evaluating parental reasons although not 
necessarily with a negative outcome for the requestor.  PC categorises monochorionic 
 
17 Participant D. 
18 Participant D. 
19 Participant A. 
20 Partcipant B. 
21 Participant C (emphasis added). 
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pregnancies as an additional group, with a further bunch of “multi fetal reductions 
where trying to reduce the risk of pre-term birth, usually triplets, quads and above.”22 
PD describes a slightly earlier practice in high order multiples (from about 10 weeks), 
although core decisions are usually made around the 11th week of pregnancy: 
“there were usually be seen by us and counselled by one of the consultants or 
counselled under the supervision of one of the consultants here.  Then they 
would see a midwife.  Then they would go away and then they would come 
back to the appointment for a nuchal scan and in the meantime they might ... 
might have made their wishes clear to the midwifes by telephone and so when 
they come back to do the nuchal scan and we are going to make sure that we 
are not going to leave a baby that was abnormal. So, we will be looking fairly 
carefully at 11 week and that's why do the nuchal scan here”23 
When asked whether there was a cut-off date for these procedures, PA’s response 
demonstrates evidence driven decision-making: 
“you don’t really want to do any reduction after 16 weeks...really want to do it as 
soon as possible, the tissue bulk is so high and the only other time that you may 
do it is if you find a problem after 32 weeks so that if you then go into labour the 
consequences don’t affect the other one it is mainly term but…. ”24 
PB says there is no cut-off date but notes that there: 
“is reasonable data that suggest if you wait until after 16 weeks there is a 
significantly higher rate of total pregnancy loss if you do a selective reduction”25 
This participant also records pockets around the 12/ 20 weeks scans when anomalies 
may be revealed. Similarly, PC agrees “that a reduction at 12 weeks the risk is smaller 
than the risks of a reduction at 16 weeks…”26 and this fits with the overall profile of risk: 
“Principally we are talking about if you do not reduce a multi fetal pregnancy, 
there is a risk of spontaneous MFP loss and the risk of premature birth.  They 
are the 2 big categories.  You lose the pregnancy because mother miscarries at 
15-17 weeks with babies or you actually have an early preterm at 28-30 weeks.  
Not really concerned at prematurity beyond 34-35 weeks because those babies 
tend to do very well anyway.”27 
In terms of early intervention, PC acknowledges there are differential jurisdictional 
practices: 
“I know that there is a fashion in the States to do it really early – 8 weeks- my 
nightmare scenario done an embryo reduction from 3 to 1 and then find that 
one you have left behind has a congenital abnormality which couldn’t be 
detected early.  I would say take a balance. really want to take a careful 
 
22 Participant C. 
23 Participant D. 
24 Participant A. 
25 Participant B. 
26 Participant C. 
27 Participant C. 
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detailed at 12 weeks. If any baby has any abnormality, even if the procedure 
was intended just for a reduction, any abnormality or even a small mark….”28 
So again, we have consequential considerations influencing domestic practice.  Then 
there is the question of whether there ought to be a waiting period between the 
decision and surgical intervention.  PA emphasises the importance of a short delay:  
“not in my practice. If they know they've got twins they come, then obviously we 
scan again …. then we have a whole discussion then they go away then we ... 
never offer and reduce never do not my practice.  However devastating, for 
example, especially those where there is a problem they have a clear they want 
I will always say you have to come back at least have one night.  I have a very 
strong …”29 
Similarly, PC says that whilst the procedure could be “done on the day. Generally, like 
them to sleep on it for a day.”30   PD notes an in-built practice-based delay: 
“It would be a minimum of week and so that's why … we would want to see 
them to give them the opportunity to discuss it.  I would divide them into three 
groups. First Group who couldn't possibly contemplate it and that's the end of 
the conversation and that's very straightforward and then the other two thirds 
probably 1/3 think about it and do it and the other third think about it and don't 
do it”31 
but admits they have acceded to immediate patient requests “if she is clear that she 
wants it done.”32  These responses suggest that beneficent considerations are 
influencing professional practices, although the delays may be patient centred and 
more prevalent when the parental stakeholders are equivocating. 
When asked about the legal time limit for termination, PC responds: 
“The 24-week cut off for termination that would only become an issue if a late 
request for a reduction in an abnormality…  not be possible but really never 
come across that. Parents will know from early on and because most are 
related to fertility treatments most come very early on”.33 
When asked about the possible introduction of a legal cut-off date for all terminations, 
PB claimed this would just create “different groups of complex patients…there are tiny 
numbers handful after 24 weeks.”34 
 
28 Participant C. Cf M S. Kim and others, ‘Procedural and obstetric outcomes after embryo reduction’ (2019) 53(2) 
Ultrasound in Obstetrics and Gynecology 214. 
29 Participant A. 
30 Participant C. 
31 Participant D. 
32 Participant D. 
33 Partcipant C. 
34 Participant B. 
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9.5 Frequency 
 
PA estimated 3-4 conversations about fetal reduction in high order cases each year but 
acknowledges that the option is not automatically offered in healthy twin pregnancies: 
“it’s only in the presence of abnormality again probably two or three times a year.”35  
PB estimated he undertook relevant discussion about fetal reduction less than 10 times 
per year: 
“I would not think as many as one /month. There are lots of different categories 
that if you tot up. We would see a number of triplet pregnancy there will be a 
discussion about selective reduction.  We would see a number of pregnancies 
each year where there might be a selective twin anomaly and there would be a 
number of pregnancies each year where there might be complications like 
severe growth restriction rather than an anomaly. Particularly in MC twins 
where they are prone to selective IUGR and other issues risks because if you 
have a DC twin and ones very small and it might die it might kill the other one in 
the process or least it can harm and so the management is more complex”36 
Interesting, this participant estimated that: “a little less than half of triplets would go for 
selective reduction.”37  PC would discuss the options with “5 or 6 triplets per year…and 
quads even less than that, maybe 1 a year”.38  PD estimated: 
“6 reductions per year and selective termination 3 to 4 on average. It may be a 
few more reductions than that, it is not in double figures but it might be up to 
10”.39 
Overall, these participants appear to be undertaking a meaningful proportion of the 
reported procedures in England and Wales on an annual basis.40   
 
9.6 Training 
 
These procedures are mainly encountered during postgraduate or sub-speciality 
stages of training: 
 
35 Participant A. 
36 Participant B. IUGR= Intrauterine growth restriction. 
37 Participant B. 
38 Participant C. 
39 Participant D. 
40 Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2017 (DHSC Revised 
December 2018). 
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“In terms of actual doing the technical aspects this was only in the final stages 
of our training Oh Actually witnessing the counselling around the discussions 
around this in the final stages when you're under subspeciality.”41 
 
9.7 Power 
 
This theme focuses on the power balance between doctor and patient.  PC conceives 
the patient relationship and decision-making process as a collaborative arrangement: 
“What you normally do is in advance of the mother coming, look at what the 
abnormality is.  Look at the latest literature and see what the benefit and risk 
ratio is and then given counselling and even reach a decision together with 
parents.  Not strictly advising… not so much advising.  Let’s make a decision 
together.  What is the most reasonable thing based on the balanced risks and 
benefits”42 
 
Ultimately, it is the parents that “have to deal with the babies not I.  Right they are in 
charge of that decision”.43  This was the most patient centric response but reflects the 
reality of the long-term caring obligations for a child or children with or without disability.  
Tellingly, PC had this to say about parental/ patient communications: 
“The way you counsel patients can be coloured by people’s perceptions and so 
for example, thinking about fetal abnormality, there are different approaches 
absolutely.  Sometimes you learn as much about how not to do things as well 
as much as how to do things.  Yeah, I very much reached a conclusion it is 
impossible to predict as a clinician how parents think about things.  A lot of time 
of the time has to be spent digging, uncover …”44 
First, this raises a question about how far doctors need to go to unearth patient values 
and priorities – whilst knowledge of these matters is undoubtedly helpful to 
collaborative decision-making, should we convert this into a legal obligation?  
Secondly, it begs the question whether we can create sufficient space for learning, 
without endangering patient safety?  PA certainly emphasises the importance of 
knowing “the context in which in which it is being asked ...why that request is being 
made”,45 giving the impression that patient disclosure is the key to unlocking access to 
the procedure.   Although PC provides powerful support for shared decision-making, he 
acknowledges this may not happen in wider clinical practice:  
 
41 Participant A.  For the importance of training in decisions about subspecialty, see Ellie Lee, Sally Sheldon Sheldon and 
Jan Macvarish, ‘The 1967 Abortion Act fifty years on: Abortion, medical authority and the law revisited.’ (2018) 212 Social 
Science and Medicine 26, 28, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.07.010 >accessed 18 May 2019 
42 Participant C. 
43 Participant C. 
44 Participant C. 
45 Participant A. 
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“To say ‘go away make your own decision’.  That is a real cop out.  That’s the 
other extreme from the directive and I have seen that happen as well. Often in 
my view that is lack of knowledge sometimes or understanding from the 
clinician’s perspective.  So one way around this is to leave all the evidence on 
table”.46 
Effective knowledge and skills training may help address any reluctance to engage in 
shared decision-making. 
Another way that doctors can exercise power is through the framing of risks and 
benefits: 
“One way of counselling is to say to look at this on both sides the positive side 
and the negative side.  The positive side is often that actually the chance are 
that whatever you do things will turn out ok because even though the risk of say 
prematurity is high say 10-15% after a reduction but that means there is an 85-
90% chance of not having that complication.  So there 2 ways always of looking 
at the two sides of the coin.  Talking back through what the chances are of 
going wrong but also what the chances are of things turning out absolutely fine. 
Whether we do decision A or decision B”47 
Although the GMC emphasises the need for consistency and balance in this context,48 
it is the doctors who are the ultimate architects of the informational landscape and 
choices presented to parents. 
As indicated, there was reticence about the reduction of healthy twin pairs by some of 
the participants49: 
“reducing a twin to singleton pregnancy because mother does not want a twin 
pregnancy.  I think that is a really difficult choice, twins actually do very very 
well and certainly increasing the risk of overall pregnancy loss and so you know 
in the end these are actually although apparently simple issue ... actually easier 
in a triplet because in the twin the chance of a normally healthy outcome for 
both baby is very high without abnormality.  Frankly, we are trying to steer 
the parents away from going down the reduction route. Really strong 
feelings about it.  If the choice is about terminating both babies you know 
if don’t offer.  Maybe it is a reasonable thing.”50 
These responses suggest that personal/ professional values may be creeping in, 
allowing beneficent and consequential considerations to influence the clinical 
response.51  Again, the highlighted segment matches our earlier description 
characterising doctors as choice architects.   
 
46 Participant C. 
47 Participant C.  
48 General Medical Council, Decision making and consent: Supporting patient choices about health and care, Draft 
guidance for consultation (GMC 2018), para 27. 
49 See also Participant A (n15) and Participant D (n16). 
50 Participant C (emphasis added). 
51 Interestingly, participant B also observes that in twin pregnancies, women are “less likely to seek information that they 
will have to make very difficult decisions about”. 
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There is further evidence of resistance when treatment is demanded - PA is clear that 
patients will “have to come back at least have one night”52 – but this is consistent with 
the need for reflection and deliberation emphasised in the latest GMC draft guidance.53  
However, in terms of professional compulsion, PC says: 
“I think about self-determination. Whose self-determination are we talking 
about: the parent, the clinician, the unborn fetus?  Don’t have that either in law 
or reality.  It is between different people.  Never been in a situation when I have 
declined a parent request but I can see where that might occur and then I would 
not want to get involved.  Got to be ok for clinician so long as the patient is 
properly looked after.  I can’t or I am not prepared to but here… and that’s fine. I 
don’t see thats a problem.”54 
So, here the specific emphasis is on the accommodating professional values, 
conscientious objection and clinical judgement in practice. 
 
9.8 Parental support 
 
This theme addresses varying forms of parental support.  PA make the point that 
parental, and typically maternal support is clinically driven and fact specific, rather than 
default.  External agencies like TAMBA and ARC are used by the clinical team to 
provide additional support and information for parents.55  Mention was made of parent 
to parent support mechanisms, although in practice, the response has been a little 
mixed because it is “(d)ifficult to match people’s expectations ... different expectations 
and baggage.”56  Again, there was mention of the supportive role played by the wider 
midwifery team during the tertiary management process, who would “provide emotional 
counselling support.”57  A range of other professionals may be brought into consult with 
the clinical team and the parents, especially for ongoing pregnancies requiring surgical 
intervention: 
“We will very often ask a paediatrician to see them and generally for the 
ongoing pregnancy we will ask a paediatric surgeon to see them if the baby is 
likely to need surgery.  That tends to be in pregnancies that are confirmed to be 
ongoing rather than to aid a decision for termination.”58 
This confirms that the level of support is moderated by the clinical decision-maker.  
Parents in tertiary centres have generally seen a medical team elsewhere prior to 
 
52 Participant A. 
53 GMC (n48), para 23.  
54 Participant C. 
55 Participant C. 
56 Participant C. 
57 Participant A. 
58 Participant D. 
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referral.  One participant suggested that parents with prior knowledge (eg of anomaly), 
are generally better prepared on arrival than other patients.59 
In terms of one to one support, participants describe a range of aids and narratives to 
help parents.  PC describes the importance of developing workable narratives: “you 
create stories that you know function well for most people work in 15-20 minutes 
bursts.”60  The same participant admits that they: 
“use pictures as well.  You know depending on the parents’ understanding.  
May give them an abstract and often with drawings as well.  We are talking 
about proportions of things.  Explaining risk. Do this quite a lot for other things.  
For example… chance of intellectual impairment in children, brain abnormality 
on ultrasound, there is a 30% chance of impairment and 70% of non-
impairment.  There the same.  We talk to them of 1/3 chance.  A toss of a coin 
although different.”61 
This use of visual aids and infographics is encouraged by the GMC in their latest draft 
guidance on decision making and consent.62 
In a critique of regulatory guidance, PE argues: 
“It is fine having all the details of every bit of evidence but you got make them 
easier for people to get the key messages.  Look at areas where they can go 
…”63 
This is consonant with the GMC draft guidance which encourages a tailored 
information sharing process reflecting their “particular concerns, wishes and values”,64 
the available options and the patient’s knowledge and understanding of “their condition, 
prognosis and the possible options”.65  It is also evident that information sources are 
not enough on their own to support or improve decision-making.  Patients still need to 
be persuaded or encouraged to read and understand the materials: 
 “A lot of hospitals give women that sort of information based on (anonymised) 
guidelines, info sheets.  A lot of women do not read them, do not retain them. 
Not a lot of opportunity to gauge how far they understand them… we are trying 
within those organisations to make info a bit more attractive women so that they 
have to have a discussion eg about forceps delivery, know a little bit about it, 
then have an easier explanation about what is to come, less time explaining.”66 
So, having active patient engagement with information sources, might help bridge the 
consultative process and make any clinical encounter more effective/ efficient. 
 
59 Participants C. 
60 Participant C. 
61 Participant C. 
62 GMC (n48), para 27. 
63 Participant E. 
64 GMC (n48), 5. 
65 Ibid., para 13. 
66 Participant E.  Cf GMC (n48), para 20. 
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9.9 Influences 
 
This theme focuses on professional and legal influences/ effects.  For PA, it is peer 
practices that are important: 
“what guides my behaviour is what the peer practices for doing or how you do a 
certain thing or when you offer something and the framework for 
multidisciplinary group What is underpinning those sort of things is actually what 
underpins good medicine so getting the sense that this does not feel right and 
so maybe I need to speak to another colleague… maybe this is quite complex 
maybe I need do speak to another colleague or something like that you know 
but those are very good underpinning general medical principles that are across 
, you use it for anything… for a broken bone…”67 
There is more hesitance about the impact/ value of professional guidelines, especially 
for more experienced doctors: 
“I think it does …  I hesitate… the answer is yes but I guess some of us who 
have been trained at a time when there wasn't guidelines on everything, we 
were trained by good medicine and that good medicine or the practice is not 
changed or we are up to date with the literature I mean oh that's what people 
do, there is the big influence of that”68 
Multiple informational sources may be of greater value for evidence-based medical 
practice: 
“one of the thoughts that came to my mind is this related to the prevalence of a 
certain thing. Is this something usually prevalent then guidelines actually much 
better, if a rare condition it could be the literature that may hold to some extent 
although also depends to some extent something is investigated or studied or is 
amenable to be studied. For something like outcome rates for selective 
reductions you would get the big centres, the big regions publishing their 
series.”69 
From PB’s perspective, the professional sources are something of a mixed bag - the 
BMA has produced little of relevance, but some RCOG guidance could be helpful: 
“(Commenting on RCOG) yes, the termination for fetal abnormality is quite a 
useful document. The ethics of late termination I personally do not find it 
particularly helpful document because it doesn't actually in the end help you 
with the difficult decisions. It kind of waffles around these very difficult decisions 
and we all know that…”70 
 
67 Participant A. 
68 Partcipant A. 
69 Participant A. 
70 Participant B. This participant acknowledges that the Nuffield Council on Bioethics “produces papers that are relevant 
to some of the (ethical) issues that we deal with.”    
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“I suppose more relevant to the majority of fetal medicine consultants was 
guidance about the law in relation to babies born potentially alive after a 
termination. That’s the statement that is most influential to practice”71 
With one or two exceptions, the professional guidance sits in the background for PC 
with peer research and workplace considerations taking priority: 
“(commenting on guidance changes made over last 5 years) I don’t think so, no, 
I think there are minor adjustments.  I very much take the scientific view or 
perspective… I think the research or the work space is the most important to 
me.”72 
“there is some NICE guidance on MP management on twin pregnancy” …” No 
except the legal framework for the termination of pregnancy”.73 
“yes, …. Almost the regulatory framework is the background upon which you 
then build with guidance and fine tune with research.  Becomes one 
consideration.  You don’t think about the linear relationship between them.”74 
PD had not used any BMA guidance but derived some assistance from some RCOG 
guidance and clinical reviews: 
“There is the risk benefit to the baby and the mother.  The RCOG have some 
guidelines on that and they're quite useful.  There are quite a few reviews out 
there that we tend to look at every now and then.”75 
There was also positivity about the impact of IVF guidance and regulation: 
“in the UK we are very fortunate to have the regulations around the IVF 
practice, high order has really dropped in terms of an issue I think.”76 
PE makes this important point about regulating the obstetric environment: 
“Problem with Obstetrics is that it is extraordinarily variable environment.  
Cannot create guidelines for every eventuality and a lot rests on professionality, 
professional decision-making.”77 
There is also evidence that vague or broad legal rules will facilitate evolutionary 
interpretation: 
“we have essentially interpreted the law in a way that most people in our 
position interpret it, which is basically legal before 24 weeks under whatever 
clause you want to use and we would use clause E and it's only legal after 24 
 
71 Participant B (emphasis added). 
72 Participant C. 
73 Participant C. 
74 Participant C. 
75 Participant D. 
76 Participant A. 
77 Participant E 
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weeks if you actually fit the criteria for clause E and of course that is very open 
to interpretation and you do different things.”78 
This interpretation is consonant with the findings of earlier research,79  and is an 
excellent example of the weak constraints imposed by current legal norms on this 
participant’s medical practice.  This fits with our earlier analysis suggesting that medical 
decisions are being made on the basis of criterion, or upon interpretations that do not 
square with a literal interpretation of the AA 1967.  This is an important observation 
when we also consider the relatively weak influence of professional ethical norms 
recorded by our participants. 
However, the threat of individual litigation does appear to have a significant focussing 
effect for PB: 
“it clearly has because the first iteration of that suggested that if you embarked 
on a termination of pregnancy with the intent of the baby not surviving but it did 
survive and if you did not treat a baby born you could find yourselves being 
prosecuted for murder and that is clearly is quite focussing.  I don’t think that 
has ever happened but the more recent guidance recognises, I think, the reality 
that some parents will not opt for feticide before late termination in which case 
there are circumstances where you may with clear prior agreement with 
parents, midwives, neontologists and everyone else make a clear written plan 
go ahead, that you will only provide comfort only care once born”80 
Another participant mentioned the detrimental effect that the fear of litigation could 
have on medical practice: 
“there is some mention in literature about how cases against Doctors can lead 
to avoidance behaviour, over investigation, over prescribing ... you know.  The 
whole system of GMC and the legal profession which is intended to protect the 
patients, may in the intention to protect that one patient may have side effects 
on the practice of that Doctor that effects a whole bunch of other people”81 
This echoes consequential and proximity concerns around medical regulation.  
Although uncertainty around the law can provide flexibility, it can also be an unhelpful 
influence on professional practice: 
“So we are all of us I guess acutely aware that you can find yourself in a court 
on both sides of the argument if you don't do a termination and turns out that 
you have a baby that has major genetic problem that you thought might be 
there but you couldn't prove it …but you could equally …you could end up with 
[anonymized] doing a termination and somebody feels you shouldn't have done 
that. So, the law isn't particularly helpful because there isn’t a lot of case law to 
help us. The RCOG utterly duck the issue saying it's terribly difficult.  They 
 
78 Participant D. For a discussion on evolutionary interpretation by doctors, see Roger Brownsword and Jeffrey Wale, 
‘Compromise Medicalisation’, in C. Stanton and others (eds), Pioneering Health Care Law Essays: In honour of the work 
of Professor Margaret Brazier (Routledge 2015). 
79 See for eg, Robyn Lotto, Lucy K. Smith and Natalie Armstrong, ‘Clinicians’ perspectives of parental decision-making 
following diagnosis of a severe congenital anomaly: a qualitative study’, (2017) 7 BMJ Open e014716. 
80 Participant B. 
81 Participant C. 
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provide a few scenarios, but they don't actually give a conclusion what to do 
with these scenarios and I know that different units have different policies.  
Some will have a formal ethical committee to consider these cases. When I 
started here, and I was the sole practitioner for [anonymized] years and 
therefore felt very exposed in terms of making the decisions I considered doing 
that and then realised I realised in the end I was going to carry the can. If the 
ethicists said yes and I said no.”82 
These closing remarks emphasise the responsibility and accountability resting on the 
shoulders of individual doctors.  
 
9.10 Culture 
 
There was acknowledgement of the impact of workplace culture and variation on local 
clinical practices: 
“yes and between institutions. Working at [anonymised] for example is very 
different from what we do here.  Try to support parents through the decision-
making process. Being directive is not our thing.”83 
The implication being that some workplaces and local cultures offered less supportive 
decision-making processes.  PD also acknowledges differentials in local practice and 
the influence of culture within his workplace and of professional views across the 
country.  Workplace resourcing and time management are also highlighted by PE: 
“I think the problem is we are having a lot of discussions about patient decisions 
in NHS which is a time poor environment and that is the area where cases/ 
decisions come across in a time poor environment caused by NHS or 
professional causes… giving patient time to choose. There are opportunities in 
NHS. It is just how you approach it, how you document it, how you run your 
consultations and how you persuade the NHS you can protect yourself from 
litigation if you spend another 10 minutes for providing time for good decision 
making.”84  
This suggests that organisational and time management skills may be critical 
professional attributes for building sufficient time for shared decision-making in publicly 
funded healthcare environments. 
 
 
82 Participant B. 
83 Participant C. 
84 Participant E. 
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9.11 Personal values 
 
This theme focuses on the personal values and beliefs of clinicians.  There was some 
appreciation that the personal values of trainees and doctors could change over time 
with experience and learning.85  The existence of personal values were not seen as 
problematic per se but there was mixed evidence about the actual effect on clinical 
practice.  For example, PA discloses a (sympathetic) reluctance to the reduction of a 
healthy twin pair:  
“your effectively doing something in effect doesn't come naturally that bit the 
request is a bit like someone somebody saying you know what actually I want to 
end a perfectly healthy arm I know it is different I'm not trying to equate one to 
the other but I guess the point I'm trying to make for somebody to try to do 
something that you don't necessarily feel may be necessary on the basis of the 
wellbeing, of the physical wellbeing of the mother or the baby yes maybe 
mental wellbeing”86 
Whilst, this statement appears to be underpinned by concern for the wellbeing of the 
mother rather than explicit personal values, the participant agrees that having 
knowledge of objective supporting criteria makes it easier to go along with the parental 
request: 
“it's easy where they got a very objective circumstantial situation around them 
that actually makes it easy to understand their decision, so for example, they 
just on their own, they've got no family support they've got no one, this or you 
know that is driving their positions it is easy.”87 
PD was much clearer about the role of his personal beliefs in practice: 
“If I think it's legal I will do it irrespective of my own personal beliefs or whatever 
it's not for me to say.”88 
and reflected upon the lessons that could be learned from past experience: 
“It is not a situation where people usually do and I can remember 15 years ago 
somebody did request one and I said you shouldn’t do that and the baby ended 
up born very preterm and handicapped and I kinda thought I had no right to do 
that because it was legal and so now I would do it, because it is legal and very 
clearly fulfils the criteria for clause E.”89  
In contrast, PC doubted it was ever possible to completely divorce personal values 
when addressing parental requests for treatment.90 
 
85 Participant C. 
86 Participant A. 
87 Participant A. 
88 Participant D. 
89 Participant D. 
90 Participant C (n54). 
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9.12 Ethical vs Legal 
 
This theme addresses the tension between ethical/ legal issues and is neatly 
encapsulated in this exchange about the weekly discussion of rare or complex cases: 
“Question will (discussion) extend to ethical issues? 
Answer can do if we've got somebody who is exploring termination of 
pregnancy in a situation where I'm not sure whether clause E might be met that 
would be something we might discuss. 
Question is there any other avenue that you would have in the institution or 
within your professional to have that dialogue? 
Answer yes so if we are considering late … very late terminations ... so as 
soon as we are post 24 weeks.  Where the viability of the baby we see that 
that as ethically different to sub 24 weeks and now you could argue that the 
law doesn't because it says you can do a termination under clause E handicap 
but actually the law does because you can't do terminations for different 
reasons after 24 weeks so clearly there is a bit of uncertainty about the law 
itself is there a difference about pre and post 24.  Clearly there is a difference 
because Society thinks it differently and [anonymized] found themselves 
investigated by the DPP because they did a termination based with a baby 
with a cleft lip and I know others who have been investigated for late 
feticide.”91 
Again, the reference to the threat of litigation/ criminal investigation and individual 
accountability suggests that defensive mechanisms are in play especially in proposed 
terminations after 24 weeks. There is clearly the potential for ethical/ legal conflict 
around viability – an area which receives limited attention in general discussions about 
conscientious objection. 
 
9.13 Legal framework 
 
This theme dwells on the legal frameworks for termination of pregnancy.92  In the 
following exchange, we observe PA going over and above the strict legislative 
requirements for certification: 
“Question if you're involving more than two colleagues - the law doesn't 
require you to do it but what I'm trying to understand is it driven by that case 
trying to introduce reflectiveness on the part of the parents?  
 
91 Participant B. 
92 See also participant E (n77) 
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 Answer yes for both ... what always try to say however difficult the position is 
what's harder is the time after and you have to make sure had enough time in 
what is available – the time and the opportunity to reflect  
Question those processes those cautious processes allow that ambition?  
Answer I hope it will allow ... it is not so much to drive their position but for 
them to feel because people do regret their decision, but they need to feel and 
if that was to unfortunately happen, they need to feel they have not just made a 
decision by speaking to one person 
Question would you be fair to describe to give them an opportunity to pause 
and reflect rather than drive or nudge the decision? 
Answer exactly”93 
This participant claims he is driven by the desire to build in reflective opportunities for 
parents, rather than by defensive or resistant practices/ values.  In contrast, PB 
maintains a strict approach in relation to requests for the reduction of healthy twin 
pairs because “that wouldn't fit the Abortion Act criteria in terms of…”94  Most of PB’s 
terminations in multiple pregnancy: 
“pretty much exclusively fall under clause E of the Abortion Act. And so, unless 
there is a significant risk of serious handicap then I don't believe that there is a 
sufficient risk of handicap having twins is higher, there is a risk of having 
cerebral palsy in twins than a Singleton mainly as a result of prematurity 
but…”95 
PD conceives the legal framework in straightforward terms albeit with an interesting 
spin on ground E before 24 weeks gestation.96  In addressing late terminations in 
pregnancy (ie post 24 weeks) some institutions operate an internal discursive 
mechanism for reaching decisions, especially in areas of uncertainty: 
“So usually there would be a neonatologist and essentially our line is if with that 
degree of abnormality, the baby would have treatment withdrawn as a neonate 
if it is delivered, we would feel that it was reasonable to offer termination. So, I 
don't think we would offer termination if we found a late diagnosed Down’s 
syndrome, a child with Downs because if that baby was delivered it will be given 
full resuscitation.  If you have major inter-cerebral haemorrhage where it's likely 
to be poor very poor the baby was born you would not assist with ventilating, 
you might consider that.”97 
This is consonant with the findings of earlier research,98 and shows patient autonomy 
being relegated for entity-based considerations in late terminations.  Here, the legal 
 
93 Participant A. 
94 Participant B. 
95 Participant B. 
96 Participant D (n78). 
97 Participant B. 
98 Lotto et al. (n79.) 
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framework is clearly limiting patient choice and doctors appear to be analogising pre 
and post birth scenarios to determine the legality of any treatment response.  Again, we 
have evidence of the instrumental effect in post 24-week terminations: 
“Its background. Does not enter the discussion with the parents.  Don’t say 
whether legal or illegal.  For most surgery.  The 24-week cut off for termination 
that would only become an issue if a late request for a reduction in an 
abnormality…  not be possible but really never come across that. Parents will 
know from early on and because most are related to fertility treatments most 
come very early on [inaudible].”99 
When asked whether triplet reductions were typically carried out under ground C, PB 
responded: 
“there are those that fall under E as well in that …. the argument is substantially 
reducing the risk of severely …. what you're trying to do reduce is the 24 to 26 
week premature triplets and maybe 26 to 28 weeks ones because those are the 
ones who will have a high risk of complications and serious handicap as a result 
of being severely premature there is a pretty substantial risk there is a risk of 
delivering in that critical period and if you do fall into that period there's a higher 
risk amongst that survivors of developing a handicap probably higher in 
multiples than singletons”100 
When PB was asked whether maternal risk considerations fed into decisions to 
reduce, this interesting response is given: 
“wouldn’t normally no, again every complicated pregnancy is more common in 
the multiple and the higher the multiple the more common it is but most 
mothers cope with perfectly well with twins with more twinges and so on. There 
is a higher risk of preeclampsia. Triplets is a noticeable physiological stress for 
quite a lot of mothers.  Higher than that, you begin to run into quite common 
significant issues, just in terms of coping with caring, carrying that many 
babies”101 
 
Of course, we should remind ourselves that consideration of fetal welfare is not a lawful 
basis for termination.   
The strict requirements of the law on information disclosure may present a dilemma for 
some consultants and again places emphasis on individual responsibility/ 
accountability: 
“Whether really what I am going to write down is for the parents and for their 
understanding and the shared decision-making process or whether going to 
write a legal document that absolves me of all responsibility and I think 
sometimes the legal…, sounds awful… gone too far to demonstrate that all 
risks.”102 
 
99 Participant C. 
100 Participant B. 
101 Participant B. 
102 Participant C. 
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9.14 Decision-making 
 
This theme has 6 sub-categories, and each is addressed separately: 
9.14.1 Clinical selection 
 
If you do not reduce a multiple pregnancy: 
“there is a risk of spontaneous MFP loss and the risk of premature birth.  They are 
the 2 big categories.  You lose the pregnancy because mother miscarries at 15-17 
weeks with babies or you actually have an early preterm at 28-30 weeks.  Not really 
concerned at prematurity beyond 34-35 weeks because those babies tend to do 
very well anyway.”103 
 
However, if you do reduce the multiple pregnancy (from 3>2): 
 
“you reduce the risk of prematurity but you increase the risk of miscarriage slightly 
because you are doing an intervention and then yeah there is that balance again is 
pregnancy loss or miscarriage is one outcome... live births with handicaps is a 
completely different outcome.  Cannot say 2 are equivalent.  Different things. 
Comparing 2 different things.  Completely”104 
 
When anomaly is not involved, the selection process is driven by location and access: 
“then you continue on with long with the lowest risk then the other principle that you 
use – the fetus you want to reduce you usually want it to be the first to away from 
the neck of the womb if possible so that … but sometimes you can’t because you 
can’t get to it or whatever but you want to try to be as high as possible so that if you 
know has the stuff breaking down it doesn’t set the whole pregnancy …”105 
 
And fetal size/ chorionicity: 
 
“that goes into the whole assessment right , so if you have two which are normally 
sized but one that is abnormally sized and is struggling and very small, even 
though it may have a favourable risk, you would go for the the small one and the 
other thing with high orders you have to check one might be sharing one placenta 
and one might be on its own so you can’t reduce the one of the two that are sharing 
in the placenta because if you reduce one you effect the other one so you’ve only 
got the one single. You could reduce three down to one it’s known it’s 
recognised”106 
 
PB records a similar practice: 
 
“There may be a clear-cut indication there is an anomaly or one is noticeably 
smaller or and if all else is equal then it is really around accessibility. And on no 
 
103 Participant C. 
104 Participant C. 
105 Participant A. 
106 Participant A. 
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particular evidence base, I try to avoid avoid twin one/ triplet one, because that 
baby is nearest the cervix and thereby more at risk of ascending infection.”107 
 
Similarly, PD chooses the “one that's furthest away from the cervix, the one that is 
easiest to get to.”108 
 
9.14.2 Medical decision-making 
 
PC helpfully summarises the term decision-making “in terms of communication and 
advice given to patients.”109  This might frame the clinical encounter as a one-way 
exchange, but this is not consistent with other comments made by this participant.  
Internal collaborative and peer review mechanisms appear to underpin good medical 
decision making for PA.110  Similarly, PB says: 
 
“yes, we have a weekly meeting where we go through everything we seen this 
week, and everything that is due to come up next week. We will often have a 
discussion around some of the difficulty of management of some of the rarer 
patients or what some of the common things that we do.  Common things we 
clearly do all the time so it's quite easy, but if there are rarer things that we are 
discussing and we will try and discuss them.”111 
 
The importance of enquiry and understanding patient requests is emphasised: 
“if you are reducing twins normal I would want to understand the reason 
underpinning the request.  I would try to understand at least. I would offer a second 
opinion and even sometimes, an external second opinion because I think it is very 
hard sometimes.”112 
 
As to the need for openness and straight talking: 
 
“She is 45 the only pregnancy she will have and really unlikely that another 
pregnancy will be achieved. I am generally very open with parents. I tell them 
unlikely you will achieve another pregnancy.  Do you feel this is likely to be your 
last chance?  Last chance pregnancy.  This plays into the decision.”113 
 
And creating time and space for decision-making: 
 
“as long as they need…. These are often the longest consultations … honestly.  
We lock our office for an hour.  Go for a cup of tea and come back.  Quite often the 
end of a long conversation. Go home, sleep on it and come back tomorrow.”114 
 
 
107 Participant B. 
108 Participant D. 
109 Participant C. 
110 Participant A (n67). 
111 Participant B. 
112 Participant A. 
113 Participant C. 
114 Participant C.  Cf GMC (n48), para 17-18, 20-32. 
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This fits with the gravity of these decisions, the draft GMC guidance on time and 
resource constraints,115 and reflects the benefits of using specialist tertiary fetal 
medicine units. 
 
For PC, collaboration with the parents is critical because “(t)hey have to carry that 
decision-making process for the rest of their life.”116  PB also emphasises the need for 
collaborative decision-making in the context of late terminations but he appears to be 
talking about internal collaboration with colleagues.117  However, the doctors ultimately 
control outcomes, timings and options as choice architects: 
 
“the parents are very clear after you've told them ‘yes’ I want a reduction, I still give 
them even if they push on the same day, I always give them that one night.”118 
 
“Frankly, we are trying to steer the parents away from going down the reduction 
route. Really strong feelings about it.”119 
 
In terms of triplet or higher order pregnancies, the decision to reduce often comes 
down to historic losses120 or the likelihood of parents coping post birth: 
 
“Our outcomes for our triplets tends to be very good.  Often comes down to how 
parents cope with triplets.  If they come holding their head in hands.  This is really 
terrible news. So difficult for our family unit to cope and actually got 3 other kids ... 
or whatever ... might be the… rather than the medical.  Very finally balanced.”121 
 
In cases of anomaly, the risk assessment and communication process can be very 
complex: 
 
“If you had a pair of babies with a major abnormality where parents had already 
some idea what the abnormality is and we confirmed that and they’ve already time 
to think about things and they will already come with a decision in their head.  We 
don’t want a handicap baby and therefore we want a selective termination.  Then I 
would explain what the effects on the co twin might be in order to make that 
balanced judgment.  It is very individualised because, for example there are some 
abnormalities that are least ... expect a baby with the abnormality to die shortly 
after birth therefore does it make sense to put the co twin at risk from a selective 
reduction if that baby in a sense is not going to be exposed to long term handicap 
anyway. One might think just leave them in case of twins leave both twins alone.  
The reasons for termination which is to avoid long term handicap is not an issue 
because baby going to die anyway. On other hand there are abnormalities 
associated with pregnancy complication, where the whole pregnancy will definitely 
be at risk, for example, you might have a problem where brain has not developed at 
all, an encephaly where you might say well the baby is going to die anyway but why 
risk a miscarriage but the condition is also associated with additional fluid around 
 
115 GMC (n48), para 36-38. 
116 Participant C. 
117 Partcipant B (n97). 
118 Participant A. 
119 Participant C. 
120 Participant D. 
121 Participant C. Cf “quite common significant issues, just in terms of coping with caring, carrying that many babies”. (PB)  
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the baby and the risk of pre-term birth. So really needs very careful consideration. 
”122 
 
9.14.3 Parental decision-making 
 
Whilst “(m)aternal mortality (is) very rare”,123 parents: 
 
“may choose to reduce triplets to 1 for example if significant burden on family 
maternal wellbeing you know but again not common at all most of the time …it 
comes into consideration, certainly comes into parental consideration, whatever it is 
I don't my wife to be more unwell or whatever…”124 
 
In terms of the need for reflection and dialogue with other healthcare professionals: 
 
“I hope it will allow ... it is not so much to drive their position but for them to feel 
because people do regret their decision but they need to feel and if that was to 
unfortunately happen, they need to feel they have not just made a decision by 
speaking to one person”125 
 
Similarly, PB says that even when parents come with a firm decision to have a 
reduction, they “would still say that they should go away and think about the data and 
come back”.126  Otherwise “the parents sometimes later look back in regret because 
they feel they have been pulled into a sausage machine process”.127  This is regarded 
as good medical practice by the GMC.128  However, parents display variable 
engagement in the discussion of reduction: 
“There will be group of parents who will not want to discuss at all and so I would 
open the discussion by saying this is an issue that some parents want to discuss, is 
it something you would want to hear about and they say no, I say fine we will 
support you with the triplets let's get on with it.  If it is something they want to 
discuss I will discuss it and I may need to counterbalance some of the counselling 
they've had beforehand.”129/130 
PE makes a similar point in the context of engagement with informational sources.131 
 
 
 
122 Participant C. 
123 Participant C. (added) 
124 Participant A. 
125 Participant A. 
126 Participant B. 
127 Participant B. 
128 GMC (n48), paras 23/ 36. 
129 Participant B. 
130 See also Participant D (n31) 
131 Participant E (n66). 
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9.14.4 Ethical decision-making 
 
PA highlights the potential ethical conflicts thrown up by certain fetal reduction 
procedures: 
“you know if you feel straight forward twin pregnancy there not sharing the same 
placenta and they're not going into the usual placenta related complications … then 
I guess the ethical difficulty there is signing up to something completely flip this 
whole thing on its head and you could end up with no pregnancy and the difficulty is 
whether that the person or the couple or whatever have really has thought through 
everything. I guess that is where the ethical difficulties and of course you can never 
judge that in entirety right, it's easy where they got a very objective circumstantial 
situation around them that actually makes it easy to understand their decision, so 
for example, they just on their own, they've got no family support they've got no 
one, this or you know that is driving their positions it is easy.”132 
 
This suggests that the participant might be seeking objective parental justification for 
their request that is not necessarily connected to the legal framework.  Again, this is 
justified on reflective grounds. 
 
There were divergent views about the involvement of a formal ethics process in 
complex cases: 
 
“When I started here and I was the sole practitioner for [anonymized] years and 
therefore felt very exposed in terms of making the decisions I considered doing that 
and then realised I realised in the end I was going to carry the can. If the ethicists 
said yes and I said no”133 
 
However, some participants were more enthusiastic about formal ethics support: 
 
“we have a very good professor of medical ethics here it's very good who we talk to 
about these things sometimes. He is a very good provider of a framework.  Thinking 
through the difficult stuff.”134 
 
PC acknowledged that ethical analogies could be helpful: 
 
“people use the lifeboat analogy in MFP.  Got a lifeboat capacity of 12.  Someone 
drowning in front of you.  The 13th person drowning in front of you. If you haul them 
on everyone will drown or … you have got to make decisions.”135 
 
There was awareness that professional ethical sources were being used for legal 
standard setting, although it was imperative that up to date versions were used for this 
 
132 Participant A. 
133 Participant B. 
134 Participant D. 
135 Participant C. 
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purpose.136  Finally, there was recognition of the need for professional organisations to 
provide clarity for the professional regulators in areas of uncertainty: 
“we will support our drs having difficulties with GMC to a reasonable degree. If 
someone acting unprofessionally, but if areas unclear try to help interaction with 
GMC. Had some success. Dr having difficulty may engage with us. May use our 
documents.  Write reviews…”137 
 
 
9.14.5 Decision difficulty 
 
 
The shifting balance of risk in multiple pregnancy makes comprehension and choices 
challenging: 
 
“you would usually divide them into those two parts. Loss pre 23 weeks and loss 
post 23 weeks and preterm birth rate post 23 weeks …  the thing that is very 
difficult for people, you are much less likely to have a handicap baby although the 
absolute risk of a handicap baby is quite low and you're slightly more likely to lose 
the whole pregnancy at an early to middle stage. That is what people find difficult to 
deal with but that risk you going to adjust.”138 
Of course, you also need to factor the differing attitudes to risk for the doctor and 
parents into the equation.   
 
9.14.6 Decision aids 
 
The participants describe the use of graphs,139  pictures, abstracts, drawings,140 and 
standardised/ personalised text141 to support the decision-making and consent 
processes: 
“to see if patients would understand in a way that they would understand 
reasonably clearly and a paper has a couple of graphs that I find which you can 
show when babies tend to deliver if they are reduced when they tend to deliver if 
they’re not reduced and so you can see that this is excess of pre 24 weeks if you 
select fetal reduction as opposed to a number of severely premature if you 
don’t…”142 
 
136 Participant E. 
137 Participant E. 
138 Participant D. 
139 Participant B. 
140 Participant C. 
141 Participant D. 
142 Participant B. 
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“I use pictures as well.  You know depending on the parents’ understanding.  May 
give them an abstract and often with drawings as well.  We are talking about 
proportions of things.  Explaining risk. Do this quite a lot for other things.”143 
 “in terms of the risks that we talk about would be usually in the ultrasound report. 
There will be a copy and paste thing that we would put into the ultrasound report 
about the risks that we would then sometimes alter that as it is a bit generic. If 
instance you had a very high maternal risk, we would add to it.  If it was a 
monochorionic and it will be slightly different and again it would depend on the 
gestation and whether they're both babies are normal.”144 
 
In the latest GMC draft guidance, it is envisaged that when a patient “is likely to have 
difficulty retaining information”, there should be an offer to record the discussion and 
any decisions made.145  Participant E also observed the value and benefit of using 
shorter and focussed professional guidance which get across “the key messages”.146 
 
9.15 Reform 
 
This theme addresses suggestions for or examples of regulatory reform.  PB thought it 
would be helpful to have “some legal guidance about the term significant ... the term 
substantial” in section 1(1)(d) AA 1967.147  This participant also made adverse 
comments about the decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board148 because of 
existing vagueness in the AA 1967: 
“I think Montgomery complicates it. I think the issue is it would be helpful to 
know what is substantial because at the moment it is so woolly.  Is a 1% risk 
substantial? Does it vary how nasty the condition is? Do you have to have a 
50% risk for a relatively minor thing or a 1% risk of something really disastrous.  
Almost every baby I look after is about 1% at risk of something really nasty like 
autism but I could terminate everybody on those grounds.”149 
Such perceptions could result in the over disclosure of risk with a view to limiting legal 
responsibility.  However, not all the feedback on Montgomery was negative and the 
decision may have facilitated reflective behaviour by some doctors: 
“(Commenting on Montgomery) I think so ... yeah.  I think it is the honesty which 
we approach things and how we write.  Whether when you reach a collaborative 
approach.  Whether really what I am going to write down is for the parents and 
for their understanding and the shared decision-making process or whether 
going to write a legal document that absolves me of all responsibility and I think 
 
143 Participant C. 
144 Participant D. 
145 GMC (n48), para 24. 
146 Participant E (n63). 
147 Participant B. 
148 [2015] UKSC 11. 
149 Participant B. 
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sometimes the legal…, sounds awful… gone too far to demonstrate that all 
risks.”150 
Perversely, requiring more from doctors might cause some professionals to feel less 
able to comply with this obligation, resulting in a greater number of referrals to tertiary 
or quaternary centres.151   This could have positives outcomes if it concentrates 
relevant expertise: 
“People might be more up to date with literature.  Is it a good or bad thing?  
Probably a good thing.  If I need a complicated surgery on my heart once in my 
life. I would find out best place in UK. If I find it is in Newcastle, I would go to 
Newcastle … This is a decision once in my life… Talking about packages of 
care   ... healthcare ... Inconvenience of travel for a couple of hours. Good at 
everything.  Good enough. Big discussion around healthcare.  To me it is very 
clear.  You should do it in centres of excellence.  4 or 5 places in country is 
fine.”152 
This statement speaks to the bigger picture and to the increasing significance of large 
specialist hospital teams.  Whilst PE was generally positive about Montgomery, there 
was a qualification: 
“My one objection, my concern about ruling started to filter through is the 
retrospective application of it worries me a bit… worries my colleagues out 
there, we do not have a view yet”153 
Indeed, this concern about retrospective application has received inconsistent judicial 
treatment to date.154 
PC offers some advice on things to avoid and on the appropriate focus for the 
regulatory framework: 
“yes so many variables has to be an individually tailored approach.  Difficult to 
make rules when there are so many different anomalies. Whether they be very 
major, intermediate and minor, then the gestational age, …”155 
“there is a temptation to try and make things fits into neat boxes and protocols.  
Many things are amenable to that but I also believe strongly that some things 
are really difficult.  Maybe this is one of those areas”.156 
“Systems should be more geared at the enabler ….  Truly not just HCP but 
really taking the views of parents.  They are the ones that live with the 
decisions.  The system has to be fit for them and not just the medical 
profession.”157 
 
150 Participant C.  
151 Participant C. 
152 Participant C. 
153 Participant E. 
154 Cf Grimstone v Epsom and St Helier Hospitals NHS Trust [2015] EWHC 3756 (QB) and Webster (a child) v Burton 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 62. 
155 Participant C. 
156 Participant C. 
157 Participant C (emphasis added). 
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This closing statement powerfully captures a perceived need for a change in attention 
and focus within the healthcare system.  PE also considers that there is a need to 
secure comprehensive national data before further standard setting occurs: 
“as you know setting standards requires evidence and getting high quality 
evidence. Until now relied on getting the high quality evidence has relied on 
academic units. Often funded by a call to NIHR.  Those are very focused. What 
we want is a much wider collection that effectively extracts information from all 
maternity information packages that all maternity units have around country. 
And uses that data for meaningful processes and outcomes. Last year, called 
national maternity and perinatal audit.”158 
The same participant highlights the importance of the form of regulation: 
“Question: You also highlighted another issue – with legislative changes you 
get some notice that law will change or could change.  With courts no notice 
and give you short time to make necessary changes? 
Answer: Any changes we make have got to have teeth.  Teeth in not resisting 
using them. Can’t mandate but want to use them”159 
Without effective enforcement mechanisms, regulatory rules need recognition and 
acceptance (‘buy in’) from key stakeholders.  However, even when sanctions are 
possible, voluntary engagement is more likely to achieve regulatory goals.  In terms of 
singleton termination, the preferred option for PE was decriminalisation: 
“Regulate it in same way as any other procedure.  Don’t need the plethora of 
signatures need under Act at moment.  One of things (Institution) wants to see. 
Got to be driven by the right standards.  I would hope NICE have a regulatory 
ambition in the framework.  That would set the appropriate standards.  Would 
the law allow member bodies or arms length body like the MRHA to regulate?  
Standards would need to be current and up to date. You and I know Political 
and religious pressures… more than anything else out there”160 
However, even if we decriminalise abortion, we would still need to agree upon the 
deregulated framework and options.  There was acknowledgment that fetal reduction: 
“has evolved actually quite significantly in last decade or so, if not fully covered 
need to produce some guidance and standards for that and working with 
legislators and regulators would be the right thing to do.”161 
In terms of external bodies (eg courts) using professional ethical guidance to set 
standards: 
“One thing ask if setting standard use the most up to date one. Have come 
across organisations using an old standard.  You said this. 15 years ago and 
 
158 Participant E. See RCOG, National Maternity and Perinatal Audit (RCOG 2017),  
< http://www.maternityaudit.org.uk/Audit/Charting/Keyfindings1516 >accessed 8 May 2019. 
159 Participant E 
160 Participant E.  This participant indicated that NICE abortion guidance was expected by the end of 2019 (see NICE, 
Termination of Pregnancy – NICE Guideline – Draft for Consultation (NICE April 2019)). 
161 Participant E. 
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now saying this. Look at what is current standard.  Don’t think we would be 
prescriptive of other bodies.  Most bodies that use them involve us.  We quite 
like you to endorse what we are doing.”162 
When pressed about the use of discursive guidance to set legal standards, PE said: 
“Historically almost the altruistic nature of these documents is open to multiple 
interpretations…With the directive point by point evidence based-green top or 
NICE guideline less open to that discursive interpretation or misiinterpretation or 
different interpretation…  Not a driver for us in cleaning up our warehouse of 
different types of guidelines.  Making it easy to interpret, less flexibility in it.  
Ultimately, if you put a flexible interpretation on it our members will say to us, I 
had this situation didn’t cover it or didn’t help me make my decision, could go 
either way.  We are trying to produce as if a peer review process there more fit 
for direct practice.  One of the problems is that we will always have situations 
where issues in clinical practice that need some sort of steering.  We do not sit 
there and… think GMC won’t mind at all.  Most important driver is safe effective 
patient care.”163 
They accept that there needs to be flexibility and professional discretion in some areas, 
whilst acknowledging the difficulty when broad/ flexible rules are used in a rigid way. 
 
9.16 Conclusions 
 
In closing, we make four comments about medical decision-making in fetal reduction/ 
selective termination, and two thematic observations. 
 
First, there is evidence that the views and comments of our participants fit with our 
earlier characterisation of doctors as ‘choice architects’.164  Secondly, notwithstanding 
the opportunity to frame and steer patient choices, there is general acceptance by the 
participants of the value of collaborative dialogue/ decision-making and active informed 
patient engagement.  There is evidence that these doctors are keen to unearth patient 
values and rationales, even if the reasons for doing so may be variable and complex. 
Thirdly, the evidence suggests that these doctors rarely refuse to perform a fetal 
reduction or selective termination in practice.  Whilst, they may attempt to resist or 
divert certain requests (eg healthy twin reductions), in most cases they will act 
according to the wishes of the parents, especially if there is a counter risk of whole 
pregnancy termination.  However, the interview data suggests that requests for late 
ground E terminations165 can be influenced by the threat of litigation/ prosecution.  
 
162 Participant E. 
163 Participant E. 
164 See for eg, Participant C (n12, 47 and 50). 
165 As per Abortion Act 1967, s1(1)(d) and post 24 weeks. 
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Fourthly, and outside of these late terminations, there is evidence that the professional 
ethical and legal norms have a relatively weak influence on the practice of fetal 
reductions and selective terminations.   
 
More generally, we observe two core themes surfacing from the interview data.  The 
first and most notable is individual accountability and responsibility.  It is evident that 
the legislative framework for pregnancy termination has a focussing and interpretive 
effect on professionals in areas of perceived uncertainty (eg ground E) and ethical 
tension (eg terminations post 24 weeks).  The existence of uncertain or vague legal 
rules does not appear to trouble the doctors unduly when they perceive there is 
societal and peer support for their professional practices (ie terminations up to 24 
weeks).  The use of team-based decision-making processes are frequently used in 
these cases and may help reduce the discretionary nature/ variability of decision-
making within an organisation.166  These processes may also have a supportive 
function because the individual doctor will know that they are likely to have workplace 
and peer support in the event of future challenge or prosecution.  However, it is also 
apparent that these processes do not remove a doctor’s awareness of individual 
accountability and responsibility.  There is a very real sense that these doctors bear the 
societal and legal burden of these decisions and an uncertain legal framework.167  The 
question then turns on whether this burden, and these types of decision, should be 
borne by individual designated human agents 
 
The other core theme is professional resistance - whether it be professional resistance 
to change, conflict, or patient demands.  This resistance may simply be a product and 
evidence of the accountability and responsibility theme.  Some professional resistance 
might encourage positive patient reflection but could also pressurise and impede 
access for some parents.  However, in borderline or uncertain cases, the resistance 
may ensure legislative compliance, narrow forms of interpretation168 and avoid medical 
treatment on demand.  In all cases, the difficulty will be to establish whether this 
resistance is due the exercise of professional discretion or personal values. 
 
 
 
 
166 Helena Serra, ‘Gamble on the Uncertain. Negotiating Medical Decision-Making’ (2016) 12(4) QSR 44.  
167 See Lee et al. (n41). Cf also the media and academic narratives claiming excessive medical leniency in the 
interpretation of the AA 1967 (Ellie, J. Lee, ‘Constructing abortion as a social problem: “Sex selection” and the British 
abortion debate.’ (2017) 27(1) Feminism and Psychology 15). 
168 Potentially important in areas of legal compromise (see Brownsword and Wale (n78)). 
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Chapter 10 – Discussion and Conclusions 
Contents: 
10.1 Introduction 
10.2 Data triangulation 
10.3 Research question 1 
10.4 Research question 2 
10.5 Research question 3 
 
10.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we draw together our findings from the interview data and our review of 
the academic literature/ research studies.  We revisit each of the research questions 
and look again at the frameworks for regulating fetal reduction in multiple pregnancy. 
 
10.2  Data triangulation 
 
We have undertaken a data triangulation exercise looking for convergence between the 
interview (chapter 9) and existing research data (chapter 8).  This exercise is intended 
to demonstrate and support the extent to which our findings relate to the interview data 
(confirmability).1  We have identified examples of convergent sources in the footnotes 
wherever possible.  The following points appear to be supported, corroborated or 
repeated in other research: 
• The inherent difficulty of situationally complex decision-making.2 
• The need for and use of consensus building within clinical teams in uncertain, 
complex, difficult and contentious areas.3 
• Lack of clarity around ground E (AA 1967) continues to cause difficulties for 
healthcare professionals especially post 24 weeks.4  This difficulty may be due 
 
1 Norman K. Denzin, Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook (McGraw Hill 1978). 
2 Robert L. Klitzman, ‘Reducing the number of foetuses in a pregnancy: providers’ and patients’ views of challenges’, 
(2016) 31(11) Human Reproduction 2570. 
3Helen Statham, Wendy Solomou and Jasper B. Green, ‘Late termination of pregnancy: law, policy and decision making 
in four English fetal medicine units’, (2006) 113(12) BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 1402; 
Robyn Lotto, Lucy K. Smith and Natalie Armstrong, ‘Clinicians’ perspectives of parental decision-making following 
diagnosis of a severe congenital anomaly: a qualitative study’, (2017) 7 BMJ Open e014716. 
4 Ibid. 
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to interpretive uncertainty, the delegation of social judgement, the fear/ risk of 
individual accountability or a combination of factors. 
• Lack of clarity around maternal rights/ interests rarely causes difficulty in 
terminations before 24 weeks.5 
• Fetal reduction/ selective terminations raise some issues that are distinctive 
from terminations in singleton pregnancy.6 
• Healthy twin reductions are problematic for some parents and healthcare 
professionals.7   
• Inconsistency persists around the terminology – however the issue may be 
more theoretical than practical.8 
• The importance of the professional framing of risks and benefits.9 
• The societal influence upon the medical interpretation of the AA 1967.10 
• The tension between vague/ broad and clear/ fixed standards.11 
• The importance of preserving professional discretion and judgement.12 
• Some professionals may be able and willing to work “within a professional 
paradigm despite it being in conﬂict with their own personal opinions.”13   
• External scrutiny creates concern for individual accountability.14  The perceived 
threat of scrutiny/ litigation may be out of proportion to the actual level of risk 
(eg in terms of sanction/ accountability).15 
• The tertiary hospital setting creates space, expertise and less regional 
variation.16 
• Artificial reproduction techniques continue to impact on the prevalence of 
multiple pregnancy and incidence of chorionicity.17 
 
5 Lisa Crowe and others, ‘Negotiating acceptable termination of pregnancy for non-lethal fetal anomaly: a qualitative study 
of professional perspectives’, (2018) 8(3) BMJ Open 2018 e020815. 
6 R. Katie Morris. and Mark D. Kilby, ‘Fetal Reduction’, (2010) 20(11) Obs, Gynae & Reprod Med 341. 
7 Klitzman (n2); Jennifer Kelland and Rosemary Ricciardelli, ‘Mothers of Multiple Perspectives on Fetal Reduction and 
Medical Abortion’, (2014) 5(2) J Motherhood Initiative for Research and Community 126. 
8 Morris and Kilby (n6); Caroline M. Ogilvie, ‘Multiple pregnancy, fetal reduction and selective termination’, (2013) 26(6) 
Reproductive Bio-Medicine Online (Elsevier Science) 52; Claire-Marie Legendre and others, ‘Differences between 
selective termination of pregnancy and fetal reduction in multiple pregnancy: a narrative review’ (2013) (26(6) 
Reproductive Bio-Medicine Online (Elsevier Science) 542, 543. 
9 David W. Britt and Mark I. Evans, ‘Sometimes doing the right thing sucks: Frame combinations and multi-fetal pregnancy 
reduction decision difficulty’, (2007) 65 Social Science & Medicine 2342; Klitzman (n2). 
10 Statham et al. (n3). 
11 Lotto et al. (n3). 
12 Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Conscientious Objection: Personal & Professional Ethics in the Public Square’, (2015) 23(2) 
Med L. Rev 200; Klitzman (n2). 
13 Lisa Crowe and others, ‘A survey of health professionals’ views on acceptable gestational age and termination of 
pregnancy for fetal anomaly’, (2018) 61(9) European Jornal of Medical Genetics 493., 497. 
14 Lotto et al. (n3); Ellie Lee, Sally Sheldon Sheldon and Jan Macvarish, ‘The 1967 Abortion Act fifty years on: Abortion, 
medical authority and the law revisited.’ (2018) 212 Social Science and Medicine 26 
,<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.07.010 >accessed 18 May 2019. 
15 Montgomery (n12), 206. 
16 Eg., TAMBA, Twin Pregnancy and Neonatal Care in England, November 2017 (TAMBA 2017). 
17 Eg., Morris & Kilby (n6). 
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• Regulation can impact on clinical behaviours but not always in clear, expected, 
consistent or foreseen ways.18   
• Professional regulation may be more impactful on the behaviour of junior than 
senior doctors.19 
• There are significant time delays between the creation of national/ professional 
guidelines and their subsequent implementation within institutional regimes and 
professional practice.20 
• Organisational and communication skills are important for effective shared 
decision-making.21 
• There is perceived value in creating reflective space for professionals.22 
• The variability of patient engagement in the decision-making process.23  There 
is some evidence of parents using avoidance techniques to remove or 
circumvent difficult decision-making.24 
• There is perceived difficulty in evaluating online information in terms of 
availability, use and quality.25  However, accurate and accessible information 
sources and decision-making tools can help bridge the gap and facilitate the 
clinical encounter.26 
 
Overall, there is a substantial degree of convergence between the interview data 
and previous research findings involving a range of relevant stakeholders.  This 
suggests that our interview findings should be sufficiently trustworthy to carry 
forward into formal conclusions and recommendations.  However, we cannot rule 
out divergence across regional practice, and given the importance of local culture, 
this may weaken the transferability of some of our interview findings. 
   
 
18 Eg., Jane Fisher and others, ‘Termination for fetal anomaly: Are women in England given a choice of method?’ (2015) 
35(2) Journals of Obs & Gynae 168. 
19 Oliver Quick, A scoping study on the effects of health professional regulation on those regulated: Final report submitted 
to the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (2011), 18. 
20 NCT and TAMBA, Maternity Services and Multiple Births: A joint report by NCT and the Twins and Multiple Births 
Association (NCT/ TAMBA 2015); TAMBA (n15) 
21 The Health Foundation, Helping People Share Decision Making: A Review of Evidence Considering Whether Shared 
Decision Making is Worthwhile (The Health Foundation 2012). 
22 PSA, The regulator’s role in professional identiuty: validator not creator (PSA 2018). 
23 Lotto et al. (n3). 
24 Kelland & Ricciardelli (n7). 
25 Briege M. Lagan, Marlene Sinclair and W. George Kernohan, ‘What is the impact of the Internet on Decision-Making in 
Pregnancy? A Global Study’ (2018) 38(4) Birth 336. 
26 The Health Foundation (n21). 
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10.3  Research question 1 
To establish how and why Maternal and Fetal Medicine specialists make 
decisions (fetal reduction) in response to specific dilemmas (multiple 
pregnancy). 
 
We have identified a range of circumstances when these specialists will offer and 
undertake fetal reductions in multiple pregnancy.  There is evidence of global variation 
but in Great Britain this typically occurs between the 11-14th week of the pregnancy.  
There are 100 or so cases annually and they are undertaken for a range of reasons 
including pregnancy preservation, improved fetal health and survival rates, socio-
economic considerations and reduced health risks for the pregnant women.  There are 
also those cases where the procedure is undertaken to remove anomalous fetuses or 
the risks posed to others by those entities (also described as selective 
termination/feticide). There is a very small pocket of cases undertaken much later in 
the pregnancy following discovery of fetal anomaly. 
These procedures are undertaken in the shadow of the AA 1967 (often using the 
statutory ground E/ section 1(1)(d)), creating a fairly unique regulatory context and 
environment for the healthcare professionals operating in this field.  They are subject to 
a range of socio-political-economic factors that do not affect other medical procedures 
to the same degree.  The AA 1967 was amended in 199027 to reflect some of the 
specific underlying considerations linked to multiple pregnancy.  However, the 
legislative amendments did not explicitly address fetal interests but introduced 
differential time limits related to the authorising ground.  Although medical methods 
increasingly dominate early singleton terminations, fetal reduction remains a highly 
specialist surgical procedure. 
 
10.4  Research question 2 
To establish how existing norms and frameworks influence and direct the 
decision-making and behaviours of these individuals. 
 
We now have a clearer sense of the connections and relationships between the moral, 
ethical and regulatory frameworks in our procedural context.  The AA 1967 has 
 
27 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s37.  
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subordinated, and to a large degree excluded individual moral values from day to day 
obstetric practice.  There is technically scope for conscientious objection, but it is 
difficult to work in this field without being exposed to termination in some way.  The 
effects of this change has been experienced differentially - depending on where you 
live (eg Scotland has more terminations undertaken in NHS hospitals) and who you 
work for (private or NHS hospital trust).  Some professionals will be able to work within 
a professional paradigm which differs from their own personal beliefs, although leakage 
via unconscious bias/ practice is possible, especially when socio-economic 
considerations are the driver for parental requests.  Public expectation of obstetric 
services and societal attitudes have shifted since 1967, but professional discretion 
remains an important and valuable aspect of delivering reproductive care and we 
exclude this feature of medicine at risk.  We are mindful of participant C’s assertion that 
it has “got to be ok… (to say no to a patient request) so long as patient is properly 
looked after.’28 
The legal framework is generally a somewhat background consideration for healthcare 
professionals.  However, in terminations post 24 weeks, it moves into the foreground 
and becomes a significant consideration for decision-making.  Here, vague, opaque or 
flexible legal criteria contribute to uncertainty and sometimes defensive medical 
practices.   Whilst this might be intentional, create caution and drive team related 
behaviours, it also offers a platform for variable access and inconsistent medical 
practices.   Focus on individual responsibility may be important whilst doctors play a 
gatekeeping or entrusted role, but there is a potential disconnect from the team-based 
reality of modern reproductive services.  We also question whether it is legitimate for 
Parliament to require an individual to undertake a gatekeeping activity based on loose 
standards with the threat of criminal accountability.  On reflection, this seems an 
extremely onerous obligation for fallible human agents and has driven our later 
recommendations to narrow the qualifications for lawful termination in the first/second 
trimester (up to 24 weeks). 
There has been some opposition to the dual certification process although this was not 
raised as a specific concern by our participants.  Ex-post scrutiny does appear to 
influence medical practice in post viability cases, although it is unclear whether the 
general CQC inspection mechanisms are more or less influential than the freestanding 
certification and notifications provisions in the AA 1967 and associated regulations.29  
There does not appear to be any real concern about the exclusion of fetal interests as 
 
28 Participant C (added). 
29 Including the Abortion Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/499); Abortion (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2002 (SI 
2002/887); Abortion (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2879); Abortion (Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 
2008 (SI 2008/1338); Abortion (Amendment) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/735). 
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a lawful ground for termination, perhaps, because there will nearly always be a 
corresponding maternal ground.  The legal framework addressing the standard and 
quality of care appears to be important, especially for independent providers reliant on 
NHS funding.  Overall, international law has had very little impact on domestic law or 
medical practices in this area. 
There is mixed evidence about the need for explicit recognition of maternal interests in 
the legislation.  Whilst maternal consent is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
surgical termination, the medical interpretation is to treat the woman’s wishes as 
decisive in most cases up to 24 weeks. Thereafter, recognition of maternal interests 
recedes, and decisions become focused on the legality of the procedure.  The 
overarching legal framework is reinforced by the availability of public funding, executive 
acknowledgement and specialist fetal medicine centres, ensuring general public 
access to these procedures. 
The professional frameworks have a more complex and nuanced relationship with 
medical practice in this context.  Some NICE, GMC and RCOG guidance/ standards 
are directly relevant and influential to clinical practice in multiple pregnancy although 
there are limited sources directly applicable to our specific procedures (see Table 4A/ 
appendix F). The associated BMA guidance30 has little relevance or significance for this 
group of professionals.  There is evidence that it takes time to embed new national 
NICE standards and guidance.  There is recent evidence that professional regulators 
and representative bodies are recognising the importance of the distinction between 
discursive guidance and directive rules.  Overall, professional ethical norms have a 
fairly limited influence on the practise of fetal reduction and selective termination. 
There is evidence that the doctors place more focus and regular emphasis on peer 
review and support.  The legal framework appears to be more influential in borderline 
cases, although doctors often need to use their discretion to interpret what is 
acceptable and lawful.  Here workplace systems and behaviours, peer to peer 
feedback and past experience drive decisions much more directly than professional 
ethical regulation. 
Workplace and subspeciality cultures and bureaucracy are important in influencing 
medical practice in this and many areas of healthcare delivery.  It is evident that shared 
decision-making mechanisms are starting to become embedded in many areas of 
healthcare, including tertiary fetal medicine, although some regional variation persists.  
Patients will have limited choice in tertiary delivery – they are likely to be referred from 
 
30 BMA, The Law and Ethics of Abortion: BMA Views (BMA November 2014 (updated October 2018)). 
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a primary or secondary provider; may not have been actively engaged in the choice; 
and there are relatively few subspecialists and fetal medicine centres in any event.  
Parents may have to travel significant distances to see these professionals and this 
may limit the choice of centre or specialist in practical terms.  Decisions often have to 
be made very quickly, under emotionally charged and difficult circumstances.  The 
parents will know that they are going to see specialists – they are likely to have been 
informed during the initial consult and be aware that a specialist referral has been 
made.  They will know that multiple pregnancy is atypical involving additional risk 
factors for the woman, her pregnancy and unborn babies.  The outcomes from fetal 
reduction involve some uncertainty and the parents will probably look to the doctors for 
active guidance or reassurance.  These considerations combine to influence the power 
dynamics/ relationships between patients and the treating professionals in these cases.  
Indeed, it is this cocktail of factors that make pregnant women especially vulnerable 
during their engagement with a tertiary centre and the decision-making processes 
leading to possible reduction of their pregnancy.  There may be additional socio-
economic, cultural or conception related factors that add to their vulnerability as 
patients.31  These factors are partially offset by a culture that attempts to build in time 
and reflection for decision-making that may not always be available elsewhere in the 
NHS.  There is evidence that longer term (post procedure) care may be of variable 
quality and this could be important because these stakeholders are a valuable asset for 
embedding future patient engagement in structural terms. 
These are undoubtedly difficult, complex and highly variable cases, and this situational 
specificity ought to be reflected in the regulation of information exchange, the decision-
making processes, the procedure and related patient care.  There needs to be 
sensitivity to the relationships, circumstances and environments in which choices are 
framed.  Going back to our earlier discussion of Montgomery,32 it is apparent that a 
‘reasonable patient’ in a tertiary fetal medicine centre contemplating reduction of a 
multiple pregnancy, will have subtly different needs than a person undergoing a hernea 
operation.  Certainly, many of the medical/ patient concerns will be similar but the order 
of complexity and risk factors appear distinctive.  It is here that tertiary centres have an 
important role to play beyond technical expertise – the medical specialists have 
experience and insight into the typical concerns of this small demographic of patients.  
This is an invaluable quality for supporting shared decision-making and embedding the 
delivery of patient centred care.   
 
31 For discussion of vulnerability in pregnancy, see Sam Rowlands and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Sterilisations at delivery or after 
childbirth: Addressing continuing abuses in the consent process’, (2019) Global Public Health 
< https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2019.1583265 >accessed 28 February 2019. 
32 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 
  
246 
 
The decision in Montgomery33can be read in different ways but appears to facilitate, 
rather than hinder a shift towards patient centred care.  We should recognise that 
Montgomery predominantly regulates civil liability at an organisational level although it 
still appears to impact upon individual professional behaviours.  Whilst legal decisions 
and rules, can be instrumental in achieving seismic shifts in behaviour, case law may 
not be the best way of achieving this.  Legislative consultation affords key stakeholders 
an opportunity to contribute to the change, may reduce the degree of resistance and 
influence the speed of take up following implementation.  Cultural engagement (at 
workplace and disciplinary level) and organisational factors (structural and individual) 
are also important to delivery.  Specifically, there needs to be recognition that the 
reception to change is likely to vary at the junior and more experienced ends of the 
medical profession, requiring differential strategies for successful implementation at a 
national and local level.  Effective patient centred care is more likely to be achieved by 
multiple strategies directed at a range of stakeholders.  Ideally, regulatory strategies 
aimed at organisational and structural factors should be combined and balanced with 
mechanisms directed to individual healthcare professionals. 
There is a complex relationship between the law and professional ethics.  We have 
argued that the law should not seek to drive out differentials unless it is absolutely 
necessary to achieve early consistent compliance and coherent public narratives.  
Montgomery34 may be one example where legal intervention was necessary.  
Differentials will be influenced by the performance of professional regulation, and 
space can produce helpful dialogue between law makers and the medical profession.35  
Although a synergistic relationship will often be helpful, law makers/ actors should look 
critically at professional rules/ standards and ask whether they are entirely suitable for 
developing clear legal principle.  Discursive guidance from representative bodies is 
unlikely to satisfy this precondition.  Consistent clarity about the mandatory and 
discretionary elements of professional guidance will also assist individual healthcare 
professionals. 
Finally, we should be alert to the influence of public narratives upon medical practice - 
whether from legal initiatives, governmental bodies, regulators or the media.  
Inconsistent narratives can create contextual barriers that distort regulatory outcomes.  
Against this backcloth, we now turn our attention to the the third research question. 
 
 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Penny Lewis, ‘The Medical Exception’, (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 355, 375. 
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10.5   Research question 3 
To consider how future legal, ethical and professional rules/guidance might be 
framed, and how future clinical developments/research might be advanced. 
 
Legal 
In light of this discussion, how should we accommodate these difficult cases within the 
law?  We are not persuaded that the criminal law has no role to play in the regulation of 
human pregnancy.  A criminal framework is still necessary and justifiable for 
addressing non-consensual terminations and procedures posing a significant risk to 
individual safety.36  We also need to recognise that there are divergent societal views 
about fetal interests, especially in the latter stages of of pregnancy.  Ultimately, the 
need for a criminal framework in early consensual low risk terminations may turn on 
whether criminalisation is deemed a necessary socio-political price for any legal 
compromise. 
We have considered taking forward three basic models for the criminal regulation of 
individuals in the context of termination of pregnancy/ entity life.  First, a single legal 
framework wide enough to cover fetal reduction and selective termination in multiple 
pregnancy.  Secondly, a distinct and separate legal framework for these procedures.  
Thirdly, a hybrid solution, with additional rules for fetal reduction and selective 
termination.  At the outset, we hypothesised that the second might be suitable, but 
have come to the view that the first solution is preferable under certain conditions.  
There is much to be said for clarity and simplicity - we should avoid overly qualified 
exceptions or legal exceptions heavily dependent on entity status.  In sketching out this 
framework, we acknowledge that there will still be areas of possible resistance and 
uncertainty although it is intended that this space will have a function.  We are not in 
favour of an unqualified right to terminate – such a position would run contrary to our 
recognition of possible fetal interests in the latter stages of pregnancy and to the value 
we place on continued professional discretion in this area of medical practice.  What 
we propose, hopefully offers a more coherent legal position that also more accurately 
reflects current medical practice and contemporaneous considerations around the 
viability of pregnancy.   
Of course, we should be prepared to defend this position.  We are heavily influenced 
by gradualist and multiple property theoretical positions that recognise that an 
appropriate balance should be struck between maternal autonomy and possible fetal 
 
36 This would include surgical (and some medical) terminations involving non medically qualified individuals and would 
arguably satisfy the requirements for intervention as per Art 8(2) ECHR. 
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interests in the latter stages of pregnancy.  It is impossible to accommodate all moral 
views within the law but a more restrictive legal approach for most terminations is 
unlikely to receive widescale societal support and would come at a heavy cost for 
pregnant women.  We consider that viability or sentience (circa 24 weeks) arguably 
strikes an appropriate balance and variation is not a significant issue where we are 
addressing legal protection within a specific jurisdiction.  Implantation and birth - in the 
sense of independent existence - should remain a significant legal criterion.  
Professional discretion is preserved but without the need for artificial or contrived legal 
grounds for terminations before 24 weeks.  We do accept that maternal interests are 
likely to be seriously engaged, if for example, a pregnant woman receives a late 
diagnosis of anomaly and decides that she does not wish to continue with her 
pregnancy.  Our proposals seek to achieve an appropriate balance although we 
acknowledge that maternal interests are qualified by the legal hurdles that we propose 
in the latter stages of pregnancy. 
We have attempted to normalise the medical procedure as much as possible, by 
removing the need for dual certification where terminations are performed by doctors, 
but have maintained the obligation to keep records, with the need for extra information 
in cases post 24 weeks.  We have made no express statutory provision for 
conscientious objection – as previously argued, objections are more appropriately 
managed at workplace level.  We would continue to regulate the prescription or use of 
abortifacients by the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (as amended), and medical 
providers in respect of safety/ care considerations.  The retention of organisational 
criminal obligations in respect of patient safety/ care is important, and these regulations 
should address the place of administration/ treatment.  Our tentative view is that patient 
safety considerations may merit initial evaluation in a UK clinical environment in the 
case of medical methods of termination.  Pregnant woman should have a choice 
between medical and surgical methods unless there are clear medical considerations 
which count against such an option (this should be explained in any event).  Healthcare 
providers should be required to ensure that all pregnant women have access to 
accessible information sources about their choices and non-directive counselling.  A 
national informational programme should accompany any legal change and clarify the 
importance/ consequences of any time limit change.  With these considerations in 
mind, we have sketched out a possible replacement criminal framework below: 
• Repeal the ILPA 1929, AA 1967, and sections 58/ 59 of the OAPA 1861.37 
• Enact a single criminal statute with 2 new indictable offences: 
 
37 For our purposes, we are restricting application to England and Wales.  Of course, there should be consideration of a 
possible unified legal framework across the UK. 
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o Unlawful Termination - covering termination of an established 
pregnancy or embryo/ fetal life post implantation and up to the 24th 
week of pregnancy.38  The offence will cover any act, procedure or 
administration of a substance causing termination and intended to cause 
termination.39   The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the 
pregnancy has not exceeded 23 weeks and 6 days.  Attempt would be 
covered where the defendant believes that the woman is pregnant or is 
reckless as to whether she is pregnant and intends to cause termination.   
There would be a lawful ground for termination if the relevant conduct40 
was consensual,41 and the person causing (or attempting to cause) the 
termination (D) was at the material time a registered medical practitioner 
(or a registered healthcare professional42 acting under the specific 
direction of a registered medical practitioner).  D will bear the burden of 
proving (a) that they were either a registered medical practitioner or a 
registered healthcare professional acting under the direction of a 
registered medical practitioner at the time of the alleged offence and (b) 
consent.  D (and any directing medical practitioner) must complete a 
written certificate with prescribed information relating to the patient, 
consent, pregnancy duration and the place/ methods of termination 
used. 
 
Note: pregnant women will not be committing either of these offences by 
consenting to a termination (or attempted termination) undertaken by a 
healthcare professional/ medical practitioner in accordance with a lawful 
ground. 
 
o Unlawful Child Destruction43 - covering terminations (as previously 
described) from 24 weeks and prior to independent existence from the 
pregnant woman.  The offence will cover any act, procedure or 
administration of a substance that causes termination and intended to 
cause termination 44   The prosecution bears the burden of proving that 
the pregnancy was 24 weeks or more, but it will be a defence to this 
offence if D can prove that they honestly and reasonably believed that 
 
38 Ie 23 weeks 6 days and using medical standards for timing. 
39 We would need to address how to treat the withdrawal of support or life sustaining technology. 
40 Any act, procedure or administration causing or intending to cause termination. 
41 The pregnant woman must give free and informed consent to the termination as per Montgomery (n32). 
42 Limited to registered nurses and midwives. 
43 We might want to debate whether the offence label might be better described as Unlawful Fetus Destruction. 
44 We would also cover attempt as per the Unlawful Termination Offence. 
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the pregnancy had not exceeded 23 weeks 6 days,45 and they are 
otherwise able to satisfy the lawful ground for the Unlawful Termination 
offence.    
 
In all other cases,46 there would only be a lawful ground for termination if 
the relevant conduct47 was consensual, and the person causing (or 
attempting to cause) the termination (D) was at the material time a 
registered medical practitioner,48 and D certifies in good faith49 either 
that: 
 
▪ their conduct was necessary to save the life of the pregnant 
woman; OR 
▪ their conduct was necessary to prevent or significantly reduce 
the risk of serious injury or harm to the physical or mental health 
of the pregnant woman.   D (and the court) may have regard to 
the pregnant woman’s wishes about the continuance of the 
pregnancy and her actual or reasonably foreseeable 
circumstances and environment but for the termination; OR 
▪ their conduct was necessary to prevent or significantly reduce 
the risk of (whole)50 pregnancy loss. 
It will not be an offence for a registered medical practitioner to take 
steps intended to prevent or reduce the risk of significant suffering to the 
unborn entity in circumstances where it is reasonably foreseeable that 
that entity will die before, at or shortly after birth. The court may have 
regard to accepted medical practice in these circumstances. 
D and their employer will bear the combined burden of keeping a written 
record of certification for 6 years - punishable with a summary criminal 
offence.  A defence will not be available to either offence unless 
contemporaneous certification is available to the court and it is signed 
by the registered medical practitioner/D.  These records should be made 
available to the CQC on request. 
 
45 Reasonable belief would be determined as per Bolam v Friern HMC [1957] 2 All ER 118 and Bolitho v City & Hackney 
HA [1992] PIQR 334. 
46 In cases, where there is no question about the pregnancy having at least reached week 24, and where the relevant 
offence is Unlawful Child Destruction. 
47 As per footnote 40.   
48 We have excluded other HCPs. 
49 This requires an honest and reasonable belief (as per footnote 45) that the certified ground(s) factually exists. 
50 The inclusion of ‘whole’ can be debated although we would argue that it is unnecessary. 
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We have deliberately removed the ground E provision and any reference to anomaly as 
a lawful ground for termination.  We recognise that if parents/ clinicians discover a fatal 
or serious fetal anomaly from 24 weeks, there will remain some uncertainty around the 
lawful termination of that entity.  Steps can be taken to protect the life of the pregnant 
woman or pregnancy loss in the case of a multiple pregnancy.  The second lawful 
ground provides scope for doctors to act where the continuation of the pregnancy 
would cause (or where there was risk of) mental or physical injury or harm to the 
pregnant woman.51  The likelihood of injury/ harm occurring is not specified but the 
required magnitude (serious) is spelled out.  D and the Court are entitled to have 
regard to maternal autonomy considerations including known wishes and contextual 
factors in the evaluation of the risk or degree of harm.  D would have to demonstrate 
that their conduct was necessary to either prevent or significantly reduce the risk of 
serious harm or injury to the woman. 
The penultimate provision relating to the prevention or reduction of suffering, does not 
make it clear whether the intended steps would extend to the termination of fetal life, 
but the court may have regard to accepted medical practice in these circumstances.  
This provision should hopefully encourage peer reflection and evidenced based 
decision-making that reflects the equivalent treatment of neonates.  The explicit 
inclusion of an objective element in the good faith requirement in the second offence 
will also ensure that the Courts remain the ultimate arbiter albeit subject to medical 
considerations. 
These draft offences do not remove all uncertainty – it is the price of greater coherency 
in the law and for driving cautious professional behaviours in the latter stages of 
pregnancy – but the intention is to reduce the overall divergence between legal and 
practice norms in this area.  We recognise that coherent professional standards should 
accompany this legal change.  This framework provides a new shadow against and in 
which obstetric professionals must operate.  We have argued elsewhere that such 
arrangements should be subject to regular and positive legislative renewal.52  What 
these proposals ought to achieve is a safe and more transparent framework that covers 
the vast majority of cases, reducing but not extinguishing the trusted role performed by 
doctors, nurses and midwives.  Further, by reducing the hurdles for most pregnant 
women in consensual terminations carried out by qualified healthcare professionals, we 
hopefully limit the opportunities for challenge under Article 8 ECHR.53  We fully 
 
51 In doing so, we focus on maternal interests and have in mind the comments of the Supreme Court In the matter of an 
application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) [2018] UKSC 27. 
52 Roger Brownsword and Jeffrey Wale, ‘Compromise Medicalisation’, in C. Stanton and others (eds), Pioneering Health 
Care Law Essays: In honour of the work of Professor Margaret Brazier (Routledge 2015). 
53 Cf Rosamund Scott, ‘Risks, Reasons and Rights: The European Convention on Human Rights and English Abortion 
Law’, (2016) 24(1) Med L. Rev 1. 
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recognise that these proposals would have an impact beyond the specific locus of this 
research, but the purpose has been to highlight how fetal reduction and selective 
termination might be accommodated in a single unitary legal framework.  We also 
acknowledge that in the absence of a specified right to terminate, it is essential that the 
environmental, contextual and social circumstances should be such that women 
continue to have free and widely available access to termination services delivered by 
suitably qualified healthcare professionals. 
We now turn our attention to the decision in Montgomery54 and the role of shared 
decision-making.  Fetal reduction (however defined) typifies the situational context in 
which shared decision-making should be encouraged and developed.  Montgomery 
may introduce fresh and uncertain variables into the patient encounter but fetal 
reduction is neither exclusively legal, technical, pathogenic or ethical to warrant 
unqualified patient or professional autonomy.  Indeed, these are thankfully rare 
scenarios that warrant a professional obligation to use reasonable endeavours to 
unearth information/ values from the patient.  We recognise the danger of creating 
unnecessary hurdles to access but these are atypical, complicated and value laden 
clinical scenarios.  We would also recommend legal clarification of the ‘reasonable 
patient’ limb of the Montgomery test.  We are not convinced that further legal authority 
mechanisms are necessary to deliver improvements in decision-making – educational, 
incentive and organisational strategies seem more likely to be effective in this context. 
Professional regulation 
Professional guidance and standards should be clear about whether there is scope for 
discretionary application or rules that ‘must’ be adhered to.  This will make it easier for 
professionals to use these documents and help external bodies (including legal actors) 
to have a clearer benchmark for subsequent use.  Legal actors should be discouraged 
from placing too much weight on documents created by self interested professional 
bodies (as opposed to those documents promulgated by statutory regulators).  We 
recognise that professional regulators may not be entirely objective, but fragmentation 
should be avoided where possible. 
We believe that professional regulators should consider standards addressing the 
neutral framing of risks and benefits. This should be part of wider informational, 
educational and organisational strategy aimed at supporting patients and professionals 
in the development of shared decision-making in appropriate medical contexts.  Shared 
decision-making, relevant communication skills and the importance of framing should 
 
54 n32. 
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also be embedded in medical education as a priority.  There is merit to the 
development of dedicated national (NICE) guidance for fetal reduction/ selective 
termination, with particular emphasis on the ‘reasonable patient’ needs in terms of 
information exchange, support and choices.  Recognised informational and decision-
making tools aimed at parents should be developed. 
We have already identified a range of local and national strategies for introducing and 
maintaining changes in professional behaviour.  Positive framing and ground up 
development is preferable to blunt regulatory enforcement.  There has to be the space 
for professional learning/ engagement and recognition of the wider organisational and 
resource consideration within the NHS. 
System regulation 
System regulation ought to be at the heart of delivering patient safety and patient 
centred care.  We agree that system regulators should not become too involved in the 
actual delivery of actual improvement – that is a job for the regulatee.  Shared decision-
making needs to be supported at an organisational/ workplace level and system 
regulation is likely to be important in managing local cultures.  We have identified a 
number of specific priorities including adequate resourcing, continuity of staffing and a 
genuine commitment to securing active patient engagement.  
Clinical developments 
The use of a tertiary fetal medicine model appears to have value in our context and in 
multiple pregnancy generally.  Online consultation and informational sources are likely 
to facilitate access to these services and help bridge the gap following referral.   
Evidence suggests that bridging the consult and aftercare services may be especially 
important in this context. 
Ectogenesis, prenatal testing and the development of remedial fetal surgery55 are likely 
to shape this field in the near future.  New invasive surgical techniques have already 
impacted on the clinical approach to the care of monochorionic multiple pregnancies.  
Prenatal testing will offer greater information but create new dilemmas and choices for 
parents. The access and timing arrangements and informational regimes around 
prenatal testing are likely to prove highly significant in any time limited termination 
framework. 
 
 
55 See for example, BBC, Spina bifida: Keyhole surgery repairs baby spine in womb (17 May 2019), < 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-48253477> accessed 18 May 2019. 
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Research 
The priority for future research is the facilitation of active patient engagement both 
generally and in specific situational contexts.  Additional studies concerning the 
development of online mechanisms for supporting patients and their decision-making 
would be worthwhile.  Undertaking institutional comparisons of fetal medicine units may 
prove helpful in the development of the national guidance outlined above. 
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Chapter 11 – Closing Remarks 
 
This research has taken a narrow contextual focus (multiple pregnancy) and placed a 
spotlight on a specialist set of medical procedures (fetal reduction) operating in a 
unique regulatory environment complicated and influenced by a polarised range of 
socio-political factors.  In doing so, we have been able to explore medical decision-
making in a situationally centred context that might not have been available had we 
used a broader landscape or a different research lens.  Specifically, it has enabled us 
to address the particular power dynamics of these clinical encounters. 
In this work, we have pursued three central lines of inquiry: first, to understand more 
about the nature of fetal reduction, its frequency, and the legal ground(s) for 
termination on which doctors typically rely; secondly, to assess the extent to which 
legal, ethical and professional norms guide and constrain this particular kind of 
decision-making; and, thirdly, to evaluate the adequacy of these norms and to explore 
possible solutions.   
With regard to the first line of inquiry, the evidence suggests that fetal reduction 
(however defined) is a relatively rare event (fewer than 150 each year) and that, by way 
of contrast with everyday singleton terminations where the justifying ground is usually 
descriptively medical, it is fetal abnormality that is often given as the justifying ground.  
Further, these procedures combine a range of technical, legal and ethical 
considerations that cannot be neatly segmented into exclusive domains of ownership. 
In relation to the second line of inquiry, analysis shows that the legal, ethical, and 
professional norms offer little explicit guidance or help in relation to fetal reduction.  In 
relation to the general question of termination, ethical norms suffer from a high level of 
contestation and a plurality of views, the key norms in the abortion legislation are both 
unclear and no longer properly connected to the practice of terminations, and 
professional norms are only marginally more adequate. Given the indeterminacy of 
these norms, it is no surprise that the empirical evidence indicates that doctors are only 
weakly guided by them in making their decisions about fetal reduction.  In practice, 
doctors are guided by the views of their peers and by the sense that, in the final 
analysis, they will be held accountable and will need to be able to justify their actions.  
We recognise that our characterisation of doctors as ‘choice architects’ may be 
controversial, but evidence supports this is an apt description of what actually 
transpires given the specific power dynamics and relational aspects of fetal medicine.  
This general position is reinforced by a legal framework that places a substantive 
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burden on the shoulders of doctors in terms of securing lawful access to these 
procedures. 
Responding to the third line of inquiry, we make several observations and 
recommendations, some have specific situational relevance, and some have more 
general application. We observe the value and acknowledge the importance of tertiary 
fetal medicine as a model and system for the delivery of specialist care and the 
acquisition of specialist knowledge, skills and expertise.  More specifically, we 
recommend that the fetal abnormality ground for termination is so problematic that it 
should be removed from the abortion legislation.  We fully recognise that this proposal 
(and our wider recommendations for reform) would have an impact beyond fetal 
reduction in multiple pregnancy, but our purpose has been to highlight how these 
procedures might be accommodated in a single unitary legal framework. 
While recognising that there is a legitimate place for professional medical discretion, 
we also recommend that professional and ethical norms should emphasise the 
importance of shared decision-making and patient-centred care in relation to these 
procedures.  Given our characterisation of doctors as ’choice architects’, regulatory 
strategies should endeavour to create an appropriate power balance in the clinical 
choice environment that is sensitive to the general and specific needs of this subset of 
patients.  Policy makers and regulators should also be alert to the possible impact of 
global variations in practice and legal norms. 
Given our findings, and while recognising the limitations of qualitative research, we 
believe that this thesis contributes new insight and the kind of evidence necessary to 
shape regulation, clinical developments and future research in this field. 
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Appendix A – Data Collection Instruments (consultant versions) 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
The title of the research project 
Regulating medical decision making: A qualitative study of fetal reduction in multiple 
pregnancy 
Invitation 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with 
others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
What is the purpose of the project? 
This research concerns the medical procedure known as ‘fetal reduction in multiple 
pregnancy’1 and seeks to obtain a better understanding of decision making in the 
context of the existing moral, ethical, regulatory and legal frameworks.  
 
The central research questions are: 
 1) To establish how and why medical professionals make particular decisions (fetal 
reduction) in response to a particular dilemma (multiple pregnancy). 
 2) To establish how existing norms and frameworks (personal/ ethical/ regulatory/ 
legal) influence and direct the decision making/ behaviours of these individuals. 
 
1 For our purposes, the working definition is ‘the interruption of the development of one or more probably normal fetuses 
in multiple pregnancy’ (Legendre et al. 2013, p 543). 
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 3) To consider how future legislative, ethical and professional rules/ guidance might 
be framed and how future clinical developments and research might be advanced. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You and other participants have been recruited in your professional capacity as 
maternal and fetal medicine specialists. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a participant 
agreement form.  You are free to withdraw up to the point where the data is 
processed and becomes anonymous, so that your identity cannot be determined.  You 
can withdraw without giving reason and without there being any negative 
consequences. 
What do I have to do and what will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be involved in this research during 2017/18. Your participation will be limited 
to one (or possibly two) formal interviews.   The interviews are not time limited but 
will typically be of 1-2 hours duration.  We plan to undertake these interviews in 
person but can undertake them by SKYPE or similar medium where requested.  You 
will be asked open questions but you will also be given the opportunity to expand on 
any issue at your discretion.  Your participation is voluntary but you are requested to 
participate in the interview as fully as you can. The interviews will be recorded by 
digital audio media and through hand written field notes (see below).  You will be 
interviewed by a lecturer and postgraduate researcher from Bournemouth University 
(Jeffrey Wale).  His research profile can be found at: 
http://staffprofiles.bournemouth.ac.uk/display/jwale#publications 
How will the recordings be used? 
The audio recordings and handwritten notes of the interviews will be used for 
transcription and analysis only. No other use will be made of them without your 
written permission.  No one (save for Jeffrey Wale) will be allowed access to the 
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original recordings/ notes without your written permission.  You do give permission for 
members of the research project team to have access to your anonymised transcribed 
responses. Your name will not be linked with the research materials, and you will not 
be identified or identifiable in the outputs that result from the research.   
For the avoidance of doubt, the research project team consists of the researcher 
(Jeffrey Wale) and his three supervisors (Dr Max Lowenstein, Associate Professor 
Sascha-Dominik Bachmann and Professor Roger Brownsword). 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Participation in this research will involve your time and engagement.  Fetal reduction is 
a controversial procedure and societal views on its moral permissibility are polarised.  
Publication of any material relating to permissibility and decision making are made 
against a background where some individuals and groups hold strong and deeply held 
views that oppose these procedures. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for the participants in the project, it is hoped 
that this work will help inform how future legislative, ethical and professional guidance 
might be framed and how future clinical developments and research might be 
advanced. 
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential and what will happen to the 
results of the research project? 
You will not be able to be identified in any subsequent reports or publications relating 
to this research.   Any identifying data will be extracted at the transcription stage and 
prior to write up and publication. Anonymised data collected during the course of this 
project might be used for additional or subsequent research and/or for conference 
presentations but anonymity will be maintained.  All the information that we collect 
about you during the course of the research will be kept in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act 1998.  All hard copy data collected will be stored in a secure location 
and any digital data will be encrypted and held securely on the University password 
protected secure network.  Audio recordings and field notes will be deleted/ destroyed 
once the interviews have been transcribed and anonymised.  All identifying data 
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relating to this project will be destroyed after 5 years from the conclusion of the 
research project in any event.  The research is likely to be concluded by the end of 
2018 and the results will be disseminated (in summary form) to each participant of the 
study.  The results will be formally written up and will hopefully be published in due 
course. 
What type of information will be sought from me? 
You will be asked to comment on the research subject (fetal reduction in multiple 
pregnancy) and on matters directly related to the research questions.  You will not be 
asked for any data or information that relates to specific individual patients or 
individuals.  This project does not intend to and will not capture data/information on 
any specific patient, parent, embryo or fetus. 
Who is funding the research?  
This research has no external funding and is supported by Bournemouth University and 
the researcher, Jeffrey Wale.  This project was granted ethics approval by 
Bournemouth University on 24 February 2014. 
Contact for further information 
The research contact is Jeffrey Wale, Bournemouth University, Weymouth House, Fern 
Barrow, Poole, Dorset, BH12 5BB. Telephone: 01202 962245 Email: 
jwale@bournemouth.ac.uk. The primary research supervisor is Dr Max Lowenstein, 
Bournemouth University, Weymouth House, Fern Barrow, Poole, Dorset, BH12 5BB. 
Email: mlowenstein@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Complaints 
If you have any concerns regarding this study, please contact Professor Iain MacRury 
by email at researchgovernance@bournemouth.ac.uk. 
Thank you for taking the time to read through the information. 
31 March 2017 
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                         Participant Agreement Form  
Full title of project: Regulating medical decision making: A qualitative study of fetal reduction 
in multiple pregnancy 
Name, position and contact details of researcher: Jeffrey Wale, Lecturer, Bournemouth 
University, Weymouth House, Fern Barrow, Poole, BH12 5BB, Email: 
jwale@bournemouth.ac.uk 
Name, position and contact details of supervisors: 
Dr Max Lowenstein, Bournemouth University, Weymouth House, Fern Barrow, Poole, Dorset, 
BH12 5BB, Email: mlowenstein@bournemouth.ac.uk;   
Associate Professor Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Bournemouth University, Executive Business 
Centre, Email: sbachmann@bournemouth.ac.uk;  
Professor Roger Brownsword, Kings College London, Email: roger.brownsword@kcl.ac.uk 
Please 
Initial    or 
           Tick Here 
I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above research 
project.  
 
 
I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary. 
 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw up to the point where the data is processed 
and becomes anonymous, so my identity cannot be determined.  I can withdraw 
without giving reason and without there being any negative consequences  
 
Should I not wish to answer any particular question(s), I am free to decline.   
 
 
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised 
responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, 
and I will not be identified or identifiable in the outputs that result from the research.   
 
 
I understand that taking part in the research will include being recorded (audio) but 
that these recordings will be deleted once transcribed. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above research project.  
 
____________________________      _______________      
__________________________________ 
Name of Participant                                Date                              Signature 
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____________________________      _______________      
__________________________________ 
Name of Researcher                               Date                              Signature 
This form should be signed and dated by all parties after the participant receives a copy of the participant 
information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated 
participant agreement form should be kept with the project’s main documents which must be kept in a secure 
location until the date for destruction.  
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[Insert Date] 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
 
 
Research Project: Regulating medical decision making: A qualitative study of 
fetal reduction in multiple pregnancy 
 
 
I am writing to introduce my research and to ask if you would be willing to be a 
participant in the aforementioned research project. 
 
I enclose a participant information sheet and agreement form that contains further 
detail about the research project and the required involvement of participants.  The 
research is being undertaken using semi structured interviews and the expected 
duration of these interviews is between 1-2 hours. 
 
This research will not capture any patient identifying data and participants are being 
interviewed in their professional capacity as doctors and not as employees or officers 
of the National Health Service. 
 
I can travel to see you at a suitable UK based location at a mutually convenient time.   
 
Do let me know if you require any further information or clarification about this research 
project. 
 
I hope that you will consider being a participant and look forward to hearing from you. 
 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
 
Jeffrey Wale 
LLB (Hons), PGCE, FHEA, Solicitor*  
LLB Programme Leader  
Department of Law 
Bournemouth University 
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Interview Plan 
Introduction 
Welcome & basic introductions 
Nature of a semi structured interview - voluntary 
Duration: 1-2 hours 
Recorded 
Use of data/anonymity/confidentiality 
Benefits/disadvantages/risks 
Funding of research 
Context 
Fetal reduction in multiple pregnancy 
Aims of research (the research 
question) 
1. How / why make decisions 
2. How norms / frameworks influence 
decision-making & behaviour. 
3. How legal, ethical & professional 
guidance/rules might be framed & clinical 
developments/research advanced 
Sampling & selection 
Preliminaries 
Questions               Sign participant agreement 
form 
Participation             Additional questions/issues 
 
Materials 
Participant Information 
Sheet X2 
Participant agreement 
form X2 
Skype/alternative contact 
details (as required) 
Other Resources 
Digital audio recorder 
Notepad/pen 
Computer Skype link (as 
required) 
Soundproof room 
 
Follow up 
Check audio recording 
Duration of research 
Outcome 
Communication of findings 
Contact details 
Including supervisors 
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Background questions (‘Tell me about’)          
Current practice: numbers of MFPR/Selective terminations 
Experience & past practice 
Future plans 
Main Questions (open)  
Legal & regulatory environment Understanding 
 
Professional guidance, standards & ethical 
codes 
 
Understanding 
Personal beliefs- Opinions/Values/Feelings Influencing  
 
Training 
 
Influencing 
Professional practice Influencing 
 
Other Health Care Professionals Influencing 
 
Institutional – practice & process Influencing 
 
Professional guidance/standards/codes 
 
Influencing 
Professional regulation & discipline Influencing 
 
Legislative Framework 
 
Influencing 
Patients 
 
Influencing 
 
Ranking influence Understanding/ 
Influencing 
Legal status of fetus Understanding 
 
Status of fetus Influencing 
 
Clinical issues & basis for MFPR 
 
Understanding/ Influencing 
Ethical issues & MFPR Understanding/ Influencing 
 
Role of patient Understanding/ Behaviour 
 
Pre-reduction sampling/scanning 
 
Understanding/ Influencing/ Behaviour 
Approach to risk assessment in MFPR Understanding/ Behaviour 
 
Selection & techniques Understanding/ Behaviour 
 
Technological & clinical developments 
 
Understanding/ Influencing / Behaviour 
Current issues Understanding/ Influencing / Behaviour 
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Research Understanding/ Influencing / Behaviour 
 
Own behaviour in MFPR Understanding 
 
 
Clarifying Questions  
Follow up: ‘please clarify’, ‘please expand’, “can you tell me anything else?’ 
Probing: ‘can you give me examples’ 
Specifying: ‘what happened when you said’ 
Interpretation: ‘what do you mean by’ 
 
Closing Questions  
Any other questions/ points/ issues 
 
Jeff Wale 27/3/2017 
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Appendix B – Research Quality 
 
Summary of Findings and Recommendations for Interview Participants: 
 
1. Analysis shows that the legal, ethical, and professional norms offer little explicit 
guidance in relation to fetal reduction.   
2. In relation to the general question of termination, ethical norms suffer from a 
high level of contestation and a plurality of views. 
3. The key norms in the abortion legislation are both unclear and no longer 
properly connected to the practice of terminations, and professional norms are 
only marginally more adequate. 
4. In light of 3, it is no surprise that the evidence indicates that doctors are only 
weakly guided by these norms in making their decisions about fetal reduction.  
In practice, doctors are guided by the views of their peers and by the sense 
that, in the final analysis, they will be held accountable and will need to be able 
to justify their actions.  There is also the need to respect the wishes of the 
pregnant woman, whenever possible. 
5. There is clear tension between clear/ fixed and vague/ broad rules or standards. 
The use of consensus/ team-based decision-making can be helpful in areas of 
uncertainty. 
6. Legal and practice uncertainty persists in relation to ground E (Abortion Act 
1967, s 1(1) (d)).  This provision should be replaced including fresh legal rules 
for terminations post 24 weeks. 
7. Organisational responsibility should play a more significant role in any 
associated criminal framework because it better reflects the contemporary 
delivery of healthcare.  The criminal legal framework for individuals (including 
the Abortion Act 1967) should be amended to remove unnecessary 
qualifications, and to reflect contemporary medical practice in consensual 
terminations up to 24 weeks (ie consensual terminations performed by doctors 
in good faith (and certain registered healthcare professionals under the 
direction of doctors) should be lawful). 
8. While recognising that there is a legitimate place for professional medical 
discretion, relevant professional and ethical norms should emphasise the 
importance of shared decision-making and patient-centred care. 
9. The need for distinctive legal provision for terminations in singleton and multiple 
pregnancies is closely linked to the nature and breadth of the associated legal 
framework.  Separate legal provision is unnecessary if the authorising 
framework is sufficiently broad/ inclusive. 
10. Any inconsistency in terminology (between fetal reduction and selective 
termination) may be a theoretical, rather than a practical issue.  However, the 
term ‘reduction’ emphasises the positive over narrative transparency. 
11. The law should not seek to drive out all differences in professional and practice 
norms, unless it is absolutely necessary and for a clearly defined purpose. 
12. Professional ethical sources should be explicit about any mandatory and 
discretionary element. These sources should also endeavour to frame risks and 
benefits with appropriate balance. 
  
xiii 
 
13. Law makers should exercise considerable care in developing legal standards/ 
norms from professional ethical norms (especially when derived or produced by 
a professional representative body). 
14. Legal development via case law (as opposed to statutory law) is generally 
unhelpful for medical practice (especially if it introduces or requires significant 
changes in medical practice). 
15. Conscientious objection is better managed at an occupational (workplace) level 
rather than through the use of statutory conscience clauses in this area. 
16. National NICE guidance requires support, co-ordination and resources to 
improve implementation timescales. 
17. Tertiary Fetal Medicine centres provide a valuable model and resource for 
supporting parents through complex multiple pregnancies.  They also offer the 
kind of situationally specific knowledge, expertise and skills that facilitate patient 
centred care.  These centres can also assist the communication of information/ 
risks etc and the conceptualisation of the ‘reasonable patient’ (as envisaged in 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11).  However, specialist 
tertiary centres may also have the capacity to increase patient vulnerability and 
medical deference.  Strategies are therefore required to combat these risks and 
to facilitate shared decision-making processes. 
18. Future research may be helpful in the following areas: 
a. Online mechanisms for supporting effective shared-decision making. 
b. Effective mechanisms for facilitating active patient engagement. 
c. Comparison of fetal medicine delivery across institutions looking for 
variables and best practice. 
 
 
Jeffrey I. Wale April 2019. 
  
  
xiv 
 
Summary Reflective Account by Researcher 
 
1. Participant Pool 
 
1 pilot interview was undertaken before my transfer/ upgrade in 2015.  This 
individual was contacted directly. 
 
32 possible participants (19 male and 13 female) plus relevant professional 
bodies were contacted directly by letter.  There was also an open invite to 
BMFMS members.  Interested participants made contact and they selected their 
preferred interview medium.  All bar one participant selected an interview in 
person. 
 
2. Data Collection Instruments 
 
The pilot interview and preliminary research on fetal reduction/ selective 
termination helped shape the draft interview plan (appendix A). 
 
3. Participant interviews 
 
The main participants were interviewed between the 9 June 2017 and the 26 
July 2018.  The interview with participant A (9 June 2017) took several aborted 
attempts during the day because they were very busy and had a number of 
emergency admissions.  However, we were eventually able to complete an 
uninterrupted interview in the late afternoon.  This participant appeared to be 
very open and keen to answer all questions fully.  They were also willing to 
expand upon points. 
 
Participant B arrived late because of peer consultation but we were able to 
complete an uninterrupted interview in the afternoon (17 July 2017).  The 
participant was initially a little defensive but opened up and expanded on points 
as the interview progressed. 
 
Participant C was interviewed during their lunch break (22 February 2018).  
They appeared very open, helpful and were keen to expand/ develop points. 
 
Participant D was seen after some delay on the arranged appointment time.  
This participant was also interviewed during their lunchbreak.  Initially their 
answers to questions were short and concise with little expansion.  This position 
did change a bit as the interview progressed. 
 
Participant E was interviewed by SKYPE on the 26 July 2018.  The medium 
actually worked reasonably well but we did have one glitch where we needed to 
re-establish contact.  The recording of this interview was clear.  This participant 
was very open and appeared keen to develop points. 
 
It is acknowledged that the framing of the interview questions were subtly 
influenced by the responses of previous interviewees, although the researcher 
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attempted to cover all of the areas on the interview plan.  All participants were 
given the opportunity to expand on any point. 
 
4. Transcription 
 
Transcription took place between March and August 2018.  All digital recordings 
were transcribed and typed up by the researcher.  The digital recordings were 
slowed down (where necessary) to assist the transcription process and 
headphones were used to prevent interruptions/ noise interferences/ breaches 
of anonymity. 
 
5. Coding and Theming 
 
NVivo was used to code the interview transcripts.  The researcher attended two 
half day training sessions on this software before it was used in practice for 
coding.  In addition, the researcher attended a number of training sessions on 
the qualitative coding process. 
 
During the coding process, various analytical routines were run in NVivo to 
assist in the identification and sorting of themes.  We have included some 
frequency charts and a word cloud produced during the theming process at the 
end of this document. 
 
6. Triangulation by Data and Investigator 
 
The first supervisor was asked to undertake some coding/theming on a single 
participant transcript.  The feedback was used by the researcher to re-evaluate 
all the transcripts, the theming of codes and the write up of interview data 
(chapter 9).  In addition, the interview data was triangulated with the findings 
from range of stakeholder research studies (chapter 8).  The results of this 
process were useful and helped develop/ reinforce our conclusions (chapter 
10). 
  
  
xvi 
 
Example Frequency Coding/ Theming Charts and Diagrams 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3 – Frequency Coding – All Participants 
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Figure 4 – Frequency Coding – Participant A 
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Figure 5 – Frequency Coding – Participant B 
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Figure 6 – Frequency Coding – Participant C 
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Figure 7 – Frequency Coding – Participant D 
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Figure 8 – Frequency Coding – Participant E 
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Figure 9 – Word Cloud 
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Appendix C – Theme Defintions 
 
Table 1A -Theme Definitions 
Primary Theme Sub Theme Definition 
Decision-Making  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision-making as a 
process or system for 
identifying, prioritising and 
selecting options/ choices 
where they exist. Includes: 
 
-contributions to the 
choices of one self and of 
others.   
-choices that may or may 
not prompt or result in 
action on the decision 
maker’s part.  
-the basis for any 
preferences.  
 Clinical Selection Decision-making around 
selections to reduce/ 
terminate. 
 Medical Decision-Making Decision-making from the 
perspective of the 
healthcare professionals. 
 Parental Decision-Making Decision-making from the 
perspective of the parental 
stakeholders. 
 Ethical Decision-Making Ethical decision-making. 
 
 Decision Difficulty Identifies those decisions/ 
choices which present (or 
are perceived to present) 
the decision-maker with a 
significant degree of 
hardship, obstacle, hurdle, 
deliberation, obfuscation or 
other impediment. 
 Decision Aids Devices, mechanisms, 
aids, systems or processes 
used to facilitate dialogue/ 
communication between 
the HCP/ parents and 
intended to facilitate/ 
support the parental 
decision-making process. 
Influences  Those factors, values or 
norms that have an effect 
or impact on the behaviour 
or decisions of someone or 
something.  May also 
describe the effect. 
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Legal Framework  The relevant legal rules, 
codes or mechanisms that 
influence, restrict, modify 
or direct behaviours and 
decisions. 
Personal Values  The personal values and 
beliefs (that fall outside 
professional and legal 
norms or rules) that 
influence, restrict, modify 
or direct behaviours and 
decisions. 
Ethical vs Legal  Addresses areas of conflict 
or potential conflict 
between ethical and legal 
frameworks and norms. 
Power  Control, authority, rights 
and influence over people, 
things, outcomes or 
decisions. 
Training  Giving or receiving 
education or information 
related to knowledge, 
competency and skills. 
Problem Areas  Areas generating issues/ 
complex decision-making. 
May indicate deficiency, 
shortcomings or flaws in 
an area, decision or 
decision-making process 
Parental Support  Processes, advice and 
other mechanisms to 
facilitate, enhance, aid or 
support parents/ parental 
decision-making.  Includes 
matters related to the 
development of self-
sufficiency. 
Timing   Relevant period(s) eg, 
during the pregnancy. 
Frequency  Temporal repetition/ how 
often something happens 
Terminology  The terms and language 
used for a technical area, 
process or application.  
Reform  Suggestions, 
recommendations or 
statements relating to 
regulatory or other reform. 
 
Culture 
 
 Practice impact of local 
(workplace and 
disciplinary) culture. 
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Individual Accountability 
& Responsibility 
 Awareness and impact of 
(possible) personal liability, 
culpability and 
responsibility on decision-
making and actions. 
Professional Resistance  Professional resistance to 
change, conflict or 
demands. 
 
  
(Table 1A)  
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Appendix E – Clinical and Qualitative Research Studies 
  
Table 2A - Clinical Case Studies (CCS) and Literature Reviews (LR) 
 
1 R L Berkowitz and others, ‘Selective reduction of multifetal pregnancies in the first trimester’, (1988) 318(16) The New 
England Journal of Medicine 1043. 
2 M R Osborn, ‘Selective reduction in multiple gestation’, (1989) 3(1) The Journal of Perinatal & Neonatal Nursing 14. 
3 J Itskovitz and others, ‘First trimester selective reduction in multiple pregnancy guided by transvaginal sonography’, 
(1990) 18(4) Journal of Clinical Ultrasound 323. 
4 T M Ko and others., ‘Selective reduction of multiple pregnancies in the first trimester or early second trimester’, (1991) 
90(5) Journal of The Formosan Medical Association = Taiwan Yi Zhi, 493 
5 S K Desai, G N Allahbadia and A K Dalal, ‘Selective reduction of multifetal pregnancies in the first trimester using colour 
Doppler ultrasonography’ (1993) 8(4) Human Reproduction 642. 
6J H Check and others, ‘The effects of multiple gestation and selective reduction on fetal outcome’, (1993) 21(4) Journal 
of Perinatal Medicine 299. 
YEAR Author Study 
type 
Numbers Method/Timing Conclusions/ 
results 
Issues/ other 
1988 Berkowitz et al.
1
 CCS MFPR 3+ >2 
(1 in a single 
case) 
TC aspiration 
& TA injection 
Criteria: 11-12 
weeks, inject 
PC, use TA, 
selection: 
avoid sac over 
internal OS & 
spare 2 
 
1989 Osborn.
2
 LR MFPR where 
1 fetus 
abnormal or 
4+ 
 Timing: 10-12 
weeks, 
selection: 
position, ease 
of location, 
fundal size & 
size of 
embryo. Spare 
2 (dependent 
on height of 
women) 
Screening, 
Use of U/S (& 
issues of 
attachment), 
termination of 
healthy fetus 
against 
background of 
fertility 
treatment, 
nursing 
implications. 
1990 Itskovitz et al.
3
 CCS MFPR TV U/S guided 
reduction 
(aspiration at 
7-8 w & intra 
thoracic 
injection at 9-
11w) 
TV better than 
TA & TC 
approaches 
 
1991 Ko et al.
4
 CCS MFPR to 2 10-14 weeks 
 
 
Acceptable 
method of 
preventing 
high perinatal 
mortality & 
morbidity in 
MP 
 
 
 
1993 Desai et al.
5
 CCS MFPR TC aspiration 
or TA needling 
using black & 
white U/S 
  
1993 Check et al.
6
 CCS MFPR 3+> 2 8 weeks MFPR is a 
reasonable 
therapeutic 
option 
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7 B Brambati and L Tului, ‘First trimester fetal reduction: its role in the management of twin and higher order multiple 
pregnancies’, (1995) 1(4) Human Reproduction Update 397. 
8 H Dechaud and others, ‘First-trimester multifetal pregnancy reduction: Evaluation of technical aspects and risks from 
2,756 cases in the literature’, (1998) 13(5) Fetal diagnosis and therapy 261. 
9 S Lipitz, ‘A comparative study of multifetal pregnancy reduction from triplets to twins in the first versus early second 
trimesters after detailed fetal screening’, (2001) 18(1) Ultrasound in Obstetrics & Gynecology 35. 
10 J, Webb, ‘A case of selective feticide’, (2003) 11(2) British Journal of Midwifery 103. 
11 M Rochon and J Stone, ‘Invasive procedures in multiple gestations’, (2003) 15(2) Current Opinion in Obstetrics and 
Gynecology 167. 
12 Mark I. Evans, D Ciorica and David W. Britt, ‘Do reduced multiples do better?’ (2004) 18(4) Best practice & research 
clinical obstetrics & gynaecology 601. 
13 Mark I. Evans and David W. Britt, ‘Fetal Reduction’, (2005) 29 Seminars Perinatol 321.  
1995 Brambati & Tului
7
 LR MFPR  Suggest 
testing of 
fetus to be 
spared before 
reduction. FR 
is most 
effective 
therapeutic 
option for 
reducing risk 
in MP 
 
1998 Dechaud et al.
8
 LR MFPR 1
st trimester TV approach 
seems safest.  
TC> high fetal 
loss & should 
be excluded 
 
2001 Lipitz et al.
9
 CCS MFPR 3>2  11-12 w & 13-
14w by TA 
injection 
Early 2nd 
trimester 
MFPR from 3 
may allow 
more selective 
termination of 
abnormal 
fetuses w/o 
adverse effect 
 
2003 Webb
10
 CCS Monochorioni
c twins (1 
with 
abnormality) 
  Differential 
reasoning 
between 
mother & HCP 
2003 Rochon & Stone
11
 LR MFPR to 
singletons 
(notes recent 
increase) 
 
 Options now 
available for 
selective 
reduction of a 
monochorioni
c pair 
 
2004 Evans et al.
12
 LR MFPR  MFPR 3+> 2 
shows 
dramatic 
improved 
outcomes. 
2>1 more 
common esp 
40+ women.  
Evidence 
combining 
MFPR with 
CVS testing. 
 
 
2005 Evans & Britt
13
 LR Increase in 
MFPR in 40+ 
women 
 3>2 clearly 
improves 
outcome. 
2> 1 now a 
reasonable 
consideration 
but no expert 
consensus 
Effective 
counseling 
against 
conflicting 
data.  Data 
suggests 
mortality 
lowest for 
twins and 
morbidity for 
singletons 
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14 R C Wimalasundera, ‘Selective reduction and termination of multiple pregnancies’, (2010) 15(6) Seminars in fetal & 
neonatal medicine 327. 
15 S, Balasubramanyam, ‘Knowledge and Attitudes of Women towards Multiple Embryo Transfer, Fetal Reduction and 
Multiple Pregnancy’, (2010) 1(1) International Journal of Infertility & Fetal Medicine 31. 
16 C C Skiadas and others, ‘Spontaneous reduction before 12 weeks' gestation and selective reduction similarly extend 
time to delivery in in vitro fertilization of trichorionic-triamniotic triplets’, (2011) 95(2) Fertility and Sterility 596. 
17 A Antsaklis and E Anastasakis, ‘Selective reduction in twins and multiple pregnancies,’ (2011) 39(1) Journal of Perinatal 
Medicine 15.  
18 P Talwar and others, ‘Embryo reduction: our experience’, (2011) 67(3) Medical Journal Armed Forces India 241 
2009 Wimalasundera
14
 LR MFPR  Evidence 4+>2 
undisputed.   
3>2 still 
significantly 
reduces risk.  
Can do MFPR 
in MC twins. 
 
 
 
MFPR in non-
trichorionic 
triplets 
possible but 
complex & 
complications 
2010 Balasubramanyam
15
 
CCS FR  67% women 
did not regard 
FR as of moral 
concern. 
 
2011 Skiadas et al.
16
 CCS MFPR in 
trichorionic & 
triamniotic 
triplets. 
Comparative 
study of SR of 
1 fetus & 
spontaneous 
reduction 
before 12w. 
 
 
 
Similar 
benefits & 
outcomes. 
 
2011 Antsaklis et al.
17
 LR MFPR 1
st trimester by 
TA injection 
guided by U/S 
of PC into fetal 
heart 
Selection: 
reduce MC 
twins, primary 
criteria is 
proximity to 
abdominal 
wall (reduce 
furthest from 
cervix). Other 
criteria: 
obvious 
abnormality, 
significantly 
smaller crown 
rump and 
abnormal 
nuchal 
translucency. 
 
 
 
 
Controversy 
in reduction in 
triplets & 
twins. 
 
Need patient 
info & 
guidelines 
based on 
expert 
consensus. 
2011 Talwar et al.
18
 CCS MFPR 
3>2 (94%) 
MFPR at 7-8 
weeks (92%) 
by TV U/S 
guided needle 
injection 
Reduced 
perinatal 
morbidity & 
may be 
associated 
with reduced 
perinatal 
mortality. 
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19 A Cameron, Fetal medicine for the MRCOG and beyond (2nd ed, RCOG Press 2011). 
20 F Kuhn-Beck and others, ‘Fetal reduction of triplet pregnancy: One or two?’ (2012) 32(2) Prenatal Diagnosis 122. 
21 C M Legendre and others, ‘Differences between selective termination of pregnancy and fetal reduction in multiple 
pregnancy: a narrative review’ (2013) 26(6) Reproductive Bio-Medicine Online (Elsevier Science) 542. 
22 C M Ogilvie, ‘Multiple pregnancy, fetal reduction and selective termination’, (2013) 26 (6) Reproductive BioMedicine 
Online (Elsevier Science) 52. 
2011 Cameron
19
 LR MFPR & ST TA needle 
injecting PC or 
TV/TC 
aspiration (TV 
associated 
with higher 
loss rate) 
 
 
 
 
Selection 
criteria: 
measure 
nuchal 
translucency, 
reduce those 
with 
abnormality, 
select furthest 
away from 
cervix & 
reduce MC 
twins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Controversy 
3>2 and 3>1 
2012 Kuhn-Beck et al.
20
 CCS MFPR 
 3>2 or 3>1 
MFPR of 
triplets in 
trichorionic 
and triamniotic 
pregnancy 
Reviews 
outcome of 
trichorionic 
triamniotic 
triplets 
reduced to 
twin (136) or 
singletons (44) 
at 10-12 weeks 
gestation. 
Outcome: 
reduction to 1 
rather than 2 
led to 
significantly 
higher term 
delivery rate 
without 
significant 
differences in 
fetal loss rate 
or take-home 
baby rate. 
 
 
2013 Legendre et al.
21
 LR   Considers 
differences 
between 
selective 
termination for 
fetal 
abnormality 
and fetal 
reduction in 
MP. 
 
 
2013 Ogilvie
22
 LR   Responds to 
Legendre 
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23 A Drugan and others, ‘Fetal Reduction in Triplet Gestations: Twins still fare better, (2013) 15(12) Lsr Med Assoc J 745. 
24 Rang Li and others, ‘Retain singleton or twins? Multifetal pregnancy reduction strategies in triplet pregnancies with 
monochorionic twins, (2013) 167(2) Eur J Obstet Gynecol Reprod Biol 146. 
2013 Drugan et al.
23
 CCS MFPR in 
triplet 
pregnancy 
 
No reduction 
vs MFPR to 
twins. 
 
34 opted to 
continue with 
triplet 
pregnancy and 
46 for MFPR to 
twins. 
Outcome: 
mean 
gestational 
age for triplets 
32.3 weeks 
and 35.6 
weeks for 
twins.  Severe 
prematurity 
(before 32 
weeks) in 
37.5% of 
triplets and 7% 
of twins.  The 
rate of 
neonatal 
morbidity and 
death was 
significantly 
higher in the 
unreduced 
triplet group. 
 
 
 
MFPR reduces 
risk of severe 
prematurity 
and neonatal 
morbidity of 
triplets plus 
saving in 
costs.  MFPR 
should be 
offered in 
triplet 
gestations. 
2013 Li et al.
24
 CCS MFPR in 
triplet 
pregnancy 
with 
monochorioni
c twins 
 
Group A (9 
MFPR to 
reduce one 
monochorionic 
twin) 
Group B (26 
MFPR for both 
MC twins) 
 
NB: Control A 
for Group A 
included 
another 18 
cases of TC 
triplet 
reduction to 
twins.  Control 
B for Group B 
included 35 
cases of TC 
triplet 
reductions to 
singletons.  
Reductions all 
at same period 
(6-8 weeks) 
Group A had 
significantly 
more low birth 
weight 
newborns than 
control A 
 
Group B had 
similar 
pregnancy 
outcomes and 
neonatal 
conditions as 
control B 
 
Early abortion 
rate was lower 
in Group A 
than B 
 
Late abortion 
rate was 
higher in 
Group A than 
B 
 
Groups A & B 
did not differ 
significantly in 
premature 
labor rate, 
term birth rate, 
gestation at 
delivery and 
take-home 
baby rate. 
 
Rate of very 
low and low 
birth weight 
significantly 
higher in 
Group A than 
B. 
 
To retain a 
singleton or 
twin in a 
triplet 
pregnancy 
with MC 
twins?  
 
Retaining a 
singleton is 
always the 
best choice 
when deciding 
about using 
MFPR to 
improve 
pregnancy 
outcomes. 
 
Where patient 
strongly 
desires to 
keep twins, 
MFPR in one 
MC twin was 
feasible by 
aspirating 
embryonic 
parts early in 
gestation (6-8 
weeks) with 
no drug 
injection.  
Pregnancy 
outcomes are 
similar with 
twin reduction 
in TC triplet 
pregnancy. 
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25 J Haas and others, ‘Perinatal outcome after fetal reduction from twin to singleton: to reduce or not to reduce’, (2014) 
103(2) Fertility & Sterility 428. 
26 J Haas and others, Pregnancy outcome of early multifetal pregnancy reduction: triplets to twins versus triplets to 
singletons, (2014) 29 Reproductive Biomedicine Online 717. 
27 Mohamed Satti and others, ‘Selective Fetal Reduction Versus Expectant Management in Triplet Pregnancies After IVF-
ET’ (2016) Obstetrics & Gynecology 127: 64S. 
28 Ashutosh Gupta and others, ‘Diachorionic Triamniotic Triplets – Saline Cardiac Tamponade for Fetal Reduction: A 
Novel Approach’, (2016) (3(4) Journal of Fetal Medicine 167.  See also Devika Gunasheela and others, ‘Outcomes of 
Transvaginal multifetal pregnancy reduction without injecting potassium chloride’, (2017) 6(1) IJRCOG ISSN 2320-1770. 
2014
a 
Haas et al.
25
 CCS MFPR 
2>1 
vs no 
reduction 
2>1 compared 
with twin 
pregnancy. 
 
63 reduced 
from 2>1 
(dichorionic/ 
diamniotic) 
vs 62 not 
reduced 
(dichorionic/ 
diamniotic). 
 
MFPR of twins 
is associated 
with lower risk 
of prematurity 
and superior 
perinatal 
outcomes.  
Consider 
where risks 
exceptionally 
high. 
 
 
 
 
2014
b 
Haas et al.
26
 CCS MFPR in 
triplet 
pregnancies 
3>2 vs 3>1 
74 trichorionic 
pregnancies – 
early TV MPFR 
at 6-8 weeks. 
Reduction of 
triplet 
pregnancies to 
singleton 
rather than 
twin 
gestations is 
associated 
with improved 
outcomes 
(later delivery/ 
higher birth 
weight). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 Satti et al.
27
 CCS MFPR in 64 
triplet 
pregnancies 
15 reductions 
vs 49 no 
reduction. 
No significant 
differences in 
maternal BMI, 
gestational 
age at birth, 
incidence of 
pre-term birth 
rate and live 
birth rate post 
viability BUT 
Significant 
difference in 
maternal age 
(older in 
reduction gp) 
and average 
birth weight 
(higher in 
reduction gp). 
 
 
2016 Gupta et al.
28
 CCS DC TA Triplet 
reduction 
using a saline 
cardiac 
tamponade 
 Potassium 
Chloride 
cannot be 
used in a MC 
pregnancy – it 
can endanger 
both fetuses.  
This is a novel 
way of 
reducing 
fetuses with 
common 
placentas 
without 
adverse 
effects on co-
twin. 
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29 Yaniv Zipori and others, ‘Multifetal reduction of triplets to twins compared with non-reduced twins: a meta-analysis’, 
(2017) (35(1) Reproductive BioMedicine Online <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rbmo.2017.04.001 >accessed 29 May 2018. 
30 Yan Liu and others, ‘Effect of selective second- trimester multifetal pregnancy reduction and its timing on pregnancy 
outcome’ (2017) 10(3) Int J Clin Exp Med: 5533. 
31 W T Tse and others, ‘Triplet pregnancy with fetal reduction: experience in Hong Kong’, (2017) 23(4) Hong Kong Medical 
Journal 326. 
32 P Chaveeva and others, ‘Intrafetal laser ablation for embryo reduction from dichorionic triplets to dichorionic twins’, 
(2017) Ultrasound in Obs and Gynae < https://doi.org/10.1002/uog.18834 >accessed 29 May 2018.. 
2017 Zipori et al.
29
 LR MFPR of 
triplet 
pregnancies 
3>2 vs 
unreduced 
twin 
pregnancies 
22 Studies. 
Comparable 
perinatal 
outcomes 
save re 
caesarian 
section rate. 
 
2017 Liu et al.
30
 CCS 302 ART 
conceived 
multiple 
pregnancies 
in China 
4/3>2 vs no 
reduction of 
twin 
pregnancies. 
 
152 triplet or 
quads reduced 
to twins (RT) 
150 non-
reduced twin 
pregnancies 
(NRT) 
 
Used TA FR 
Also, 
comparison 
between FR at 
different 
stages of 
gestation. 
 
Pregnancy 
loss rates 
were 14.5% 
(RT) and 
6.7%(NRT). 
 
Loss rate at 
weeks 16-24 
were 
significantly 
higher than 
12-13 week 
groups. 
Increased risk 
of pregnancy 
loss in RT 
group but 
performing 
MFPR before 
16 weeks 
could reduce 
the risk of 
loss 
significantly. 
2017 Tse et al.
31
 CCS MFPR in 52 
triplet 
pregnancies 
in Hong Kong 
3>2 vs 3>1 vs 
no reduction 
 
22 reduced to 
twins and 4 to 
singletons. 
Mean 
gestation: 
 
No reduction: 
32.6 
3>2: 35.2 
3>1: 39.6 
 
50% of triplet 
pregnancies 
elected to 
undergo FR. 
2017 Chaveeva et al.
32
 CCS DC triplet 
pregnancies 
reduced to 
DC twins by 
laser ablation 
of pelvic 
vessels of 
one of MC 
twins 
3>2 
 
FR undertaken 
using intrafetal 
laser ablation 
in 61 DC triplet 
pregnancies at 
11 to 14 (+3) 
weeks 
gestation. 
MC co-twin 
died in 28 
cases within 2 
weeks. Of 
those, 27 had 
a liveborn 
singleton. 
 
In the DC 
group of 33 (Ie 
with live DC 
twins left), 
there was one 
miscarriage at 
16 weeks, one 
neonatal death 
after delivery 
at 26 weeks 
and then 31 
live births at a 
median 
gestational 
age of 35.3. 
 
 
Approximately 
50% of these 
procedures 
resulted in the 
death of the 
MC co-twin. 
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33 Neda Razaz and others, ‘Perinatal outcomes in multifetal pregnancy following fetal reduction’, (2017) 189(18) CMAJ: 
E652. 
34 Mohamed S. Abdelhafez, Mahmoud M. Abdelrazik and Ahmed Badawy, ‘Early fetal reduction to twin versus 
prophylactic cervical cerclage for triplet pregnancies conceived with assisted reproductive techniques’ (2018) 57(1) 
Taiwanese J of Obs and Gynae: 95. 
35 Yaqiong Liu and others, ‘Clinical outcomes of multifetal pregnancy reduction in trichorionic and dichorionic triplet 
pregnancies: A retrospective observation study’, (2019) 58 Taiwanese Journal of Obstetrics & Gynecology 133. 
2017 Razaz et al.
33
 CCS MFPR in 
triplet or twin 
pregnancy in 
Canada 
>2 / 1 vs no 
reduction 
 
95 underwent 
FR (45 to twin 
and 50 to 
singleton) 
No significant 
difference in 
rate of serious 
morbidity or 
perinatal death 
(save in ART 
induced 
pregnancies) 
 
But FR (in 
both groups) 
was 
associated 
with 
substantial 
improvements 
in several 
other perinatal 
outcomes 
such as 
preterm birth 
and low birth 
weight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2018 Abdelhafez et al.
34
 CCS Triplet (ART) 
pregnancies  
Reduction to 
twins vs those 
managed with 
cervical 
cerclage 
 
53 TV FR vs 65 
cervical 
cerclage 
Pregnancy 
duration 
significantly 
longer with FR 
(and 
incidences of 
delivery 
between 32-34 
weeks 
gestation 
significantly 
lower with FR).  
 
Miscarriage 
and live birth 
rates were 
comparable. 
 
 
 
TV FR of 3>2 
leads to 
improved 
obstetric 
outcomes as it 
decreases 
prematurity 
and related 
morbidity and 
mortality 
without 
increase in 
miscarriage 
rate. 
 
 
 
 
2019 Liu et al.
35
 CCS Triplet 
pregnancies 
3 groups – 
MFPR to 
singleton (22 
TC/22 DC), 
MFPR to twins 
(610 TC/ 50 DC) 
and expectant 
mothers (40 
TC/ 17 DC)). 
The groups 
with MFPR 
had better 
pregnancy and 
perinatal 
outcomes.  
The singleton 
group had 
higher birth 
weight and 
elder 
gestational 
age in DC and 
TC 
pregnancies. 
 
 
 
For DC 
triplets, 
reduction to 
singleton is 
recommended
. But if 
keeping MC 
twins, 
reduction of 
single fetus = 
acceptable 
outcomes. 
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(Table 2A)  
 
36 Xinlu Meng and others, ‘Forty-five consecutive cases of complicated monochorionic multiple pregnancy treated with 
microwave ablation: a single-center experience’, (2019) Prenatal Diagnosis DOI.org/10.1002/pd.5423. 
37 M S. Kim and others, ‘Procedural and obstetric outcomes after embryo reduction’ (2019) 53(2) Ultrasound in Obstetrics 
and Gynecology 214. 
2019 Meng et al.
36
 CCS MFPR in MC 
pregnancies 
using 
microwave 
ablation 
40 twins 
5 triplets 
12 cases 
(26.7%) of post 
procedural 
fetal loss. 
 
33 women 
delivered at a 
median 
gestational 
age of 37.6 
weeks. 
 
No evidence of 
injury/ 
neurological 
anomaly in 
surviving co-
twin. 
 
 
 
 
Microwave 
ablation 
appears safe 
and effective 
in complicated 
MC 
pregnancies. 
2019 Kim et al.
37
 CCS MFPR to 
twins or 
singleton 
181 
transvaginal 
embryo 
reductions 
(ER) at a mean 
of 7.6 weeks & 
115 
transabdomina
l fetal 
reductions 
(FR) at mean of 
12.9 weeks. 
 
The incident of 
procedure 
related loss, 
miscarriage 
rate and 
overall loss 
rate was lower 
in the FR 
group. 
The FR 
procedure is a 
better and 
safer 
approach to 
reduce 
morbidity and 
mortality in 
multiples. 
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Table 3A – Qualitative Research38 
Author/Year Method Analysis Participants Purpose 
 
Statham et 
al., 200639 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic 15 HCP in 
English NHS fetal 
units 
Decision 
making re 
late 
abortions on 
grounds of 
abnormality 
 
Lipp, 200740 Literature review 
of existing 
research 
Unknown Nurses and 
midwives in UK 
Healthcare 
attitudes to 
abortion 
 
Britt & 
Evans, 
200741 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Comparative 54 women 
contemplating 
multi-fetal 
reduction in a US 
Centre 
Decision 
difficulty in 
different 
conceptual 
frameworks 
Graham et 
al., 200942 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic HCP and parents 
in 3 NHS fetal 
units 
Feticide in 
late 
terminations 
Gallagher 
et al., 
201043 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic 9 nurses in 3 
clinics in UK 
Global 
themes: 
“attitudes 
towards 
abortion” 
and coping 
(roles, 
patients, late 
abortions) 
Nicholson 
et al., 
201044 
Structured 
interviews 
Interpretive 
phenomenol
ogical 
7 gynae nurses 
working in TOP 
services in 
England 
Challenges 
for staff 
working in 
TOP. 
 
38 Also note the ESRC funded research project by Sheelagh McGuiness and the British Pregnancy Advisory Service: 
‘The experience of doctors who provide abortion services in the UK’.   
39 Helen Statham, Wendy Solomou and Jasper B. Green, ‘Late termination of pregnancy: law, policy and decision making 
in four English fetal medicine units’, (2006) 113(12) BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 1402. 
40 Allyson Lipp, ‘A review of termination of pregnancy: prevalent health care professional attitudes and ways of influencing 
them’, (2007) 17(13) Journal of Clinical Nursing 1683. 
41 David W. Britt and Mark I. Evans, ‘Sometimes doing the right thing sucks: Frame combinations and multi-fetal 
pregnancy reduction decision difficulty’, (2007) 65 Social Science & Medicine 2342. 
42 Ruth H. Graham and others, ‘The role of feticide in the context of late termination of pregnancy: a qualitative study of 
health professionals' and parents' views’, (2009) 29 Prenat Diagn 875. 
43 Katie Gallagher, Davinia Porock and Alison Edgley, ‘The concept of nursing in the abortion services’, (2010) 66 Journal 
of Advanced Nursing 849. 
44 J Nicholson, P Slade and J Flethcher, ‘Termination of pregnancy services: Experiences of gynaecological nurses’, 
(2010) 66(10) Journal of Advanced Nursing 2245. 
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Kirkman et 
al., 201145 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Discourse  Pregnant women 
contemplating 
abortion in 
Australia 
 
Patient 
perception of 
fetal status 
Lagan et 
al., 201146 
13 online focus 
groups 
A version of 
thematic 
analysis 
92 women from 
Australia, New 
Zealand and the 
US who had 
accessed the 
internet for 
pregnancy related 
information over a 
3-month period. 
 
To 
understand 
internet use 
in pregnancy 
and its role 
in relation to 
decision-
making 
Astbury 
Ward et al., 
201247 
Semi -structured 
interviews 
Unknown 17 Pregnant 
women 
undergoing 
abortion in 2 UK 
NHS Trust clinics 
Experiences 
influenced 
by perceived 
social 
attitudes 
 
 
Menezes et 
al., 201348 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic 40 HCP in 
Australian fetal 
units 
Emotional 
response of 
working with 
couples viz 
risk of fetal 
abnormality 
 
Kelland & 
Ricciardelli
, 201449 
 
Interviews Thematic 
 
41 Canadian 
mothers of 
multiples (twins 
and triplets) 
To explain 
how 
decision-
making is 
based on 
medical and 
non-medical 
reasoning. 
 
 
 
 
 
45 Maggie Kirkman and others, ‘Abortion is a difficult solution to a problem: A discursive analysis of interviews with women 
considering or undergoing abortion in Australia’, (2011) 34(2) Women's Studies International Forum 121. 
46 Briege M. Lagan, Marlene Sinclair and W. George Kernohan, ‘What is the impact of the Internet on Decision-Making in 
Pregnancy? A Global Study’ (2018) 38(4) Birth 336. 
47 Edna Astbury-Ward, Odette Parry and Ros Carnwell, ‘Stigma, Abortion, and Disclosure – Findings from a Qualitative 
Study’, (2012) 9 IJ Sex Med 3137. 
48 Melody A. Menezes and others, 'Taking Its Toll': The Challenges of Working in Fetal Medicine. (2013) 40(1) Birth: 
Issues in Perinatal Care 52. 
49 Jennifer Kelland and Rosemary Ricciardelli, ‘Mothers of Multiple Perspectives on Fetal Reduction and Medical 
Abortion’, (2014) 5(2) J Motherhood Initiative for Research and Community 123. 
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Richards et 
al., 201550 
Semi-structured  Thematic 14 UK mothers 
who had 
experienced 
pregnancy loss 
and had a 
surviving twin 
To obtain 
mothers’ 
perspectives 
on the 
perinatal 
loss of a 
twin. 
 
Purcell et 
al.,201651  
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic 37 HCP involved 
in abortion 
provision in NHS 
hospitals in 
Scotland 
Focus on the 
role of 
emotional 
labour, the 
temporality 
of abortion 
work and 
changes in 
provision. 
 
 
Klitzman., 
201652  
Semi-structured 
telephone 
interviews 
Grounded 
theory 
17 physicians, 10 
other health 
providers and 10 
patients all 
involved in ART in 
US 
To obtain 
perspectives 
on the 
challenges 
of fetal 
reduction in 
multiple 
pregnancy. 
 
Richards et 
al., 201653 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic 26 HCPs working 
within a single UK 
NHS hospital 
To obtain 
HCP 
perspectives 
in respect of 
caring for 
parents who 
had lost a 
baby from a 
twin 
pregnancy 
either during 
pregnancy or 
in the 
neonatal 
period. 
 
50 Judy Richards and others, ‘Mothers' perspectives on the perinatal loss of a co-twin: A qualitative study’ (2015) 15 BMC 
Pregnancy & Childbirth: 143. 
51 Carrie Purcell and others, ‘The changing body work of abortion: A qualitative study of the experiences of health care 
professionals’, (2016) Sociology of Health and Illness ISSN 0141-9889:1. 
52 Robert L. Klitzman, ‘Reducing the number of foetuses in a pregnancy: providers’ and patients’ views of challenges’, 
(2016) 31(11) Human Reproduction 2570. 
53 Judy Richards and others, ‘Health professionals' perspectives on bereavement following loss from a twin pregnancy: 
A qualitative study’ (2016) 36 Journal of Perinatology 529. 
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Lotto et al., 
201654 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Constant 
comparative 
18 parents in 4 
UK fetal medicine 
units (10 women 
and 8 partners) 
Experiences 
of parents in 
4 UK fetal 
medicine 
units 
following a 
decision to 
terminate a 
pregnancy 
affected by 
severe 
congenital 
anomaly. 
 
Lafarge et 
al., 201755 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic 15 HCP in 3 
English Hospitals 
 
Are HCP 
perspectives 
of women’s 
coping with 
termination 
for fetal 
anomaly 
congruent 
with 
maternal 
accounts? 
 
 
Meaney et 
al., 201756  
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Phenomenol
ogical  
9 Irish (ROI) 
parents who had 
experienced 
perinatal loss in 
twin pregnancy 
with a diagnosis 
of congenital 
abnormality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exploring 
parental 
perspectives 
of loss 
following 
diagnosis of 
congenital 
abnormality. 
 
54 Robyn Lotto, Natalie Armstrong and Lucy K. Smith, ‘Care provision during termination of pregnancy following diagnosis 
of a severe congenital anomaly - A qualitative study of what is important to parents’, (2016) 43 Midwifery 14. 
55 Caroline Lafarge and others, ‘Pregnancy termination for fetal abnormality: Are health professionals' perceptions of 
women's coping congruent with women's accounts?’, (2017) 17(1) BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth 60.   
56Sarah Meaney, Paul Corcoran and Keelin O’Donoghue, ‘Death of One Twin during the Perinatal Period: An 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis’, (2017) 20(3) Journal of Palliative Medicine < 
https://doi.org/10.1089/jpm.2016.0264 >accessed 29 May 2018. 
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MacFarlane 
et al., 
201757 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Content and 
thematic 
14 adult women 
who had obtained 
abortion care in 
Istanbul on/ after 
1 January 2009. 
 
To assess 
recent 
experiences 
in light of 
political 
rhetoric and 
threatened 
legislative 
changes  
restricting 
abortion in 
Turkey. 
Lotto et al., 
201758 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Constant 
comparative 
 
22 HCP across 4 
tertiary UK fetal 
medicine centres. 
To obtain 
HCP 
perspectives 
of parental 
decision-
making (re 
severe 
congenital 
anomaly). 
 
Crowe et 
al., 201859 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic 23 UK HCP 
perspectives of 
termination for 
non-lethal fetal 
anomaly. 
 
To obtain 
HCP 
perspectives 
around the 
issue of 
termination 
of pregnancy 
for non-lethal 
anomaly. 
 
Lee et al., 
201860 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Thematic 14 UK HCP 
involved in 
abortion provision 
& policy/ service 
development. 
To obtain 
perspectives 
of practice & 
law. 
(Table 3A) 
  
 
57 Katrina A. MacFarlane and others, “‘It was as if society didn’t want a woman to get an abortion”: a qualitative study in 
Istanbul, Turkey’, (2017) 95(2) Contraception 154. 
58 Robyn Lotto, Lucy K. Smith and Natalie Armstrong, ‘Clinicians’ perspectives of parental decision-making following 
diagnosis of a severe congenital anomaly: a qualitative study’, (2017) 7 BMJ Open e014716. 
59 Lisa Crowe and others, ‘Negotiating acceptable termination of pregnancy for non-lethal fetal anomaly: a qualitative 
study of professional perspectives’, (2018) 8(3) BMJ Open e020815,  
<http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjopen/8/3/e020815.full.pdf >accessed 31 May 2018. 
60 Ellie Lee, Sally Sheldon Sheldon and Jan Macvarish, ‘The 1967 Abortion Act fifty years on: Abortion, medical authority 
and the law revisited.’ (2018) 212 Social Science and Medicine 26,<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.07.010 
>accessed 18 May 2019 
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Appendix F – Recommendations, Codes and Guidance 
Table 4A – Recommendations, Codes and Guidance 
Body 
 
Instrument/ Comment Recommendations/ Instruction 
International 
Bodies 
 
  
FIGO Ethical Recommendations 
on Multiple Pregnancy and 
Multifetal Reduction.61 
 
Multiple pregnancy involves 
great danger for the woman’s 
health and her fetuses, which 
are likely to be delivered 
prematurely with a high risk 
of either dying or suffering 
damage. 
 
Multifetal reduction is not 
medically considered as 
terminating that pregnancy 
but rather as a procedure to 
secure its best outcome. 
Clinical priority should by way of 
careful planning and monitoring of 
infertility treatment for the 
reduction or avoidance of multiple 
pregnancies. However, where 
such pregnancies arise, it may be 
considered ethically preferable to 
reduce the number of fetuses 
rather than to do nothing. 
 
Information provided must include 
the risks to mothers and fetuses 
with and without fetal reduction, 
including miscarriage. Whether 
the couple decide to maintain or 
to reduce high order multiple 
pregnancies, they should be 
assured that they will receive the 
best available medical care. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of Human Reproduction and Woman’s Health, ‘Ethical Recommendations on 
Multiple Pregnancy and Multifetal Reduction’, (2006) 92 Int J of Gynecologists and Obstetricians 331. 
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ACOG Committee Opinion on 
Multi Fetal Pregnancy 
Reduction.62 
 
Fellows should be aware that 
multifetal pregnancies 
increase both maternal and 
perinatal morbidity and 
mortality. High-order 
multifetal pregnancies 
present higher risks than do 
twin pregnancies. 
 
Nondirective patient 
counseling should be 
provided to all women with 
high-order multifetal 
pregnancies. Resources for 
providing such counseling 
include maternal-fetal 
medicine specialists, 
neonatologists, mental health 
professionals, child 
development specialists, 
support groups, and 
clinicians with expertise in 
multifetal pregnancy 
reduction. 
 
Respect for autonomy – only 
the patient can weigh the 
relative importance of the 
medical, ethical, religious, 
and socioeconomic factors 
and determine the best 
course of action for her 
unique situation. 
 
“Selective reduction is 
somewhat different from that 
of multifetal pregnancy 
reduction. In multifetal 
pregnancy reduction, the 
fetus(es) to be reduced are 
chosen on the basis of 
technical considerations, 
such as which is most 
accessible to intervention. In 
selective reduction, fetuses 
are chosen on the basis of 
health status.”63 
 
Fertility treatments have 
contributed significantly to the 
increase in multifetal pregnancies. 
Strategies to limit multifetal 
pregnancies, especially high-
order multifetal pregnancies, 
should be practiced by all 
physicians who treat women for 
infertility. 
 
Fellows should be knowledgeable 
about the medical risks of 
multifetal pregnancy, the potential 
medical benefits of multifetal 
pregnancy reduction, and the 
complex ethical issues inherent in 
decisions regarding the use of 
multifetal pregnancy reduction. 
They should be prepared to react 
in a professional and ethical 
manner to patients who request or 
decline to receive information, or 
intervention, or both. 
 
Recognises the ethical concerns 
around reduction on the basis of 
fetal sex and in twin to singleton 
pregnancies. 
 
62 American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee Opinion on Multi Fetal Pregnancy Reduction (2017.) 
<https://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Multifetal-Pregnancy-
Reduction >accessed 21 June 2017. 
63 Ibid. 
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Representative 
Bodies 
 
Instrument/ Comment Recommendations/ Instruction 
British Medical 
Association 
Law and Ethics of 
Abortion.64 
“Selective termination to be 
justifiable where the procedure is 
recommended for medical 
reasons … Where there are no 
medical indications for aborting 
particular fetuses, the choice 
should be a random one.”65 
Royal College of 
Obstetricians 
and 
Gynaecologists 
Fetal Awareness: Review 
of Research and 
Recommendations for 
Practice.66 
 
 
Termination of pregnancy 
for fetal abnormality.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple pregnancy: the 
management of twin and 
triplet pregnancies in the 
antenatal period (NICE 
Clinical Guideline).68  
 
 
The care of women 
requesting induced 
abortion.69 
 
 
Monochorionic Twin 
Pregnancy Management 
2016 (Green Top Guideline 
51).70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Selective feticide “will only be 
lawful if one of the four statutory 
grounds is satisfied.  Most 
specialists in this area believe that 
the continuation of multiple 
pregnancies could involve a 
greater risk to the woman than the 
termination of one of the foetuses 
and Ground 1(1)(a) is usually 
relied upon in pregnancies of 
under 24 weeks of gestation.”71 
 
 
 
NB. EXPRESSLY EXCLUDES 
EMBRYO REDUCTION FROM 
REMIT (no relevant changes are 
proposed in the 2019 
consultation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Prior to invasive testing or in the 
context of twins discordant by 
abnormality, selective reduction 
should be discussed and made 
 
64 BMA, The Law and Ethics of Abortion: BMA Views (BMA November 2014 (updated October 2018)). 
65 Ibid., 9. 
66 RCOG, Fetal Awareness: Review of Research and Recommendations for Practice (RCOG 2010a). 
67 RCOG, Termination of pregnancy for fetal abnormality (RCOG 2010b). 
68 RCOG, Multiple pregnancy: the management of twin and triplet pregnancies in the antenatal period (NICE Clinical 
Guideline) (RCOG 2011a); NICE CG129.  See also NICE, Twin and Triplet Pregnancy (CG129 Guideline Update) – Draft 
for Consultation (NICE 2019). 
69 RCOG, The care of women requesting induced abortion (RCOG 2011b). 
70 RCOG, Monochorionic Twin Pregnancy Management (Green Top Guideline 51) (RCOG 2016). 
71 RCOG (n67), 5 (emphasis added). 
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available for those requesting the 
procedure after appropriate 
counselling.”72 
 
“Selective feticide by intravascular 
injection is not an option in (MC) 
pregnancies because of the 
presence of placental 
anastomoses.  The potential risks 
of intrafetal/umbilical cord ablative 
procedures should be discussed 
prospectively, including the risk of 
co-twin loss and neurological 
morbidity.”.73 
 
“The consensus views 
…recommend that selective 
reduction should be discussed in 
all high order pregnancies”.74 
 
Royal College of 
Nursing 
Termination of Pregnancy: 
An RCN nursing 
framework.75 
“When a woman has a triplet or 
higher order pregnancy, all the 
issues associated with fetal 
reduction should be discussed in 
depth to ensure she is able to 
make a fully-informed decision”.76 
 
Guidance appears to differentiate 
fetal reduction (also described as 
embryo reduction or selective 
reduction) from selective feticide 
“if a fetus in a multiple pregnancy 
has major abnormalities”.77 
 
The guidance assesses the risk of 
losing the pregnancy after a fetal 
reduction at “about 5% for triplets, 
8% for quadruplets and 11% for 
quintuplets”78 but oddly makes no 
allowance for gestational stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 RCOG (n70), e8. See also e7, 25, 27 and 33. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., e32. 
75 Royal College of Nursing (RCN), Termination of Pregnancy: An RCN nursing framework (RCN 2017). 
76 Ibid., 10. 
77 Ibid., 11. 
78 Ibid. 
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Professional 
Regulators 
 
Instrument/ Comment Recommendations/ Instruction 
General Medical 
Council 
Good Medical Practice.79  
 
 
 
Confidentiality: Good 
Practice in Handling 
Patient Information.80 
 
 
 
Decision making and 
consent: Supporting 
patient choices about 
health and care, Draft 
guidance for 
consultation.81  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Serious or persistent failure to 
follow this guidance that poses a 
risk to patient safety or public trust 
in doctors will put your registration 
at risk” but “there is no automatic 
link between failure to follow this 
guidance and action against your 
registration…because the 
guidance sets out the principles of 
good practice, not thresholds for 
taking action”.82 
 
“Doctors have an ethical and legal 
responsibility to involve patients 
as much as possible in making 
decisions about their own health 
and care”.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 Updated April 2019. 
80 2017. 
81 2018 
82 Ibid., 3. 
83 Ibid., 4. 
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System 
Regulators 
 
Instrument/ Comment Recommendations/ Instruction 
Department of 
Health and 
Social Care 
(formerly 
Department of 
Health) 
Guidance in relation to 
requirements of the 
Abortion Act 1967.84   
 
Procedures for the 
Approval of Independent 
Sector Places for the 
Termination of 
Pregnancy.85  
 
Matching Department of 
Health Abortion 
Notifications and Data from 
the National Down’s 
Syndrome Cytogenetic 
Register and 
recommendations for 
improving notification 
compliance.86  
This does not explicitly address 
fetal reduction. 
 
 
This has little relevance for fetal 
reduction per se. 
 
 
 
 
This addresses notification 
compliance issues. Fetal 
reductions and selective 
terminations are subject to greater 
scrutiny by the DHSC at the ex 
post stage, although the specific 
focus/ concern, appears to be on 
selective late terminations on the 
grounds of anomaly.87  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 Department for Health, Guidance in relation to requirements of the Abortion Act 1967 (DOH 2014a). 
85 Department for Health, Procedures for the Approval of Independent Sector Places for the Termination of Pregnancy 
(DOH 2014b). 
86 Department for Health, Matching Department of Health Abortion Notifications & Data from the National Down’s 
Syndrome Cytogenetic Register & recommendations for improving notification compliance (DOH 2014d). 
87 See Department of Health, Detailed guidance note for completing the abortion notification form HSA4 for abortions 
performed in England & Wales (DOH 2013a); Department of Health, Guidance Note for completing abortion notification 
form HSA 4 (England & Wales) (DOH 2013b); Department of Health, Summary Guidance note for completing the abortion 
notification form HSA4 for Abortions performed in England & Wales (DOH 2013c). 
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National 
Institute for 
Health and 
Care 
Excellence 
(NICE) 
NICE Quality Standard 
(QS46)88 
 
(Core statements for the 
treatment of women with a 
multiple pregnancy): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Women with a multiple 
pregnancy have the 
chorionicity90 and amnionicity91 
of their pregnancy determined 
using ultrasound and recorded 
between 11 weeks 0 days and 
13 weeks 6 days.  
• Women with a multiple 
pregnancy have their foetuses 
labelled using ultrasound and 
recorded between 11 weeks 0 
days and 13 weeks 6 days.  
• Women with a multiple 
pregnancy are cared for by a 
multidisciplinary core team.  
• Women with a multiple 
pregnancy have a care plan 
that specifies the timing of 
appointments with the 
multidisciplinary core team 
appropriate for the chorionicity 
and amnionicity of their 
pregnancy.  
• Women with a multiple 
pregnancy are monitored for 
foetal complications according 
to the chorionicity and 
amnionicity of their pregnancy.  
• Women with a higher-risk or 
complicated multiple 
pregnancy have an 
obstetrician from a tertiary 
level foetal medicine centre 
involved in their care.  
• Women with a multiple 
pregnancy have a discussion 
by 24 weeks with one or more 
members of the 
multidisciplinary core team 
about the risks, signs and 
symptoms of preterm labour 
and possible outcomes of 
preterm birth. 
• Women with a multiple 
pregnancy have a discussion 
by 32 weeks with one or more 
members of the 
multidisciplinary core team 
about the timing of birth and 
possible modes of birth so that 
a birth plan can be agreed. 
 
88 NICE Quality Standard (QS46): Multiple pregnancy: twin and triplet pregnancies 
<https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/qs46/resources/multiple-pregnancy-twin-and-triplet-pregnancies-2098670068933 
>accessed 11 April 2017. 
90 Number of placentas. 
91 Number of amniotic sacks. 
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NICE Guidance (CG129)89   
 
 
 
Referrals to tertiary fetal medicine 
centres in the following 
circumstances: 
• monochorionic monoamniotic 
twin pregnancies 
• monochorionic monoamniotic 
triplet pregnancies 
• monochorionic diamniotic 
triplet pregnancies 
• dichorionic diamniotic triplet 
pregnancies 
• pregnancies complicated by 
any of the following: 
o discordant fetal growth 
o fetal anomaly 
o discordant fetal death 
o feto-fetal transfusion 
syndrome. 
 
NHS Standard Contract for Fetal 
Medicine92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NHS RightCare Shared 
Decision-Making 
Programme93 
• Provides for the creation of 
specialist fetal medicine services 
that will handle invasive 
procedures relating to termination 
of pregnancy (including multifetal 
pregnancy reduction, feticide 
(selective or otherwise). 
 
 
“Shared Decision Making is where 
individuals and clinicians work 
together to understand and 
decide what tests, treatments, 
management or support packages 
are most suitable bearing in mind 
the persons individual 
circumstances. It brings together 
the individual’s expertise about 
themselves and what is important 
to them together with the 
clinician’s knowledge about what 
is known about the benefits and 
risks of the available options.” 
 
Challenges include low health 
literacy and the professional 
perspective.  
 
 
89 NICE Clinical Guideline (CG129) Multiple pregnancy: antenatal care for multiple pregnancy: antenatal care for twin and 
triplet pregnancies twin and triplet pregnancies (short version of the RCOG 2011a), < 
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg129/resources/multiple-pregnancy-antenatal-care-for-twin-and-triplet-pregnancies-
35109458300869 >accessed 11 April 2017.  For latest, see NICE, Twin and Triplet Pregnancy (CG129 Guideline Update) 
– Draft for Consultation (NICE 2019) and NICE, Termination of Pregnancy – NICE Guideline – Draft for Consultation 
(NICE April 2019). 
92 NHS England E12/S/a 2013 p6 
93 NHS England, Shared Decision Making Programme<https://www.england.nhs.uk/rightcare/useful-links/shared-
decision-making/ >accessed 20 June 2018. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AA 1967 – Abortion Act 1967 
ACOG – American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
BJOG – An International Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
BMA – British Medical Association 
BMJ – British Medical Journal 
BMFMS - British Maternal and Fetal Medicine Society 
CCS – Clinical Case Study 
CDCLA – Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976. 
CICA – Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority 
CQC – Care Quality Commission 
DA – Diamniotic pregnancy 
DC – Dichorionic pregnancy 
DOH – Department of Health  
DHSC - Department of Health and Social Care 
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (Council of Europe) 
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights 
ER – Embryo reduction 
FIGO – International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics 
FR – Fetal reduction 
GMC – General Medical Council 
HCP – Healthcare professional 
HCProv – Healthcare provider 
HFEA – Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act(s) 
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ILPA 1929 – Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 
IUGR - Intrauterine growth restriction 
LR – Literature Review 
MC – Monochorionic pregnancy 
MFPR – Multi fetal pregnancy reduction 
MP – Multiple pregnancy 
MPTS - Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service  
NDSCR – National Down Syndrome Cytogenetic Register 
NICE – National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
NIHR – National Institute for Health Research 
NHS – National Health Service 
OAPA 1861 – Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
OUP – Oxford University Press 
PSA – The Professional Standards Authority 
RCOG – Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
RCP - Royal College of Physicians 
TA – Transabdominal 
TAP – Triamniotic pregnancy 
TC – Transcervical 
TCP – Trichorionic pregnancy 
TFA – Termination for fetal anomaly 
TOG – The Obstetrician and Gynaecologist 
TOP – Termination of pregnancy 
TTTS – Twin to twin transfusion syndrome 
TAPS – Twin anaemia polycythemia sequence 
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TRAPS – Twin reversed arterial perfusion sequence. 
TV – Transvaginal 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Abortion – this term is used to describe non-spontaneous terminations of pregnancy.   
Amniocity – the number of amniotic sacs. Shared amniotic sacs are called 
monoamniotic. Two amniotic sacs are called Diamniotic and three are called 
Triamniotic and so on. 
Bodily autonomy – “the freedom to act upon choices made by a person with decision-
making capacity which relate to the human body”.1 
Decision-making - a process resulting in the selection of a course of action (choices) 
from several alternative possibilities.  In our context, this includes the process of 
communicating choices to others. 
Dichorionic twin pregnancy – each embryo has its own placenta. 
Dichorionic/ diamniotic twin pregnancy – each embryo has their own placenta and 
amniotic sac. 
Embryo or fetal reduction – a specific term used to denote the termination of one or 
more embryos or fetuses usually in a multiple pregnancy. 
Monochorionic twin pregnancy – these have monozygotic (identical) twin embryos 
sharing the same placenta. 
Monochorionic/ diamniotic twin pregnancy – the twins share a placenta but have 
separate amniotic sacs. 
Monochorionic/ monoamniotic twin pregnancy – the twins share a placenta and 
amniotic sac. 
Monochorionic multiples - where the placenta is shared by more than two twins. 
Morbidity – a state of illness, disease, anomaly, impairment or ill health. 
Mortality – another term for death. 
Regulation – we have framed this broadly as an attempt to alter the behaviour of 
others with the intention of producing certain outcomes or goals. 
Transabdominal – across the abdominal wall or through the abdominal cavity. 
 
1 This is replicated from Elizabeth Wicks, The State and the Body: Legal Regulation of Bodily Autonomy (Hart 2016), 4. 
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Transcervical – through the cervical opening of the uterus. 
Transvaginal – across or through the vagina. 
Trichorionic pregnancy – triplet pregnancy and each embryo has their own placenta. 
Trichorionic / triamniotic pregnancy – triplet pregnancy and each embryo has their 
own placenta and amniotic sac. 
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